The Trump Coalition

A Council on Foreign Relations study group convened scholars and political analysts to examine the foreign policy views of several groups of 2024 Donald Trump voters: Hispanic, Black, Jewish, Muslim, evangelical, and white working-class Americans who supported Trump in that year’s election.

The group found that Republican voters still support U.S. global leadership and military strength, as defined by the party since the era of President Ronald Reagan, though they are more wary of alliances and of democracy promotion.

For white working-class voters, religion was key: evangelicals were much more likely to vote for Trump in 2024 than non-evangelicals. They did not consider foreign policy a central issue but one mixed with economic security matters, and they widely believe that immigration takes jobs from Americans, leading them to support lower immigration levels and a closed border. Spending overseas (on foreign aid, for example, but also on military involvements) is also unpopular due to the fear that it takes funds away from the safety net here at home.

Jewish voters were a minor part of the Trump voting coalition; 29 percent of Jewish voters supported him. In future elections, more Jewish Americans may become swing voters due to growing antisemitic actions in the United States and growing hostility to Israel in parts of the Democratic Party coalition.

Muslim voters were unique among all cohorts the study group examined: foreign policy was their primary concern. When asked whether a candidate must share their views on an issue to earn their vote, Muslim voters said no on most issues—but yes on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The American Muslim community is religiously and socially conservative, which might favor Republicans, but anxious about its security and inclusion, which might favor Democrats. 

Latino voters have historically favored Democrats, but in 2024 they split evenly between Kamala Harris and Trump—a sharp departure. Whether that shift will prove durable is the central political question. Many Hispanic citizens have relatives who are undocumented or living under temporary protection, making immigration policy—the very tough enforcement actions of the Trump administration—the one issue related to foreign policy that is most likely to move Hispanic voters.

Immigration was also the top foreign-policy-linked concern among Black Trump voters, who were mostly male. The historian Christopher Shell told the study group this was connected to a “growing nativist impulse” among some Black Americans, one that Trump appealed to with the claim that undocumented immigrants are “taking Black jobs.” For Black working-class voters in particular, the issues of economic security and immigration have become intertwined.

The study group concluded that even voters who are “not foreign policy voters” often have strong views on issues related to foreign policy, and choices they make will affect U.S. foreign policy in the coming years. The coalition of voters who supported Trump in 2024 is very unlikely to be reassembled in the 2028 election, and foreign policy issues are among the keys to how voters will swing in that contest.

The coalition that elected President Donald Trump in 2024 was, like many presidential election coalitions, new. It included higher-than-usual percentages of Black, Hispanic, Jewish, and Muslim voters, alongside consistently high percentages of white working-class and evangelical voters.

Over the past year, a study group at the Council on Foreign Relations brought together scholars and political analysts to examine that coalition. The discussions addressed what explained it, whether it will hold in 2026 and 2028, and what it means for U.S. foreign policy. Specifically, they considered whether foreign policy was a key factor in how those groups voted and whether their views will shape future elections and U.S. foreign policy. What follows is an amalgam of those views.

The voter coalition that delivered Trump’s 2024 victory was unique—distinct from his 2016 coalition and unlikely to be replicated by the Republican presidential candidate in 2028. The primary political question is whether voters who switched to Trump—particularly Black male, Hispanic, and Muslim citizens—will support Republicans in 2026 or 2028, or whether those “switcher” votes were highly personal and contextual, with little bearing on the party’s future prospects. 

On foreign policy, Republican voters broadly still support the traditional approach—U.S. global leadership and military strength, as defined by the party since the era of President Ronald Reagan. A Vandenberg Coalition poll in March 2026 found that 96 percent of MAGA conservatives and 90 percent of Trump voters overall have confidence in American military power. Vandenberg’s January 2026 poll found that 89 percent of Trump voters thought it was important that “the United States, as opposed to China, Iran, or Russia, remains the strongest country in the world,” and 91 percent agreed that “the world is a safer place with strong, principled American leadership.” The 2026 Reagan Institute Summer Survey similarly found high Republican support for American international engagement—71 percent overall and 76 percent among MAGA Republicans.  

Republicans have long won that group, but Trump exceeded previous margins. Reagan won 56 percent in 1984 and Mitt Romney 57 percent in 2012; Trump reached 62 percent in 2016 and 66 percent in 2024.

More striking than those numbers is the split among white working-class voters between evangelical and non-evangelical voters. In 2024, Trump won roughly 90 percent of working-class (i.e., noncollege) white evangelical men and about 83 percent of women. But he won only about 52 percent of non-evangelical white working-class men and 38 percent of women.

Those large differentials suggest that evangelical identity, more than economic or social status, explains much of the vote. Beyond that central divide, the 2024 returns reveal several additional patterns. Trump improved his showing slightly among white working-class evangelical voters over 2020, while among non-evangelical white working-class voters he gained among men but lost among women (40 percent voted for Trump in 2020, compared with 38 percent in 2024). He also gained among nonwhite working-class voters—among Hispanic men and women, and among Black men, though majorities still voted Democratic.

On the question of whether labor unions affect the voting patterns of white working-class voters, political scientist John DiIulio reminded the study group that only 6 percent of private-sector jobs are now unionized and that many union members are college-educated, female, and nonwhite. He noted that 70 percent of working-class Americans approve of unions even though they are not members of one and suggested that for many voters “union as a concept mainly signals secure, decent, benefit-rich jobs.” Issues related to economic security affect many voters’ foreign policy views, as discussed below. 

For white working-class voters, as for many Americans, foreign policy is usually a minor issue in voting—and overall, those voters are “only modestly different” from other groups, DiIulio concluded. But they are more supportive of Trump policies that they believe directly affect their lives. Among working-class white Americans, 60 percent favor higher trade barriers, versus only 38 percent of college-educated white citizens. Of working-class white voters, 52 percent favor less immigration, versus 34 percent of college-educated white voters.

They are also more likely to favor higher military spending and less likely to endorse U.S. support for Ukraine. Those gaps should not be interpreted as a form of isolationism but rather as support for Trump policies that such voters believe affect their economic security. More than college-educated voters, they believe immigrants take away jobs, leading them to favor lower immigration levels and higher border security. 

Jewish voters make up just over 2 percent of the U.S. population and were a small part of the Trump coalition; they typically lean 70 to 25 toward the Democratic presidential candidates. Trump improved on that, winning 29 percent of Jewish voters. Those who voted for Trump skewed heavily Orthodox: 87 percent of Jewish Americans who voted for Trump in 2024 identified as Republican, and the Orthodox community (roughly 10 to 12 percent of all Jewish Americans) skews 64 to 23 Republican over Democrat. The largest denomination, Reform (37 percent of Jewish Americans) is heavily Democratic. By contrast, the Conservative denomination (17 percent) may offer Republicans the greatest opportunity for gain—and Democrats their greatest risk of loss—because 95 percent of Conservative Jewish Americans say caring about Israel is essential to their Judaism.  

Although foreign policy ranks low on most voters’ priority lists, two groups are significant exceptions: Jewish Americans and Muslim Americans, whose concerns are much sharper and more unified. Among Jewish respondents, there is widespread criticism of many Israeli policies, though 85 percent describe themselves as “pro-Israel.” There has also been a dramatic shift from previous generations’ near-unquestioned support for Israel to more divided views; a majority of Jewish Americans, for example, did not approve of U.S. military action against Iran despite the strong support from the Israeli government and close U.S.-Israeli military collaboration against Iran. 

Measuring what Jewish voters think is complicated by the question of who counts as Jewish. For some who answer “yes” when asked by a pollster, Jewish identity is central to their lives—their religion, their community, their connection to Israel. For others, answering “yes” may be the only act of Jewish identification; they have no active religious affiliation or community involvement. Predictably, foreign policy—meaning support for Israel—is an important political matter for those in the first group but not for those in the second. A June 2026 AP-NORC Center Poll [PDF] found that 58 percent of those who answered that they were Jewish in some way said Israel was important to them personally, while 40 percent said it was not. As the poll found,

About 3 in 10 Jews in the U.S. identify as Jewish ethnically, culturally, or by family background even though they report being agnostic, atheist, or unaffiliated when asked about their religion. . . . Religiously affiliated Jews tend to feel more connected to Israel than secular Jews. Forty percent of religious Jews feel very or extremely emotionally attached to Israel compared with only 11% of secular Jews. Forty-five percent of secular Jews do not feel connected to Israel at all. While 48% of religious Jews say supporting Israel is a key part of their Jewish identity, only 12% of secular Jews agree. 

For decades, foreign policy (including support for Israel) ranked low among the concerns of American Jewish voters. That was partly because some of those counted as Jewish by pollsters were disconnected not only from Israel but also from their communities and their own Jewish identities. It was also because in recent years both parties broadly supported the U.S.-Israel relationship. Concern about Israel would not necessarily have suggested voting for Reagan or Walter Mondale in 1984, Bush or John Kerry in 2004, or Biden or Trump in 2020. Jewish Americans told pollsters that support for Israel was “very important” to them yet still ranked it—along with other foreign policy issues—below the usual economic concerns that drive most voters. Jewish voting patterns in that regard, including the roughly 70 to 25 Democratic advantage, have long been stable. 

Muslim voters constitute about 1 percent of the U.S. population, though estimates vary and the U.S. Census does not track religion. The Muslim population is highly diverse, with African, African American, Arab, Hispanic, and South Asian components and no single dominant group. It skews younger than the U.S. population overall, though younger Muslim respondents are as likely as older ones to say that religion is “very important” to them. It is also predominantly an immigrant community: about 75 percent are immigrants or the children of immigrants.

After showing considerable support for Bush in 2000, Muslim voters shifted sharply left: in the 2016 election, 78 percent voted for Hillary Clinton and two-thirds identified as Democrats. That number seemed to dip in 2020, with exit polls suggesting one-third of Muslim citizens voted for Trump in 2020 and two-thirds for Biden. 

But then came Gaza. Many Muslim voters opposed the Biden administration’s support for Israel, and data from the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) suggests that in 2024 the Democratic vote fell to 50 percent, while Trump’s share held steady at roughly one-third and protest votes for Green Party candidate Jill Stein reached 12 percent. The shift away from Kamala Harris was pronounced among Arab, Asian, and white Muslim voters but not among Black Muslim voters: 76 percent of that group supported Harris, compared with only 38 percent of white Muslim voters. A significant gender gap also emerged: Trump won 42 percent of Muslim men but only 17 percent of Muslim women. Overall, the ISPU data showed that only 55 percent of Muslim Americans who voted for Biden in 2020 reported voting for Harris in 2024.

Polls by the political scientist Youssef Chouhoud found that Muslim voters ranked U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East as their top issue, with U.S. foreign policy toward the rest of the world also in the top three. Domestic concerns such as jobs and the economy mattered, but less so. Thus, Muslim voters were unique among all cohorts the study group examined: foreign policy was their primary concern. When asked whether a candidate must share their views on an issue to earn their vote, Muslim voters said no on most issues—but yes on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

An experiment by Chouhoud reinforced that conclusion. All else being equal, Muslim voters were 14 percent more likely to vote for a Muslim candidate, 12 percent more likely to vote for a candidate who favored banning LGBTQ+ materials in schools, and 50 percent more likely to vote for a candidate who supported freezing all aid to Israel. The ISPU polls also found that “the war in Gaza is a shared top policy priority across Harris, Trump, and third-party Muslim voters.”

That leaves Muslim voters without strong confidence in or alignment with either party. When asked which party better aligns with “Muslim values,” a plurality said “neither” or “both the same.” Among those who chose between the parties, more picked Republican—but when asked which party is more concerned with the well-being of Muslim Americans, more picked the Democrats. Chouhoud captured the community’s ambivalence in a pithy formulation: “Democrats are against Islam, but Republicans are against Muslims.” The American Muslim community is religiously and socially conservative, which might favor Republicans, but anxious about its security and inclusion, which might favor Democrats.  

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is clearly the top mobilizing issue today, though it registers more strongly among immigrants and their children than among Black American Muslim voters who are descendants of enslaved people. Less clear is whether that will result in permanent or long-lasting alignment with the Democrats or will fade in importance over time. That question, and the related divide between nonimmigrant Black American Muslim and immigrant Muslim communities, is a key analytic issue in future elections.

Immigration and domestic enforcement constitute a partial exception, as a foreign-policy-adjacent issue that directly affects Latino families and communities. Many Hispanic citizens have relatives who are undocumented or living under temporary protection (through the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy, temporary protected status, humanitarian parole, or with asylum claims) who fear deportation. A Pew Research Center survey found that “52% of Latino adults say they worry a lot or some that they, a family member or a close friend could be deported” and “19% say they have recently changed their day-to-day activities because they think they’ll be asked to prove their legal status in the country.” Those who are directly affected by that unsettled status cannot vote, but their citizen relatives and neighbors can. Immigration policy thus remains the one issue most likely to move Hispanic voters.

Apart from immigration, foreign policy is not a top concern for Latino voters, and its salience appears no greater than for most other Americans. Partisan identity is a far better explanation of Latino positions on issues such as the war in Ukraine, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or China than ethnic background. Even where cultural distinctiveness persists, partisan identity and the primacy of domestic concerns will tend to pull Latino political behavior toward the American mainstream. Immigration is the issue most likely to slow that convergence: aggressive enforcement by the Trump (or any Republican) administration against Latino people in the United States will push Latino voters toward the Democratic Party. Thus, despite being the largest group examined by the study group within the 2024 Trump coalition, Latinos’ impact on U.S. foreign policy is, and will likely remain small—immigration aside. 

Black voters have historically supported Democrats by margins of about 90 to 10, with a historic high for President Barack Obama. In 2024, Trump received about 15 percent of the Black vote—nearly double his 8 percent share in 2020, and the largest Republican share since Richard Nixon in 1960. That shift, however, did not reflect a mass partisan realignment. Trump’s larger percentage owes more to depressed Democratic turnout among 2020 Biden voters and to new or previously ineligible Black voters than to wholesale defection. A significant gender gap was also evident: Trump won the votes of roughly 10 percent of Black women and 21 percent of Black men. Foreign-born Black voters (from Africa or the Caribbean) showed greater propensity to support Trump than did U.S.-born Black voters or U.S.-born children, a reminder of the diversity within the Black community that immigration since 1965 has produced. In 2024 preelection surveys, 30 percent of foreign-born Black men reported supporting Trump, compared with 11 percent of U.S. born and 10 percent of their second-generation children.

As with nearly all voters, domestic issues—particularly the economy and health care—ranked highest in importance. According to a 2024 Carnegie election poll, however, immigration was the top foreign-policy-linked concern among Black Trump voters.

The historian Christopher Shell told the study group this was connected to a “growing nativist impulse” among some Black Americans, one that Trump appealed to with the claim that undocumented immigrants are “taking Black jobs.” For Black working-class voters in particular, economic security and immigration have thus become intertwined concerns. On the question of whether undocumented immigrants should be permitted to remain in the United States, Black voters showed a substantial partisan gap—31 percentage points separated Black Harris voters (more permissive) from Black Trump voters (more restrictive)—yet Black Trump supporters were less restrictive than white Trump supporters, and Black Harris voters were more restrictive than white Harris voters. Roughly a third of Black Trump voters favored a path for undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States.  

When it comes to the top foreign policy issues of 2024, the same pattern is also visible. On Gaza, Black supporters of both Harris and Trump clustered near the middle: roughly half of each group favored applying more pressure on Israel.

The median Black voter may be more centrist on those issues than the voices of outspoken activists suggest. A similar pattern holds on China: Black Trump and Harris voters showed relative consensus, with roughly half of each group favoring close U.S.-China cooperation on trade, climate, and security matters.

On Ukraine, two broader concerns emerge: the sense that foreign wars divert resources from domestic needs (the guns-versus-butter trade-off) and sensitivity to Black casualties in the conflict. Black Harris voters are consequently less supportive of aid to Ukraine than white Harris supporters. Overall, according to an election poll by the Economist, 59 percent of Black Americans disapproved of Trump’s Ukraine policy in late 2025 polling, and only 14 percent approved.

Shell noted a long-standing skepticism of U.S. military intervention abroad within the Black community, rooted partly in economic insecurity, partly in the influence of the Black left, and partly in the fact that although Black Americans constitute 14 percent of the U.S. population, they make up roughly 30 percent of the enlisted ranks in the military. Shell suggested that these tendencies are deeply rooted and likely to persist, especially among descendants of enslaved people. Whether they will characterize the views of newer African and Caribbean immigrants and their descendants remains an open question—and a reminder that, as with other minorities, the Black community is more diverse than observers sometimes acknowledge. 

When looking at the Trump coalition of 2024 from the foreign policy perspective, domestic issues—especially the economy—were far more important in determining how most voters cast their ballots. That is typically the case in national elections, and in that sense the composition of the 2024 coalition may say little about future influences on U.S. foreign policy.

Foreign policy has not been highly salient to Jewish voters, owing largely to their long-standing loyalty to the Democrats and to decades of bipartisan support for Israel. But that may be changing. Trump’s 29 percent among Jewish voters may not be the high-water mark if the two parties diverge sharply and permanently over support for Israel. Jews are just over 2 percent of the U.S. population, but in several states they could be influential swing votes—if they are in fact available to swing in future elections. That will depend on both U.S. and Israeli policies and leaders and remains unpredictable.

The phrase that became a political touchstone in 1992—“It’s the economy, stupid”—is still an excellent guide to voting patterns. But for some groups of voters, and for many more voters when foreign policy is seen as a success or failure, it is not only the economy.

Fourth, foreign policy is not always easy to define as a voting issue. For many voters it encompasses the effect of overseas commitments on federal spending and family economic security. For Black Americans and working-class white Americans in particular, U.S. involvement in foreign crises raises two distinct fears: that such spending will reduce the ability of the government to provide a safety net and that their communities—disproportionately represented in the U.S. military—will bear the human cost.  

The study group examined whether the groups that constituted the 2024 Trump coalition held foreign policy views strong enough to determine their votes and to shape U.S. policy. Those questions extend to 2028 and beyond: whether Muslim voters, still a small percentage of the overall electorate, will move the Democratic Party on Israel—and if so, whether that will shift Jewish voting patterns; and whether immigration enforcement will turn Hispanic voters into loyal Democrats—or whether a growing Hispanic electorate will reshape those policies. The only firm conclusion is that the 2024 coalition was fluid, and 2028 will look substantially different. Foreign policy is not most voters’ primary concern, but it remains on the ballot.