Social Issues

Radicalization and Extremism

  • United Kingdom
    UK Keynote: A New Approach to Counter-Radicalization
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      This session was part of the symposium, UK and U.S. Approaches in Countering Radicalization: Intelligence, Communities, and the Internetwhich was cosponsored with Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies and King’s College London’s International Centre for the Study of RadicalisationThis event was made possible by Georgetown University's George T. Kalaris Intelligence Studies Fund and the generous support of longtime CFR member Rita E. Hauser. Additionally, this event was organized in cooperation with the CFR’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. JIM LINDSAY:  Good morning, everyone.  I am Jim Lindsay, director of studies here at the Council on Foreign Relations.  On behalf of Richard Haass, the president of CFR, and our partners in today's event, Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, I want to welcome you to our symposium here today:  "United Kingdom and U.S. Approaches in Countering Radicalization." In putting together a conference like the one we have today, we have a big debt of gratitude and thanks to give a number of people.  And I'd like to single them out here.  On behalf of Georgetown University, I would like to thank Thomas Kalaris for his unwavering support for today's symposium and the George T. Kalaris Fund for Intelligence Studies at Georgetown University.  The fund is named in honor of Tom's father, an unsung hero of the U.S. intelligence services.  And the fund invests in the future of intelligence professional and intelligence studies at Georgetown's Center for Peace and Security Studies. CFR would also like to thank longtime member and supporter, Rita Hauser.  Rita is an international lawyer who is deeply involved in intelligence work through her service on the president's Intelligence Advisory Board.  Rita, thank you very much for all your support. I would also like to thank Georgetown University's Bruce Hoffman and Ellen McHugh, Henry Sweetbaum and Peter Neumann of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.  I also owe some thanks to my colleagues here at CFR, led by Ed Husain and Steve Simon.  In addition, it takes a lot of people working in the background to make an event like today happen.  And my colleague Nancy Bodurtha heads up a truly outstanding meetings team here.  So I want to thank Nancy, Chris Tuttle, Emily Mcleod, Jeff Gullo, Allison Blou (sp) and Kate Collins for pulling today's conference together. I have a couple of housekeeping details to go over.  First, today's sessions are all on the record with two exceptions.  The exceptions are session two on "Violent Radicalization -- Key Trends and Developments," and session six, "New Frontiers -- Countering Online Radicalization."  I would also politely request that if you have a BlackBerry, PDA, any other electronic device that sends or receives signals, if you could please turn it off right now so that it will not interfere with our sound system and put out squealing, very painful sounds over the speakers.  So I would appreciate that. Why are we having today's symposium?  The answer is fairly straightforward.  The United States is experiencing a significant increase in violent Islamic extremism, both abroad and at home.  Ongoing events in the Middle East are a cause for concern about the probable rise of Islamic radicalism, at least in the short term. At home, we have more and more instances of Americans either plotting attacks against their fellow Americans or attempting to travel overseas to receive terrorist training.  The Fort Hood shooting in November of 2009 and the near-successful car bombing in Times Square in May, 2010, are the most dramatic illustrations of this trend. We are seeking in today's event to bring together leading officials and experts from the United Kingdom and the United States to take stock, to exchange best practices and to develop fresh ideas for tackling some of the most important issues in the current debate.  And I owe a great debt of gratitude to our British colleagues who traveled a considerable distance to get here this morning.  I only had to take a Metro subway ride.  They had to fly a long way. We are honored to begin today's conversation with a truly distinguished keynote speaker, Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones, the United Kingdom's minister of state, responsible for security and counterterrorism.  Minister Neville-Jones has had a distinguished 30-year career as a diplomat, serving in posts around the world, including the former Rhodesia, Singapore, Washington and Bonn.  She was also seconded to the European Commission.  Minister Neville Jones has held her current position since May of 2010. And with that, I would invite Minister Neville-Jones to come to the podium. MINISTER OF STATE FOR SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES:  Thank you.  (Applause.)  Thank you.  Good morning, everyone.  Thank you very much for that kind introduction.  As has just been noted, I've spent time in my -- in my past, in Washington.  And I just want to say what a pleasure it is to come back.  I think that anybody who has spent time here seldom goes away feeling that they will ever entirely shake off the lure of this town.  And it is -- it is good to be here. And as somebody who, you know, has had some experience in this subject -- and I understand that the administration is likely to be issuing a strategy in this -- in this -- in this policy area quite shortly -- I hope I can shed some light at any rate on the U.K. experience.  And I shall be talking from the point of view, obviously of U.K. experience.  Not everything that we've done or not everything that we've experienced is necessary -- necessarily relevant to the American context, but I do think there are some -- probably some problem -- some common both problems and solutions that we might be able to share and respectively benefit from.  And it is with that spirit that I'm going to talk with you this morning. And as was well said, I bear this rather portentous title of minister of security and counterterrorism, and as a result of that have focused quite considerably since the coalition came into office last May in our approach to radicalization and countering it because we do regard it as a key part of any successful strategy.  And it's that that I will now focus on. And I suppose it's worth starting, of course, amid -- you know, where does this story all begin?  Well, one thing's very clear, that terrorism isn't just a threat which is external to Western countries.  It's not simply a foreign menace that comes from overseas to strike our cities.  It can and it does, as we now know, come from within our own countries and from inside our own populations.  And I think it's fair to say that every single country in the West needs to wake up to what's happening within our own borders. This means that we must strengthen the security aspect of our response, the capacity and capabilities of our intelligence agencies and of our law enforcement officers -- all part of the picture. But it's only part of the solution, and we do have to get also to the root.  And we must tackle the ideology that fuels and drives radicalization and the circumstances which give that ideology appeal.  We need to act against the existence of a pervasive, perverse and pernicious political ideology which is Islamist extremism. Now, let me stress emphatically that this does not mean tackling the religion of Islam, which is one of the great religions of the world.  Those on the right-wing extremist fringe who argue that is exactly what we should do, but they have it wrong.  Those who say that the West and Islam are eternally irreconcilable have more in common with the Islam extremists than they might like to think, for it's the very same argument of course advanced by al-Qaida.  And they do have it wrong.  We need to work with mainstream Islam. Moreover, the events of last week in North Africa -- in Tunisia, in Egypt, in Libya -- have demonstrated that the populations of Muslim countries themselves see no incompatibility, and that they crave the freedoms that they see us in the West enjoying in our (land ?), and that's very important.  In our foreign -- and in our -- and our domestic policies, it should be a cardinal tenet that domestic -- that democratic freedoms and Islam are companions, and not opponents. Now, as the British prime minister made clear in a recent speech which he gave the Munich Security Conference, Islamist extremist ideology is the problem; Islam is not.  So that brings us to the -- on to the question of what is it about Islamist extremist ideology which can lead ultimately to terrorism.  Clearly, rejection of democratic values need not of itself lead to violence.  By no means, all Islamists are terrorists.  So how does the process of radicalization work? Now, there's been a great deal of academic research in universities and think tanks on radicalization.  And our and your intelligence agencies have also used their knowledge and covert information to try to come up with an answer.  And what emerges is the unremarkable conclusion that there is no single cause.   Our work in Britain suggests that radicalization is driven by an ideology which claims that Muslims around the world are being oppressed and -- and this is the key bit of the argument -- which then legitimizes violence in their supposed defense.  This legitimization of violence is often coupled with a political vision:  the restoration of the caliphate, based on a purported reading of scriptures. Now, this is a revolutionary message, and this revolutionary message is broadcast and amplified by a global network of influential propagandists who make extensive use of the Internet to penetrate societies across the globe.  And it finds an audience among individuals with specific personal vulnerabilities which make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling.  Where those vulnerable individuals are part of a community, be it an actual community or a virtual community, where extremist views are widely accepted, the legitimization of violence becomes easy, and the path to terrorism is thereby smoothed. We know in the U.K. from our own citizenship surveys -- and I'll give you an example -- that in situations where people believe that ethnic and faith groups should not mix and where people are segregated from the rest of society, they are more likely to accept the extremist arguments.  And this is then liable to become an enabling context in which the espousal of violence is made easy. The well-crafted online jihadist messaging has contributed powerfully to the perception of a single global terrorist campaign, which in fact is quite often carried on by otherwise separate terrorist groups, not always with the same interests or identities.  And we underestimate such a potent infrastructure and such a superficially powerful ideology at our peril.  And as our prime minister put it, we must confront and we must undermine it.  This will be a concerted effort from all governments, institutions and citizens -- all of us. Now, in the U.K., we've had for some years a strategy to counter this radicalization, to stop people becoming terrorists.  There are parallels with the countering violent extremism programs which are being run in this country and I would -- about which I think Jane Lute will be talking later in the day.  Our strategy, which is called Prevent, is a key component of a broader strategy designed to counter all aspects of terrorism, which is called CONTEST.   And it's fair to say that these days, in many places, the police and the local Muslim communities are now more willing to talk to each other frankly and constructively than previously about the threat of terrorism, the dangers of radicalization and how we should try to reduce them.  And the level of awareness of the dangers is much greater, and there is greater sense of shared purpose than was once the case.  Our information and understanding is slowly getting better.  The police have a mandate grounded in their community policing role to locate vulnerable individuals and to intervene to help them with -- and along with the cooperation of local government and voluntary community bodies.  And community-based groups have been engaged to provide anti- and de-radicalization services.  And we can report some successes in stopping people being radicalized or drawn into terrorism. However -- there is a "however" -- we do think that the mistakes have blotted out a good deal of the progress.  There have been accusations of stigmatization and of the police spying on Muslim communities, and a perception, which has been lent false color, by the legitimate role of the police in personal interventions.  You can see how easy it is, actually, to mistake the one for the other, either willfully or unwittingly. The government has also been accused of not -- of being only interested in British Muslims insofar as they represented a terrorist threat, and that their mainstream needs like health or education or housing were of no concern.  The government, it was said, was securitizing its approach to Muslim communities. The result of this is that Prevent has gradually lost the trust and good will of many in the very communities it was designed to help.  More widely, it's being criticized also for trying to do too many things at once, for wasting money and also for spending it on the wrong projects.  It was clear that compared with the other parts of our counterterrorism strategy -- when the incoming coalition came in -- that we had to do something about this, because Prevent wasn't working and could be vastly improved.  And so that is what we have been focusing on. Now, our first conclusion was that the segregation of communities was actually becoming more pronounced and that Prevent was in the wrong vehicle as it was designed to counter this.  Indeed, unless set in a wider policy context, I think it's clear that special programs are liable to have the effect opposite from that intended.  Far from uniting, they have a tendency to isolate, leading to accusations of stigmatization. We reckon that we needed a unity strategy, a strategy of integration in its own right, of which Prevent would then be a component part rather than the other way around.  And in his Munich speech in February, the British prime minister said, quote, we must build stronger societies with stronger identities at home. He criticized past government policies of state multiculturalism, which encourage differentiation between communities, instead, as we see the task, of actively fostering a sense of what we share and what we value.  Well, to give you an example of the kind of things we think we need to do, as part of the Big Society program, the government is introducing the National Citizen Service, in which 16-year-olds from all backgrounds and walks of life will spend two months living and working together. We want to create a vision of a society to which all, including young Muslims, feel they want to belong and to participate in.  And we believe there's something that we can learn here from America.  You have created in your country a palpable sense of national identity, an American dream to which all can aspire and an acceptance of immigrant communities as Americans. And it's a task that the British government seeks to create a similar sense of shared identity in our country.  And we need this, anyway, and it stands independently of counterterrorism.  It is, however, the framework within which we will challenge nonviolent and violent extremist views.   So if our values mean anything, they must be equal to taking on opposing opinions, however hostile, in open debate.  And we won't discriminate.  We will confront all forms of extremism, from far left to far right, from neo-fascist to militant separatist.  The government will work actively in this task with those of all faiths and viewpoints who share our values.  We will not rely on extremists to combat violence merely because they do not espouse violence themselves. And at the same time, we will not -- not permit the advocacy of violence.  We have laws against this, which we will enforce, and we will exclude from the U.K. those from abroad who have a track record of preaching or advocating violence.   Our revised Prevent strategy will be implemented within the broad -- this broad context.  It will be more narrowly focused on violent extremism and the pathways that lead to the espousal of violence.  And since what is at issue is people and networks that they work and live in, it will be more granular in its approach dealing with people.  We need also to remember that the threat we face from terrorism is constantly evolving and that we need to be flexible in our response. And at the core of the revised Prevent will be three "I"s -- ideology, institutions and individuals:  the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it; the institutions where radicalization may occur, which will be crucial in -- and which will also be crucial in disrupting its impact; and the individuals who are vulnerable to radicalization. And I want to say a little bit more about each of these and why they're important; first of all, ideology.  Well, challenging extremism is part of the normal functioning of a democratic society and, as I have made clear, it finds an important place in our wider integration strategy.  But when it comes to the advocacy of violence and its espousal, a concerted response is required, which must be more focused and specialized than can be the case in the normal cut and thrust of democratic debate.  A sustained anti- and counterterrorist message is called for.  Much can and should be done at the local level by communities themselves.  And Prevent does focus on this, and it funds the projects.   As I mentioned at the outset, the exploitation of the Internet also needs to be at the center of our attention.  This is a very serious issue.  The Internet plays an ever more significant role in the sedulous promotion of terrorism.  We know that in the U.K., groups gather to view the preaching of violent men located many thousands of miles away and that this does have a powerful effect on young minds.  We know that individuals have been radicalized to the point of being willing to kill -- and have tried to do this -- as the result of viewing websites carrying such material.  A British MP suffered serious injury in this way from a woman who came to see him in his constituency office.  And this is not just a stab at the man.  It is a stab at the open -- at open democracy. And we must take action to stem this flow of poison, which comes across borders, and it requires international action.  Child pornography on the Internet stimulates evil activity in real life, and we go after it.  And we believe that we should go after websites and other Internet activity which enables or fosters terrorism.  We welcome the increasing awareness on the part of Internet providers of the dangers of such material, and we look forward to working with partners on effective action.  And for example -- I'll give you an example -- Google has now added a referral flag on YouTube for content which promotes terrorism, and we applaud this. Government can also carry out activity directly, such as helping build the capacity of civil society organizations who are campaigning to build on the awareness of moderate organizations, encouraging the creation of websites that offer online topical advice for young Muslims, and engaging in online debate about extremist narrative and -- narratives and ideologies, get going at the local level.  And we also hope that civil society and concerned individuals directly will also be active. My second point, institutions:  Now, our experience suggests that certain institutions -- such as prisons, universities and colleges, and, indeed, mosques -- may be especially vulnerable to the influence of charismatic radicalizers.  Our universities and colleges are conscious of their dedication to unfettered academic research and to freedom of expression.  And my goodness, the government respects this and will defend the rights of free speech, as we will defend the rights -- all citizens' rights to free speech.   But we do believe that alongside this there is a responsibility which universities carry to ensure that these freedoms are not exploited and perverted by speakers, on or off campus, and that the pastoral care of students is taken seriously, and that individuals needing help and guidance are spotted, and that assistance is available to them.  And the training of English-speaking imams, as part of pastoral care, is absolutely fundamental to bonding the faith of young Muslims to the Western social context in which they find themselves.  The U.K. -- I just want to turn briefly to schools -- the U.K. has a thriving faith school sector, which offers some of the best education available, and that includes Muslim schools which receive public funding.  And we're not going to stop that, but we will seek to maintain national standards of instruction in those schools, as in all others.   Now Muslims in Britain are disproportionately represented in our prisons.  We need to ensure that prison does not become an incubator of violent extremism, the closed society.  The U.K. is developing programs for prisoners, both inside and on release, to increase the likelihood of successful disruption of attempts at radicalization and recruitment, and of the chances of successful rehabilitation and reintegration into society.  I wouldn't like to claim this is easy, but it is very important. Though (missions ?) have often -- mosques have often been, I think, seen as part of the problem, and there have been and there still are instances of this, today I think the issue is less one of mosques harboring preachers being suspected of fostering violent extremism, let alone being guilty of it.  It's more, in our view, one of a gap of confidence that still exists between the mosque and local authorities and the police.  And this is a gap which it will be vital -- vital -- to close if we are to be successful in dealing with my third "I," which is individuals.  You can see that the cooperation between local mosques and local communities and local authorities is very important. Individuals.  Those individuals who are on the path to radicalization don't exist in a vacuum.  They live in neighborhoods, they meet friends and family, they use shops and businesses, and they come into contact with local community sector workers such as teachers, nurses or community police officers.  And these are individuals who may be well placed, especially if trained -- and that's one of the things we do -- to notice changes in behavior.   And it's when working with local community organizations or community groups who can provide personal deradicalization interventions that we get some of the best results.  These -- this is an invaluable route, and it is crucial, obviously, to have the support of local Muslim leaders -- vital, frankly, to long-term success. So we've already had quite a bit of experience of this sort of work, and as I say, we found it to be helpful and cost-effective.  Hundreds of people have now been referred through our flagship Channel program.  This type of multi-agency intervention, called Channel, is enormously more cost-effective than maintaining an MI5 investigation or dealing with the consequences of a successful attack.  That's why Prevent is such an important pre-emptive part of the broader strategy. Let me emphasize:  Channel is emphatically not about criminalizing people who have not committed an offense.  It is about helping them, and it's about drawing them back from the danger of radicalization and the espousal of violence.  But I think I ought to draw to a conclusion.  What I would say is, you know, the agenda ahead of us is a full one.  We will have to be determined and persevering and not expect, I think, lots of quick wins.  What we want is to turn the propaganda tide, get from the back foot to the front foot.  We have to create the values and institutions accepted by the whole of society, not just abroad, which is another task, but also, obviously, at home.   We believe it can be done and that in the U.K., within the broader program of strengthening our collective identity, Prevent has a key role to play in dissuading people from being drawn by the siren message of violent jihad. Thank you very much.  (Applause.) LINDSAY:  Thank you, Minister, for a thoughtful set of remarks. I'd like to begin with an issue you raised in your remarks about the role of integration and the importance of national identity.  You quite nicely complimented Americans on a strong sense of national identity and the great pride that Americans have in incorporating immigrants in society.  And I think because of that, for many years Americans thought that they were immune from the risk of homegrown radicalization.   But recently we've been forced to grapple with this problem.  Why do you think it is that America's facing this challenge, given that it has this history of incorporating immigrants? NEVILLE-JONES:  Well, I think -- I think it's necessary but not sufficient is probably my first answer.  And we don't have enough of it.  And so as we think of it, actually, it is the framework within which you can then deal with a specific problem.  That's why we have laid on that -- a lot of emphasis on that necessary framework. I think it's not sufficient because -- I hope, as I tried to make clear, there is -- a healthy democracy will conduct a -- you know, a really strong cut and thrust, and you will argue through your values and you will -- and it's a very, very important part of living your -- living your beliefs.   But if you get to -- when it comes to people who are preaching to potentially rather closed communities and who have successfully drawn people away from listening to that democratic debate, participating in that democratic debate, being willing -- being willing components of society -- and we have some of that -- then it is very important actually to carry out, I think, you know, specific interventions designed actually to get at that kind of community.   And that is where I think we feel that we have to have a specific program.  It works best when it is conducted by Muslims themselves.  There isn't any doubt about that.  And so one of the absolutely key things we have to do is to gain the confidence of the Muslim community in this country, such that they are willing themselves to lead these programs. We've gone a bit down this road.  We haven't -- I mean, in a sense we've pilot tested what we need to do.  We know it works, but it's got to be much broader.  And that is why I can't help feeling, in the end, if Muslims are going to be willing to do that, they must feel two things:  one, that they are proud of the broader society and that actually they have rights as well as duties in the place and that they are regarded as equal Brits, and that what they're doing is valued. So I think it's partly -- doesn't come to all of this, but it can give leadership.  And I think it's the -- getting into that little corner that you've got to get into which I think is important.  I don't know if that responds to American experience, but it's certainly, I think, where we feel that you have to underpin the values of democracy by doing actually a special program. LINDSAY:  But I take it from your remarks that there's a challenge in doing that and doing it well. NEVILLE-JONES:  There is.  There is. LINDSAY:  Because you run into the issue -- you spoke of stigmatization in creating it.  And I think obviously in the American context, as this issue has emerged there's a great deal of fear that what Americans are going to do or what the U.S. government will do will lead to stigmatization of Muslims and will actually make the problem worse rather than better. NEVILLE-JONES:  Absolutely. LINDSAY:  And I guess I'd draw you out a little bit about sort of your thoughts -- NEVILLE-JONES:  This is not easy stuff. LINDSAY:  No.  Just from your perspective of -- from the British perspective, you know, what are the lessons you learned; how do you avoid committing the error you know you shouldn't commit? NEVILLE-JONES:  Well, I mean, we didn't entirely avoid it.  I mean, we have actually had this problem.  And I'll give you one example of where different parts of a strategy actually do damage to each other.  As you know, we've had -- I mean we have to have, given the nature of the kind of plots that we've had to deal with, of course, we've had a very vigorous (pursue ?) strategy alongside that, which deals with -- directly with counterterrorism.  Now, it's not too difficult to find those things entangled.  So that's one danger. Second danger is -- and, of course, exploited, wittingly -- and there have been mistakes, as well.  I'll give you one example.  The police force in one area in the country put put a whole lot of CCTV cameras.  They didn't explain what they were doing. LINDSAY:  These are closed caption television cameras? NEVILLE-JONES:  Yes, that's right, some sort of.  And it gave rise -- it gave rise to the accusation that this is "big brother."  So you do have to be transparent about what you're doing.  You do -- I mean, the government does have constantly to explain what's happening.  It's also why in the end of the day you can only do it locally.  I mean, it's really on the ground where the local community is operating, where there's confidence.   The key, key component in all of this is trust and confidence.  And we have to rebuilt a bit of that because there has been -- you know, there has been an erosion.  I think we believe that people start again; you can't just accept that having made a mistake, you abandon the objective.  But you can see we have tried to reshape the framework within which it stands and put what we believe to be the dominant thing, which is getting the country together, as the overall framework.  And then there is Prevent within it.  And we've changed the way the money's spent.  We have put the integration strategy into the hands of a different government department so that it's quite clear that, you know, this is a different activity. But I come back in the end to saying that we have to gain confidence, and we have to work very carefully at the whole business of personal and individual intervention.  I do believe at the end of the day this is a very granular thing.  You're dealing with people.  You're dealing with individuals.  And the best people to deal with individuals are those who are close to them, those who they think have some regard for them; you know, the so-called role model.  And so it's there that we have to go.  This is -- we have to build a strategy. LINDSAY:  When you talk about reaching out to individuals, that's, as I understand it, the purpose of your channel program, to sort of -- NEVILLE-JONES:  That's right.  That's right. LINDSAY:  -- engage friends, families, the community.  Can I just draw you out a little bit more about how that works in practice? NEVILLE-JONES:  Well, it works -- it literally works, you know, in long sessions with individuals.  The basing issues.  Arguing.  Going over the territory.  Coming back to the issue.  And it's hearts-and-minds stuff, but particularly mind stuff.  What is this world about?  I mean, it goes to absolute fundamentals about what people think they're there for. Now, if you start getting somewhere with someone, what you then want to ensure is that they've got a job, that actually they feel their family has a future.  So there are a whole series of other things that need to accompany that.  So you start not just change the mindset, but also reintegrate.  So multiagency working can be very important in this. LINDSAY:  Okay.   At this point, Minister, I'd like to bring the audience into our conversation here.  I would ask you to please wait for the microphone, and when you get a microphone, to please speak into it.  Please stand, state your name and affiliation.  And I would ask people keep their questions concise and short and that there be a question so we can do as many of these as possible. Yes, sir.  I promised the minister I will keep her on schedule. QUESTIONER:  Madam Minister, Arnaud de Borchgrave, CSIS.  What can you tell us about the 400,000 Pakistanis who go back and forth between the U.K. and FATA or other parts of Pakistan?  And how does one persuade those people vis-a-vis those who live in England permanently and never go back to Pakistan? NEVILLE-JONES:  Quite right, the single largest Muslim community in the U.K. is subcontinental.  And there is a lot of modern communication and modern travel, means there's a lot of coming and going.  We should be quite clear that it is a tiny, tiny fraction of those people who travel backwards and forwards who are up to no good.  And if you ask the average Pakistani-origin Brit, what do you think about that, they will give you the answer, this isn't -- we don't want to have anything to do with this.  That's absolutely clear. What we have to establish, however, is the willingness of individuals actually to come and say there is a problem here, we think we've got a -- we've got a problem in our local community.  And that's the gap that we have to bridge.  And it does happen.  It does happen.  Some of the most important pieces of information that the authorities have ever received in the U.K. have come from individuals in the Pakistan community.  And that's precisely what we want to encourage. So I think it is.  It's a feeling that I can be (onside ?).  I don't need to be -- I'm not -- I'm neither going to be neutral nor am I going to be with these guys.  I'm going to be (onside ?) with the rest of society.  That's the bit that we've got to try and accomplish. I think -- I have to say that I do think we've got a real opportunity at the moment.  I mean, if you look at what's going on in the Middle East, there's a huge tide there that we ought to be able to do something about.  It's preaching to -- the kind of -- it's -- of messages that we want to get across, that Islam, Western values, can ride together.   So I think that part of -- you know, part of our -- the way we go about this also, of course, is the way we interpret the world to our own -- to our own societies and how they see how they fit in. So I think foreign policy -- and I'm -- you know, there's too much -- we don't have enough time to go into all of these issues, but foreign policy and how government both explains and defends its foreign policy, I mean, is quite an important part of overall mindset, and it particularly applies when it comes to an issue like Pakistan. The British government is very, very clear that we have a strategic relationship with the Pakistan government in a cooperative enterprise against terrorism.  So we don't set them as -- you know, as our opponents.  We set them as our partners, and they are indeed.  It's a difficult task between us, as we know. So I think that we -- I think we got our messaging right on that.  We just have to get that little bit more link-up where people say:  Right, I think there's something wrong here; I'm going to go and talk to the -- going to go and talk to the -- I'm going to go and talk to the imam, and the imam I know will go and do what's necessary. LINDSAY:  OK.  Sir. QUESTIONER:  Hello.  My name's Timothy Reuter (sp). And I've heard you say just now two things that sound to me a little bit like they might be in tension with each other.  One is, you talked about the narrative that al-Qaida and other organizations put forward -- NEVILLE-JONES:  Yes. QUESTIONER:  -- that, first, Muslims are embattled and under attack around the world and, second, that the proper response is a violent one.  And now you just talked about the fact that Britain has a strategic relationship with the Pakistani government.  So how do you take apart the narrative that you talked about for those who believe that the Pakistani government is part of what's oppressing Muslims in that part of the world?  And now we've said that you have an explicit policy of backing them on at least a number of issues, so how do you sort that out and explain it?  Thank you very much. NEVILLE-JONES:  Well, having a strategic relationship with a government doesn't mean that you necessarily, you know, endorse or back every single thing that happens under the roof of that country.  I think on the other hand, though, I would defend very vigorously the Pakistani government in its attempts to deal with terrorism on its own soil.  I think it faces a very, very difficult problem, and their difficulties are not going to be dealt with with -- you know, with -- at all easily.  And it's part of our -- you know, part of our policy to try and help. The situation in Pakistan is very -- is very -- obviously very complex.  Because it's very complex, though, and because it's difficult, it is precisely why on the whole you need to try and help.  And we help in all sorts of ways, including of course helping the underlying structures of Pakistan society.  We put a lot of money into education, we put a lot of money into trying actually to make the underpinning of Pakistan such that, you know, both education and economic activity are available to more people.  I mean, these are absolute fundamentals for getting -- you know, for getting a stable society in that part of the world.  And it's an important part of our policy.  And I don't think we see any contradiction between, you know, that kind of long-term -- like I said in my speech, there are no quick wins in this -- that kind of long-term support and a -- and working together, you know, against violence. LINDSAY:  I think we have time for one more question.  Now, before I take the question, I want to remind everybody that this session is on the record. And in fairness, I'm going to go to the back of the room, since the first two questions came to the front, and the young lady all the way at the end, last row. QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  Cambria Hamburg, with the Department of State. What is the U.K. government's approach to engaging with allies, moderate voices in the Muslim community -- or maybe some not so moderate voices, but nevertheless leaders who, you know, espouse a nonviolent approach but maybe do support a Salafi ideology?  Thank you. NEVILLE-JONES:  I didn't entirely hear it, but I think it's a question about the attitudes of nonviolent Islamism; is that right? QUESTIONER:  (Off mic.) NEVILLE-JONES:  Yes, well, I think -- I think -- LINDSAY:  Microphone. NEVILLE-JONES:  Clearly, what we are -- what we are concerned with is the transition to violence.  And it's there that we will focus prevent money.  I did make clear, however, that one of the things -- and this is, I think, the difference between ourselves and our predecessors -- is that we do not believe it right to try and work through the agency of those who are themselves on the separatist tendency or extremist in their views and use them as agents simply because they're not violent.  I think we do believe that you can only do this effectively with people who share your values.  And we want, obviously, for that -- and we do believe that -- resources available, that Muslims who share our values will help us and that we will be together in this. But we're not, I think, partisans of the notion that somehow you can easily get the right result by trying to work through the agency of those who themselves don't share your value systems.  And it goes, obviously, to your analysis partly of how you think the relationship between extremism and extreme values and values that aren't ours and actual -- the actual espousal of violence works.  And we don't trust the notion that somehow you can -- you can effectively deal with preventing and discouraging people from violence working through those who are not of the -- of your own value system. LINDSAY:  Minister, I know you have a very busy schedule today.  I want to say on behalf of all of the sponsors of today's event thank you very much for giving (up such strong thoughts ?).  (Applause.) NEVILLE-JONES:  Thank you.  Thank you for giving me the opportunity.  (Applause.) I'm very pleased -- very pleased to have had the opportunity to come.  Thank you. #### ®FC¯END ®FL¯     .STX     (C) COPYRIGHT 2011, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA.  ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.  ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED.   UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION.   FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.  NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES.   FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR E-MAIL [email protected].   THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. -------------------------  
  • United Kingdom
    A New Approach to Counter-Radicalization
    Play
    Pauline Neville-Jones, minister of state for security and counterterrorism in the United Kingdom, discusses the common problems Western countries face with countering Islamic radicalization and the need to reinforce the idea that democratic freedoms and Islam are companions and not opponents. This session was part of the symposium, UK and U.S. Approaches in Countering Radicalization: Intelligence, Communities, and the Internet, which was cosponsored with Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies and King’s College London’s International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. This event was made possible by Georgetown University's George T. Kalaris Intelligence Studies Fund and the generous support of longtime CFR member Rita E. Hauser. Additionally, this event was organized in cooperation with the CFR’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. JIM LINDSAY:  Good morning, everyone.  I am Jim Lindsay, director of studies here at the Council on Foreign Relations.  On behalf of Richard Haass, the president of CFR, and our partners in today's event, Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, I want to welcome you to our symposium here today:  "United Kingdom and U.S. Approaches in Countering Radicalization." In putting together a conference like the one we have today, we have a big debt of gratitude and thanks to give a number of people.  And I'd like to single them out here.  On behalf of Georgetown University, I would like to thank Thomas Kalaris for his unwavering support for today's symposium and the George T. Kalaris Fund for Intelligence Studies at Georgetown University.  The fund is named in honor of Tom's father, an unsung hero of the U.S. intelligence services.  And the fund invests in the future of intelligence professional and intelligence studies at Georgetown's Center for Peace and Security Studies. CFR would also like to thank longtime member and supporter, Rita Hauser.  Rita is an international lawyer who is deeply involved in intelligence work through her service on the president's Intelligence Advisory Board.  Rita, thank you very much for all your support. I would also like to thank Georgetown University's Bruce Hoffman and Ellen McHugh, Henry Sweetbaum and Peter Neumann of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.  I also owe some thanks to my colleagues here at CFR, led by Ed Husain and Steve Simon.  In addition, it takes a lot of people working in the background to make an event like today happen.  And my colleague Nancy Bodurtha heads up a truly outstanding meetings team here.  So I want to thank Nancy, Chris Tuttle, Emily Mcleod, Jeff Gullo, Allison Blou (sp) and Kate Collins for pulling today's conference together. I have a couple of housekeeping details to go over.  First, today's sessions are all on the record with two exceptions.  The exceptions are session two on "Violent Radicalization -- Key Trends and Developments," and session six, "New Frontiers -- Countering Online Radicalization."  I would also politely request that if you have a BlackBerry, PDA, any other electronic device that sends or receives signals, if you could please turn it off right now so that it will not interfere with our sound system and put out squealing, very painful sounds over the speakers.  So I would appreciate that. Why are we having today's symposium?  The answer is fairly straightforward.  The United States is experiencing a significant increase in violent Islamic extremism, both abroad and at home.  Ongoing events in the Middle East are a cause for concern about the probable rise of Islamic radicalism, at least in the short term. At home, we have more and more instances of Americans either plotting attacks against their fellow Americans or attempting to travel overseas to receive terrorist training.  The Fort Hood shooting in November of 2009 and the near-successful car bombing in Times Square in May, 2010, are the most dramatic illustrations of this trend. We are seeking in today's event to bring together leading officials and experts from the United Kingdom and the United States to take stock, to exchange best practices and to develop fresh ideas for tackling some of the most important issues in the current debate.  And I owe a great debt of gratitude to our British colleagues who traveled a considerable distance to get here this morning.  I only had to take a Metro subway ride.  They had to fly a long way. We are honored to begin today's conversation with a truly distinguished keynote speaker, Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones, the United Kingdom's minister of state, responsible for security and counterterrorism.  Minister Neville-Jones has had a distinguished 30-year career as a diplomat, serving in posts around the world, including the former Rhodesia, Singapore, Washington and Bonn.  She was also seconded to the European Commission.  Minister Neville Jones has held her current position since May of 2010. And with that, I would invite Minister Neville-Jones to come to the podium. MINISTER OF STATE FOR SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES:  Thank you.  (Applause.)  Thank you.  Good morning, everyone.  Thank you very much for that kind introduction.  As has just been noted, I've spent time in my -- in my past, in Washington.  And I just want to say what a pleasure it is to come back.  I think that anybody who has spent time here seldom goes away feeling that they will ever entirely shake off the lure of this town.  And it is -- it is good to be here. And as somebody who, you know, has had some experience in this subject -- and I understand that the administration is likely to be issuing a strategy in this -- in this -- in this policy area quite shortly -- I hope I can shed some light at any rate on the U.K. experience.  And I shall be talking from the point of view, obviously of U.K. experience.  Not everything that we've done or not everything that we've experienced is necessary -- necessarily relevant to the American context, but I do think there are some -- probably some problem -- some common both problems and solutions that we might be able to share and respectively benefit from.  And it is with that spirit that I'm going to talk with you this morning. And as was well said, I bear this rather portentous title of minister of security and counterterrorism, and as a result of that have focused quite considerably since the coalition came into office last May in our approach to radicalization and countering it because we do regard it as a key part of any successful strategy.  And it's that that I will now focus on. And I suppose it's worth starting, of course, amid -- you know, where does this story all begin?  Well, one thing's very clear, that terrorism isn't just a threat which is external to Western countries.  It's not simply a foreign menace that comes from overseas to strike our cities.  It can and it does, as we now know, come from within our own countries and from inside our own populations.  And I think it's fair to say that every single country in the West needs to wake up to what's happening within our own borders. This means that we must strengthen the security aspect of our response, the capacity and capabilities of our intelligence agencies and of our law enforcement officers -- all part of the picture. But it's only part of the solution, and we do have to get also to the root.  And we must tackle the ideology that fuels and drives radicalization and the circumstances which give that ideology appeal.  We need to act against the existence of a pervasive, perverse and pernicious political ideology which is Islamist extremism. Now, let me stress emphatically that this does not mean tackling the religion of Islam, which is one of the great religions of the world.  Those on the right-wing extremist fringe who argue that is exactly what we should do, but they have it wrong.  Those who say that the West and Islam are eternally irreconcilable have more in common with the Islam extremists than they might like to think, for it's the very same argument of course advanced by al-Qaida.  And they do have it wrong.  We need to work with mainstream Islam. Moreover, the events of last week in North Africa -- in Tunisia, in Egypt, in Libya -- have demonstrated that the populations of Muslim countries themselves see no incompatibility, and that they crave the freedoms that they see us in the West enjoying in our (land ?), and that's very important.  In our foreign -- and in our -- and our domestic policies, it should be a cardinal tenet that domestic -- that democratic freedoms and Islam are companions, and not opponents. Now, as the British prime minister made clear in a recent speech which he gave the Munich Security Conference, Islamist extremist ideology is the problem; Islam is not.  So that brings us to the -- on to the question of what is it about Islamist extremist ideology which can lead ultimately to terrorism.  Clearly, rejection of democratic values need not of itself lead to violence.  By no means, all Islamists are terrorists.  So how does the process of radicalization work? Now, there's been a great deal of academic research in universities and think tanks on radicalization.  And our and your intelligence agencies have also used their knowledge and covert information to try to come up with an answer.  And what emerges is the unremarkable conclusion that there is no single cause.   Our work in Britain suggests that radicalization is driven by an ideology which claims that Muslims around the world are being oppressed and -- and this is the key bit of the argument -- which then legitimizes violence in their supposed defense.  This legitimization of violence is often coupled with a political vision:  the restoration of the caliphate, based on a purported reading of scriptures. Now, this is a revolutionary message, and this revolutionary message is broadcast and amplified by a global network of influential propagandists who make extensive use of the Internet to penetrate societies across the globe.  And it finds an audience among individuals with specific personal vulnerabilities which make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling.  Where those vulnerable individuals are part of a community, be it an actual community or a virtual community, where extremist views are widely accepted, the legitimization of violence becomes easy, and the path to terrorism is thereby smoothed. We know in the U.K. from our own citizenship surveys -- and I'll give you an example -- that in situations where people believe that ethnic and faith groups should not mix and where people are segregated from the rest of society, they are more likely to accept the extremist arguments.  And this is then liable to become an enabling context in which the espousal of violence is made easy. The well-crafted online jihadist messaging has contributed powerfully to the perception of a single global terrorist campaign, which in fact is quite often carried on by otherwise separate terrorist groups, not always with the same interests or identities.  And we underestimate such a potent infrastructure and such a superficially powerful ideology at our peril.  And as our prime minister put it, we must confront and we must undermine it.  This will be a concerted effort from all governments, institutions and citizens -- all of us. Now, in the U.K., we've had for some years a strategy to counter this radicalization, to stop people becoming terrorists.  There are parallels with the countering violent extremism programs which are being run in this country and I would -- about which I think Jane Lute will be talking later in the day.  Our strategy, which is called Prevent, is a key component of a broader strategy designed to counter all aspects of terrorism, which is called CONTEST.   And it's fair to say that these days, in many places, the police and the local Muslim communities are now more willing to talk to each other frankly and constructively than previously about the threat of terrorism, the dangers of radicalization and how we should try to reduce them.  And the level of awareness of the dangers is much greater, and there is greater sense of shared purpose than was once the case.  Our information and understanding is slowly getting better.  The police have a mandate grounded in their community policing role to locate vulnerable individuals and to intervene to help them with -- and along with the cooperation of local government and voluntary community bodies.  And community-based groups have been engaged to provide anti- and de-radicalization services.  And we can report some successes in stopping people being radicalized or drawn into terrorism. However -- there is a "however" -- we do think that the mistakes have blotted out a good deal of the progress.  There have been accusations of stigmatization and of the police spying on Muslim communities, and a perception, which has been lent false color, by the legitimate role of the police in personal interventions.  You can see how easy it is, actually, to mistake the one for the other, either willfully or unwittingly. The government has also been accused of not -- of being only interested in British Muslims insofar as they represented a terrorist threat, and that their mainstream needs like health or education or housing were of no concern.  The government, it was said, was securitizing its approach to Muslim communities. The result of this is that Prevent has gradually lost the trust and good will of many in the very communities it was designed to help.  More widely, it's being criticized also for trying to do too many things at once, for wasting money and also for spending it on the wrong projects.  It was clear that compared with the other parts of our counterterrorism strategy -- when the incoming coalition came in -- that we had to do something about this, because Prevent wasn't working and could be vastly improved.  And so that is what we have been focusing on. Now, our first conclusion was that the segregation of communities was actually becoming more pronounced and that Prevent was in the wrong vehicle as it was designed to counter this.  Indeed, unless set in a wider policy context, I think it's clear that special programs are liable to have the effect opposite from that intended.  Far from uniting, they have a tendency to isolate, leading to accusations of stigmatization. We reckon that we needed a unity strategy, a strategy of integration in its own right, of which Prevent would then be a component part rather than the other way around.  And in his Munich speech in February, the British prime minister said, quote, we must build stronger societies with stronger identities at home. He criticized past government policies of state multiculturalism, which encourage differentiation between communities, instead, as we see the task, of actively fostering a sense of what we share and what we value.  Well, to give you an example of the kind of things we think we need to do, as part of the Big Society program, the government is introducing the National Citizen Service, in which 16-year-olds from all backgrounds and walks of life will spend two months living and working together. We want to create a vision of a society to which all, including young Muslims, feel they want to belong and to participate in.  And we believe there's something that we can learn here from America.  You have created in your country a palpable sense of national identity, an American dream to which all can aspire and an acceptance of immigrant communities as Americans. And it's a task that the British government seeks to create a similar sense of shared identity in our country.  And we need this, anyway, and it stands independently of counterterrorism.  It is, however, the framework within which we will challenge nonviolent and violent extremist views.   So if our values mean anything, they must be equal to taking on opposing opinions, however hostile, in open debate.  And we won't discriminate.  We will confront all forms of extremism, from far left to far right, from neo-fascist to militant separatist.  The government will work actively in this task with those of all faiths and viewpoints who share our values.  We will not rely on extremists to combat violence merely because they do not espouse violence themselves. And at the same time, we will not -- not permit the advocacy of violence.  We have laws against this, which we will enforce, and we will exclude from the U.K. those from abroad who have a track record of preaching or advocating violence.   Our revised Prevent strategy will be implemented within the broad -- this broad context.  It will be more narrowly focused on violent extremism and the pathways that lead to the espousal of violence.  And since what is at issue is people and networks that they work and live in, it will be more granular in its approach dealing with people.  We need also to remember that the threat we face from terrorism is constantly evolving and that we need to be flexible in our response. And at the core of the revised Prevent will be three "I"s -- ideology, institutions and individuals:  the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it; the institutions where radicalization may occur, which will be crucial in -- and which will also be crucial in disrupting its impact; and the individuals who are vulnerable to radicalization. And I want to say a little bit more about each of these and why they're important; first of all, ideology.  Well, challenging extremism is part of the normal functioning of a democratic society and, as I have made clear, it finds an important place in our wider integration strategy.  But when it comes to the advocacy of violence and its espousal, a concerted response is required, which must be more focused and specialized than can be the case in the normal cut and thrust of democratic debate.  A sustained anti- and counterterrorist message is called for.  Much can and should be done at the local level by communities themselves.  And Prevent does focus on this, and it funds the projects.   As I mentioned at the outset, the exploitation of the Internet also needs to be at the center of our attention.  This is a very serious issue.  The Internet plays an ever more significant role in the sedulous promotion of terrorism.  We know that in the U.K., groups gather to view the preaching of violent men located many thousands of miles away and that this does have a powerful effect on young minds. We know that individuals have been radicalized to the point of being willing to kill -- and have tried to do this -- as the result of viewing websites carrying such material.  A British MP suffered serious injury in this way from a woman who came to see him in his constituency office.  And this is not just a stab at the man.  It is a stab at the open -- at open democracy. And we must take action to stem this flow of poison, which comes across borders, and it requires international action.  Child pornography on the Internet stimulates evil activity in real life, and we go after it.  And we believe that we should go after websites and other Internet activity which enables or fosters terrorism.  We welcome the increasing awareness on the part of Internet providers of the dangers of such material, and we look forward to working with partners on effective action.  And for example -- I'll give you an example -- Google has now added a referral flag on YouTube for content which promotes terrorism, and we applaud this. Government can also carry out activity directly, such as helping build the capacity of civil society organizations who are campaigning to build on the awareness of moderate organizations, encouraging the creation of websites that offer online topical advice for young Muslims, and engaging in online debate about extremist narrative and -- narratives and ideologies, get going at the local level.  And we also hope that civil society and concerned individuals directly will also be active. My second point, institutions:  Now, our experience suggests that certain institutions -- such as prisons, universities and colleges, and, indeed, mosques -- may be especially vulnerable to the influence of charismatic radicalizers.  Our universities and colleges are conscious of their dedication to unfettered academic research and to freedom of expression.  And my goodness, the government respects this and will defend the rights of free speech, as we will defend the rights -- all citizens' rights to free speech.   But we do believe that alongside this there is a responsibility which universities carry to ensure that these freedoms are not exploited and perverted by speakers, on or off campus, and that the pastoral care of students is taken seriously, and that individuals needing help and guidance are spotted, and that assistance is available to them.  And the training of English-speaking imams, as part of pastoral care, is absolutely fundamental to bonding the faith of young Muslims to the Western social context in which they find themselves. The U.K. -- I just want to turn briefly to schools -- the U.K. has a thriving faith school sector, which offers some of the best education available, and that includes Muslim schools which receive public funding.  And we're not going to stop that, but we will seek to maintain national standards of instruction in those schools, as in all others.   Now Muslims in Britain are disproportionately represented in our prisons.  We need to ensure that prison does not become an incubator of violent extremism, the closed society.  The U.K. is developing programs for prisoners, both inside and on release, to increase the likelihood of successful disruption of attempts at radicalization and recruitment, and of the chances of successful rehabilitation and reintegration into society.  I wouldn't like to claim this is easy, but it is very important. Though (missions ?) have often -- mosques have often been, I think, seen as part of the problem, and there have been and there still are instances of this, today I think the issue is less one of mosques harboring preachers being suspected of fostering violent extremism, let alone being guilty of it.  It's more, in our view, one of a gap of confidence that still exists between the mosque and local authorities and the police.  And this is a gap which it will be vital -- vital -- to close if we are to be successful in dealing with my third "I," which is individuals.  You can see that the cooperation between local mosques and local communities and local authorities is very important. Individuals.  Those individuals who are on the path to radicalization don't exist in a vacuum.  They live in neighborhoods, they meet friends and family, they use shops and businesses, and they come into contact with local community sector workers such as teachers, nurses or community police officers.  And these are individuals who may be well placed, especially if trained -- and that's one of the things we do -- to notice changes in behavior.   And it's when working with local community organizations or community groups who can provide personal deradicalization interventions that we get some of the best results.  These -- this is an invaluable route, and it is crucial, obviously, to have the support of local Muslim leaders -- vital, frankly, to long-term success. So we've already had quite a bit of experience of this sort of work, and as I say, we found it to be helpful and cost-effective.  Hundreds of people have now been referred through our flagship Channel program.  This type of multi-agency intervention, called Channel, is enormously more cost-effective than maintaining an MI5 investigation or dealing with the consequences of a successful attack.  That's why Prevent is such an important pre-emptive part of the broader strategy. Let me emphasize:  Channel is emphatically not about criminalizing people who have not committed an offense.  It is about helping them, and it's about drawing them back from the danger of radicalization and the espousal of violence. But I think I ought to draw to a conclusion.  What I would say is, you know, the agenda ahead of us is a full one.  We will have to be determined and persevering and not expect, I think, lots of quick wins.  What we want is to turn the propaganda tide, get from the back foot to the front foot.  We have to create the values and institutions accepted by the whole of society, not just abroad, which is another task, but also, obviously, at home.   We believe it can be done and that in the U.K., within the broader program of strengthening our collective identity, Prevent has a key role to play in dissuading people from being drawn by the siren message of violent jihad. Thank you very much.  (Applause.) LINDSAY:  Thank you, Minister, for a thoughtful set of remarks. I'd like to begin with an issue you raised in your remarks about the role of integration and the importance of national identity.  You quite nicely complimented Americans on a strong sense of national identity and the great pride that Americans have in incorporating immigrants in society.  And I think because of that, for many years Americans thought that they were immune from the risk of homegrown radicalization.   But recently we've been forced to grapple with this problem.  Why do you think it is that America's facing this challenge, given that it has this history of incorporating immigrants? NEVILLE-JONES:  Well, I think -- I think it's necessary but not sufficient is probably my first answer.  And we don't have enough of it.  And so as we think of it, actually, it is the framework within which you can then deal with a specific problem.  That's why we have laid on that -- a lot of emphasis on that necessary framework. I think it's not sufficient because -- I hope, as I tried to make clear, there is -- a healthy democracy will conduct a -- you know, a really strong cut and thrust, and you will argue through your values and you will -- and it's a very, very important part of living your -- living your beliefs.   But if you get to -- when it comes to people who are preaching to potentially rather closed communities and who have successfully drawn people away from listening to that democratic debate, participating in that democratic debate, being willing -- being willing components of society -- and we have some of that -- then it is very important actually to carry out, I think, you know, specific interventions designed actually to get at that kind of community.   And that is where I think we feel that we have to have a specific program.  It works best when it is conducted by Muslims themselves.  There isn't any doubt about that.  And so one of the absolutely key things we have to do is to gain the confidence of the Muslim community in this country, such that they are willing themselves to lead these programs. We've gone a bit down this road.  We haven't -- I mean, in a sense we've pilot tested what we need to do.  We know it works, but it's got to be much broader.  And that is why I can't help feeling, in the end, if Muslims are going to be willing to do that, they must feel two things:  one, that they are proud of the broader society and that actually they have rights as well as duties in the place and that they are regarded as equal Brits, and that what they're doing is valued. So I think it's partly -- doesn't come to all of this, but it can give leadership.  And I think it's the -- getting into that little corner that you've got to get into which I think is important.  I don't know if that responds to American experience, but it's certainly, I think, where we feel that you have to underpin the values of democracy by doing actually a special program. LINDSAY:  But I take it from your remarks that there's a challenge in doing that and doing it well. NEVILLE-JONES:  There is.  There is. LINDSAY:  Because you run into the issue -- you spoke of stigmatization in creating it.  And I think obviously in the American context, as this issue has emerged there's a great deal of fear that what Americans are going to do or what the U.S. government will do will lead to stigmatization of Muslims and will actually make the problem worse rather than better. NEVILLE-JONES:  Absolutely. LINDSAY:  And I guess I'd draw you out a little bit about sort of your thoughts -- NEVILLE-JONES:  This is not easy stuff. LINDSAY:  No.  Just from your perspective of -- from the British perspective, you know, what are the lessons you learned; how do you avoid committing the error you know you shouldn't commit? NEVILLE-JONES:  Well, I mean, we didn't entirely avoid it.  I mean, we have actually had this problem.  And I'll give you one example of where different parts of a strategy actually do damage to each other.  As you know, we've had -- I mean we have to have, given the nature of the kind of plots that we've had to deal with, of course, we've had a very vigorous (pursue ?) strategy alongside that, which deals with -- directly with counterterrorism.  Now, it's not too difficult to find those things entangled.  So that's one danger. Second danger is -- and, of course, exploited, wittingly -- and there have been mistakes, as well.  I'll give you one example.  The police force in one area in the country put put a whole lot of CCTV cameras.  They didn't explain what they were doing. LINDSAY:  These are closed caption television cameras? NEVILLE-JONES:  Yes, that's right, some sort of.  And it gave rise -- it gave rise to the accusation that this is "big brother."  So you do have to be transparent about what you're doing.  You do -- I mean, the government does have constantly to explain what's happening.  It's also why in the end of the day you can only do it locally.  I mean, it's really on the ground where the local community is operating, where there's confidence.   The key, key component in all of this is trust and confidence.  And we have to rebuilt a bit of that because there has been -- you know, there has been an erosion.  I think we believe that people start again; you can't just accept that having made a mistake, you abandon the objective.  But you can see we have tried to reshape the framework within which it stands and put what we believe to be the dominant thing, which is getting the country together, as the overall framework.  And then there is Prevent within it.  And we've changed the way the money's spent.  We have put the integration strategy into the hands of a different government department so that it's quite clear that, you know, this is a different activity. But I come back in the end to saying that we have to gain confidence, and we have to work very carefully at the whole business of personal and individual intervention.  I do believe at the end of the day this is a very granular thing.  You're dealing with people.  You're dealing with individuals.  And the best people to deal with individuals are those who are close to them, those who they think have some regard for them; you know, the so-called role model.  And so it's there that we have to go.  This is -- we have to build a strategy. LINDSAY:  When you talk about reaching out to individuals, that's, as I understand it, the purpose of your channel program, to sort of -- NEVILLE-JONES:  That's right.  That's right. LINDSAY:  -- engage friends, families, the community.  Can I just draw you out a little bit more about how that works in practice? NEVILLE-JONES:  Well, it works -- it literally works, you know, in long sessions with individuals.  The basing issues.  Arguing.  Going over the territory.  Coming back to the issue.  And it's hearts-and-minds stuff, but particularly mind stuff.  What is this world about?  I mean, it goes to absolute fundamentals about what people think they're there for. Now, if you start getting somewhere with someone, what you then want to ensure is that they've got a job, that actually they feel their family has a future.  So there are a whole series of other things that need to accompany that.  So you start not just change the mindset, but also reintegrate.  So multiagency working can be very important in this. LINDSAY:  Okay.   At this point, Minister, I'd like to bring the audience into our conversation here.  I would ask you to please wait for the microphone, and when you get a microphone, to please speak into it.  Please stand, state your name and affiliation.  And I would ask people keep their questions concise and short and that there be a question so we can do as many of these as possible. Yes, sir.  I promised the minister I will keep her on schedule. QUESTIONER:  Madam Minister, Arnaud de Borchgrave, CSIS.  What can you tell us about the 400,000 Pakistanis who go back and forth between the U.K. and FATA or other parts of Pakistan?  And how does one persuade those people vis-a-vis those who live in England permanently and never go back to Pakistan? NEVILLE-JONES:  Quite right, the single largest Muslim community in the U.K. is subcontinental.  And there is a lot of modern communication and modern travel, means there's a lot of coming and going.  We should be quite clear that it is a tiny, tiny fraction of those people who travel backwards and forwards who are up to no good.  And if you ask the average Pakistani-origin Brit, what do you think about that, they will give you the answer, this isn't -- we don't want to have anything to do with this.  That's absolutely clear. What we have to establish, however, is the willingness of individuals actually to come and say there is a problem here, we think we've got a -- we've got a problem in our local community.  And that's the gap that we have to bridge.  And it does happen.  It does happen.  Some of the most important pieces of information that the authorities have ever received in the U.K. have come from individuals in the Pakistan community.  And that's precisely what we want to encourage. So I think it is.  It's a feeling that I can be (onside ?).  I don't need to be -- I'm not -- I'm neither going to be neutral nor am I going to be with these guys.  I'm going to be (onside ?) with the rest of society.  That's the bit that we've got to try and accomplish. I think -- I have to say that I do think we've got a real opportunity at the moment.  I mean, if you look at what's going on in the Middle East, there's a huge tide there that we ought to be able to do something about.  It's preaching to -- the kind of -- it's -- of messages that we want to get across, that Islam, Western values, can ride together.   So I think that part of -- you know, part of our -- the way we go about this also, of course, is the way we interpret the world to our own -- to our own societies and how they see how they fit in. So I think foreign policy -- and I'm -- you know, there's too much -- we don't have enough time to go into all of these issues, but foreign policy and how government both explains and defends its foreign policy, I mean, is quite an important part of overall mindset, and it particularly applies when it comes to an issue like Pakistan. The British government is very, very clear that we have a strategic relationship with the Pakistan government in a cooperative enterprise against terrorism.  So we don't set them as -- you know, as our opponents.  We set them as our partners, and they are indeed.  It's a difficult task between us, as we know. So I think that we -- I think we got our messaging right on that.  We just have to get that little bit more link-up where people say:  Right, I think there's something wrong here; I'm going to go and talk to the -- going to go and talk to the -- I'm going to go and talk to the imam, and the imam I know will go and do what's necessary. LINDSAY:  OK.  Sir. QUESTIONER:  Hello.  My name's Timothy Reuter (sp). And I've heard you say just now two things that sound to me a little bit like they might be in tension with each other.  One is, you talked about the narrative that al-Qaida and other organizations put forward -- NEVILLE-JONES:  Yes. QUESTIONER:  -- that, first, Muslims are embattled and under attack around the world and, second, that the proper response is a violent one.  And now you just talked about the fact that Britain has a strategic relationship with the Pakistani government.  So how do you take apart the narrative that you talked about for those who believe that the Pakistani government is part of what's oppressing Muslims in that part of the world?  And now we've said that you have an explicit policy of backing them on at least a number of issues, so how do you sort that out and explain it?  Thank you very much. NEVILLE-JONES:  Well, having a strategic relationship with a government doesn't mean that you necessarily, you know, endorse or back every single thing that happens under the roof of that country.  I think on the other hand, though, I would defend very vigorously the Pakistani government in its attempts to deal with terrorism on its own soil.  I think it faces a very, very difficult problem, and their difficulties are not going to be dealt with with -- you know, with -- at all easily.  And it's part of our -- you know, part of our policy to try and help. The situation in Pakistan is very -- is very -- obviously very complex.  Because it's very complex, though, and because it's difficult, it is precisely why on the whole you need to try and help.  And we help in all sorts of ways, including of course helping the underlying structures of Pakistan society.  We put a lot of money into education, we put a lot of money into trying actually to make the underpinning of Pakistan such that, you know, both education and economic activity are available to more people.  I mean, these are absolute fundamentals for getting -- you know, for getting a stable society in that part of the world.  And it's an important part of our policy.  And I don't think we see any contradiction between, you know, that kind of long-term -- like I said in my speech, there are no quick wins in this -- that kind of long-term support and a -- and working together, you know, against violence. LINDSAY:  I think we have time for one more question.  Now, before I take the question, I want to remind everybody that this session is on the record. And in fairness, I'm going to go to the back of the room, since the first two questions came to the front, and the young lady all the way at the end, last row. QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  Cambria Hamburg, with the Department of State. What is the U.K. government's approach to engaging with allies, moderate voices in the Muslim community -- or maybe some not so moderate voices, but nevertheless leaders who, you know, espouse a nonviolent approach but maybe do support a Salafi ideology?  Thank you. NEVILLE-JONES:  I didn't entirely hear it, but I think it's a question about the attitudes of nonviolent Islamism; is that right? QUESTIONER:  (Off mic.) NEVILLE-JONES:  Yes, well, I think -- I think -- LINDSAY:  Microphone. NEVILLE-JONES:  Clearly, what we are -- what we are concerned with is the transition to violence.  And it's there that we will focus prevent money.  I did make clear, however, that one of the things -- and this is, I think, the difference between ourselves and our predecessors -- is that we do not believe it right to try and work through the agency of those who are themselves on the separatist tendency or extremist in their views and use them as agents simply because they're not violent.  I think we do believe that you can only do this effectively with people who share your values.  And we want, obviously, for that -- and we do believe that -- resources available, that Muslims who share our values will help us and that we will be together in this. But we're not, I think, partisans of the notion that somehow you can easily get the right result by trying to work through the agency of those who themselves don't share your value systems.  And it goes, obviously, to your analysis partly of how you think the relationship between extremism and extreme values and values that aren't ours and actual -- the actual espousal of violence works.  And we don't trust the notion that somehow you can -- you can effectively deal with preventing and discouraging people from violence working through those who are not of the -- of your own value system. LINDSAY:  Minister, I know you have a very busy schedule today.  I want to say on behalf of all of the sponsors of today's event thank you very much for giving (up such strong thoughts ?).  (Applause.) NEVILLE-JONES:  Thank you.  Thank you for giving me the opportunity.  (Applause.) I'm very pleased -- very pleased to have had the opportunity to come.  Thank you. #### ®FC¯END ®FL¯     .STX     (C) COPYRIGHT 2011, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA.  ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.  ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED.   UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION.   FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.  NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES.   FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR E-MAIL [email protected].   THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. -------------------------  
  • United Kingdom
    UK and U.S. Approaches in Countering Radicalization: Intelligence, Communities, and the Internet
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    On Friday, April 1, 2011, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies, and King's College London's International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation will hold a day-long, multisession symposium on the issue of Islamist radicalization. The symposium, to be held at CFR's office in Washington, DC, aims to bring together leading officials and experts from the United Kingdom and the United States to take stock, exchange best practices, and develop fresh ideas for tackling some of the most important issues in the current debate. The symposium, currently scheduled from 8:30 a.m. to 4:45 p.m., will feature keynote addresses by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Jane Holl Lute and UK Minister of State for Security and Counterterrorism Pauline Neville-Jones, as well as panel discussions on trends and developments related to radicalization, the role of the intelligence community, promoting community engagement, and countering online radicalization. **A detailed agenda is below. Please note there have been some changes to the program since the initial announcement.** 8:30 – 9:00 a.m. - Registration and Breakfast Reception 9:00 – 9:15 a.m. - Welcoming Remarks James Lindsay, Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair, Council on Foreign Relations 9:15 – 10:15 a.m. - UK Keynote Pauline Neville-Jones, Minister of State for Security and Counterterrorism, Home OfficePresider: James Lindsay, Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair, Council on Foreign Relations 10:15 – 10:25 a.m. - Break 10:25 – 11:25 a.m. - Panel One: Violent Radicalization – Key Trends and Developments John Scarlett, Former Chief, British Secret Intelligence ServiceJuan Zarate, Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Former Deputy National Security Adviser for Combatting TerrorismPresider: Eric Schmitt, Terrorism and National Security Correspondent, New York Times **This session is not for attribution.** 11:25 – 11:35 a.m. - Break 11:35 – 12:35 p.m. - Panel Two: Intelligence and Counter-Radicalization Charles Allen, Principal, Chertoff Group; Former Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and AnalysisWilliam Bratton, Former Chief of Police, Los Angeles Police Department; Chairman, Kroll, Altegrity, Inc.Peter Clarke, Former Head, Counterterrorism Command, New Scotland Yard, and UK National Coordinator of Terrorist InvestigationsPresider: Dina Temple-Raston, Counterterrorism Correspondent, NPR 12:35 – 1:10 p.m. - Lunch 1:10 – 2:10 p.m. - U.S. Keynote: "Community Partnerships to Counter Violent Extremism" Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland SecurityPresider: Bruce Hoffman, Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University 2:10 – 2:20 p.m. - Break 2:20 – 3:20 p.m. - Panel Three: "Reaching Out" – Promoting Community Engagement Ed Husain, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign RelationsSuhail Khan, Former Adviser, George W. Bush AdministrationMunira Mirza, Adviser to the Mayor of London Abdal Ullah, Councillor, Tower Hamlets; Former Member, London Metropolitan Police AuthorityPresider: Craig Whitlock, National Security Correspondent, Washington Post 3:20 – 3:30 p.m. - Break 3:30 – 4:30 p.m. - Panel Four: "New Frontiers" – Countering Online Radicalization Shahed Amanullah, Founder, altmuslim.com; Senior Adviser for Technology, U.S. Department of StateDaniel Kimmage, Group Director for Digital Presence, Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, U.S. Department of StateShiraz Maher, Associate Fellow, International Centre for the Study of RadicalisationWilliam McCants, Founder, jihadica.com; Senior Adviser, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of StatePresider: Peter Neumann, Director, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation; Visiting Fellow, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University 4:30 – 4:45 p.m. - Closing Remarks Steven Simon, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
  • United Kingdom
    U.S. Keynote: Community Partnerships to Counter Violent Extremism
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    This session was part of the symposium, UK and U.S. Approaches in Countering Radicalization: Intelligence, Communities, and the Internetwhich was cosponsored with Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies and King’s College London’s International Centre for the Study of RadicalisationThis event was made possible by Georgetown University's George T. Kalaris Intelligence Studies Fund and the generous support of longtime CFR member Rita E. Hauser. Additionally, this event was organized in cooperation with the CFR’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. BRUCE HOFFMAN: Welcome to the afternoon session of the conference and to the second keynote of the day. Before I introduce Deputy Secretary Jane Lute, let me again remind you to please turn off all BlackBerrys, cell phones, pagers -- not just put them to vibrate but turn them completely off, because otherwise they interfere with the sound system. Let me also remind you that this particular session is on the record, but when you ask questions, please do not refer to the session earlier in the day that was off the record. That would be greatly appreciated. The title of this session is "Community Partnerships to Counter Violent Extremism." And I'd be hard pressed to think of someone better to make that presentation than the deputy secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security, Jane Lute. I have to say that Deputy Secretary Lute has had the type of distinguished career that I know our students at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown aspire to and indeed that many of their professors dream of. She served in the United States Army with distinction, including in Operation Desert Storm. She subsequently went on to serve twice with the National Security Council under the first President Bush and also under President Clinton. She was the executive director of the Carnegie Commission's -- the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. She subsequently went on to be an assistant secretary at the United Nations and is now in the -- in her current position as deputy secretary of Homeland Security. Deputy Secretary Lute, welcome and thank you very much. (Applause.) DEPUTY SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY JANE HOLL LUTE: Well, thanks very much. It's great to be back at the council, and it's extraordinary to see the new surroundings. And it tells you how long it's been since I've been with the council in Washington that I didn't even know you were here. But it's really beautiful. It's great to see Jim and to share a stage with Bruce. I don't think any of us know anything about terrorism or about countering terrorism that we haven't learned from Bruce. And so on behalf of all of us, thanks for what you've done throughout your career. It's particularly interesting and exciting and not a very usual opportunity for me these past couple of years to have a chance to sit down and talk with scholars and practitioners, with policymakers and journalists and operators all in the same room. And that for me is the most exciting opportunity for conversation, for discussion and for learning. I have had the privilege in my life to work with some of the most extraordinary scholars, practitioners, operators, journalists that this country, in fact the world, has to offer. My (doctoral) father when I was at Stanford was Alexander George, a giant not only in the field of political science but as a human being. He, along with David Hamburg, Cy Vance, so many others taught me a long about what it means to do well in this business and also taught me maybe the most fundamental lesson is that it's possible to do this work and be kind -- (soft laughter) -- something you don't learn from everybody you interact with every day, let me tell you. But part of the reason I like it so much is because they -- scholars and practitioners -- scholars and operators ask each other a different set of questions, but the questions merge in really interesting ways. Scholars always want to know why. Why do people take up violence to advance their cause? Why can some people or why do some people position themselves at the very center of their faith, yet espouse what are clearly marginal or even the ragged edge of the faith and a mis- or maladaptation of that faith, yet occupy the center and claim for themselves the very custodians of the doctrinal core? Why can they do that? Why do they do that? Why do they justify killing in the name of their faith? Operators, on the other hand -- and I consider myself an operator -- ask themselves what. What are -- what is it about their circumstances that we don't understand? What is it about the journey that these individuals take that we have not yet successfully been able to map? What is the problem? What can be done about it? You might even ask, I suppose -- and many people do -- you know, given life's complexity and the pressures of everyday life not only in the United States but around the world, why don't we see more of this; why don't we see more people pursuing violence? Yet we don't see it. Why not? What is working in our society that allows so many of us to manage conflict, differences, stresses and pressures in relative peace? Some of you know me. It's great to see your faces here. I've learned so much in my career. Things that I've been able to achieve are largely due to the influence that you've had on me. Mistakes I've made -- it's probably because I haven't been paying as close attention as I should have throughout my career. But these have been the kinds of questions that have interested me my whole life long. I started out my career as a soldier, as Bruce mentioned. That was a long time ago. 1976, I went to basic training. I'm married to a soldier, just recently retired. I believe deeply in the calling of a soldier. I love being a soldier. I love my country, but it's not even a hundred years ago that my grandparents came to this country. Yet you wouldn't mistake me for anything except an American straight out of central casting. (Chuckles.) Just ask my staff. But it's true that these questions are so deeply interesting, motivating for me not only as a -- as a former soldier and one who believes deeply in the values of this country but also someone who has spent a fair amount of time thinking and writing about war: how wars end, why they end when they do, why they don't end sooner, why factors seem to combine to prevent wars from ending, and how you prevent the emergence and spread and resumption of violence once a peace has been achieved. I will be committed throughout my life to the prevention of deadly conflict, to peacekeeping and peace building. How do you restore societies in the aftermath of violence, and how do you prevent that violence from returning? Over the course of my career, I've learned there are a lot of mythologies about conflict and war. And for those of you who've studied it, you know that there are these mythologies. For example, we call a conflict religious or ethnic, thinking somehow that that tells us why people are violent. It doesn't tell us anything about why people are violent. It tells us why they're different, tells us why they might not get along very much, but it doesn't tell us nearly anything about why they've decided to kill each other over their differences. Poverty -- cause of violence? Rich people will kill each other, too. Poverty is one of the mythologies about conflict. I'll talk a little bit about it later. The role of government -- mythology: government's the most important actor in conflict. Mythology: government is irrelevant to conflict and violence. A lot of theories in general about why there is violence in the world and a lot of theories about violent extremism; far fewer theories to my taste about how we can prevent this kind of violence, how we can prevent the emergence of violent extremism. How does this matter to the homeland and to homeland security? We're not immune in the United States to the kind of violence and violent extremism that you have been talking about over the course of this conference. Dozens have been arrested over the past two years. Indeed, we know there are people who are present in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, elsewhere around Europe, North America, who align themselves with the ideology and the operations of al-Qaida and other violent extremists. Through constant vigilance, effective law enforcement, information sharing, community partnerships, we've uncovered a number of plots, and we continue to do that. And we know this will be well known to you, some of them. Najibullah Zazi intended to bomb the New York subway. Daniel Patrick Boyd intended to murder soldiers in North Carolina. There are others -- some we have not caught in time: David Headley, associated with the attacks -- more than associated, a planner and instrumental agent in the attacks on Mumbai; Faisal Shahzad, the man who would have tried to blow up Times Square, who did try. We know al-Qaida is actively recruiting. They've got hip language. They're plugged into social media. They are persistent. We have to be equally persistent and alert, because unlike plots overseas, plots originating closer to home will likely have shorter tails, few obvious signs and little or no warning. So what are our tools? What are our strategies? How do we address this potential for violent extremism? We have expertise and we have experience. And those of you who know me know that I think that there's a big difference between expertise and experience, and we need to bring the two of them together. Our theory, our strategy in dealing with terrorism has been to find them and fix them abroad -- to find terrorists and fix them in the military sense, find them and fix them abroad. This has been our existing approach. The danger originates abroad. The threat evolves over time. Our familiar tools for doing this -- robust intelligence, active military operations and our partnerships with international partners in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, elsewhere -- these are the tools we use to combat terrorism and fight it, find them, fix them far away from us. But as I have learned, over the course of the past two years, after having spent the previous 30 years deeply embedded in the national security community of this country and, in fact, in the international security community, homeland security is really very different. It is certainly a part of national security, but it is very different. And it has been exceedingly interesting to me to see the differences. How do we combat violent extremism in the homeland? Are these tools -- intelligence, military operations, international partnerships -- the tools that we must use in the homeland? We have different tools here. I'll talk a little bit about them. We have border tools. We have law enforcement tools. We have information, information sharing, intelligence certainly. And we have the American public, including those parts of the public who serve in public service every day, nearly 800,000 men and women of law enforcement at the state and local level. We want to use their experience -- we want to use all of our experience -- to recognize behavior and preparation that indicate trouble, and we want to use our knowledge and expertise to craft the kinds of effective interventions that prevent this trouble, prevent the emergence of violence. Well, who is we? As I mentioned, it's all of us. Certainly in Homeland Security, we think we have a special responsibility here, and it's not a responsibility that is new to us. Indeed, the department is now eight years old. The work that we've been doing, over the past two years, is built on the work that has gone on before, and built, in fact, on work that's gone on before the events of 9/11 and the founding of the Department of Homeland Security. What are we trying to do in DHS? What do we think our vision is -- our mission is? Well, we say the following. What we're trying to do is build the safe, secure and resilient place where the American way of life can thrive -- safe, secure, resilient place where the American way of life can thrive. How do we do that? We think we have five core missions. The first and foremost, of course, is to prevent another terrorist attack like 9/11, prevent terrorist attacks of any kind. We need to secure our borders, enforce our immigration laws, ensure our cybersecurity. We think this is key and essential to a safe and secure and resilient homeland. And we need to build national resilience. But we know, in DHS, that we can't do all that needs doing by ourselves, certainly. There's an important role for the leaders, for the officials, for law enforcement and for citizens who are closest to the communities -- because they know best, who they are, what their strengths, values, capabilities are and equally what their -- what their vulnerabilities and shortcoming are. And they know first when trouble is about to start or is unfolding. To support them in the area of preventing violent extremism, we're going to pursue in our department a two-part strategy. In fact, it's already begun. On the one hand, we want to break down barriers that isolate and marginalize communities, and on the other hand we want to strengthen law enforcement to identify and prevent violent acts before they occur. How do we break down barriers? Well, first and foremost, we might stop by miniaturizing people, by reducing people to a single version of their identity that we think is important or that we think is defining. In fact, one of the things -- one of the great things about being an American is that you can be multiple things. You can have your ethnic identity, your religious affiliation and your social set of engagements all at the same time, and they can coexist, and they are each at least as defining as any single one of them would be. And I think, at a minimum, as the president began in his Cairo speech, and certainly has said before that and since, the cultural diversity of this country is a richness and a strength, and one that we cannot only build on, it's one we can also rely on. We want to pursue breaking down barriers that isolate communities by engaging with local leaders, with state and local law enforcement, policy leaders, social leaders, religious leaders as well. We're going to do this with partnerships, again, because the Department of Homeland Security can't do all that needs doing -- partnership with other federal agencies, partnerships with the private sector, partnerships with NGOs and, again, at all levels of life in the United States. We're advancing programs for new immigrants so that they can broadly embrace their new society and so -- and equally importantly so that their new society can broadly embrace them. Both have to happen. On the other hand, we want to strengthen state and local law enforcement to allow them to do both of their jobs, which is to uphold the rule of law and to serve the people. We're going to do this through advocacy, through convening, sharing of best practice and sharing of knowledge, information, intelligence, where it's appropriate, through the fusion centers that we've been working on and establishing, jointly with the FBI and other federal agencies, through the Joint Terrorism Task Forces. But this is really about reaching down to communities, giving them the kind of training that they need to recognize and connect them to what we have learned about the habits of violent extremists, these groups, al-Qaida and others, and what this might mean for activities closer to them. You know that Secretary Napolitano has, over the course of the past year, been speaking around the country and talking about the importance of a program that we know from New York City, "See Something, Say Something," which is designed to involve people in the circumstances that are around them. If something is odd and wrong, it's probably odd and wrong. Bring it to the attention of folks who can do something about it. We've built out the suspicious activity reporting database together with the FBI, and we are learning where there are patterns emerging that are troubling and indicate that early action is required. We want to support and sustain these efforts through grant-making and through our continual engagement with state and local law enforcement officials. In other words, we want to expand our engagement and support for information-driven community-oriented policing, including -- and importantly, based on strategies that have been successful at preventing violent crime in the past. A lot of people, over the course of my career, have been looking at violent conflict, have been looking at violent extremism, and they often, when they are looking at this phenomenon, examine the discontent of the unfortunate -- the desperately poor, the chronically oppressed. But many of the young who are attracted to the ideology and the message of extremism are by any measure fortunate. So what is at the heart of the discontent of the fortunate? Is it a lack of opportunity, voice, freedom? A lack of respect? A lack of dignity, value and meaning? This is not the agenda of the terrorist. This is not what the terrorists want. They don't want these things. When it comes to violent extremism, they want our youth. So we must be vigilant and alive to our responsibilities to prevent their success. Certainly we have to -- and will -- enforce our laws and support efforts to prevent the development of and growth of violent extremists. And we have to break down barriers. We must break down barriers that isolate and marginalize community, and work to create a homeland where all of us -- and that means each of us -- can pursue the American way of life and thrive. Thanks very much. (Applause.) HOFFMAN: Thank you very much, Deputy Secretary. Let me begin by referring actually to the title of this conference, which is of course "U.K. and U.S. Approaches to Countering Radicalization." And we've heard often this morning, in the on-the-record sessions, how the U.K. does it differently. For some years they've had a defined strategy, CONTEST. They've had an arm of that strategy that specifically is oriented towards counter-radicalization, which is Prevent. They have a specific agency that has the lead, the Home Office, and even a specific office within that, Charles Farr's Office of Security and Counterterrorism. Now I know we've done it differently, and we've done it by learning some of the lessons from the U.K. that apply to the United States. I wonder if you could discuss how DHS has taken that on board and applied some of these lessons. LUTE: So we've had a very robust dialogue with the Brits over the course not only of the past two years but certainly beyond that. I would say a couple of things. One, which is obvious, is there -- no one size fits all. They are working with and adapting programs for their communities, their population, in all of its richness and history. We've taken a different approach, not least because we're -- we are so extraordinarily different, notwithstanding the fact that we share very fundamentally norms and values and even some of that history. One of the most interesting things to me over the past couple of years is the degree to which the Department of Homeland Security and Home Offices, not only in the U.K. but around the world, have kind of discovered each other and have opened up a dialogue about how they are doing business, the challenges that they are facing, as ministries of interior, Home Offices, Department of Homeland Security. And this dialogue is extraordinarily rich and extraordinarily exciting. It's also extraordinarily operational. The Department of Homeland Security is a deeply operational department. Nearly 400,000 people come to work every day. Five thousand of them are at headquarters and the rest are deployed in the operating agencies. And similarly around the world, including with the Home Office, there are things that they do every day. So in the question of violent extremism and the program of Prevent which the U.K. is evolving now and taking a different approach, we continue to share best practices and really look -- share information and look at the best way for each of us, governments at the national level, to engage with state and locals and with communities, in order to achieve the same effect. HOFFMAN: Well, following on from that, in terms of the sharing of information, I think something we heard this morning as well is the importance of sharing information between federal, state and local authorities. How can DHS be the glue, in essence, that holds this process together, especially when there are multiple federal agencies in the United States involved in counterterrorism but especially in counter-radicalization? LUTE: So this is -- there's also another very interesting thing for me, as somebody who's spent their whole career in national security. I mentioned that homeland security is very different. I mean, national security is about all of us. Homeland security is about each of us. National security is strategic, centralized, top-driven. Homeland security is decentralized, operational and driven from the grass roots up. And so -- we recognize this in DHS, and while we -- you used the phrase "glue," I think, in a way, what we're trying to do is empower state and locals and underscore and support community-based policing, the engagement of community leaders. We have fusion centers. We also have partnerships with the FBI, Department of Justice, Health and Human Services, other departments, so that we can create a responsive federal structure that helps build capable communities and through -- both at that vertical and horizontal engagement, I think, provide some of that glue, but we don't think by any means we're the whole story. HOFFMAN: Let me ask one more question before we open it up to the floor. I was very taken with the beginning of your presentation, when you sort of fell back on your role at the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and were talking about the diversity of the roots of violent extremism and indeed of violence, the reasons why someone is driven or motivated to pick up a gun or to throw a bomb. Given that we understand that this is highly -- you know, very much of an individual phenomena in many respects, but of course is being propagated and the motivation is coming from organizations with a particular agenda -- but given the diversity, can we have any metrics? I mean, is countering violent extremism amenable to any kind of meaningful metrics that we can actually determine progress? Or is this something that rather we just have to do as a good and because it's one of the only things we know that we can do to stop this? LUTE: This is a -- this is a fascinating discussion, and one -- why in part it's so important to have scholars and practitioners come together. Practitioners or operators are dealing with the immediate every single day, and it's a -- it's a luxury to have a long-term view. It's a necessity to have short-term view, to be able to see -- discern trends within the immediate or -- among the immediate things that you're observing. And so first and foremost, we probably have to understand what it is. Are we looking at a match, a flicker or a flare? Or are we looking at a flame? There are some expressions of violence where people act out their frustrations or their evil intentions, as an individual act of anger and evil. There are other acts that -- that's a flicker or a flame. Does it have wider implications for us as a society? Are there larger lessons to draw? We should make those judgments as we look at these incidents. There are some incidences that are more like flares. They have a wider effect. They're more visible to others. They're seen and interpreted to be bigger and more important than a -- than a flash expression of anger or hatred. And then there are flames. There are flames that are both fueling and fueled by causes larger than the individual act, and their aim is to reject the system, to reject the established order, to reject the rule of law. And we need, I think -- and we need the help of scholars here, certainly informed by the practice of the operators, people who are dealing with law enforcement, dealing at our borders every single day, to know what it is we're looking at. HOFFMAN: Thank you. Well, let me open up the floor to questions. Let me remind you again this session is on the record. Please don't refer to previous sessions that were not. And may I ask you also to stand and state your name and affiliation. The floor is open. Yes, sir. QUESTIONER: (Inaudible) -- Georgetown University and DHS. You spoke about the partnership with the private sector. What do you see as the role of the private sector at the community level and in social networking, especially among the telecommunication companies? LUTE: I -- rather than assign responsibilities, what we're doing in DHS is opening a dialogue. Our -- it's not immediately germane, but you mentioned telecommunications companies. We have a very robust dialogue and partnership with the telecommunications companies in cyber, for example. They -- companies have over the course of the past decade or more begun to develop a set of -- a sense of social responsibility engagement with the local communities. What we simply want to know is, we want companies themselves to equip themselves with the knowledge for national resilience, be able to contribute to the See Something, Say Something campaign, and also to be pillars of support for the broader development of the societies within which they live and work, and draw employees and contribute in return. And so this is -- you know, I -- (you stole my kids ?). You know, life doesn't happen in the passive voice -- unless it does. There is no more opportunity for passive-voice engagement in life today. We all need to play a part. HOFFMAN: Yes, Arnaud. Microphone's coming. QUESTIONER: Arnaud de Borchgrave, CSIS. You mentioned that you were kind of puzzled about violence. But if one pictured a Pakistan, which is probably the most dangerous country in the world today, you have between 100(,000) and 500,000 youngsters that graduate from the madrassas where they've been taught to hate America. You have highly educated people in Pakistan who are convinced that the CIA and Mossad did 9/11 -- these are people who come out of universities in the Western world. So when you listen to all of this -- and I spent a lot of time in and out of Pakistan -- one understands immediately where violence springs from. LUTE: I -- I'm tempted to say "wrong lute." (Laughter.) I certainly understand, and I understand what you're saying. I have -- I don't think there's any doubt about the intention of many of the violent extremists. There is no -- there is no doubt. We need to know more about what works. We need to know more about the signs of trouble as it's brewing, to prevent that trouble from becoming violent. And the scholars need to continue to tell us more about the kinds of remedies that eliminate the attractiveness of these extremist ideologies. We think we know something about that, in terms of promulgating our own norms, our values; living them every day; enfranchising people in the opportunities and promise of freedom, of representative governance, of market economic activity available to all, of the power and strength of the rule of law that is renewed through the voices of all of us, not just a few of us. I mean, we know that. But I think there is still a lot we don't know. HOFFMAN: Burton. QUESTIONER: Burton Gerber, of Georgetown University. Thank you for coming today. We've heard a lot today about what we should be doing, what we want to do and so forth. Can you give us -- share with us some things that you -- not you, deputy secretary, but your organization -- in the past several years has done and has shown marked improvement in protecting the United States, and a couple of things that you'd like to do but you just don't see how you're ever going to achieve it? LUTE: So what -- again, we've built on the experience of the previous years of the department in its standup and formative years. More concretely with respect to this particular problem of preventing violent extremism has been our building out and working with state and local authorities on the fusion centers, engaging with training, with the big-city chiefs and with other state and local law enforcement officials, to really strengthen their hand in recognizing some of the signs and some of the patterns and precursive steps or preparatory steps to violent conflict, and bring that expertise that we've developed with what might be called, perhaps not altogether accurately, a traditional approach to counterterrorism through intelligence, military operations and our international partnerships, and bring that -- lessons learned, knowledge, expertise -- and put that in the hands, appropriately, of state and local fusion centers, state and local law enforcement, policy leaders, community leaders as well. That has been a big effort of ours to engage with the department. One of the striking things about homeland security is that it is very -- it's very much a unity of effort, not a unity of command, model. It's a unity of effort model that will take all of us in various parts of the community, and all leaders. There have been other things. Again, through our grantmaking program, we want to sustain fusion centers and really establish them as information platforms and sources of decision-making available to the states and the major municipalities, to be able to respond to all contingencies when they arise. That's one example. The to-do list in homeland security is pretty long, so -- (chuckles) -- so I don't know that -- I'll think about one of the things that -- nothing's impossible. And you don't get -- anybody who's lived through the events of 1989 doesn't get to say anything's impossible. If you've lived through 9/11, you don't get to say anything's impossible. So I don't ever say that. But there are sure some things that are harder than others. HOFFMAN: Could I actually jump in and follow up on that? One of the -- I think one of the big differences is -- certainly 10 years after 9/11, is we have the Department of Homeland Security. We've undertaken massive intelligence reform as well. We have the fusion centers, as you describe. But what about in terms of the American public and our resilience? Do you think that the American public now is more resilient; in Lee Hamilton's words, that we can take a punch better now than we could have 10 years ago? And what has DHS been doing in that respect in reaching out to communities not necessarily with radicalization, extremism, but preparing the American public to have a more realistic appreciation of the threat and of the risks? LUTE: I think this country is stronger. I think we are fundamentally secure in the basic knowledge that we can defend ourselves. This country can defend itself, and we continue to have a lot worth defending. We have strengthened our faith in each other, moreover, and that's been an extraordinary thing to see over the past 10 years. The "See Something, Say Something" campaign is a small illustration of that. It hasn't taken people off the deep edge. It has caused the important raising of concerns about behavior that is -- that is anomalous and strange, and given law enforcement the opportunity to look at incidents. It has resulted in the effective prevention of potentially dangerous and violent acts. And so it's -- that's just, again, one illustration. But I think there's no question that this country is stronger and safer for the efforts that have been undertaken -- again, not just by the department but by all of us. HOFFMAN: Yes. Over there. QUESTIONER: Kevin Sheehan, ORIX Ventures. Good to see you, Deputy Secretary. LUTE: We were children together. (Laughs, laughter.) QUESTIONER: While engagement with the Muslim community particularly is certainly key, that at best is going to allow us to perhaps to -- perhaps delay and certainly identify radicals who identify themselves to those communities. So, for example, young men who are playing basketball in one quarter and are wearing Islamic garb and quoting Said Qutub in the next would -- you would hope that the community would identify those individuals. But what happens if Islamic terrorist organizations begin to develop a stronger sense of operational security and act more like KSM did prior to 9/11 and train their -- train their recruits to stay away from those communities and not give up obvious signs of radicalization? Have we thought about that? Anything we can do to deal with that particular threat? LUTE: You know, it's great to see you, Kevin. We really were children together. (Chuckles.) We started our Army careers together a long time ago. You know, we -- what we know is we have a persistent, adaptive adversary, and they are not spending all their money taking out billboards and advertising their next moves. We have a -- we have in some cases a strategy that depends on their -- our knowing who they are. And what if we don't? What if they use individuals who are previously unknown? What are the signs? What are the behaviors? What are the preparations? What are the elements of preparation? An old friend of mine used to say, you know, every hurricane has a warning; not all warnings yield hurricanes. But we live in an age when we may have hurricanes without warnings, in the sense of violent extremism. But someone knows. And what we want to do is when people who are closest who know, who have concerns can raise their hand and bring these concerns to the attention of folks who will take -- who will take the appropriate steps. We don't want vigilantism. We don't want the kinds of worst excesses that we could imagine when people see strange garb or engage -- or don't understand behaviors that they might be observing. That's why it's so essential that we take the knowledge, experience and expertise that we have learned from fighting terrorism abroad, bring it here, engage in a consistent and open channel of dialogue with state and local authorities also to learn what they know. If something is wrong to a local law enforcement officer, it's probably wrong, but they may not in all cases know just how wrong it is, because the anomalous behavior or the worrying signs that they see may not fit in their particular circumstance but would fit an understanding of a terrorist pattern of action. And we want to put those pieces of the puzzle together to prevent and use what law enforcement knows every day about preventing violent crime so that we can succeed here, too. HOFFMAN: Mitzi. Over here. QUESTIONER: Deputy Secretary, I'm Mitzi Wertheim with the Naval Postgraduate School. I'm a social anthropologist by training, so I find myself thrilled to hear you talk about individuals and how individuals are an important piece, because in my defense world, it's all about large numbers. What -- has the whole department recognized it's about how people think, feel and behave? Is this a revolution in understanding that's occurring? LUTE: I don't know how to answer that. I think what I would say, that people certainly matter. They always have. You know, when you're a -- you know, when you're a soldier and you give part of yourself as an individual to the larger organization, you give it to the -- your country; you give it to the ideals that your people stand for. But what you know is that when it comes down to it, people die one at a time, but people make a difference one at a time as well. And that's -- we can never lose sight of the importance and the power and the -- and the beauty in the contributions of each of us. And so I say, you know, national security really at some level is about all of us. Homeland Security is absolutely about each of us, and each of us have to do our part. HOFFMAN: All the way in the back? QUESTIONER: Dean Godson, Policy Exchange think tank in London. Just viewed -- some of us viewed with interest in London the recent report of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, the -- or the report by Senators Lieberman and Collins on the Fort Hood episode. I've made some critical remarks about the culture, particularly of the Department of Defense and the FBI in respect of spotting telltale signals of Major -- that's major's radicalization who perpetrated, obviously, that killing. I'm just wondering how many of those recommendations, in light of the fact that (there have/they have ?), of course, been the official DOD report, are now going to be integrated more broadly into sort of federal analyses of the kind of signals that should be spotted sooner and sort of having a sort of proper culture of appreciation of those sort of threatening notes that are being sounded early on in the development of someone's radicalization. LUTE: Well, we work very closely, obviously, with our colleagues in Defense and with the bureau, the Department of Justice but equally with the other federal departments. And what you're hearing from me today is that for Homeland Security, a huge part of our reality is what's happening at the state and local level, what's happening at the grassroots of this country, what we're learning about and what we know, frankly, about how law enforcement officials, policy officials, governance officials, community leaders at every level in this country engage with their communities and with their -- the broader context within which they live. There's a -- there's a lot to be learned, and there's a potential for wrong lessons to be learned, and equally we want to be sure that the right lessons are learned. So in terms of the signs, that's what I said earlier. Someone knows -- someone knows that this is trouble. What we need to do is be able to connect the person who knows that trouble is brewing with a responsible and responsive structure to take appropriate action. QUESTIONER: (Off mic.) LUTE: We can -- we can -- you know, why don't we chat about that afterward. HOFFMAN: Yes, up there. QUESTIONER: Mischa Thompson with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I'm struck that Senator Durbin's hearing this week, protecting the civil rights of Muslims, was described as a counter to Representative King's radicalization hearings and its potential to be used as a recruitment tool by extremists. And I was wondering if you could talk more about whether support of international human rights commitments, including anti-discrimination and religious freedom commitments, and civil rights and inclusive democracies at home, are part of your multi-pronged strategy. If so, I was hoping you might be able to list specific examples; and then also how you can promote a strategy when you have high-profile figures in the United States and also abroad pretty much saying that Muslims are unwelcome in Western society. Thank you. LUTE: Well, you certainly won't hear anyone in Homeland Security saying that Muslims are unwelcome in American society. The president himself has set the tone and has been quite specific with respect to the message that this administration is sending on this question. For us in Homeland Security, as we -- when we say we want to build a safe, secure, resilient place where the American way of life can thrive, that way of life is founded on a set of values, on a fundamental belief in freedom, in the value of individual worth. And that extends to all of our citizens. When I mentioned that we want to break down the barriers that isolate and marginalize communities, I mean it. And we want to reach out to our new immigrants and, as I said, encourage them and give them ways and means to broadly embrace their new society, but equally, to have their society broadly embrace them. And so this is an ongoing -- there are no 1.6's, there are no single-shot solutions. This is an ongoing effort. It's part of our culture, it's part of who we are to be a welcoming society, but one -- equally it's part of our culture to be a society based on the rule of law and on the order of that law. QUESTIONER: Charles King, Georgetown University. Are there lessons learned or items that we might take from the experience in dealing with non-Islamic forms of radicalization in the United States? One thinks of the very important work of the Southern Poverty Law Center in dealing with white supremacist groups in the U.S. And if so, what have we learned? If not, what is particular about that adjective, "Islamic," when it comes to radicalization in the U.S.? LUTE: You know, I'll leave it -- I'll leave it to the academics among you to sort out the lexicon. I'm an operator. And certainly those groups -- again, you know, are there flickers, flashes? You know, are there flames? Are there groups committed to the pursuit of violence? Yes. Are they the concern of local law enforcement? Yes. Are we working with them and understand them -- to understand these groups and prevent their intentions from manifesting themselves violently? Yes. QUESTIONER: It's interesting to note that both -- HOFFMAN: Please introduce yourself. QUESTIONER: I'm sorry. (Name inaudible) -- George Mason University. It's interesting to note that both President Bush and President Obama both noted the same threat to the United States. They both stated that the most significant threat to the United States would be the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by a terrorist group. So given that, and given that you're part of Department of Homeland Security, how do you deal with that threat, given the radicalization topic? LUTE: So it certainly is a threat. I mean, if one can imagine it, that is significant. We deal with the -- or we have the responsibility -- immediately we have the office of -- the Domestic Nuclear Detection office, which is really designed to prevent such an event like that from occurring. What would be the strategy and approach to preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons? First and foremost, as the president has said, having some certainty about the nuclear arsenals and materials that are around the world and that might be vulnerable to hostile exploitation and to prevent that from happening, and certainly to take all measures necessary to prevent terrorists from acquiring them or transiting them to the United States or to the West or to any -- frankly, in ways that might imperil any population. And so it's something that we think about and we have responsibilities for, which we obviously accept. QUESTIONER: Alan Schlaifer, Wharton School Club. Given the huge upsurge in digital devices -- our cell phones, our smartphones, iPads and other computers, in the face of the WikiLeaks situation, where a relatively low-level employee exposed massive amounts of documents, where do we stand in meeting your goal of cybersecurity? LUTE: I spend a lot of time on the question of cybersecurity. There are really only two challenges -- securing our identities and securing our information. The rest, as they say, is commentary. (Laughter.) But again, we can't -- we can't do this alone. We are working together in -- I mean, there are things I could talk to you about about the fielding of cybersecurity equipment in the dot-gov space. There are things I could talk to you about in working with the critical infrastructure in the lead agencies in this country, working with the Department of Defense, obviously, very closely, Department of Justice, to ensure that we can make progress in securing our identities and our information. What's our basic theory of the case? Our basic theory of the case is that there is no single-point solution; that this is going to require a broadly distributed system of self-help, where machines and users can activate defenses, supported by smart networks who can recognize, identify and (cabin off ?) hostile signatures, alert the rest of us that trouble is afoot and act at network speed. All of what I just said in the sentence will probably take two or three years, and so both the problems that we will have and the technology that we'll have to deal with those problems in two or three years haven't been invented yet. But this is something that Homeland Security is very much at the leading edge of government on. HOFFMAN: Scott. QUESTIONER: Scott Helfstein, West Point's Combating Terrorism Center. LUTE: Hello. QUESTIONER: Thank you for your remarks today, ma'am. I'm curious. We talked quite a bit about identifying negative trends as they occurred -- the "See Something, Say Something" -- before we get to a critical level. I'm curious what the department's role is in preventing that from even getting to bad things seem to be afoot. So what is the role in sort of the Prevent strategy, whether we call it a counter-narrative or a counter-radicalization? Is there a role for the department to play in that regard? LUTE: Well, when I was -- when I was working on the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, I spent a lot of time thinking about this problem. You know, I began my career as a soldier. I wrote my doctoral dissertation on how wars end. I spent a lot of time thinking about how you might prevent the emergence of mass violence, and I spent a lot of time as a peacekeeper. I'm thinking about peace-building -- so have walked this circle of violent conflict. And a lot of people a lot smarter than me, including the guy I'm sharing the stage with right now, have much smarter answers to your question. People used to say: How do you prevent deadly conflict? What do you need to do? What's the sentence? You want the sentence? The sentence is: Educate young women, employ young men. That's the sentence. Is that the answer? I don't think so. It's not entirely the answer. Or if it is, there's a lot that goes into educating young women and employing young men. There's a lot we know about the high-payoff interventions with adolescent girls, for example. It is the high-payoff intervention for us as a -- as a global society. There's a lot we know about getting to young men. What's the right age? It's between 7 and 9, they say, when you really want to influence the choices that they're going to make later in life. It's really about then when you begin to shape their world view, their understanding; create their sense of opportunities, entitlement and hope. How do we prevent the potential terrorist? There's -- for every individual one, there's an individual story, but there is a counter-narrative. What al-Qaida and other terrorist groups are trying to do is create a sense of community, a sense of belonging, a sense of purpose and meaning. It's the wrong purpose, it's the wrong community, it's the wrong belonging and meaning. And counter-narrative -- living the American way of life, making this a safe, secure, resilient place where all of us can pursue it -- is going to be key to what this department does every day in preventing the emergence of violent extremism. HOFFMAN: Yes. QUESTIONER: Hi. My name is Andy Polk, with Congresswoman Sue Myrick's office. Thanks so much for coming today, and thank you for your work, because we all understand it's very difficult work. The question is, we've been talking a lot today about Muslim communities and law enforcement communities. We haven't really talked much about local thought leaders, be it, you know, journalists or school teachers or local mayors. If you look at the Dutch system, what they did was when they set up their national counter-radicalization strategy it was pushed from the bottom up. So local mayors went to the Dutch national government and said: We need help with this issue. I feel like today in America we're kind of seeing a top-down approach, to where we're pushing it down. And I'm wondering what kind of resistance you're getting on this, what kind of response you're getting, especially with tight budgets and priorities on other issues. LUTE: So that's what I mean when I say homeland security is a bottom-up phenomenon. We are all about the states, the municipalities, the communities. And our role is to help create a responsible and responsive federal piece of the puzzle. But we by no means think we have all the answers. We believe in community-based policing, we believe in the power of community leaders of all -- in all sectors of life. And we have and we are building robust dialogues with all of them on all of these questions. Our Civil Rights/Civil Liberties Office, for example, is out there every single day, meeting with them, taking with them, understanding not only the grievances that they have, but the frustrations and opportunities -- not because the solutions lie within the Department of Homeland Security; they usually don't. But to provide a forum for convening advocacy along the lines that the president and the secretary certainly have spoken about publicly numerous times. And that's the aim that we're trying to pursue: precisely that joining of local knowledge and local sense of responsibility with additional knowledge, best practice, training and opportunities to sustain that over the long term. HOFFMAN: Yes, the woman in the back. QUESTIONER: Nancy Bearg, from Project on National Security Reform in George Washington University. LUTE: Nancy, hi. QUESTIONER: Hi, Jane. I was glad to hear you use the term "unity of effort," and talking about horizontal and vertical efforts. And you've addressed this to some extent, but I wanted to ask what do you need in this regard? How is that going, in terms of the U.S. -- the federal government and the efforts with the states? Are there particularly good practices that you're instituting, such as intergovernmental teams or special teams or whatever? But are there things you need that would help you enhance this further? LUTE: So we meet at a federal level, at the interagency level, all the time, and share what each of us happen to be doing with the constituencies with which we normally interact on a day-to-day level. And here it's important to realize that this is not just the security agencies coming together. You know, I've mentioned Health and Human Services. For example, the Department of Education; they have liaisons and relationships, and bringing their understanding. You know, what is it that we can bring into the schools, for example, to equip people with the knowledge, information and awareness that they need, to be alert for signs? Again, our focus is on the community level, both to break down the barriers and to strengthen the hand of local law enforcement, capitalizing on their extraordinary ability to prevent violent crime. New ideas are coming in every day, and so there are many portals and opportunities to bring that into the mix. We've met with mayors, and we're going to continue to do that, both to understand the problem as they understand it and to see the needs that they have at the local level. It's very much coming back to this question about, you know, bottom-driven or driven from the ground up -- very much a feature of how we're approaching this. HOFFMAN: Time for one last question. I'm going to break, then -- probably dangerously -- with CFR protocol, and ask it -- (laughter) -- because I've been dying to ask someone in authority this question. We've just recently had the fifth issue of Inspire magazine, and in your opinion, is this something that really is a revolution in terrorist communications, or are we getting needlessly spun up because it's in the English language and we can understand it? LUTE: So I'd -- you know, any time we see this level and kind of appeal, with this kind of a message -- any time? Is this the first time? Is this the first time more of us are paying attention? There's no question it's slick, it's hip, it's connecting at a level with the kind of granularity and information that can lead and encourage people to pursue those means. It's -- is it dangerous? Yes. But we've confronted dangerous literature before in this country, and not panicked. I have a great deal of faith in the American people. It's an -- we are extraordinary. I've spent the 15 years sort of before I came back into government virtually on the outside, looking in. We are an extraordinary society and an extraordinary nation. And I am betting on us. I always will. HOFFMAN: Thank you deputy secretary. I had -- in introducing you, I had left out deliberately the most important element in your very impressive vitae, and that's you're a graduate of Georgetown University -- sadly, not the School of Foreign Service, but the Law Center. (Laughter.) LUTE: (Laughs.) HOFFMAN: And you've acquitted yourself extremely well and brought great honor to the alma mater. Thank you very much. LUTE: Thank you. Thank you. (Applause.) #### ®FC¯END ®FL¯ _ (C) COPYRIGHT 2011, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR E-MAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.
  • United Kingdom
    "Intelligence and Counter-Radicalization"
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    Panelists compare and contrast the linkages between law enforcement and intelligence in the United States and the United Kingdom and discuss how violent extremism has changed the business of intelligence. This session was part of the symposium, UK and U.S. Approaches in Countering Radicalization: Intelligence, Communities, and the Internet, which was cosponsored with Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies and King's College London's International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. This event was made possible by Georgetown University's George T. Kalaris Intelligence Studies Fund and the generous support of longtime CFR member Rita E. Hauser. Additionally, this event was organized in cooperation with the CFR's Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative.
  • United Kingdom
    Panel Two: Intelligence and Counter-Radicalization
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    This session was part of the symposium, UK and U.S. Approaches in Countering Radicalization: Intelligence, Communities, and the Internetwhich was cosponsored with Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies and King’s College London’s International Centre for the Study of RadicalisationThis event was made possible by Georgetown University's George T. Kalaris Intelligence Studies Fund and the generous support of longtime CFR member Rita E. Hauser. Additionally, this event was organized in cooperation with the CFR’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. DINA TEMPLE-RASTON: Thank you very much. My name is Dina Temple-Raston, and I'm the counterterrorism correspondent at National Public Radio. And I want to welcome you to the third session of today's symposium, "Intelligence and Counter-radicalization." Once again, if you could please completely turn off your cellphones -- not on vibrate, but completely turn them off. I'm always guilty of leaving it on vibrate. And as a reminder, this session is on the record. The last session was off the record, so we can't refer to anything, please, that we heard in the last session. That goes for our speakers, too, because that was completely off the record. So in this session, what we're going to do is we're going to compare and contrast the linkages between intelligence and law enforcement in the U.S. and the U.K., and generally see how violent extremism has changed the business of intelligence. And for this session we have the world's most perfect panel, and that would be, to start with, Charles Allen, who was at the CIA for more than 40 years and basically was doing intelligence longer than I've been alive. And people that I have -- (laughter). It's a compliment. The people I spoke to about Mr. Allen referred to him as a legend. And I've never actually interviewed a legend before, so I'm looking forward to that. Bill Bratton is known as the smartest cop in America. And if you don't already know a lot about him, it would suffice to say that he is the only person alive or dead to have led the two largest police forces in the United States: NYPD and the LAPD. And last but not least, I'm pleased to have Peter Clark from the U.K. with us today. With all this focus on the royal wedding, you might be interested to know that he used to be in charge of the royalty and diplomatic protection department. That means he was in charge of protecting the royal family in its residences. I was looking for a way to try to get Prince William and Kate into this conversation, but I couldn't find a smooth transition. So we're going to focus instead on his other job, which was at the -- as the former head of the Anti-terrorist Branch at Scotland Yard. You have their bios in your sheet, but that gives you sort of an idea of the caliber of person we're going to be speaking with today. And before we get all breathless about extremism, I thought we would start by having -- using some definitions and defining the issue about how bad the scope is here in the United States and how bad it is in the U.K. And perhaps you could give me a number -- 10 being the greatest amount of extremism, and one being very little -- and what number would you think correspond to the U.S. and to the U.K. Mr. Allen, to start. CHARLES ALLEN: Well, I would -- I would start with very moderate terms, because extremism has grown in this society in certain areas, in small pockets around our broad, large country, but the actual numbers has been a very tiny minority. I believe that the scope and size of this needs to be debated more publicly. That was where I was hoping Chairman King would start his hearings, with trying to size the issue. When you look at the number of cases of people indicted between 2001 and the end of 2010, it's relatively small: I think 176 individuals, according to RAND statistics. It doesn't mean it's not -- it's insignificant. It grew. In 2009-2010, we had about 35 cases, but we only averaged between 2001-2008 about four cases a year. I think that's pretty small. And how much growth has occurred? I don't think we have a good handle. And I think that's one of the disconnects that I believe that we have to address in the future. TEMPLE-RASTON: How about you, Mr. Bratton? If you were to put it on a one-to-10 basis, are we -- where are we? WILLIAM BRATTON: Well, in terms of the United States, I think, echoing Charlie's comments, much less of an issue than it is our colleagues, what they deal with in Britain. The briefings I'd receive when I'd go over there and meet with the Met, it was frightening to me, in the sense of all that they were dealing with. And Peter can speak much more to that. And at the same time, with what I thought to be a very significant set of issues versus what we were dealing with in United States in my city, Los Angeles, and prior to that New York, that there seemed to be less public concern and focus on the issue than here in the United States, with what seemed to be a much smaller problem in terms of both actual cases as well as the unknown, which is what's going on out there that we don't know about. TEMPLE-RASTON: So more breathless here, is what you're saying, even though there's less? BRATTON: There's, I think, almost in some respects much more public attention to the issue here. And maybe that's because of some of the limitations that the British press have relative to what they can report on relative to these cases, versus here the ability to keep churning it up even after the incident during all the various aspects of the investigation and the court case. TEMPLE-RASTON: We like that about here. Absolutely. BRATTON: I'm sure you do. (Laughter.) TEMPLE-RASTON: And Mr. Clarke, how about you? PETER CLARKE: I don't think I can put a number on it. But if the question is, is it serious and enduring in the United Kingdom, I'd say absolutely, yes. Our last security minister before the baroness was an admiral, and he once described himself as a simple sailor, so I suppose I'm a simple policeman, and I tend to think of this in terms of criminality. When we're analyzing criminals, what do we say? Do they have the motive, the means and the opportunity to commit their crimes? So if we think of this terrorism in a similar way, do they have the motive? Well, question: Have any of the underpinning issues giving rise to a sense of grievance gone away? My analysis is, no. Do they have the means? Yes. We've seen in the U.K. very low-tech, very low-cost attacks: 52 people killed by the kitchen-sink bomb makers. Do they have the opportunities? Well, yes, of course, because in any open society there are vulnerabilities; but also, the opportunities that arise in terms of radicalization. We often talk about ungoverned spaces being fertile breeding ground. Well, my view is that we have internal ungoverned spaces. And in particular, those ungoverned spaces are in universities, in mosques and in prisons. And I don't think we're anywhere near yet addressing these issues yet. The government has been putting out guidance, for instance, to the further education sector, and there has been push back about this. Recently, a spokesman for the Association of Teachers and Lecturers in the U.K. said that more monitoring was a bad thing, in essence, and it's not for the educational authorities to police. Well, if it's not for the educational authorities, who is it for? So is there a role for intelligence and law enforcement within the further education establishment? Hugely controversial, but these are issues that need to be debated very openly and honestly. TEMPLE-RASTON: And this gets to our main point, which is this intersection of law enforcement and intelligence. And presumably, when intelligence works the right way it helps make the distinction between -- as you were saying last night, between the vulnerable and the malevolent. So that's what I wanted to talk about a little bit today. This challenge, Mr. Allen, if you could address, have they been successful at making that distinction here in the United States? ALLEN: Well, I think we're moving in that direction in ways that -- we did not have homeland security intelligence on September the 11th, 2001, but with the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation changing the way it operates, forming an intelligence directorate of 2,600 analysts, putting those analysts in the field with the -- their 56 stations, I think there has been -- and the emphasis on trying to understand what is occurring in this country, the degree of radicalization, to try to not only look strictly at a -- at a predicate where you can open a case, but look to see if there can be intelligence, tips or leads. I really do believe that part of our response here is, it will come, I believe, from the community, from the bottom up. The people that know the community are our police departments. There are 18,500 of those across the country. Not all of them have intelligence elements. Los Angeles of course does and did under Chief Bratton. New York has an excellent one. But to get a better understanding and to be able to really work on tips and leads -- the police departments in our country are very diverse. They sort of reflect the neighborhoods where they do their work. And I just believe that we're in the early stages of blending intelligence and law enforcement, and I think a lot more can be done while still protecting the privacy, civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans. I think we have to be very careful about this, but I do believe we're headed in the right direction in building Homeland Security. Homeland Security as a -- as a degree now is being taught in many universities across this country. I've met many of the professors, many of the deans of universities when I was undersecretary at Homeland Security. So I think we're in the right direction. I do believe we have a good deal to go. TEMPLE-RASTON: I think everybody agrees, Chief Bratton, that the key component here is outreach to Muslim communities. Can you talk a little bit about what's working, what's not working, what you think we should be doing? BRATTON: Sure. Charlie talked about the blending of intelligence with law enforcement, with policing. And post-9/11, that has been accelerating. It's off to a slow start. But the blending is important because the -- one of the previous speakers talked about the nature of intelligence agencies, that they're pessimists, that -- because of always worrying about what they don't know, what's going wrong. American policing, based on the successes that we achieved in the 1990s that are continuing into the 21st century in our traditional role of dealing with crime, improving community relations -- we tend to be much more optimistic. I'm an -- I'm an optimist. And in the 1990s, when American policing led the assault on traditional crime with ideas like community policing; with ideas like problem solving, crime mapping, CompStat, broken windows, those ideas percolated from the local level, and that was important because the people that were being impacted by that crime problem were the community. The federal government partnership was essential -- the funding, the COPS program, research. Similarly, now, in this new era, with the new crime issue, the optimism of the local law enforcement community is critically important. And Charlie can speak to this because during his time serving with Secretary Chertoff they really opened up Homeland Security to allowing local law enforcement a place at the table, because local chiefs understood that in dealing with this new form of threat, the idea of -- and as we've seen, an increasing threat in the homeland, rather than coming from the external areas that had previously been the problem -- that local police were going to have to be a valuable partner at the table with, one, our optimism from our successes in the '90s, and those successes in the '90s can help to inform the continuing successes into the 21st century. First, as Charlie pointed out, the level of the problem is still relatively small. The potential to grow -- and it has been accelerating, but the numbers are still really very small versus what the Brits are dealing with. And our sophistication, our intelligence-gathering efforts -- the coordination is improving and, I think, improving at a rate faster than the growth of the problem, and so that as we move forward trying to deal with the issue of trying to prevent the growth, the radicalization, nobody is better positioned to do that than the local police because our successes in the '90s were reaching into the community. In the '70s and '80s, we were isolated from the community, a thin blue line. The Los Angeles Police was -- Department was the model of that; we'll take care of business, and you stay over there. And the business we were going to take care of was the crime problems in the African-American community. Well, now we have the problem -- the perceived problem of the crime issue, the terrorist issue in the Muslim community. And who better to reach into that community than local police, who learned in the '90s that to deal with crime, you got to develop relationships. And we are getting much better at that. And so in Los Angeles, a significant amount of our time is spent learning about the Muslim community, reaching into it, understanding how diverse it is. We tend to think of it as a monolithic entity, and it is not that. It is incredibly diverse, like the rest of American society. So we are, I think, on the right path -- so much more to be done, but I think we are informed by the mistakes of the '70s and '80s and what we learned in the '90s. TEMPLE-RASTON: Let me talk about an issue that brings together some of the tension of intelligence and law enforcement, and that would be the issue of stings. You remember back in Thanksgiving, there was a Somali-American kid, a 20-something from Seattle, who allegedly wanted to detonate a car bomb at a local Christmas tree lighting. The FBI found him, I think in a chat room -- I think I have this right -- and they stepped in and basically provided him with what he needed for the operation: fake explosives, detonators, van, telephone to dial to supposedly detonate this. Depending on which side of the fence you're on, some people see this as entrapment, some people see this as good police work. Mr. Allen, if I could start with you, can you talk about these kinds of operations and what they represent in terms of the intersection of intelligence and law enforcement? ALLEN: Well, I'm an intelligence officer and not a law enforcement officer, but the FBI, I believe, has been very careful in the way it operates when it comes to the stings. There's been a small number of them, hasn't been a large number of them. And you have to remember that the FBI would operate on tips, leads where they would see someone who has become radicalized, who is moving to advocate or engage or be willing to engage in violent actions. I think the FBI has operated under some very tough rules and guidelines over the years. And from my perspective, this is a fine line. As an intelligence officer, it's something that is a little foreign to me. But I believe in this case that the FBI, working with the Department of Justice, has handled this, I think, quite well. And the numbers are not great. But you've got to remember there's one thing here, and that's intent. The intent in a number of cases -- and we had a couple of -- after Abdulmutallab was -- tried to blow up the plane in Detroit, we had a couple of sting operations that were brought to closure by the bureau -- is the intent was to inflict damage, to kill innocents, to hurt U.S. critical infrastructure. So it's a fine line to walk, being an intelligence officer. It's one that I'm not as comfortable with as perhaps law enforcement. But I believe the bureau has operated very effectively and very carefully in this arena. TEMPLE-RASTON: Now, I'll get to you in a second, Mr. Clarke, about how you can't do this in the U.K. But I wanted to say quickly, Chief Bratton, can you talk a little bit about the effect these kinds of operations have in the community? It has a chilling effect, one would assume. BRATTON: Well, from the law enforcement perspective, stings are part of what we do, that -- whether it's internal affairs issues directed at our own police officers or, in the traditional criminal world, directed at criminals. In the NYPD, we created sting operations. We're doing hundreds of them directed against our own officers. In the LAPD, as part of the federal consent decree, they required that we effectively set up stings to see if our officers were accepting citizen complaints. Charlie points out correctly that they have to be done appropriately. They have to be done in a way that they are not subject to criticism. The use of stings in this new paradigm, the new crime -- and particularly with the sensitivities of the population in this case, particularly the Muslim population -- that it is a thin line that has to be followed. I think the bureau, my understanding of their cases without having intimacies of them other than one or two that we dealt with in L.A., that I think they've done a very good job here. But what has been missing is the relationship between, whether it's the bureau or local police, to be able to explain -- to be trusted, if you will, to explain -- and to have a level of transparency that we are able to show what we're doing, why we're doing it, how we're doing it. And stings are incredibly valuable also for the intelligence that's gathered from it. How was this individual radicalized? What was the chain of events that brought him to -- him or her to a point where they were going to take this type of overt action? Are there others out there that are involved? So they're an incredibly useful intelligence gathering opportunity also. TEMPLE-RASTON: And there's also a sense, I guess, that if you get the community involved or community leaders involved earlier in the process, then they aren't surprised by the headline, which has been part of the problem. BRATTON: In dealing with the gang problem in Los Angeles, we were continually going into neighborhoods, minority neighborhoods, flash bang, going into drug houses, really making a big scene. And the neighbors would come out and they would be concerned, because the traditional police response was: Go away. What we changed was basically we would go in -- and we'd go in with a whole group of community service officers. As we were finishing up the action, those officers were working through the neighborhood: This is why we're here. Here's the complaints we received about this drug activity, this violence associated with this house. We're responding to your (issues, concerns ?). So that's where American police have began to learn to basically be inclusive rather than exclusive. Instead of just saying to people, go away, instead: Come here; let me tell you what we're doing, why we're here, what we're doing. You may all remember the movie "Chinatown," and everybody also thinks the last line in that movie, in "Chinatown" -- "This is Chinatown, Jake." The last line in that movie was the lieutenant turning around to the crowd and saying, get off the streets. Well, that's effectively the way we policed: Get off the streets. Instead: Come here, let me tell you what's going on and why we're here. And that's what needs to change. TEMPLE-RASTON: And Mr. Clarke, can you talk a little bit about how this doesn't happen in the U.K. and why? CLARKE: Well, it's not quite true to say it doesn't happen, because we have conducted some operations -- not many, about two that I can recall, over the last six or seven years -- where undercover officers have been used. But the parameters of what is permissible within U.K. law is very different from what it is here in the United States. But I think the important thing is that we've tried to use the criminal trial process as a means of showing the objectivity and integrity of the counterrorist effort in the United Kingdom, and the intelligence community has had a huge part to play in that. And I think MI-5 deserve a huge amount of credit for the way in which they've moved into the evidential arena and worked incredibly closely with the police service looking for evidential opportunities, because the openness of the criminal trial process has been a means of demonstrating to communities what we're trying to do on their behalf. I think that the sting operation and, indeed, with any operation which moves you upstream -- and usually this is done on the grounds of public safety -- there is an issue around perception within communities. And certainly it's been expressed by some that thought crime is something for which people are being punished. And indeed, there are some aspects of some U.K. legislation -- glorifying terrorism, for interest, which some -- and I find confusing, let alone everybody else, what it actually means. So I think it's very important that we are very careful about what perceptions we generate when we carry out certain types of operation(s). And putting it in broad terms, certainly, in the U.K., it would not be permissible to run an operation where the objective was to find how far somebody would be prepared to go given the opportunity. TEMPLE-RASTON: Which makes it very different from the United States. CLARKE: Makes it very different from the United States. TEMPLE-RASTON: OK. ALLEN: May I -- may I add a point on this? TEMPLE-RASTON: Please. ALLEN: We were behind, back in 2008, with the Somali community in this country. And we had a lot of meetings. I remember meeting on Veterans Day at the White House just trying to get our arms around it with the FBI, with intelligence agencies. And I think we did that fairly effectively. Now, one of the things I think is very important to remember that -- in places like St. Paul -- Minneapolis, St. Paul, we found that the local communities, that parents started reaching out to the bureau some, but also to the local police in a major way. So I think something -- it can be very positive sometimes when a sting operation is executed. We do find that the communities do respond if we do the policing the way Chief Bratton just described. TEMPLE-RASTON: Well, now we're going to invite some audience members to join the discussion. If you could please wait for the microphone and speak directly into it and stand, state your name and your affiliation. And if we could keep those questions as concise as possible, that would be great. And one other reminder: Anything that you learned an hour ago from the last session, please don't refer to it in your questions. Yes, sir, in front here. Please wait for the microphone. QUESTIONER: John Gannon from BAE Systems, formally of the U.S. intelligence community. And a terrific panel; really appreciate your very thoughtful comments. We heard this morning something we've heard frequently from our own government, and that is that the threat is from Islamic extremism, not from Islam. But that's hardly an endorsement of Islam, and I think the way that gets translated down to -- in some cases to local law enforcement is, well, they're not all bad. But we have to -- you have to figure out who the goods one are and the bad guys are. But when you -- when you look at the -- a strategy for intelligence collection, both for investigation, how do you deal with -- is it a religious issue? If it's Islamic extremism, that's religion. But is it religion? Is it ideology? Is it politically driven? Or is it simply criminal activity? Because that would seem to me to be an issue for how you develop a collection system, where you go to collect. Same thing with investigations. So what -- is it religion we're talking about, or is it ideology, or what is it, when we talk about radical -- the radical threat that we're facing? ALLEN: I look on it not as religion, John, but I look on it as extremism, the manifestations of which is political Islamism, which I -- it's very hard for local police and local law enforcement to understand that. I really do believe that this is where a lot of work has to be done. There are instructors -- I was -- I sent people out to talk about these issues. We had a whole office of civil rights -- civil liberties, Dan Sullivan, who really held the roundtables in all major cities, continues to do so under the National Counterterrorism Center. These things are very effective, but if we -- if we confuse Islam with what is occurring with those who are advocating violent, what I call Islamic extremism, ideological extremism, it -- then we get confused. And I think there's a lot of confusion across the country, some of it on both sides of the spectrum politically here in this country, which seems to fuel this kind of, I think, misconception. I think from an intelligence perspective at Homeland Security, we worked extremely hard with Secretary Chertoff to get this right. We even put out a brochure, which looked at political terminology and the care with which we should -- we should use certain languages -- language very carefully. And we did this. I believe, though, we have a very major task to work with state and local governments, with our fusion centers -- there are 72 of them -- to start explaining this in a more articulate way as part of intelligence training. We don't have an easy and immediate answer on how to do this. And -- but we're -- we are in the right direction. The new undersecretary who took my position very much is concerned about this and is working very closely with Secretary Napolitano and others on these issues. But I'll turn to Chief Bratton. I know he has a lot more ideas on this than I do. BRATTON: I think this is where we can really learn from the past and -- both the successes and failures. The '70s, '80s -- I came into policing in 1970 -- the whole issue of crime beginning its upward spiral for the next 20 some odd years; and so much of that crime was within the African-American community, the bulk of it committed against the African-American community. But the idea of policing -- a lot of what went on in policing, and LAPD in particular, was literally an occupying force in Los Angeles and almost at war with the African-American community, when the issue was really particularly the gang component located in that community, some 20,000, a huge number, but in the population of well over a million. And the policy of policing of that time was really one of staying apart from the community. And it wasn't until the late '80s, '90s where the concept of community policing with its three elements -- partnership, problem solving, prevention -- where we began to change. The partnership wasn't just with the alphabet agencies -- the FBI, DEA -- being able to utilize their skills and their RICO statutes, but most importantly the idea of measuring our success by reaching into that African-American community, the leadership, understanding the diverse aspects of it and separating the problem portion of that population, the gang population, from that and focusing on that group but talking with and listening to. And some of our actions were controversial. For example, several years ago, we began to work very actively with gang interventionists. My rank-and-file cops didn't want anything to do with them because they saw them as gang bangers who were literally basically just deceiving us by appearing to go straight. But in the African-American, Latino communities, these were their fathers, their sons, their brothers, who they felt the police were not supporting their efforts to go straight. But once we started trying to find ways to work with them -- we even set up academies with Connie Rice, the civil rights advocate -- to work with them, the community began to see us in a different way. Similarly with the issue you raised about religion, if we are going to demonize a whole group of people because of their religion, when it's a small group that are trying to use that religion to inspire their own purposes, then we're going to lose. And that's why the efforts to understand their community are so essential, because quite frankly, we really don't. Up until 9/11 and coming back into policing, I couldn't have told you the difference between a Shia or a Sunni. Muslims, I thought they were all alike. And now we understand clearly they are not. There are many sects and beliefs. So a longwinded answer to that, but let's learn from the past, the successes and the failures -- and we failed in the '70s and 80's, in the '90s; and now into the 21st century, we're beginning to see a lot of that can work with this issue. TEMPLE-RASTON: So you think some of the things that you learned in trying to stop gangs will actually be applicable to this? BRATTON: Oh, definitely. MR. : Absolutely. TEMPLE-RASTON: Okay. BRATTON: Definitely. Even -- I was having a discussion with a senior British official the last day or so relative to this conference; and the idea of in a sense, how do you get intelligence of what's going on in that portion of the community, the -- in the case of gangs, the gang community; in the case of the radicals, how do you elicit getting into their group? And very often, policing, the tactics had been -- had not really thought about this -- to coerce an informant the threat of jail, the threat of actions against the family, versus the new thinking and the idea that there are other ways to do this without coercion, to access. And it's an expansion of the thinking about how to approach this problem, to try new ideas, and the idea of sharing what has been largely a British initiative with American policing. And I'm very intrigued by that, because the experience we have is a shared experience. We come at it from different perspectives sometimes, different laws certainly. But we can learn so much from each other. And some of our strength in this issue is that the exchange between British and American police services has been very extensive. I used to spend a lot of time in London -- well, I love London, but -- there's always an excuse to get over there. (Laughter.) But they were so far ahead of us on this issue, so far ahead of us in many respects at the local police level. TEMPLE-RASTON: Do you want to comment on that, Mr. Clarke? CLARKE: No, I entirely agree with all of that. Many of the fundamental features and principles of policing apply to this as to any other type of criminality. And I think that's the important thing, that basically -- as I said earlier, I'm a simple policeman -- these are violent criminals looking to kill people, to kill their fellow citizens. And we mustn't lose sight of that. I think it's terribly important as well that there are consistent messages about this. And I have to say, I was really disappointed last year when -- you remember Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and his father who'd gone into the United States embassy in Lagos, I believe it was, expressing concerns about his son's behavior and where it was taking him. TEMPLE-RASTON: This is the Detroit bomber. Go ahead. CLARKE: Indeed. MR. : Yes. CLARKE: And a man who was then a serving British government minister went onto the BBC "Question Time" from a mosque in south London and said that his -- Abdulmutallab's father had snitched on him. Now I think that's a most unfortunate use of language. You wouldn't use that language about any other type of crime. You wouldn't use it about a concerned parent going to the police because they were fearful that their child was perhaps getting involved in drugs. It should be allowed to be expressed as a proper expression of concern. We shouldn't put this into a different category. TEMPLE-RASTON: Other questions? How about way back there in the back? QUESTIONER: Heidi Noonan, Fox News Channel. This question's for Mr. Allen. In -- regarding to Yemen and al-Qaida, what does it mean that AQAP has declared the Abyan province an Islamic emirate to be government by Shariah? ALLEN: Which province? I'm sorry. I didn't hear. QUESTIONER: Abyan province. ALLEN: Oh. Yes. QUESTIONER: (Using a different pronunciation.) Abyan. ALLEN: Okay. Abyan. I don't know that it has a great deal of ramifications. AQAP -- we know that it is active and aggressive, and conditions may be more favorable as if President Saleh does not survive and more ungoverned space develops within Yemen. We -- it gets back to the idea of, you know, a despotic ruler versus (anarchical ?), ideological -- driven elements within a -- within a(n) area that can cause a great deal of problems for the West and for the very area -- for all of the -- and for the stability of the Arabian Peninsula, which we all know is very important to us. I don't know that that in itself has that much resonance. AQAP is under a lot of pressure. Awlaki is under a lot of pressure. We hear Anwar al-Awlaki but there are other leaders within al- -- within AQAP which are very -- which we know well, which are very important, more hardened, more operationally experienced than al-Awlaki. So I don't think we should overstate this. I think what we should have concerns about is the whole stability of the Arabian Peninsula as a result of what is occurring within Yemen, and we again have very -- we lack a great deal of in-depth understanding, but I'm not -- I'm not more concerned than I was. We are concerned and have been concerned over the last three years over Yemen. It's not something we learned only when al-Awlaki became a popular name back here in the United States. TEMPLE-RASTON: A question on our subject at hand, intelligence and counter-radicalization. How about the gentleman back there in the blue shirt, who's raising his hand. He's right by the microphone. There you go. QUESTIONER: Hi. Jonathan Brown, Georgetown University. You mentioned methods for dealing with this in terms of communal -- community policing, dealing with some of these communities facing kind of gang problems as opposed to ideological problems. But in the U.S., at least, how do we encourage community members to, let's say, talk to police about their children they might be concerned about when the punishments that have been dealt out are so severe, with things like terrorism enhancement sentencing, where people are getting 20 years for lying to a federal officer or 40 years for perjury? I mean, these -- in the case of the D.C. Six, I think, and also in some of the Somali-Americans who went to fight with Shabab, it was the parents who turned them in, but why would a parent turn in their child when they're almost certainly going to be in jail for 30 years? TEMPLE-RASTON: Specifically, during the Minneapolis case, you'll recall that many of the mothers didn't want to tell the police that their kids were gone because they thought if their kids came back, they might be sent to Guantanamo. Who'd like to answer that? CLARKE: (Let us ?) make a comment on this. This is a -- it's not the first time this problem's arisen. We had it in the United Kingdom, where concerned parents did come in some years ago expressing concerns about their son. And unfortunately, at that time, there was no opportunity or means of diversion, and so this person ended up -- this young person ended up -- inappropriately, I think -- within the criminal justice system, which is why I think it's so important now that initiatives such as the Channel project are nurtured, funded and allowed to grow. There has to be a means of keeping people, if they are vulnerable -- as opposed to malevolent, the expression we used earlier -- if they are vulnerable, as opposed to malevolent, if possible keeping them out of the criminal justice system, for the very reasons you've just articulated. TEMPLE-RASTON: So you give them other things to do? Is that it, essentially? Make new friends for them? Is that -- is that what happens? When you talk about diversion, I just wonder if you can explain what that is. CLARKE: Well, diversion, I mean -- look, if somebody came to you and said, we're concerned about our child; they're -- we think they're possibly getting involved in drugs, there are many, many ways of dealing with that, with trying to prevent a young person going down that particular route. A few years ago there were none at all in terms of the problem we're talking about today. Now there are some, but I think we need to probably develop them, and there are people in this audience who will be speaking this afternoon who are far more qualified to say what the range of potential opportunities are in this respect than me. TEMPLE-RASTON: Okay. Other questions? Yes. Here in front, please. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Rita Hauser. One big difference between the U.K. and the U.S. is gun control, and the availability of weapons here is very well-known. In the Fort Hood case, the major in question -- I forget how many days, but several days before had acquired a big arsenal, which was known, and the authorities did nothing about it. I can envisage not all these fancy bombs but people just buying a lot of big guns and assault weapons and going about their business easily in this country. So I was wondering if you have anything to say about that question and how you see the differences here in the U.K. CLARKE: You're both looking at me. (Laughter.) It's -- BRATTON: We know we have a gun issue. (Inaudible) -- about it that -- unfortunately. ALLEN: We have a -- and it's good to see you again -- we have a huge problem. We -- I worked this for Secretary Chertoff because President Bush was deeply concerned and told President Calderon how deeply concerned about guns flowing south. There is a lot of work going on within -- not only within normal law enforcement but with the law enforcement act -- arms of the operating components of the Department of Homeland Security, because a vast amount of guns, as you know, flow south into Mexico, and our ability to detect and prevent that is limited. But yes, the availability of guns I don't think -- but I don't think it's going to necessarily add or subtract from the -- what is occurring here as far as a growth of Islamic extremism. I think the two, yes, may converge in certain ways, but fundamentally that's not the issue. The issue is how to scope size and determine how best to influence and change attitudes, because we've found certain communities that arrived here in the last 10 or 15 years in the United States are not as well assimilated as those who arrived in the '60s and '70s. I've met a lot of those Muslim leaders who are well-educated -- lawyers, doctors, really great individuals, great intellectuals. Secretary Chertoff sent me out to meet these people, and we had a tremendous dialogue. But it's some of our newer immigrants' communities who feel very much alienated. They're self-segregated into various communities. There's where I don't believe the federal government has the answer -- not the department, not the Department of Justice either. I think it has to come from community-led outreach and community-led policing. That's the reason I think what Chief Bratton outlined is -- given our federal system of government, which is very different from the U.K., I think that's the way we have to operate in the future. But guns we know have been a problem in a variety of criminal ways. And it certainly could be a factor here, but it's not a driving factor in my mind. BRATTON: And what is actually amazing, considering that we have 300 million firearms in the country -- enough to give every infant through grandmother in the country their own weapon -- (laughter) -- that there is not more terrorist-related violence, because the spontaneity of it, as with the colonel at Fort Hood, is so easy for somebody that's become radicalized. But the penchant for developing the bombs -- you know, that's much more complicated, takes more time -- allows us more opportunity to detect and prevent it, versus with the firearm. So much of our violence and the recent violence directed against police officers in this country in the last couple of months is the ready availability and a person that snaps for whatever reason. So we're very fortunate. We've often wondered why there were not many more terrorist-inspired shooting incidents. This portion of the country was terrorized when those two men were going up and down the Washington Beltway, sniping; that literally, they shut the economy down here for a month till they were arrested. TEMPLE-RASTON: Right. BRATTON: So we don't -- we've never been -- never been able to figure that out. But fortunately, since they have the penchant for building bombs, it gives us more opportunity to detect and prevent it before it actually occurs. TEMPLE-RASTON: Just because I want to do front and back of the room, the gentleman in the red tie there in the back, please. QUESTIONER: Hi. Jonathan Stevenson, Naval War College. TEMPLE-RASTON: Could you bring the mic a little closer? Thank you. QUESTIONER: Sure. Is this better? TEMPLE-RASTON: A little better. QUESTIONER: Mr. Clarke I thought very evocatively and incisively characterized universities, mosques and prisons as internal ungoverned spaces that were, you know, particularly vulnerable to radicalization. And I wondered if either Mr. Allen or Chief Bratton thought that prisons, mosques and universities in the United States -- now, bearing in mind that the U.S. doesn't have as intense a radicalization problem as the U.K. -- whether those places also were relatively fertile grounds for radicalization as compared to some others. BRATTON: Certainly prisons; we know that for a certainty. We had a major case in California while I was chief out there that an imam in one of the state prisons was basically training people to go out, rob gas stations and CVS stores for the intent to raise money to buy more weapons, to then assault army recruiting stations and Jewish synagogues. So we had a firsthand example of that. The California prison system has a lot of their intelligence gathering efforts focused on that area of concern. NYPD has developed phenomenal capabilities in that area. The issue of institutions of higher learning, The New York Times Magazine, a week ago Sunday had a major piece on an individual -- that, I'm sorry, his name eludes me -- about being at one of those universities and teaching, and the dilemma and the issues around that. And then thirdly, the issue of the mosques, that the reality is that, unfortunately, some of those mosques may in fact be centers for that type of radicalization. And the difficulty for law enforcement, the difficulty for the community, is in a sense how to deal with that. Prisons, the easiest; education, educational institutions and mosques, much, much more difficult. The thin lines that you can fall off are so difficult. TEMPLE-RASTON: Yes, actually, this gentleman here, please, in the blue shirt. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Clark Ervin, with the Aspen Institute. I actually had a related question to that, for Mr. Clarke, largely. How would one propose to govern mosques and universities in particular -- I think prisons is a different case -- in a way that's duly protective of civil rights and civil liberties? Is that possible? And if so, how, in your judgment? CLARKE: If I knew the answer to that, I very much doubt I'd be sitting here. (Laughter.) But it is hugely difficult, and there are no simple answers to this. But I think what we need to do is to have an honest and open debate about it, at least. And I think that's lacking at the moment. And I think earlier today we heard about the need to keep politics out of this, and I think that is an important thing. For many, many years, counterterrorism in the U.K. was actually characterized by across-party consensus. That broke down in 2005 because of some legislation that was going through Parliament and proved to be controversial, and it split on -- the debate split on party lines. And the whole discussion then about the balance between security and liberty then split on party lines. And as a result -- and that hasn't yet got back onto an even keel. It became an election issue, and there's now legislation again going through Parliament supposedly redressing the balance. We do need to get the politics out of this, and only then I think can we move forward to have a sensible discussion about these really difficult areas that you mentioned. I don't have the answer. TEMPLE-RASTON: This gentleman here, please, the white shirt. QUESTIONER: Thank you. George Fulsom (sp). My question relates to transnational cooperation on intelligence and law enforcement. Leveraging off the issue of the U.K. having restrictions against sting operations, are there other countries that are significant to your operations that you know of in the past who also have similar restrictions? For example, like Australia or France or Germany -- or Spain, for example? ALLEN: From an intelligence perspective, I can't recall this issue coming up. Our cooperation on dealing with inbound threats of al-Qaida or working with our closest allies abroad on al-Qaida threats, extremist threats, affiliated networks, I'm of the view that, you know, we've had a dramatic effect on both al-Qaida central, al-Qaida affiliated networks, and some of them have literally disappeared from the landscape. I'm one of those who believes that good things have happened and that perhaps they're on the back foot in the Middle East. Good things may happen there. So that issue of stings has not come up in my intelligence experience, but Chief Bratton may have something to add to that. BRATTON: I really can't speak to that because I'm not aware of -- in my dealings for seven years with the LAPD, that our international relationships were largely through JTTFs, and so the intimacy with that issue in terms of what other countries allowed or how they felt about it, I just don't have that experience. TEMPLE-RASTON: "JTTF" is joint terrorism task force. CLARKE: Could I just, if I may just -- if I left an impression that we don't and can't do sting operations in the United Kingdom, I didn't mean to. We can; we do; we love doing them. It's just that the -- (laughter) -- it's just that the legal framework within which they can be conducted is different from here in the United States. TEMPLE-RASTON: Yes, sir. Oh. No, I'm sorry, this gentleman here. QUESTIONER: Hi. (Name inaudible.) I had a question to kind of follow up. We seem to be struggling between the law enforcement issue and the ideological issue. And so I guess I wanted to pose a question. Are we fighting a political battle -- a political warfare battle or are we fighting a law enforcement battle? And I would -- the reason why I pose that question is because in the example of gangs, it's we're mainly dealing with an economic issue. In the issue of Northern Ireland, I would argue it's a political issue. And so the question is, is do we view, for example, the issue of Northern Ireland or the issue of fighting the Soviet Union as a law enforcement issue or as a political issue? BRATTON: There's a third element there. You're referencing gangs. Gangs would be primarily a societal issue. A lot of the attractiveness of gangs for young men and women is the dissolution of their own family environment, the traditional family environment. So they go to gangs for the socialization, the protection, if you will, the excitement. So there's a social, a socialization aspect to it also. TEMPLE-RASTON: Which makes it very similar to what's going on with radicalization. ALLEN: That's correct. BRATTON: I think in many respects that is the case, that so many of the people that we encounter, the lone wolves, if you will, or the American experience has been, sure, we've had groups, but so many of these loners who are seeking to latch onto something, and then they -- through the Internet now they -- unfortunately, through academia, prison or religious institutions, they find other like-minded souls where they can come together. But it's -- a lot of it is, I think, societal, the pull of people wanting to be part of something. TEMPLE-RASTON: We have time for one more question. And before I take it, I want to remind everyone that this was on the record and the last session was off the record. And do we have any more questions? Yes, sir. QUESTIONER: Hello. Timothy Reuter (sp). I'm interested in how do you deal differently with terrorist-related intelligence versus the information you've gathered since time immemorial about gangs or drugs or other kind of activity? Is there something that makes this essentially different from those kinds of things that law enforcement has traditionally engaged in? ALLEN: I think the two do go together, but I think we have a lot yet to do on the intelligence side to determine what are the minimal essential intelligence we need for terrorism-related activities here in this country. We haven't talked about the -- I spent all my career until recent years working foreign intelligence. There's a huge bright line between foreign and domestic, and we didn't cross that at CIA. We just refused to do that. The bureau was very case oriented and did not have an intelligence capability. But in my view, that there's intelligence there that helps us understand the new law enforcement world. So we're moving in a -- we're converging in ways, I think, that are actually now starting to pay off in small ways, but we -- the British, I think, with a different system of government, have some advantages that we just certainly don't have. BRATTON: Two thoughts. That the concern about terrorist-related intelligence is, based on the 9/11 experience, the cataclysmic potential of some of that activity, versus traditional crime would not be usually anywhere on that scale. However, the convergence in terms of treating them the same is reflected in where we're going with fusion centers around the country. Increasingly, many of them are all crime; that information relative to traditional crime is going into the same location where terror-specific information is also being analyzed, because the appreciation, particularly as -- we're in an evolving field here, that local information about what seems to be local crime may, in fact, increasingly have nexus to terrorist-related activities. And we have seen case after case -- I was at a breakfast this morning with the former deputy commander of my terrorism operation in L.A., and just in the course of 10 minutes she related half a dozen instances where local crime information being analyzed led to terrorist-related types of investigations. And so that that's where we're improving. And also the critical importance of the partnership between local law enforcement with the FBI, Homeland Security, in these fusion centers; inclusion rather than exclusion. And the recent report that just came out from Homeland Security that something along the line of 80 percent of the detected and thwarted terrorist-related activities -- which are relatively small, which Charlie has pointed out -- were the result of a citizen or police -- local police initial piece of information rather than the billions that we're spending on national and -- international intelligence. So that there is strong support now. I believe Secretary Napolitano, certainly following on the heels of Secretary Chertoff, transcending a Republican administration into a Democratic administration, on this issue there is a wide support for the idea of partnership on this issue. TEMPLE-RASTON: And how about you, Peter? Would you like to comment on that? CLARKE: Yeah. There is a great difference between, if you like, ordinary, decent criminal intelligence and intelligence relating to terrorism in the U.K., because the statutory lead for counterterrorist intelligence sits with the security service, which means that the police investigator doesn't have the same freedom of action as he or she would do, as I say, in a normal, decent criminal case -- which means that from the very beginning of a case, there has to be extraordinarily close working between the owners of the intelligence, the security service, and the police. And this has been a feature particularly of the past 10 years, the way this has developed. And if any of you want to really go into this, just look at the transcripts from the recent inquest in London into the 7/7 attacks. We will see that the case which is, if you like, the precursor to those attacks, the so-called fertilizer bomb plot the year before, there were 50 consecutive meetings, called Executive Liaison Group meetings, chaired by the national coordinator at the time, me, involving these security service and the police, where all the intelligence is put on the table, obviously in a very classified environment; but that means there are no shocks, no surprises, nothing that can derail the operation, and it is an entirely agreed, shared strategy. And that has been a feature of what we've tried to do over the years and to make sure that the intelligence is properly handled, properly protected where it has to be, but also as much as possible is available evidentially to support the prosecutions, which I talked about earlier, which is so important in demonstrating what it is we're trying to do. TEMPLE-RASTON: And in the United States we're not there yet. CLARKE: I couldn't say that. BRATTON: I don't think we are, but we are evolving and moving. And again, going back to Secretary Chertoff's time, that Charlie was involved in this, in terms of allowing local police into the room, sit at the table. And for a while we were "below the salt," the British expression, but eventually we've allowed the salt. And so we're not there yet. There's still a lot of tensions. And the heaven that you just described, where everybody puts it all on the table, I don't think, Charlie, we're there yet, but -- ALLEN: Not totally there, but it's night and day from where it was even three, four years ago. We do information sharing at federal, state and local. We have Ambassador McNamara here, who played a key role for the president in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. He sort of helped us through a lot of issues and processes. But we did a lot of it ourselves. And Secretary Chertoff, you know, he pushed me to get the intelligence out to the state and local, to do joint assessments with the FBI, to encourage the fusion centers to do assessments, and to also give the training down so that we were always mindful of privacy, civil rights, civil liberties as we do share information, and some of it very sensitive at times, down to the state and local levels. TEMPLE-RASTON: Wonderful. Thank you so much for being here, gentlemen. Thank you. (Applause.) #### ®FC¯END ®FL¯ _ (C) COPYRIGHT 2011, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR E-MAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.
  • United Kingdom
    Community Partnerships to Counter Violent Extremism
    Play
    Jane Holl Lute, deputy secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, provided a U.S. administration perspective on efforts to disrupt violent extremism, and discussed best practices in counter radicalization in the United States and the United Kingdom. This session was part of the symposium, UK and U.S. Approaches in Countering Radicalization: Intelligence, Communities, and the Internet, which was cosponsored with Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies and King’s College London’s International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. This event was made possible by Georgetown University's George T. Kalaris Intelligence Studies Fund and the generous support of longtime CFR member Rita E. Hauser. Additionally, this event was organized in cooperation with the CFR’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. BRUCE HOFFMAN: Welcome to the afternoon session of the conference and to the second keynote of the day. Before I introduce Deputy Secretary Jane Lute, let me again remind you to please turn off all BlackBerrys, cell phones, pagers -- not just put them to vibrate but turn them completely off, because otherwise they interfere with the sound system. Let me also remind you that this particular session is on the record, but when you ask questions, please do not refer to the session earlier in the day that was off the record. That would be greatly appreciated. The title of this session is "Community Partnerships to Counter Violent Extremism." And I'd be hard pressed to think of someone better to make that presentation than the deputy secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security, Jane Lute. I have to say that Deputy Secretary Lute has had the type of distinguished career that I know our students at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown aspire to and indeed that many of their professors dream of. She served in the United States Army with distinction, including in Operation Desert Storm. She subsequently went on to serve twice with the National Security Council under the first President Bush and also under President Clinton. She was the executive director of the Carnegie Commission's -- the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. She subsequently went on to be an assistant secretary at the United Nations and is now in the -- in her current position as deputy secretary of Homeland Security. Deputy Secretary Lute, welcome and thank you very much. (Applause.) DEPUTY SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY JANE HOLL LUTE: Well, thanks very much. It's great to be back at the council, and it's extraordinary to see the new surroundings. And it tells you how long it's been since I've been with the council in Washington that I didn't even know you were here. But it's really beautiful. It's great to see Jim and to share a stage with Bruce. I don't think any of us know anything about terrorism or about countering terrorism that we haven't learned from Bruce. And so on behalf of all of us, thanks for what you've done throughout your career. It's particularly interesting and exciting and not a very usual opportunity for me these past couple of years to have a chance to sit down and talk with scholars and practitioners, with policymakers and journalists and operators all in the same room. And that for me is the most exciting opportunity for conversation, for discussion and for learning. I have had the privilege in my life to work with some of the most extraordinary scholars, practitioners, operators, journalists that this country, in fact the world, has to offer. My (doctoral) father when I was at Stanford was Alexander George, a giant not only in the field of political science but as a human being. He, along with David Hamburg, Cy Vance, so many others taught me a long about what it means to do well in this business and also taught me maybe the most fundamental lesson is that it's possible to do this work and be kind -- (soft laughter) -- something you don't learn from everybody you interact with every day, let me tell you. But part of the reason I like it so much is because they -- scholars and practitioners -- scholars and operators ask each other a different set of questions, but the questions merge in really interesting ways. Scholars always want to know why. Why do people take up violence to advance their cause? Why can some people or why do some people position themselves at the very center of their faith, yet espouse what are clearly marginal or even the ragged edge of the faith and a mis- or maladaptation of that faith, yet occupy the center and claim for themselves the very custodians of the doctrinal core? Why can they do that? Why do they do that? Why do they justify killing in the name of their faith? Operators, on the other hand -- and I consider myself an operator -- ask themselves what. What are -- what is it about their circumstances that we don't understand? What is it about the journey that these individuals take that we have not yet successfully been able to map? What is the problem? What can be done about it? You might even ask, I suppose -- and many people do -- you know, given life's complexity and the pressures of everyday life not only in the United States but around the world, why don't we see more of this; why don't we see more people pursuing violence? Yet we don't see it. Why not? What is working in our society that allows so many of us to manage conflict, differences, stresses and pressures in relative peace? Some of you know me. It's great to see your faces here. I've learned so much in my career. Things that I've been able to achieve are largely due to the influence that you've had on me. Mistakes I've made -- it's probably because I haven't been paying as close attention as I should have throughout my career. But these have been the kinds of questions that have interested me my whole life long. I started out my career as a soldier, as Bruce mentioned. That was a long time ago. 1976, I went to basic training. I'm married to a soldier, just recently retired. I believe deeply in the calling of a soldier. I love being a soldier. I love my country, but it's not even a hundred years ago that my grandparents came to this country. Yet you wouldn't mistake me for anything except an American straight out of central casting. (Chuckles.) Just ask my staff. But it's true that these questions are so deeply interesting, motivating for me not only as a -- as a former soldier and one who believes deeply in the values of this country but also someone who has spent a fair amount of time thinking and writing about war: how wars end, why they end when they do, why they don't end sooner, why factors seem to combine to prevent wars from ending, and how you prevent the emergence and spread and resumption of violence once a peace has been achieved. I will be committed throughout my life to the prevention of deadly conflict, to peacekeeping and peace building. How do you restore societies in the aftermath of violence, and how do you prevent that violence from returning? Over the course of my career, I've learned there are a lot of mythologies about conflict and war. And for those of you who've studied it, you know that there are these mythologies. For example, we call a conflict religious or ethnic, thinking somehow that that tells us why people are violent. It doesn't tell us anything about why people are violent. It tells us why they're different, tells us why they might not get along very much, but it doesn't tell us nearly anything about why they've decided to kill each other over their differences. Poverty -- cause of violence? Rich people will kill each other, too. Poverty is one of the mythologies about conflict. I'll talk a little bit about it later. The role of government -- mythology: government's the most important actor in conflict. Mythology: government is irrelevant to conflict and violence. A lot of theories in general about why there is violence in the world and a lot of theories about violent extremism; far fewer theories to my taste about how we can prevent this kind of violence, how we can prevent the emergence of violent extremism. How does this matter to the homeland and to homeland security? We're not immune in the United States to the kind of violence and violent extremism that you have been talking about over the course of this conference. Dozens have been arrested over the past two years. Indeed, we know there are people who are present in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, elsewhere around Europe, North America, who align themselves with the ideology and the operations of al-Qaida and other violent extremists. Through constant vigilance, effective law enforcement, information sharing, community partnerships, we've uncovered a number of plots, and we continue to do that. And we know this will be well known to you, some of them. Najibullah Zazi intended to bomb the New York subway. Daniel Patrick Boyd intended to murder soldiers in North Carolina. There are others -- some we have not caught in time: David Headley, associated with the attacks -- more than associated, a planner and instrumental agent in the attacks on Mumbai; Faisal Shahzad, the man who would have tried to blow up Times Square, who did try. We know al-Qaida is actively recruiting. They've got hip language. They're plugged into social media. They are persistent. We have to be equally persistent and alert, because unlike plots overseas, plots originating closer to home will likely have shorter tails, few obvious signs and little or no warning. So what are our tools? What are our strategies? How do we address this potential for violent extremism? We have expertise and we have experience. And those of you who know me know that I think that there's a big difference between expertise and experience, and we need to bring the two of them together. Our theory, our strategy in dealing with terrorism has been to find them and fix them abroad -- to find terrorists and fix them in the military sense, find them and fix them abroad. This has been our existing approach. The danger originates abroad. The threat evolves over time. Our familiar tools for doing this -- robust intelligence, active military operations and our partnerships with international partners in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, elsewhere -- these are the tools we use to combat terrorism and fight it, find them, fix them far away from us. But as I have learned, over the course of the past two years, after having spent the previous 30 years deeply embedded in the national security community of this country and, in fact, in the international security community, homeland security is really very different. It is certainly a part of national security, but it is very different. And it has been exceedingly interesting to me to see the differences. How do we combat violent extremism in the homeland? Are these tools -- intelligence, military operations, international partnerships -- the tools that we must use in the homeland? We have different tools here. I'll talk a little bit about them. We have border tools. We have law enforcement tools. We have information, information sharing, intelligence certainly. And we have the American public, including those parts of the public who serve in public service every day, nearly 800,000 men and women of law enforcement at the state and local level. We want to use their experience -- we want to use all of our experience -- to recognize behavior and preparation that indicate trouble, and we want to use our knowledge and expertise to craft the kinds of effective interventions that prevent this trouble, prevent the emergence of violence. Well, who is we? As I mentioned, it's all of us. Certainly in Homeland Security, we think we have a special responsibility here, and it's not a responsibility that is new to us. Indeed, the department is now eight years old. The work that we've been doing, over the past two years, is built on the work that has gone on before, and built, in fact, on work that's gone on before the events of 9/11 and the founding of the Department of Homeland Security. What are we trying to do in DHS? What do we think our vision is -- our mission is? Well, we say the following. What we're trying to do is build the safe, secure and resilient place where the American way of life can thrive -- safe, secure, resilient place where the American way of life can thrive. How do we do that? We think we have five core missions. The first and foremost, of course, is to prevent another terrorist attack like 9/11, prevent terrorist attacks of any kind. We need to secure our borders, enforce our immigration laws, ensure our cybersecurity. We think this is key and essential to a safe and secure and resilient homeland. And we need to build national resilience. But we know, in DHS, that we can't do all that needs doing by ourselves, certainly. There's an important role for the leaders, for the officials, for law enforcement and for citizens who are closest to the communities -- because they know best, who they are, what their strengths, values, capabilities are and equally what their -- what their vulnerabilities and shortcoming are. And they know first when trouble is about to start or is unfolding. To support them in the area of preventing violent extremism, we're going to pursue in our department a two-part strategy. In fact, it's already begun. On the one hand, we want to break down barriers that isolate and marginalize communities, and on the other hand we want to strengthen law enforcement to identify and prevent violent acts before they occur. How do we break down barriers? Well, first and foremost, we might stop by miniaturizing people, by reducing people to a single version of their identity that we think is important or that we think is defining. In fact, one of the things -- one of the great things about being an American is that you can be multiple things. You can have your ethnic identity, your religious affiliation and your social set of engagements all at the same time, and they can coexist, and they are each at least as defining as any single one of them would be. And I think, at a minimum, as the president began in his Cairo speech, and certainly has said before that and since, the cultural diversity of this country is a richness and a strength, and one that we cannot only build on, it's one we can also rely on. We want to pursue breaking down barriers that isolate communities by engaging with local leaders, with state and local law enforcement, policy leaders, social leaders, religious leaders as well. We're going to do this with partnerships, again, because the Department of Homeland Security can't do all that needs doing -- partnership with other federal agencies, partnerships with the private sector, partnerships with NGOs and, again, at all levels of life in the United States. We're advancing programs for new immigrants so that they can broadly embrace their new society and so -- and equally importantly so that their new society can broadly embrace them. Both have to happen. On the other hand, we want to strengthen state and local law enforcement to allow them to do both of their jobs, which is to uphold the rule of law and to serve the people. We're going to do this through advocacy, through convening, sharing of best practice and sharing of knowledge, information, intelligence, where it's appropriate, through the fusion centers that we've been working on and establishing, jointly with the FBI and other federal agencies, through the Joint Terrorism Task Forces. But this is really about reaching down to communities, giving them the kind of training that they need to recognize and connect them to what we have learned about the habits of violent extremists, these groups, al-Qaida and others, and what this might mean for activities closer to them. You know that Secretary Napolitano has, over the course of the past year, been speaking around the country and talking about the importance of a program that we know from New York City, "See Something, Say Something," which is designed to involve people in the circumstances that are around them. If something is odd and wrong, it's probably odd and wrong. Bring it to the attention of folks who can do something about it. We've built out the suspicious activity reporting database together with the FBI, and we are learning where there are patterns emerging that are troubling and indicate that early action is required. We want to support and sustain these efforts through grant-making and through our continual engagement with state and local law enforcement officials. In other words, we want to expand our engagement and support for information-driven community-oriented policing, including -- and importantly, based on strategies that have been successful at preventing violent crime in the past. A lot of people, over the course of my career, have been looking at violent conflict, have been looking at violent extremism, and they often, when they are looking at this phenomenon, examine the discontent of the unfortunate -- the desperately poor, the chronically oppressed. But many of the young who are attracted to the ideology and the message of extremism are by any measure fortunate. So what is at the heart of the discontent of the fortunate? Is it a lack of opportunity, voice, freedom? A lack of respect? A lack of dignity, value and meaning? This is not the agenda of the terrorist. This is not what the terrorists want. They don't want these things. When it comes to violent extremism, they want our youth. So we must be vigilant and alive to our responsibilities to prevent their success. Certainly we have to -- and will -- enforce our laws and support efforts to prevent the development of and growth of violent extremists. And we have to break down barriers. We must break down barriers that isolate and marginalize community, and work to create a homeland where all of us -- and that means each of us -- can pursue the American way of life and thrive. Thanks very much. (Applause.) HOFFMAN: Thank you very much, Deputy Secretary. Let me begin by referring actually to the title of this conference, which is of course "U.K. and U.S. Approaches to Countering Radicalization." And we've heard often this morning, in the on-the-record sessions, how the U.K. does it differently. For some years they've had a defined strategy, CONTEST. They've had an arm of that strategy that specifically is oriented towards counter-radicalization, which is Prevent. They have a specific agency that has the lead, the Home Office, and even a specific office within that, Charles Farr's Office of Security and Counterterrorism. Now I know we've done it differently, and we've done it by learning some of the lessons from the U.K. that apply to the United States. I wonder if you could discuss how DHS has taken that on board and applied some of these lessons. LUTE: So we've had a very robust dialogue with the Brits over the course not only of the past two years but certainly beyond that. I would say a couple of things. One, which is obvious, is there -- no one size fits all. They are working with and adapting programs for their communities, their population, in all of its richness and history. We've taken a different approach, not least because we're -- we are so extraordinarily different, notwithstanding the fact that we share very fundamentally norms and values and even some of that history. One of the most interesting things to me over the past couple of years is the degree to which the Department of Homeland Security and Home Offices, not only in the U.K. but around the world, have kind of discovered each other and have opened up a dialogue about how they are doing business, the challenges that they are facing, as ministries of interior, Home Offices, Department of Homeland Security. And this dialogue is extraordinarily rich and extraordinarily exciting. It's also extraordinarily operational. The Department of Homeland Security is a deeply operational department. Nearly 400,000 people come to work every day. Five thousand of them are at headquarters and the rest are deployed in the operating agencies. And similarly around the world, including with the Home Office, there are things that they do every day. So in the question of violent extremism and the program of Prevent which the U.K. is evolving now and taking a different approach, we continue to share best practices and really look -- share information and look at the best way for each of us, governments at the national level, to engage with state and locals and with communities, in order to achieve the same effect. HOFFMAN: Well, following on from that, in terms of the sharing of information, I think something we heard this morning as well is the importance of sharing information between federal, state and local authorities. How can DHS be the glue, in essence, that holds this process together, especially when there are multiple federal agencies in the United States involved in counterterrorism but especially in counter-radicalization? LUTE: So this is -- there's also another very interesting thing for me, as somebody who's spent their whole career in national security. I mentioned that homeland security is very different. I mean, national security is about all of us. Homeland security is about each of us. National security is strategic, centralized, top-driven. Homeland security is decentralized, operational and driven from the grass roots up. And so -- we recognize this in DHS, and while we -- you used the phrase "glue," I think, in a way, what we're trying to do is empower state and locals and underscore and support community-based policing, the engagement of community leaders. We have fusion centers. We also have partnerships with the FBI, Department of Justice, Health and Human Services, other departments, so that we can create a responsive federal structure that helps build capable communities and through -- both at that vertical and horizontal engagement, I think, provide some of that glue, but we don't think by any means we're the whole story. HOFFMAN: Let me ask one more question before we open it up to the floor. I was very taken with the beginning of your presentation, when you sort of fell back on your role at the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and were talking about the diversity of the roots of violent extremism and indeed of violence, the reasons why someone is driven or motivated to pick up a gun or to throw a bomb. Given that we understand that this is highly -- you know, very much of an individual phenomena in many respects, but of course is being propagated and the motivation is coming from organizations with a particular agenda -- but given the diversity, can we have any metrics? I mean, is countering violent extremism amenable to any kind of meaningful metrics that we can actually determine progress? Or is this something that rather we just have to do as a good and because it's one of the only things we know that we can do to stop this? LUTE: This is a -- this is a fascinating discussion, and one -- why in part it's so important to have scholars and practitioners come together. Practitioners or operators are dealing with the immediate every single day, and it's a -- it's a luxury to have a long-term view. It's a necessity to have short-term view, to be able to see -- discern trends within the immediate or -- among the immediate things that you're observing. And so first and foremost, we probably have to understand what it is. Are we looking at a match, a flicker or a flare? Or are we looking at a flame? There are some expressions of violence where people act out their frustrations or their evil intentions, as an individual act of anger and evil. There are other acts that -- that's a flicker or a flame. Does it have wider implications for us as a society? Are there larger lessons to draw? We should make those judgments as we look at these incidents. There are some incidences that are more like flares. They have a wider effect. They're more visible to others. They're seen and interpreted to be bigger and more important than a -- than a flash expression of anger or hatred. And then there are flames. There are flames that are both fueling and fueled by causes larger than the individual act, and their aim is to reject the system, to reject the established order, to reject the rule of law. And we need, I think -- and we need the help of scholars here, certainly informed by the practice of the operators, people who are dealing with law enforcement, dealing at our borders every single day, to know what it is we're looking at. HOFFMAN: Thank you. Well, let me open up the floor to questions. Let me remind you again this session is on the record. Please don't refer to previous sessions that were not. And may I ask you also to stand and state your name and affiliation. The floor is open. Yes, sir. QUESTIONER: (Inaudible) -- Georgetown University and DHS. You spoke about the partnership with the private sector. What do you see as the role of the private sector at the community level and in social networking, especially among the telecommunication companies? LUTE: I -- rather than assign responsibilities, what we're doing in DHS is opening a dialogue. Our -- it's not immediately germane, but you mentioned telecommunications companies. We have a very robust dialogue and partnership with the telecommunications companies in cyber, for example. They -- companies have over the course of the past decade or more begun to develop a set of -- a sense of social responsibility engagement with the local communities. What we simply want to know is, we want companies themselves to equip themselves with the knowledge for national resilience, be able to contribute to the See Something, Say Something campaign, and also to be pillars of support for the broader development of the societies within which they live and work, and draw employees and contribute in return. And so this is -- you know, I -- (you stole my kids ?). You know, life doesn't happen in the passive voice -- unless it does. There is no more opportunity for passive-voice engagement in life today. We all need to play a part. HOFFMAN: Yes, Arnaud. Microphone's coming. QUESTIONER: Arnaud de Borchgrave, CSIS. You mentioned that you were kind of puzzled about violence. But if one pictured a Pakistan, which is probably the most dangerous country in the world today, you have between 100(,000) and 500,000 youngsters that graduate from the madrassas where they've been taught to hate America. You have highly educated people in Pakistan who are convinced that the CIA and Mossad did 9/11 -- these are people who come out of universities in the Western world. So when you listen to all of this -- and I spent a lot of time in and out of Pakistan -- one understands immediately where violence springs from. LUTE: I -- I'm tempted to say "wrong lute." (Laughter.) I certainly understand, and I understand what you're saying. I have -- I don't think there's any doubt about the intention of many of the violent extremists. There is no -- there is no doubt. We need to know more about what works. We need to know more about the signs of trouble as it's brewing, to prevent that trouble from becoming violent. And the scholars need to continue to tell us more about the kinds of remedies that eliminate the attractiveness of these extremist ideologies. We think we know something about that, in terms of promulgating our own norms, our values; living them every day; enfranchising people in the opportunities and promise of freedom, of representative governance, of market economic activity available to all, of the power and strength of the rule of law that is renewed through the voices of all of us, not just a few of us. I mean, we know that. But I think there is still a lot we don't know. HOFFMAN: Burton. QUESTIONER: Burton Gerber, of Georgetown University. Thank you for coming today. We've heard a lot today about what we should be doing, what we want to do and so forth. Can you give us -- share with us some things that you -- not you, deputy secretary, but your organization -- in the past several years has done and has shown marked improvement in protecting the United States, and a couple of things that you'd like to do but you just don't see how you're ever going to achieve it? LUTE: So what -- again, we've built on the experience of the previous years of the department in its standup and formative years. More concretely with respect to this particular problem of preventing violent extremism has been our building out and working with state and local authorities on the fusion centers, engaging with training, with the big-city chiefs and with other state and local law enforcement officials, to really strengthen their hand in recognizing some of the signs and some of the patterns and precursive steps or preparatory steps to violent conflict, and bring that expertise that we've developed with what might be called, perhaps not altogether accurately, a traditional approach to counterterrorism through intelligence, military operations and our international partnerships, and bring that -- lessons learned, knowledge, expertise -- and put that in the hands, appropriately, of state and local fusion centers, state and local law enforcement, policy leaders, community leaders as well. That has been a big effort of ours to engage with the department. One of the striking things about homeland security is that it is very -- it's very much a unity of effort, not a unity of command, model. It's a unity of effort model that will take all of us in various parts of the community, and all leaders. There have been other things. Again, through our grantmaking program, we want to sustain fusion centers and really establish them as information platforms and sources of decision-making available to the states and the major municipalities, to be able to respond to all contingencies when they arise. That's one example. The to-do list in homeland security is pretty long, so -- (chuckles) -- so I don't know that -- I'll think about one of the things that -- nothing's impossible. And you don't get -- anybody who's lived through the events of 1989 doesn't get to say anything's impossible. If you've lived through 9/11, you don't get to say anything's impossible. So I don't ever say that. But there are sure some things that are harder than others. HOFFMAN: Could I actually jump in and follow up on that? One of the -- I think one of the big differences is -- certainly 10 years after 9/11, is we have the Department of Homeland Security. We've undertaken massive intelligence reform as well. We have the fusion centers, as you describe. But what about in terms of the American public and our resilience? Do you think that the American public now is more resilient; in Lee Hamilton's words, that we can take a punch better now than we could have 10 years ago? And what has DHS been doing in that respect in reaching out to communities not necessarily with radicalization, extremism, but preparing the American public to have a more realistic appreciation of the threat and of the risks? LUTE: I think this country is stronger. I think we are fundamentally secure in the basic knowledge that we can defend ourselves. This country can defend itself, and we continue to have a lot worth defending. We have strengthened our faith in each other, moreover, and that's been an extraordinary thing to see over the past 10 years. The "See Something, Say Something" campaign is a small illustration of that. It hasn't taken people off the deep edge. It has caused the important raising of concerns about behavior that is -- that is anomalous and strange, and given law enforcement the opportunity to look at incidents. It has resulted in the effective prevention of potentially dangerous and violent acts. And so it's -- that's just, again, one illustration. But I think there's no question that this country is stronger and safer for the efforts that have been undertaken -- again, not just by the department but by all of us. HOFFMAN: Yes. Over there. QUESTIONER: Kevin Sheehan, ORIX Ventures. Good to see you, Deputy Secretary. LUTE: We were children together. (Laughs, laughter.) QUESTIONER: While engagement with the Muslim community particularly is certainly key, that at best is going to allow us to perhaps to -- perhaps delay and certainly identify radicals who identify themselves to those communities. So, for example, young men who are playing basketball in one quarter and are wearing Islamic garb and quoting Said Qutub in the next would -- you would hope that the community would identify those individuals. But what happens if Islamic terrorist organizations begin to develop a stronger sense of operational security and act more like KSM did prior to 9/11 and train their -- train their recruits to stay away from those communities and not give up obvious signs of radicalization? Have we thought about that? Anything we can do to deal with that particular threat? LUTE: You know, it's great to see you, Kevin. We really were children together. (Chuckles.) We started our Army careers together a long time ago. You know, we -- what we know is we have a persistent, adaptive adversary, and they are not spending all their money taking out billboards and advertising their next moves. We have a -- we have in some cases a strategy that depends on their -- our knowing who they are. And what if we don't? What if they use individuals who are previously unknown? What are the signs? What are the behaviors? What are the preparations? What are the elements of preparation? An old friend of mine used to say, you know, every hurricane has a warning; not all warnings yield hurricanes. But we live in an age when we may have hurricanes without warnings, in the sense of violent extremism. But someone knows. And what we want to do is when people who are closest who know, who have concerns can raise their hand and bring these concerns to the attention of folks who will take -- who will take the appropriate steps. We don't want vigilantism. We don't want the kinds of worst excesses that we could imagine when people see strange garb or engage -- or don't understand behaviors that they might be observing. That's why it's so essential that we take the knowledge, experience and expertise that we have learned from fighting terrorism abroad, bring it here, engage in a consistent and open channel of dialogue with state and local authorities also to learn what they know. If something is wrong to a local law enforcement officer, it's probably wrong, but they may not in all cases know just how wrong it is, because the anomalous behavior or the worrying signs that they see may not fit in their particular circumstance but would fit an understanding of a terrorist pattern of action. And we want to put those pieces of the puzzle together to prevent and use what law enforcement knows every day about preventing violent crime so that we can succeed here, too. HOFFMAN: Mitzi. Over here. QUESTIONER: Deputy Secretary, I'm Mitzi Wertheim with the Naval Postgraduate School. I'm a social anthropologist by training, so I find myself thrilled to hear you talk about individuals and how individuals are an important piece, because in my defense world, it's all about large numbers. What -- has the whole department recognized it's about how people think, feel and behave? Is this a revolution in understanding that's occurring? LUTE: I don't know how to answer that. I think what I would say, that people certainly matter. They always have. You know, when you're a -- you know, when you're a soldier and you give part of yourself as an individual to the larger organization, you give it to the -- your country; you give it to the ideals that your people stand for. But what you know is that when it comes down to it, people die one at a time, but people make a difference one at a time as well. And that's -- we can never lose sight of the importance and the power and the -- and the beauty in the contributions of each of us. And so I say, you know, national security really at some level is about all of us. Homeland Security is absolutely about each of us, and each of us have to do our part. HOFFMAN: All the way in the back? QUESTIONER: Dean Godson, Policy Exchange think tank in London. Just viewed -- some of us viewed with interest in London the recent report of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, the -- or the report by Senators Lieberman and Collins on the Fort Hood episode. I've made some critical remarks about the culture, particularly of the Department of Defense and the FBI in respect of spotting telltale signals of Major -- that's major's radicalization who perpetrated, obviously, that killing. I'm just wondering how many of those recommendations, in light of the fact that (there have/they have ?), of course, been the official DOD report, are now going to be integrated more broadly into sort of federal analyses of the kind of signals that should be spotted sooner and sort of having a sort of proper culture of appreciation of those sort of threatening notes that are being sounded early on in the development of someone's radicalization. LUTE: Well, we work very closely, obviously, with our colleagues in Defense and with the bureau, the Department of Justice but equally with the other federal departments. And what you're hearing from me today is that for Homeland Security, a huge part of our reality is what's happening at the state and local level, what's happening at the grassroots of this country, what we're learning about and what we know, frankly, about how law enforcement officials, policy officials, governance officials, community leaders at every level in this country engage with their communities and with their -- the broader context within which they live. There's a -- there's a lot to be learned, and there's a potential for wrong lessons to be learned, and equally we want to be sure that the right lessons are learned. So in terms of the signs, that's what I said earlier. Someone knows -- someone knows that this is trouble. What we need to do is be able to connect the person who knows that trouble is brewing with a responsible and responsive structure to take appropriate action. QUESTIONER: (Off mic.) LUTE: We can -- we can -- you know, why don't we chat about that afterward. HOFFMAN: Yes, up there. QUESTIONER: Mischa Thompson with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I'm struck that Senator Durbin's hearing this week, protecting the civil rights of Muslims, was described as a counter to Representative King's radicalization hearings and its potential to be used as a recruitment tool by extremists. And I was wondering if you could talk more about whether support of international human rights commitments, including anti-discrimination and religious freedom commitments, and civil rights and inclusive democracies at home, are part of your multi-pronged strategy. If so, I was hoping you might be able to list specific examples; and then also how you can promote a strategy when you have high-profile figures in the United States and also abroad pretty much saying that Muslims are unwelcome in Western society. Thank you. LUTE: Well, you certainly won't hear anyone in Homeland Security saying that Muslims are unwelcome in American society. The president himself has set the tone and has been quite specific with respect to the message that this administration is sending on this question. For us in Homeland Security, as we -- when we say we want to build a safe, secure, resilient place where the American way of life can thrive, that way of life is founded on a set of values, on a fundamental belief in freedom, in the value of individual worth. And that extends to all of our citizens. When I mentioned that we want to break down the barriers that isolate and marginalize communities, I mean it. And we want to reach out to our new immigrants and, as I said, encourage them and give them ways and means to broadly embrace their new society, but equally, to have their society broadly embrace them. And so this is an ongoing -- there are no 1.6's, there are no single-shot solutions. This is an ongoing effort. It's part of our culture, it's part of who we are to be a welcoming society, but one -- equally it's part of our culture to be a society based on the rule of law and on the order of that law. QUESTIONER: Charles King, Georgetown University. Are there lessons learned or items that we might take from the experience in dealing with non-Islamic forms of radicalization in the United States? One thinks of the very important work of the Southern Poverty Law Center in dealing with white supremacist groups in the U.S. And if so, what have we learned? If not, what is particular about that adjective, "Islamic," when it comes to radicalization in the U.S.? LUTE: You know, I'll leave it -- I'll leave it to the academics among you to sort out the lexicon. I'm an operator. And certainly those groups -- again, you know, are there flickers, flashes? You know, are there flames? Are there groups committed to the pursuit of violence? Yes. Are they the concern of local law enforcement? Yes. Are we working with them and understand them -- to understand these groups and prevent their intentions from manifesting themselves violently? Yes. QUESTIONER: It's interesting to note that both -- HOFFMAN: Please introduce yourself. QUESTIONER: I'm sorry. (Name inaudible) -- George Mason University. It's interesting to note that both President Bush and President Obama both noted the same threat to the United States. They both stated that the most significant threat to the United States would be the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by a terrorist group. So given that, and given that you're part of Department of Homeland Security, how do you deal with that threat, given the radicalization topic? LUTE: So it certainly is a threat. I mean, if one can imagine it, that is significant. We deal with the -- or we have the responsibility -- immediately we have the office of -- the Domestic Nuclear Detection office, which is really designed to prevent such an event like that from occurring. What would be the strategy and approach to preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons? First and foremost, as the president has said, having some certainty about the nuclear arsenals and materials that are around the world and that might be vulnerable to hostile exploitation and to prevent that from happening, and certainly to take all measures necessary to prevent terrorists from acquiring them or transiting them to the United States or to the West or to any -- frankly, in ways that might imperil any population. And so it's something that we think about and we have responsibilities for, which we obviously accept. QUESTIONER: Alan Schlaifer, Wharton School Club. Given the huge upsurge in digital devices -- our cell phones, our smartphones, iPads and other computers, in the face of the WikiLeaks situation, where a relatively low-level employee exposed massive amounts of documents, where do we stand in meeting your goal of cybersecurity? LUTE: I spend a lot of time on the question of cybersecurity. There are really only two challenges -- securing our identities and securing our information. The rest, as they say, is commentary. (Laughter.) But again, we can't -- we can't do this alone. We are working together in -- I mean, there are things I could talk to you about about the fielding of cybersecurity equipment in the dot-gov space. There are things I could talk to you about in working with the critical infrastructure in the lead agencies in this country, working with the Department of Defense, obviously, very closely, Department of Justice, to ensure that we can make progress in securing our identities and our information. What's our basic theory of the case? Our basic theory of the case is that there is no single-point solution; that this is going to require a broadly distributed system of self-help, where machines and users can activate defenses, supported by smart networks who can recognize, identify and (cabin off ?) hostile signatures, alert the rest of us that trouble is afoot and act at network speed. All of what I just said in the sentence will probably take two or three years, and so both the problems that we will have and the technology that we'll have to deal with those problems in two or three years haven't been invented yet. But this is something that Homeland Security is very much at the leading edge of government on. HOFFMAN: Scott. QUESTIONER: Scott Helfstein, West Point's Combating Terrorism Center. LUTE: Hello. QUESTIONER: Thank you for your remarks today, ma'am. I'm curious. We talked quite a bit about identifying negative trends as they occurred -- the "See Something, Say Something" -- before we get to a critical level. I'm curious what the department's role is in preventing that from even getting to bad things seem to be afoot. So what is the role in sort of the Prevent strategy, whether we call it a counter-narrative or a counter-radicalization? Is there a role for the department to play in that regard? LUTE: Well, when I was -- when I was working on the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, I spent a lot of time thinking about this problem. You know, I began my career as a soldier. I wrote my doctoral dissertation on how wars end. I spent a lot of time thinking about how you might prevent the emergence of mass violence, and I spent a lot of time as a peacekeeper. I'm thinking about peace-building -- so have walked this circle of violent conflict. And a lot of people a lot smarter than me, including the guy I'm sharing the stage with right now, have much smarter answers to your question. People used to say: How do you prevent deadly conflict? What do you need to do? What's the sentence? You want the sentence? The sentence is: Educate young women, employ young men. That's the sentence. Is that the answer? I don't think so. It's not entirely the answer. Or if it is, there's a lot that goes into educating young women and employing young men. There's a lot we know about the high-payoff interventions with adolescent girls, for example. It is the high-payoff intervention for us as a -- as a global society. There's a lot we know about getting to young men. What's the right age? It's between 7 and 9, they say, when you really want to influence the choices that they're going to make later in life. It's really about then when you begin to shape their world view, their understanding; create their sense of opportunities, entitlement and hope. How do we prevent the potential terrorist? There's -- for every individual one, there's an individual story, but there is a counter-narrative. What al-Qaida and other terrorist groups are trying to do is create a sense of community, a sense of belonging, a sense of purpose and meaning. It's the wrong purpose, it's the wrong community, it's the wrong belonging and meaning. And counter-narrative -- living the American way of life, making this a safe, secure, resilient place where all of us can pursue it -- is going to be key to what this department does every day in preventing the emergence of violent extremism. HOFFMAN: Yes. QUESTIONER: Hi. My name is Andy Polk, with Congresswoman Sue Myrick's office. Thanks so much for coming today, and thank you for your work, because we all understand it's very difficult work. The question is, we've been talking a lot today about Muslim communities and law enforcement communities. We haven't really talked much about local thought leaders, be it, you know, journalists or school teachers or local mayors. If you look at the Dutch system, what they did was when they set up their national counter-radicalization strategy it was pushed from the bottom up. So local mayors went to the Dutch national government and said: We need help with this issue. I feel like today in America we're kind of seeing a top-down approach, to where we're pushing it down. And I'm wondering what kind of resistance you're getting on this, what kind of response you're getting, especially with tight budgets and priorities on other issues. LUTE: So that's what I mean when I say homeland security is a bottom-up phenomenon. We are all about the states, the municipalities, the communities. And our role is to help create a responsible and responsive federal piece of the puzzle. But we by no means think we have all the answers. We believe in community-based policing, we believe in the power of community leaders of all -- in all sectors of life. And we have and we are building robust dialogues with all of them on all of these questions. Our Civil Rights/Civil Liberties Office, for example, is out there every single day, meeting with them, taking with them, understanding not only the grievances that they have, but the frustrations and opportunities -- not because the solutions lie within the Department of Homeland Security; they usually don't. But to provide a forum for convening advocacy along the lines that the president and the secretary certainly have spoken about publicly numerous times. And that's the aim that we're trying to pursue: precisely that joining of local knowledge and local sense of responsibility with additional knowledge, best practice, training and opportunities to sustain that over the long term. HOFFMAN: Yes, the woman in the back. QUESTIONER: Nancy Bearg, from Project on National Security Reform in George Washington University. LUTE: Nancy, hi. QUESTIONER: Hi, Jane. I was glad to hear you use the term "unity of effort," and talking about horizontal and vertical efforts. And you've addressed this to some extent, but I wanted to ask what do you need in this regard? How is that going, in terms of the U.S. -- the federal government and the efforts with the states? Are there particularly good practices that you're instituting, such as intergovernmental teams or special teams or whatever? But are there things you need that would help you enhance this further? LUTE: So we meet at a federal level, at the interagency level, all the time, and share what each of us happen to be doing with the constituencies with which we normally interact on a day-to-day level. And here it's important to realize that this is not just the security agencies coming together. You know, I've mentioned Health and Human Services. For example, the Department of Education; they have liaisons and relationships, and bringing their understanding. You know, what is it that we can bring into the schools, for example, to equip people with the knowledge, information and awareness that they need, to be alert for signs? Again, our focus is on the community level, both to break down the barriers and to strengthen the hand of local law enforcement, capitalizing on their extraordinary ability to prevent violent crime. New ideas are coming in every day, and so there are many portals and opportunities to bring that into the mix. We've met with mayors, and we're going to continue to do that, both to understand the problem as they understand it and to see the needs that they have at the local level. It's very much coming back to this question about, you know, bottom-driven or driven from the ground up -- very much a feature of how we're approaching this. HOFFMAN: Time for one last question. I'm going to break, then -- probably dangerously -- with CFR protocol, and ask it -- (laughter) -- because I've been dying to ask someone in authority this question. We've just recently had the fifth issue of Inspire magazine, and in your opinion, is this something that really is a revolution in terrorist communications, or are we getting needlessly spun up because it's in the English language and we can understand it? LUTE: So I'd -- you know, any time we see this level and kind of appeal, with this kind of a message -- any time? Is this the first time? Is this the first time more of us are paying attention? There's no question it's slick, it's hip, it's connecting at a level with the kind of granularity and information that can lead and encourage people to pursue those means. It's -- is it dangerous? Yes. But we've confronted dangerous literature before in this country, and not panicked. I have a great deal of faith in the American people. It's an -- we are extraordinary. I've spent the 15 years sort of before I came back into government virtually on the outside, looking in. We are an extraordinary society and an extraordinary nation. And I am betting on us. I always will. HOFFMAN: Thank you deputy secretary. I had -- in introducing you, I had left out deliberately the most important element in your very impressive vitae, and that's you're a graduate of Georgetown University -- sadly, not the School of Foreign Service, but the Law Center. (Laughter.) LUTE: (Laughs.) HOFFMAN: And you've acquitted yourself extremely well and brought great honor to the alma mater. Thank you very much. LUTE: Thank you. Thank you. (Applause.) #### ®FC¯END ®FL¯ _ (C) COPYRIGHT 2011, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR E-MAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.
  • United States
    Radicalization and U.S. Muslims
    The Muslim community has played an integral role in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and congressional hearings on radicalization of Muslims risk polarizing a considerable asset for law enforcement, says expert Mark Fallon.
  • Saudi Arabia
    The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment
    Saudi Arabia’s program to deradicalize suspected terrorists has experienced some high-profile failures but could still provide important lessons for other states, says CFR’s Marisa Porges.
  • Religion
    The Future of Radical Islam in Europe
    Play
    VALI R. NASR:  Good afternoon.  I'd like to welcome everyone to our session at the Council on Foreign Relations today with Olivier Roy.  I'm going to, first, after introducing Olivier, have a conversation with him, ask him some questions, and then open the discussion for questions and thoughts from the audience.Before we start, I want to remind everyone if you can please turn off your cell phones, or at least put them on vibrate, and also that the meeting's going to be on the record.  Now, it's a great pleasure to welcome Olivier Roy to the Council for this session.  For those of you who are familiar with Islamic studies, the study of the Middle East and Olivier, he requires no introduction.  Olivier has been one of the best-known experts on Islam in Europe, and also now his works have been translated in English, are widely read.  He has presented many new conceptual ideas, ways of thinking about issues of Islamic fundamentalism, political Islam, and now in particular the very sensitive issue of the future of Islam in Europe and what it means for extremism and political change within Europe itself.  Olivier came to many people's attention first for his book, "Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan," which became very rapidly a classic about the fight of the Mujaheddin and the role that Islam played in it against the Soviet Union.  More recently, he wrote a book called "Globalized Islam," which was actually nominated among the best books of the year by the Council on Foreign Relations.  It recasts the way we think about the problem of extremism, of the new generation of Islamic ideology which he refers to as "neofundamentalism."  And I've used that book in classrooms with students, and I think it's a very, very important book.And recently Olivier has been engaged in debates in Europe about the question of Islam, and his recent book, published by Columbia University Press, "Islam and Secularization," which is actually available here, deals with this issue from a very, very different perspective.  And I think for those who are interested in this issue who read material that is now available in the market, largely often from an alarmist viewpoint, I think Olivier's book is very instructive.  I recommend it, for those who are interested, very strongly.  And if you would like to, there are copies available here today.Olivier is with the CNRS, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in France.  He teaches, writes and does research in France.  He's also a frequent visitor to the United States.  I think he's going to be spending next year at Berkeley, at the University of California, Berkeley.  At any rate, we're very fortunate to have him here.And I wanted Olivier to start the discussion by going back to a theme that you've raised as a setting, about -- which is an issue -- we deal greatly in this country with extremism, the reason for its appeal to, particularly, the youth in the Muslim world and in Europe.  And you've compared the rise of sort of new extremism as a cultureless phenomenon, as something new, and you even compare it to evangelical trends in the West.  I want to see if you can sort of elaborate a bit on that, about how we ought to think of this extremism.OLIVIER ROY:  Thank you very much, Vali.  Yes, if one looks at the biographies, for instance, of the radicals in Europe -- I really concentrate on Europe, but we can discuss more largely after, if you want.  There are some common patterns.   The young, the youngsters who joined al Qaeda or any of the terrorist organizations are by different ways a prudent people.  By that I mean, first, they are living in a country which is not the country of their parents.  Secondly, most of them became born-again Muslims or converts in Europe and not, you know, in the Middle East or not through the influence of Middle Eastern -- (inaudible) -- of people, for instance.Thirdly -- and this is something which is very interesting, too -- when they decide to go for jihad, for action, for fighting, none of them, except for a few Pakistanis that did remain, none of them did return to the country of origin of his parents.  So clearly we see that the way they are becoming radicals is a way to break with the family, with the past, their own past, their own history.  None of them, for instance, have special roots with the country of origin.  They all speak Western languages.  Many of them have Western citizenship.  Let's take a guy like Moussaui who is now in jail in the States.  He was born in France.  He was not educated as a -- (inaudible) -- Muslim; he was taught in French schools.  And he became radical when he was in his early 20s in France.  And he decided to go to London because he thought that the real people, the real tough guys are in London.  He didn't go to Yemen or to Pakistan and so.  And after that he decided to go for jihad in Afghanistan.So these guys, you know, they are confronted with a world which is not divided into -- (inaudible) -- into Middle East and the West.  They are living in a global world, in a global society.  The real global people, and it's why they are (essentially ?) -- they are, they can deliver the goods -- (inaudible) -- goods, by definition.The last point is about converts.  Al Qaeda is the only Muslim -- quote-unquote Muslim -- organization which not only are a high level of converts in it, a high percentage of converts, but the only Muslim organization which gives  responsibility to converts.  If you go to the Muslim in Cairo or elsewhere.  If you go to the Islam Republic of Iran, you will never find a convert at a position of responsibility.  But if you look at al Qaeda, at least 30 percent and in Europe to 20 percent of the militants of al Qaeda are converts.  And they have responsibility.  The bombing of the synagogue in Tunisia, was handled by a German convert.  Part of the bombings or of the -- endeavor you know, to do something in London, were engineered by Barat (ph), and Barat (ph) is a very interesting guy.  He was born from a Hindu family of -- (inaudible) -- who migrated to Great Britain, and then in Great Britain he became a Muslim and joined al Qaeda.  So he -- for me, these guys typically embodies what al Qaeda is, a global organization, and not the expression of a traditional Muslim culture, and not even a Middle Eastern organization.NASR:  I think it's an interesting point you raise that if it's this cultural dislocation, this being rootless is that -- pushes these young people into this global extremist vision, then is this a transitory phenomenon, do you think?  In other words, is this just -- is the extremism just a phenomenon limited to this period in history, to this second generation, and it's a matter of time that it would go away? ROY:  We'll see.  (Laughter.)  But for me it's a generational phenomenon.  It's a youth phenomenon.  It's not the expression of a traditional society.  And it's why -- for example, I compare this with the wave of -- (inaudible) -- in the West during the '60s and '70s.  There are many comparisons. The same connections between middle class intellectuals and school dropouts and uprooted people.  The same commitment to global revolution and/or global jihad.  The same nomadism from one -- (inaudible) -- you know, from one -- (inaudible) -- from one liberation movement to the other liberation movement, from one jihad to the other jihad.  The same lack of rooting among a real society.  No political party, no union, no real organization, you know?  A bunch of young guys who decide to fight the world order by the means of terrorism. And in the '70s, remember Italy, France, Germany, it was seen as a strategy fight.  And suddenly -- by suddenly I mean in 50 years -- suddenly nothing, and almost no -- (inaudible) -- exactly the people who claim, you know, this -- (inaudible).  They call us, you know, the terrorist of the '70s, he converted to Islam in jail.  And why?  Because he said, "Now al Qaeda is doing what we were trying to do in the '70s."  So clearly for me it's a global movement, a youth movement, and not a social and culturally rooted movement, so it's one I am -- (inaudible).  But as I said, let's -- (off mike).NASR:  But actually, what you say reminds me of a comment a Chilean colleague made that in Chile now to be a revolutionary you are Muslim.  The people convert, young people convert or have a positive image because -- not because of what the faith says or what the ideology says, but this is -- the rebelliousness is there.In your book you actually have a very interesting analysis of the imagery of the beheadings, the manner in which it's set up with a trial, a summary trial, with a flag hanging behind the masked men and the prisoner, and then the summary execution of justice.  And you say that that is much more -- the imagery of it is much more reminiscent of the trial and execution of Aldo Moro, the former Italian prime minister, by the Red Brigade than is anything in Islamic history.  And now you're also drawing parallels between how Che Guevara's a better way of understanding al Qaeda than anything within the Islamic tradition, but which raises the question that where does the contact come?  I mean, where is it that these young extremists, who -- children of these migrants, some of whom, you know, are not necessarily university students and the like, are absorbing this 1970s revolutionary language of the left?ROY:  In a sense, you know, to absorb the revolutionary language of the left is in a sense it means to be integrated.  In one of the political traditions of the West, the tradition of confrontation, violent confrontation and anarchy.  The revolutionary tradition of the West, especially of continental Europe, of course.  On the other hand, when one looks to these guys, why do they go not only for violence, but also for suicide?  What is at stake for them?  They are not revolutionary, in the sense that they don't expect anything for the day after.  This isn't their thing.  If you listen to al Qaeda through bin Laden, he doesn't say anything about what would be a good society, a just society, a perfect society, and even an Islamic society.  He doesn't care about the day after.  None of them does care about the day after.So in a sense, suicide is part of the project, you know?  It's not just a mean.  It's also a life and death, of course, project.  I think these guys are more moved by a certain concern for self-made than by a really -- real religious faith.  Because if we speak in terms of faith, suicide is not allowed no more than in Islam than in most of the religions, you know, because it's to decide, instead of God, to decide about life.  But in a sense, these guys, they think that they are God.  They have this fantastic feeling of being -- of having the power, the power to kill people, the power to change a society, and this -- they have a fascination for imagery.   Al Qaeda would never existed without the TV.  I'm not blaming the journalists, by the way.  (Laughter.)  They do their job, you know.But as well as TV is part of our world, I'd say that's part of our world,  they all -- most of them, not all -- do make video before going for a suicide attack, and they stage their own self.  So from being nobody, they are not only somebody, but arm of God.  And I think that for a disenfranchised young guy who has a lot of expectations, who went to school, who was an average student or even a good student, but has a feeling, you know, that his life is not really connected to the existing society, then to go for suicide is a way to take his hand on society, but also a way to exist as a hero.  So I think there is a psychological dimension which is more important than any cultural tradition which, by the way, doesn't exist.  There is no traditional culture of suicide bombing in Islam.  And I would say in any religion, by the way. So here again these guys are modern.  Too modern --NASR:  Well, when we think about the 1970s, for instance, when you did -- you had similar kind of Communist organizations in Europe.  Terrorists -- or the Red Brigades, the Bader Meinhof gang, et cetera.  At the same time there was much more mainstream Communist parties in France, Italy, trade unions, and there was a dynamic there as well.  When we talk about extremists in -- or this sort of alienated youth in Euro, we think of them in isolation.  I want to see what you think is the nature of relationship with mainstream Muslims, or if there is such a thing in Europe.  And how is that likely to play itself out?  I mean, we hear numbers about Muslims in Europe in an undifferentiated way.  Our focus is on, obviously, the extremists and the terrorists, but what is happening among the rest, if that's -- if there is something there?  ROY:  There is a trend to consider al Qaeda as some sort of a revolutionary vanguard of the Muslim community.  And of course, the way al Qaeda itself presents itself -- (inaudible).  But if you look at the mainstream, for them al Qaeda is largely a phenomenon.  And the problem is we appraise the mainstream Muslims through the lens of terrorism.  We ask them, for instance, to condemn terrorism which, by the way, most of them do.  But all are -- not all but a large part of policy towards the mainstream Muslim is driven by the fear of terrorism.  And do that it's precisely to play for al Qaeda, to make -- to put al Qaeda at the center, you know, of the issue of Islam in Europe.Why, if you look at the mainstream Muslims in Europe, their concern is not about terrorism; it's not about Middle East.  It's a legend; it's a myth to say that the Muslim population in Europe is polarized on the caliphate in the Middle East.  Great Britain might be an exception, because there is a higher level of politicization among British Muslims, for different reasons.  But in continental Europe, no.  It's very simple, let's take the riots in France years ago.  There was not one Palestinian flag.  While it's usual for the rest, for the -- (inaudible) -- in France to wave Palestinian flags -- (inaudible) -- you know.  It's some -- (inaudible) -- if I can say that.You didn't find any political fight.  You didn't find any -- (inaudible) -- for vindication -- (inaudible) -- nothing about the mosque, no.  All was about discrimination and, specifically, discrimination to go to the night clubs, which -- that's very connected with Islam.  (Laughter.)  Or discriminations, you know -- it's a big issue, night clubs.  Big political issue.  (Laughter.)  Discrimination of the labor market also. (Inaudible) -- in Paris, you know we love to demonstrate in the streets.  A demonstration in favor of Palestine, you have 15,000 people, half of them graying (partistes ?), you know.  But there are -- millions of Muslims are in Paris.  So if this  -- (inaudible) -- Palestinian conflict were at the core of the concerns of the Muslim population in France, we would have 1 million Muslims demonstrating in Paris.  Nothing.  Nothing at all.And for example, I was two weeks ago at the conference of the OSCE in Cordoba, a very symbolic place, Cordoba in Andalusia.  And diplomats were invited, Muslim organizations of Europe were invited and so on.  All the diplomats spoke about defusing the conflict in the Middle East in order to placate the Muslim public opinion in Europe.  But the European Muslims who participated at the conference, they didn't say a word about Middle East.  All of their interventions, which were done in French for the French, in German for the Germans, in Spanish for the Spaniards -- all their interventions were about how to have mosques in Europe, how to be recognized as a church -- I would use the term "as a church" -- on the same level of Catholics or Presbyterians churches, how to have -- (word inaudible) -- with the schools, what about the veil, how should we sign agreements from (cemeteries ?).  And see, everything was about how to be a good Muslim and a good citizen in Europe.  None of them, including the people who originated from the Middle East, none of them spoke about Palestine, Iraq, or Afghanistan.  So I think the trend among most of the Muslims in Europe is to find the accommodation between being open and being Muslim.  But most of the policies which are devised by the government -- (audio difficulty) -- precisely have the -- (inaudible) -- effect to reconnect -- reconnect the Muslims in Europe with the Middle Eastern conflict.  To do -- to finish here, just an example.At this conference, the conference both on Islamophobia in Europe, so a representative of the organization of the Islamic concerns was invited which is no more, you know.  The organization of the Islamic conflict -- (inaudible) -- is supposed to -- (inaudible) -- with Muslims in the world.  But the general secretary of the Arab League was invited, and it doesn't make sense, you know?  And by definition, Mr. -- (inaudible) -- spoke about Israel, with Palestine, about Iraq, and so and so, but didn't address the concerns of the Muslim population in Europe.  And they were furious.  They said that "This guy is a foreigner, he is a diplomat, he has nothing to do with us."  So most of our policies tend precisely to stir up the problems we want to defuse.NASR:  (Inaudible) -- and I think often Arab countries think of Muslims in Europe the way British used to think of settlers in the United States, sort of arms of the empire out there, regardless of what their issues are.ROY:  I will not -- (inaudible).NASR:  And actually I must say, it's not just in Europe.  Recently a colleague of mine at a very high-level conference in Jordan took a poll of important diplomats and government leaders within the room about what's the most important issue for the future of the region.  And without surprise, it was solving the Palestinian issue. And he went outside and on the same street asked the people in Amman what they thought was the most important issue, and it was the economy, education, it was everything other than the one that their leaders were peddling as the most important issues.So I think it's important, what you say.  It's important because not just Muslims in Europe, but I think often we are being managed in terms of what ought to be thought about that.Now, you know, your book, you raise important issues from the other side of the picture, namely that if we were to look at England, France, Netherlands, they each have followed a different model in dealing with Muslims, sort of multiculturalism versus what you call laicite.  And now -- also I'll say with the election of particularly Sarkozy in France, it probably maybe will open a door for this debate about whose model is better.I wondered if you can comment about the debate on the other side among Europeans as to how they are going to manage mainstream Islam as well as that issue of culturelessness that you thought is animating the youth.ROY:  There have been two models in Europe to deal with the issue -- multiculturalism and assimilationism.  So the French model is clearly assimilationist.  We say "integration," we don't say assimilation, but in fact we mean assimilation.For 20 years there was no debate because the positions were so different, you know, between -- (inaudible) -- British and the French on this issue, so there was not a -- no communication -- (inaudible).  Now we have a lot of debate.  Why?  Because both models have failed, multiculturalism and assimilization.  And they have failed for the same reasons.  Both models press upon that culture and religions are interrelated.  So if you are Muslim, it means you are -- (inaudible) -- and so that you speak Turkish or Arabic, you eat Turkish, you eat Arabic and things like that, you know.  And so multiculturalism is treating the faith community as an ethnic minority.  So it means that these people, they do remain foreigners, in a sense.  The assimilationists, the French assimilationist model, which is really based on laicite, supposes that once you become a true French, religion doesn't matter.  That you should not be openly religious, no.  So the big scandal in France were when -- (inaudible) -- perfectly integrated.  Born in France, and so some of them converts, you know, good scholars without any pressure (from the family ?) came to school with a veil.  And this was the symbol of the -- (inaudible) -- assimilationism.  If you are totally integrated, then speak in French.  They don't speak Arabic, they don't -- if you are totally French, how could you, as a young woman, wear a veil and hence big scandal you know -- (inaudible).And the thing with the Dutch after the assassination of -- (inaudible) -- it was a trauma for the Dutch people, who have been so nice with the foreigner.  How could they kill one of us, you know?  But for me, in both cases what we see is precisely the disconnection, the disconnect between religion and culture.  Bouyeri, the guy who killed Theo van Gogh, -- is a -- (inaudible) -- culturalist.  He doesn't speak good Arabic, he doesn't care about that.   He did not mention the presence of Dutch troops in The Hague -- (inaudible) -- some degree care about that, and his group, the (Hofstad ?) group, is made of converts, second generation but -- (inaudible) -- converts, a third of converts.  So it's absolutely not the expression of an ethnic group living in Holland.And the issue now is how to deal not with an ethnic minority, but with a new religion, with a faith community.  And the difference is that to join a faith community means to join it voluntarily.  You are not born to be a Muslim or a Christian.  You join the faith community because you have a faith; you believe in it.  So we think we should now take this approach, not dealing with Muslims as foreigners or people with a certain ethnicity, because it's no more the case.  And it's no more relevant; it's less and less relevant.  And to deal with (honestly ?) the people who think that they were Muslims have a religion which now is a Western religion, and to take them on the same level as all the other religions is the way to deal.And I say that because many so-called Muslims didn't consider themselves as Muslims, and for different reasons.  There are people who said, "I don't have the faith.  Why should I enter into the category of Muslims?  Why should I be automatically given a hallal plateau when I go to the school, you know, to the eating room at school?  I have a Muslim name, but I don't care."  And we have even some people like -- (inaudible) -- and -- (inaudible) -- who say, "I am an atheist Muslim.  I don't believe in God, so I don't care about hallal.  I drink wine," so -- welcome to the club.  And so these people, there is the sense of -- you know, the idea of being categorized -- as Muslim because they don't have the faith.  (Inaudible) -- but also we have conversions on both sides. And this is something which is underestimated, that a lot of writings about Christians converting to Islam, and specifically the young guys, you know, joining al Qaeda.  But nothing is said about Muslims converting to Christianity.  Near my hometown we have a huge evangelic church which is exclusively made of lots of Christian Arabs who converted to Protestantism. They claim 10,000 people in France.  Maybe it's a bit slightly exaggerated, but it's a growing movement.And by the way, they are Zionists, because they are -- (inaudible).  (Laughter.)  But they claim to be Arab, they claim to be Arabs.  So things are a bit more complicated sometimes, you know -- (laughter) -- specifically with religions, by the way.NASR:  Well, 10,000 is definitely much higher than a century of Christian missionary activity accomplished in the Middle East in the 19th century.  So it is a notable figure, without a doubt.I would like to at this time invite members to join the conversation.  Please raise your hand if you have a question and wait for the microphone and speak into it so everybody could hear.  Yes, sir?QUESTIONER:  I'm Aristide Zolberg.  I teach at the Graduate Faculty at the New School, and I work on international migrations, including what you're talking about.  And I'm wondering whether you would agree that prior to 9/11 the American approach to the incorporation of a new religion actually worked quite well, and it's only since 9/11 that these kind of counterproductive policies have been initiated, unfortunately, as far as I'm concerned, because I know at the time of 9/11, I even organized a meeting here in New York about Muslim representatives, and everybody was very in agreement that this was a very unfortunate kind of thing.  I mean, it was very easy to start a new mosque anywhere in the city of New York.  And I think it still is much easier than in Britain, or France, or the Netherlands, or Belgium, or Germany. ROY:  Yeah, it's because Mexicans are not Muslims.  (Laughter.)  A part of the suspicions in Europe is because there is a link, which is a true link -- it's true, you know -- between a labor organization and Islam.  So it allows to connect many different forms of rejection.  The Christian right, which is opposed to Islam, a part of secular rights which is -- (inaudible) -- let's say -- people of the left who are thinking that immigration is changing too much the patterns of our society like that.  And as long as Islam will be associated with -- (audio difficulty) -- there will be more suspicion in Europe against Islamic religion than in the States.But this is changing in Europe, because what we see now is two different patterns.  One is the increase of the Muslim middle class. If you go to a hospital now in Europe and you look at the names of the surgeons, you have now Muslim names, which of course didn't exist 20 years ago.  If you go to look at the -- (inaudible) -- you will find Muslim -- (inaudible) -- and we have now Rachida Dati, the minister of justice.  And it's a news story.  She's born in France and she doesn't claim to be a Muslim.  She never said anything about religion.  And she's representative -- she's not an exception, she's representative of a new trend.The second thing is that migration now are less and less linked with the Muslim world.  Migrations are now diverse.  We have a lot of Chinese for instance now in Europe, people from different -- Africa who are not Muslim and things like that.  So the association between immigration and Islam is less strong than it used to be 20 years before.QUESTIONER:  I'm Allison Silver.  I'm from Charlie Rose.  And you talked about how this, what's going on now, is like the Red Brigades or the Baader-Meinhof in the '60s.  But is it also like the young people?  Is it also like a cult, like the Jim Jones cult about rejecting their family and forming their own family?  And how do you de-program that sort of thing? ROY:  Yeah, you are right.  I think we are confronted with some sort of violent phenomenon among the youth which sometimes do find political framework it's al Qaeda or to the left -- and sometimes don't find the political framework, and so is treated as an individual phenomenon.  But take for instance -- suppose that schoolboys will go to school and kill or try to kill their fellow countrymen, Muslim countrymen.  It's quite close of the individual motivation to go to al Qaeda to make news, to kill, to commit suicide or to be killed in action.  So we have here a psychological profile which sometimes could fit with organizations like al Qaeda, especially for the converts for instance.  Many of the converts would have done something.NASR:  John?QUESTIONER:  John Entelis of Fordham University.  I always wanted the opportunity to be able to ask you in person, in light of your writings of the past -- back in 1994 you wrote a book on the failure of political Islam, and you and your colleague Gilles Kepel predicted that political Islam was a waning phenomenon.  Yet, the very aspects that you've been discussing today, the sociological and political and social and economic aspects you have been talking about today, have been developing over a long period of time.  Obviously September 11th transformed the framework of your discussion.  But what is it in your analysis that a decade ago led you to conclude that political Islam is a failure, and now you're using the same evidence to predict that it is a success? ROY:  Well, form al Qaeda was not political Islam.  Political Islam is a failure, and it's why because -- it's why political Islam failed that we have al Qaeda.  What is political Islam?  It's a political project to create an Islamic state, an Islamic society, an Islamic economy, an Islamic justice, or to manage a country in the name of Islam -- not only in the name of Islam but by using Islamic concepts and, not precisely, by using an Islamic ideology.  So political Islam is a Muslim Brothers, the Jamiat -- (inaudible) -- in Pakistan, the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and so and so -- and it's a total failure. It doesn't work.  In Iran you do not fight an Islamic justice, an Islamic economy and Islamic -- (inaudible) -- the Iranian society is the most secularized society of the Middle East.  People don't care about -- they may have a definite faith -- I am not speaking of that.  But religion is no more -- that the people are fed up with political Islam in Iran.  Of course Ahmadinejad is in charge and it's still a problem on that.  But the society is more Westernized and more secularized than ever now in Iran.  So I stick with what I said. So it's why the people who are going -- who are looking for violence to fight the West, they are no more doing that in the -- (inaudible) -- state because it doesn't work.  And they are going to go jihad.  They do not have a territory.  They are outside the space of a nation-state.  It's both their strength -- they are everywhere and nowhere. It's also their weakness:  they do not have a social basis.  Al Qaeda has no social basis.  But al Qaeda is not a political organization -- (inaudible).  As I said, al Qaeda and bin Laden never speak about an Islamic state, they never say what he will do the day after, because for him there's no day after he doesn't care.  You know, he doesn't care at all.  It's not a political organization.NASR:  If I may just push you to maybe elaborate a little bit more about the debate about Caliphate, which obviously has some resonance among policy makers in the U.S. as well, in the context of this issue of Islam.  If they're not following an Islamic state, where does this debate fit in?ROY:  Caliphate is not so -- we may have mentioned caliphate from time to time, but what he's doing has nothing to do with building a caliphate.  The caliphate has a territorial basis by definition.  And al Qaeda, as I said, is a de-territorialized organization, which is not so much interested by the Middle East.  Al Qaeda was almost never involved in the Israel-Palestinian conflict.  More exactly, more precisely, the forerunner of al Qaeda, Abdullah Azzam, they left the Middle East because they thought the situation was hopeless. And why?  Not because of the American presence in the Middle East, but because for them the Middle East struggles were stuck in nationalism.  The main accusation of this people against Yasser Arafat were that Arafat in fact was a nationalist -- which is true, by the way.  And Abdullah Azzam said if liberating Palestine means to have another -- (inaudible) -- like Nasser in Palestine, I don't like this struggle.  It's not my struggle.  I am a Muslim.  I fight for the umma.  The Palestinian struggle is important for umma, of course.  But if it's to have some sort of basis Palestine, I am not interested.  He decided to go to Afghanistan, which is not an Arab country, and it's not part of the Middle East, except for the State Department -- (laughter) -- which is not necessarily a mistake under the present circumstances.  He decided to go to Afghanistan precisely because they considered the jihad of the Afghan mujaheddin as a global jihad against a superpower and not to liberate just a given territory.If you look at the most popular jihad among the al Qaeda's people, it has always been outside the Arab world.  It was in Afghanistan, in Kashmir, in Chechnya, in Bosnia -- it went to Malaysia, to Indonesia to New York and so- but almost none of them went to Israel Palestine.  And in Iraq -- they go to Iraq now -- they go to Iraq because now they go everywhere the Americans are.  They have no project for Iraq.  What they do is to a certain extent to (preside ?) a different conflict -- to try to manipulate different conflicts and to recast local conflicts in a global narrative as a fight for -- against America globally speaking.  But they do not have any concrete agenda on Iraq.  And it's why, by the way, they are not so successful in Bosnia, in Iraq, and so -- because they don't care about the local agenda.  The problem is that there are too many agendas in Iraq.  But none of them does fit with al Qaeda's global agenda. QUESTIONER:  Bill Drozdiak, American Council on Germany.  Do you think the inclusion of Turkey into the European Union would help deal with these challenges of integrating Muslims into Europe?  Or is the matter of Turkish membership, as you suggest with the Palestinian issue, totally extraneous to their cause? ROY:  The issue of Turkey into Europe is not so much popular among European Muslims, except among the Turks of course, because it will make things far more easy, you know -- but not so much for the others.The idea that Turkey has a model of good Islam doesn't make sense.  First, it's a government Islam.  And Muslims in Europe are not looking for a government Islam.  They are fed up with governments.  They have a good opportunity to have a free Islam, an independent Islam, to have imams who are not paid by the government, one who are given orders by the government or by state authorities.  And they are happy about that.  So Turkey is an issue for the Muslims in Europe because it has been recast into the terms of relations between Europe and Islam.  And because that is an issue, and many people think that we have rejected the Turks because they are Muslims -- but we will reject -- I hope so -- the Russians too -- I hope so -- for different reasons, you know -- yeah, for good reasons -- they are Russians.  (Laughter.)  And the Turks are, for me, too nationalist to be Europeans, but not too Muslim -- it has nothing to do with religion.  They are too nationalist. We have already a lot of nationalists.  So the Turks are trying -- the government of Turkey is trying to say we have -- we can deliver good Muslims.  But I think it is a mistake.  It's once again to recognize the issue of Islam in Europe with the Middle East.NASR:  The gentleman in the back.QUESTIONER:  Hi.  Marty Gross from Sandalwood Securities.  I'm still a little bit confused about your definition of radical Islam.  It's kind of like the war on terror:  you're defining this group of people by what they do.  I think -- I'd like to know your view.  I think that what you have to do here is decide to what extent the imposition of Shari'a law in place of, quote "Western law in Europe" is the key to defining radical Islam.  It's clearly true that a lot of the riots in France are for social reasons, having nothing to do with anything but jobs.  But there's no aspect of fundamentalist radical Islam that you've described that didn't have a violent component to it.  For example, are the Danish cartoons part of radical Islam's move into Europe to get us to think differently about how we view our own laws?  So if you could address the non-violent aspects of radical Islam, I'd appreciate that.ROY:  I will call radical Islam jihadi Islam.  The people who consider to make jihad is is mandatory for everybody, for me these are radicals.  Then we call the -- I will not use the term -- (inaudible) -- Salafi or Wahhabi -- people who think that Shari'a -- a good Muslim is somebody who lives exclusively in the framework of the Shari'a, Islamic law.  So I think this difference is important.And now in Europe the issue -- you're right, the issue is not about the jihadists, the jihadists are a minority.  The issue is about the Salafis, the Wahhabis and they are very affluent -- (inaudible) -- because they use the narrative, the discourse of multiculturalism.  The term multiculturalism on the side -- they say, okay, we are -- you're right, we are a different population.  We are very different.  And because we are different we should have our own domestic laws.  And there's a lot of confliction among certain circles to divide Europe into compatible Shari'a.  We don't contest your state.  We don't contest that it's a Christian country.  We just want Shari'a for us.  That means in marriage law, in -- (inaudible) -- and things like that.  In Canada you have the Ontario stories in the same way too.And usually there is rejection.  Sometimes after a discussion, after debate -- in France there is no debate -- it's totally out of -- it will never be taken into consideration.  But there have been some debates in Canada, in -- (inaudible) -- and at the end the idea of separate law has been discarded everywhere -- for two reasons.  One, it doesn't fit with our legal and constitutional principles, which are based on individual freedom.  And the issue is how -- what I said -- how to make a difference between an ethnic minority group and a faith community.  If you say that Shari'a should be applied to the Muslims, who is a Muslim?  And then you describe individual freedom, which is -- (inaudible).So the other issue is, okay, let's take the faith community.  We are grown-ups, a free people, and we decide to live according to the Shari'a between us.  Okay, why not?  But there should be no state regulation of that.  If people decide for instance to practice polygamy between themselves, it's not against the law as long as there is no -- only one marriage is registered.  But you can have like the French cuisinier Mr. Bocuse -- he has three wives, you know, which they are in the same building.  And people say, "Oh, what a man."  (Laughter.)  But if -- (inaudible) -- Karim has the same thing, people will say oh, he's a fundamentalist.  No.  But it's not against the law if you don't register different marriages. So we have some faith communities -- and, by the way, not just among the Muslims, but also among the Jews, among -- (inaudible) -- people, among some different cults who decide freely to live according to their own rules between themselves.  But for me the state doesn't recognize that and should not recognize that.As far as the cartoon affair is concerned, it's not a European affair.  You know, if the demonstration in Europe have been -- and certainly, we think, as usual -- I'm French.  (Laughter.)  You have no demonstrations in Europe.  The demonstrations were in Damascus, in Cairo, in the Gaza Strip, in Pakistan as usual -- you know?  And all these demonstrations were assimilated by a people who had an interest in designing, almost in constricting the Muslim population in Europe as a diaspora.  But in France we had 700 demonstrators to protest the Danish cartoons -- which for the French no doubt is very, very low -- and they didn't burn one car, which is not very French, you know.  (Laughter.) NASR:  Judith. QUESTIONER:  I think everybody can hear me.  Judy Miller.  I'm a journalist -- can you hear me?Very interesting, as usual, Olivier.  A question for you.  In New York, the New York police department recently did a study of radicalization, which traced four different phases, but found that radicalization was most likely to occur, or just as likely to occur, even among the middle class that you talked about -- let us remember the doctors' attack or attempt in England.  What does one do about the radicalization phenomenon, given the fact that this is a youth phenomenon and this youthful population is likely to be disproportionately large for some time in Europe?  And, secondly, why do you think mainstream Muslim clerics and guides have been so hesitant and reluctant to condemn and separate their own populations from the jihadis? ROY: It's true that radicalization has nothing to do with social uprootedness you know.  But it's the same with all the extreme revolutionary movements.  Lenin was not an outcast.  So it has to do I think with expectations.  And it's interesting to see that in fact -- you asked about the doctor -- often people with a scientific background are more prone to some sort of radicalization, strangely enough, to religious radicalization, but it's true it has nothing to do with social status.  And usually we have intellectuals coming from the middle class followed by people of lower social status.  You know, that's very typical.  What was your second question?QUESTIONER:  Why isn't the mainstream clerics -- ROY:  Mainstream clerics.  The problem with the mainstream clerics is there is no mainstream clerics.  This -- the social changes among the Muslims didn't bring until now a new generation of imams.  And that's a big problem.  It's a big problem.  As you know, Islam is more than Protestantism you don't have an institution.  And when you have a state institution, which is some sort of -- (inaudible) -- there is a depth of change -- not only adapted imams.  For years in Iraq the imams used to come from Pakistan, from the Gulf, didn't speak European languages, and had a lot of problem to grasp with the local entities.  So especially when these people used to come from the Middle East, they used to bring the Middle East issues into the mosques.  And for these guys to fight the Americans in Iraq is not bad.  So they had a problem to make a distinction between terrorism and nationalist struggles.But what we see is a growing discrepancy between the present, the actual congregation, and their imams.  The problem is the children of this new middle class -- (inaudible) -- because you cannot make a lot of money.  You have to be a real -- really committed to your faith to be an imam.  The community -- not in the Islamic states but in Europe -- the Muslim communities are poor. They don't have a way to pay an imam, so there are ways to good pay now, but somebody who has a diploma after five to seven years, he doesn't want to go to work for a salary of $1,000 a month.  And so there is a big problem of recruitment.  In every European country now there is an endeavor to create schools.  But the point is who should teach and what to teach.  And here we have another problem, the theological problem -- oh, we should teach good Islam.  But what is good Islam now?  And if you ask most of the European politicians, good Islam it's liberal, definitely Islam.  Okay, liberal definitely.  Well, look at the Catholic Church.  Look at the Jews -- (inaudible) -- We have to accept that we can have decent, conservative religious people.  It's a discovery, especially in France.  But there might be some decent conservative religious people.  And these are the guys who will build the congregations, you know, by the -- (inaudible) -- will be the imams now.QUESTIONER:  I'm struck by your continuing emphasis in this very important talk on the disconnect between policy makers and the reality of the community.  And I'm thinking in the international discussions, in the international discourse, that very serious disconnect.  And I'm wondering will it make a difference if we change the terms of that discourse, if we bring in more of a development perspective, if there's more of a recognition of what the real issues are rather than the -- they are real issues but that one could bring in these other sets of issues and perhaps make changes there that might then lead to more rootedness of youth in these societies -- in Europe, United States, and Muslim societies? ROY:  At least -- at last, I think that we should de-ideologize the debate. To speak about Islamic culture, what does the Koran say it's -- (inaudible) -- no.  We should not discuss about Islam; we should discuss about Muslims, about people, about real people, about citizens, you know.  Those are the concerns -- what is acceptable, not acceptable -- negotiable, not negotiable.  To take that, in a broader sense, a social and political issue and not as a psychological, metaphysical, or strategic issue.  That's for me.  So we have to give up all these speeches about dialogue of civilization.  Dialogue of civilization is based on the -- (inaudible) -- and clash of civilizations.  We are different.  We are very different.  Now, we may be different, of course, but in the framework of a political society we are citizens, and there should be no debate about civilization.  We share the same civilization.So that's why, yes, I think we should give up this way to speak with big words about the issue of Islam and to address people more than to address ideas. NASR:  Unfortunately, we are at the end of our time, and I want to take this occasion to thank Olivier Roy for a very rich and enlightening discussion.  Thank you, Olivier.  (Applause.) ####      (C) COPYRIGHT 2007, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE.NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA.  ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.  ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED.      UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION.      FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. 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NASR:  Good afternoon.  I'd like to welcome everyone to our session at the Council on Foreign Relations today with Olivier Roy.  I'm going to, first, after introducing Olivier, have a conversation with him, ask him some questions, and then open the discussion for questions and thoughts from the audience.Before we start, I want to remind everyone if you can please turn off your cell phones, or at least put them on vibrate, and also that the meeting's going to be on the record.  Now, it's a great pleasure to welcome Olivier Roy to the Council for this session.  For those of you who are familiar with Islamic studies, the study of the Middle East and Olivier, he requires no introduction.  Olivier has been one of the best-known experts on Islam in Europe, and also now his works have been translated in English, are widely read.  He has presented many new conceptual ideas, ways of thinking about issues of Islamic fundamentalism, political Islam, and now in particular the very sensitive issue of the future of Islam in Europe and what it means for extremism and political change within Europe itself.  Olivier came to many people's attention first for his book, "Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan," which became very rapidly a classic about the fight of the Mujaheddin and the role that Islam played in it against the Soviet Union.  More recently, he wrote a book called "Globalized Islam," which was actually nominated among the best books of the year by the Council on Foreign Relations.  It recasts the way we think about the problem of extremism, of the new generation of Islamic ideology which he refers to as "neofundamentalism."  And I've used that book in classrooms with students, and I think it's a very, very important book.And recently Olivier has been engaged in debates in Europe about the question of Islam, and his recent book, published by Columbia University Press, "Islam and Secularization," which is actually available here, deals with this issue from a very, very different perspective.  And I think for those who are interested in this issue who read material that is now available in the market, largely often from an alarmist viewpoint, I think Olivier's book is very instructive.  I recommend it, for those who are interested, very strongly.  And if you would like to, there are copies available here today.Olivier is with the CNRS, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in France.  He teaches, writes and does research in France.  He's also a frequent visitor to the United States.  I think he's going to be spending next year at Berkeley, at the University of California, Berkeley.  At any rate, we're very fortunate to have him here.And I wanted Olivier to start the discussion by going back to a theme that you've raised as a setting, about -- which is an issue -- we deal greatly in this country with extremism, the reason for its appeal to, particularly, the youth in the Muslim world and in Europe.  And you've compared the rise of sort of new extremism as a cultureless phenomenon, as something new, and you even compare it to evangelical trends in the West.  I want to see if you can sort of elaborate a bit on that, about how we ought to think of this extremism.OLIVIER ROY:  Thank you very much, Vali.  Yes, if one looks at the biographies, for instance, of the radicals in Europe -- I really concentrate on Europe, but we can discuss more largely after, if you want.  There are some common patterns.   The young, the youngsters who joined al Qaeda or any of the terrorist organizations are by different ways a prudent people.  By that I mean, first, they are living in a country which is not the country of their parents.  Secondly, most of them became born-again Muslims or converts in Europe and not, you know, in the Middle East or not through the influence of Middle Eastern -- (inaudible) -- of people, for instance.Thirdly -- and this is something which is very interesting, too -- when they decide to go for jihad, for action, for fighting, none of them, except for a few Pakistanis that did remain, none of them did return to the country of origin of his parents.  So clearly we see that the way they are becoming radicals is a way to break with the family, with the past, their own past, their own history.  None of them, for instance, have special roots with the country of origin.  They all speak Western languages.  Many of them have Western citizenship.  Let's take a guy like Moussaui who is now in jail in the States.  He was born in France.  He was not educated as a -- (inaudible) -- Muslim; he was taught in French schools.  And he became radical when he was in his early 20s in France.  And he decided to go to London because he thought that the real people, the real tough guys are in London.  He didn't go to Yemen or to Pakistan and so.  And after that he decided to go for jihad in Afghanistan.So these guys, you know, they are confronted with a world which is not divided into -- (inaudible) -- into Middle East and the West.  They are living in a global world, in a global society.  The real global people, and it's why they are (essentially ?) -- they are, they can deliver the goods -- (inaudible) -- goods, by definition.The last point is about converts.  Al Qaeda is the only Muslim -- quote-unquote Muslim -- organization which not only are a high level of converts in it, a high percentage of converts, but the only Muslim organization which gives  responsibility to converts.  If you go to the Muslim in Cairo or elsewhere.  If you go to the Islam Republic of Iran, you will never find a convert at a position of responsibility.  But if you look at al Qaeda, at least 30 percent and in Europe to 20 percent of the militants of al Qaeda are converts.  And they have responsibility.  The bombing of the synagogue in Tunisia, was handled by a German convert.  Part of the bombings or of the -- endeavor you know, to do something in London, were engineered by Barat (ph), and Barat (ph) is a very interesting guy.  He was born from a Hindu family of -- (inaudible) -- who migrated to Great Britain, and then in Great Britain he became a Muslim and joined al Qaeda.  So he -- for me, these guys typically embodies what al Qaeda is, a global organization, and not the expression of a traditional Muslim culture, and not even a Middle Eastern organization.NASR:  I think it's an interesting point you raise that if it's this cultural dislocation, this being rootless is that -- pushes these young people into this global extremist vision, then is this a transitory phenomenon, do you think?  In other words, is this just -- is the extremism just a phenomenon limited to this period in history, to this second generation, and it's a matter of time that it would go away? ROY:  We'll see.  (Laughter.)  But for me it's a generational phenomenon.  It's a youth phenomenon.  It's not the expression of a traditional society.  And it's why -- for example, I compare this with the wave of -- (inaudible) -- in the West during the '60s and '70s.  There are many comparisons. The same connections between middle class intellectuals and school dropouts and uprooted people.  The same commitment to global revolution and/or global jihad.  The same nomadism from one -- (inaudible) -- you know, from one -- (inaudible) -- from one liberation movement to the other liberation movement, from one jihad to the other jihad.  The same lack of rooting among a real society.  No political party, no union, no real organization, you know?  A bunch of young guys who decide to fight the world order by the means of terrorism. And in the '70s, remember Italy, France, Germany, it was seen as a strategy fight.  And suddenly -- by suddenly I mean in 50 years -- suddenly nothing, and almost no -- (inaudible) -- exactly the people who claim, you know, this -- (inaudible).  They call us, you know, the terrorist of the '70s, he converted to Islam in jail.  And why?  Because he said, "Now al Qaeda is doing what we were trying to do in the '70s."  So clearly for me it's a global movement, a youth movement, and not a social and culturally rooted movement, so it's one I am -- (inaudible).  But as I said, let's -- (off mike).NASR:  But actually, what you say reminds me of a comment a Chilean colleague made that in Chile now to be a revolutionary you are Muslim.  The people convert, young people convert or have a positive image because -- not because of what the faith says or what the ideology says, but this is -- the rebelliousness is there.In your book you actually have a very interesting analysis of the imagery of the beheadings, the manner in which it's set up with a trial, a summary trial, with a flag hanging behind the masked men and the prisoner, and then the summary execution of justice.  And you say that that is much more -- the imagery of it is much more reminiscent of the trial and execution of Aldo Moro, the former Italian prime minister, by the Red Brigade than is anything in Islamic history.  And now you're also drawing parallels between how Che Guevara's a better way of understanding al Qaeda than anything within the Islamic tradition, but which raises the question that where does the contact come?  I mean, where is it that these young extremists, who -- children of these migrants, some of whom, you know, are not necessarily university students and the like, are absorbing this 1970s revolutionary language of the left?ROY:  In a sense, you know, to absorb the revolutionary language of the left is in a sense it means to be integrated.  In one of the political traditions of the West, the tradition of confrontation, violent confrontation and anarchy.  The revolutionary tradition of the West, especially of continental Europe, of course.  On the other hand, when one looks to these guys, why do they go not only for violence, but also for suicide?  What is at stake for them?  They are not revolutionary, in the sense that they don't expect anything for the day after.  This isn't their thing.  If you listen to al Qaeda through bin Laden, he doesn't say anything about what would be a good society, a just society, a perfect society, and even an Islamic society.  He doesn't care about the day after.  None of them does care about the day after.So in a sense, suicide is part of the project, you know?  It's not just a mean.  It's also a life and death, of course, project.  I think these guys are more moved by a certain concern for self-made than by a really -- real religious faith.  Because if we speak in terms of faith, suicide is not allowed no more than in Islam than in most of the religions, you know, because it's to decide, instead of God, to decide about life.  But in a sense, these guys, they think that they are God.  They have this fantastic feeling of being -- of having the power, the power to kill people, the power to change a society, and this -- they have a fascination for imagery.   Al Qaeda would never existed without the TV.  I'm not blaming the journalists, by the way.  (Laughter.)  They do their job, you know.But as well as TV is part of our world, I'd say that's part of our world,  they all -- most of them, not all -- do make video before going for a suicide attack, and they stage their own self.  So from being nobody, they are not only somebody, but arm of God.  And I think that for a disenfranchised young guy who has a lot of expectations, who went to school, who was an average student or even a good student, but has a feeling, you know, that his life is not really connected to the existing society, then to go for suicide is a way to take his hand on society, but also a way to exist as a hero.  So I think there is a psychological dimension which is more important than any cultural tradition which, by the way, doesn't exist.  There is no traditional culture of suicide bombing in Islam.  And I would say in any religion, by the way. So here again these guys are modern.  Too modern --NASR:  Well, when we think about the 1970s, for instance, when you did -- you had similar kind of Communist organizations in Europe.  Terrorists -- or the Red Brigades, the Bader Meinhof gang, et cetera.  At the same time there was much more mainstream Communist parties in France, Italy, trade unions, and there was a dynamic there as well.  When we talk about extremists in -- or this sort of alienated youth in Euro, we think of them in isolation.  I want to see what you think is the nature of relationship with mainstream Muslims, or if there is such a thing in Europe.  And how is that likely to play itself out?  I mean, we hear numbers about Muslims in Europe in an undifferentiated way.  Our focus is on, obviously, the extremists and the terrorists, but what is happening among the rest, if that's -- if there is something there?  ROY:  There is a trend to consider al Qaeda as some sort of a revolutionary vanguard of the Muslim community.  And of course, the way al Qaeda itself presents itself -- (inaudible).  But if you look at the mainstream, for them al Qaeda is largely a phenomenon.  And the problem is we appraise the mainstream Muslims through the lens of terrorism.  We ask them, for instance, to condemn terrorism which, by the way, most of them do.  But all are -- not all but a large part of policy towards the mainstream Muslim is driven by the fear of terrorism.  And do that it's precisely to play for al Qaeda, to make -- to put al Qaeda at the center, you know, of the issue of Islam in Europe.Why, if you look at the mainstream Muslims in Europe, their concern is not about terrorism; it's not about Middle East.  It's a legend; it's a myth to say that the Muslim population in Europe is polarized on the caliphate in the Middle East.  Great Britain might be an exception, because there is a higher level of politicization among British Muslims, for different reasons.  But in continental Europe, no.  It's very simple, let's take the riots in France years ago.  There was not one Palestinian flag.  While it's usual for the rest, for the -- (inaudible) -- in France to wave Palestinian flags -- (inaudible) -- you know.  It's some -- (inaudible) -- if I can say that.You didn't find any political fight.  You didn't find any -- (inaudible) -- for vindication -- (inaudible) -- nothing about the mosque, no.  All was about discrimination and, specifically, discrimination to go to the night clubs, which -- that's very connected with Islam.  (Laughter.)  Or discriminations, you know -- it's a big issue, night clubs.  Big political issue.  (Laughter.)  Discrimination of the labor market also. (Inaudible) -- in Paris, you know we love to demonstrate in the streets.  A demonstration in favor of Palestine, you have 15,000 people, half of them graying (partistes ?), you know.  But there are -- millions of Muslims are in Paris.  So if this  -- (inaudible) -- Palestinian conflict were at the core of the concerns of the Muslim population in France, we would have 1 million Muslims demonstrating in Paris.  Nothing.  Nothing at all.And for example, I was two weeks ago at the conference of the OSCE in Cordoba, a very symbolic place, Cordoba in Andalusia.  And diplomats were invited, Muslim organizations of Europe were invited and so on.  All the diplomats spoke about defusing the conflict in the Middle East in order to placate the Muslim public opinion in Europe.  But the European Muslims who participated at the conference, they didn't say a word about Middle East.  All of their interventions, which were done in French for the French, in German for the Germans, in Spanish for the Spaniards -- all their interventions were about how to have mosques in Europe, how to be recognized as a church -- I would use the term "as a church" -- on the same level of Catholics or Presbyterians churches, how to have -- (word inaudible) -- with the schools, what about the veil, how should we sign agreements from (cemeteries ?).  And see, everything was about how to be a good Muslim and a good citizen in Europe.  None of them, including the people who originated from the Middle East, none of them spoke about Palestine, Iraq, or Afghanistan.  So I think the trend among most of the Muslims in Europe is to find the accommodation between being open and being Muslim.  But most of the policies which are devised by the government -- (audio difficulty) -- precisely have the -- (inaudible) -- effect to reconnect -- reconnect the Muslims in Europe with the Middle Eastern conflict.  To do -- to finish here, just an example.At this conference, the conference both on Islamophobia in Europe, so a representative of the organization of the Islamic concerns was invited which is no more, you know.  The organization of the Islamic conflict -- (inaudible) -- is supposed to -- (inaudible) -- with Muslims in the world.  But the general secretary of the Arab League was invited, and it doesn't make sense, you know?  And by definition, Mr. -- (inaudible) -- spoke about Israel, with Palestine, about Iraq, and so and so, but didn't address the concerns of the Muslim population in Europe.  And they were furious.  They said that "This guy is a foreigner, he is a diplomat, he has nothing to do with us."  So most of our policies tend precisely to stir up the problems we want to defuse.NASR:  (Inaudible) -- and I think often Arab countries think of Muslims in Europe the way British used to think of settlers in the United States, sort of arms of the empire out there, regardless of what their issues are.ROY:  I will not -- (inaudible).NASR:  And actually I must say, it's not just in Europe.  Recently a colleague of mine at a very high-level conference in Jordan took a poll of important diplomats and government leaders within the room about what's the most important issue for the future of the region.  And without surprise, it was solving the Palestinian issue. And he went outside and on the same street asked the people in Amman what they thought was the most important issue, and it was the economy, education, it was everything other than the one that their leaders were peddling as the most important issues.So I think it's important, what you say.  It's important because not just Muslims in Europe, but I think often we are being managed in terms of what ought to be thought about that.Now, you know, your book, you raise important issues from the other side of the picture, namely that if we were to look at England, France, Netherlands, they each have followed a different model in dealing with Muslims, sort of multiculturalism versus what you call laicite.  And now -- also I'll say with the election of particularly Sarkozy in France, it probably maybe will open a door for this debate about whose model is better.I wondered if you can comment about the debate on the other side among Europeans as to how they are going to manage mainstream Islam as well as that issue of culturelessness that you thought is animating the youth.ROY:  There have been two models in Europe to deal with the issue -- multiculturalism and assimilationism.  So the French model is clearly assimilationist.  We say "integration," we don't say assimilation, but in fact we mean assimilation.For 20 years there was no debate because the positions were so different, you know, between -- (inaudible) -- British and the French on this issue, so there was not a -- no communication -- (inaudible).  Now we have a lot of debate.  Why?  Because both models have failed, multiculturalism and assimilization.  And they have failed for the same reasons.  Both models press upon that culture and religions are interrelated.  So if you are Muslim, it means you are -- (inaudible) -- and so that you speak Turkish or Arabic, you eat Turkish, you eat Arabic and things like that, you know.  And so multiculturalism is treating the faith community as an ethnic minority.  So it means that these people, they do remain foreigners, in a sense.  The assimilationists, the French assimilationist model, which is really based on laicite, supposes that once you become a true French, religion doesn't matter.  That you should not be openly religious, no.  So the big scandal in France were when -- (inaudible) -- perfectly integrated.  Born in France, and so some of them converts, you know, good scholars without any pressure (from the family ?) came to school with a veil.  And this was the symbol of the -- (inaudible) -- assimilationism.  If you are totally integrated, then speak in French.  They don't speak Arabic, they don't -- if you are totally French, how could you, as a young woman, wear a veil and hence big scandal you know -- (inaudible).And the thing with the Dutch after the assassination of -- (inaudible) -- it was a trauma for the Dutch people, who have been so nice with the foreigner.  How could they kill one of us, you know?  But for me, in both cases what we see is precisely the disconnection, the disconnect between religion and culture.  Bouyeri, the guy who killed Theo van Gogh, -- is a -- (inaudible) -- culturalist.  He doesn't speak good Arabic, he doesn't care about that.   He did not mention the presence of Dutch troops in The Hague -- (inaudible) -- some degree care about that, and his group, the (Hofstad ?) group, is made of converts, second generation but -- (inaudible) -- converts, a third of converts.  So it's absolutely not the expression of an ethnic group living in Holland.And the issue now is how to deal not with an ethnic minority, but with a new religion, with a faith community.  And the difference is that to join a faith community means to join it voluntarily.  You are not born to be a Muslim or a Christian.  You join the faith community because you have a faith; you believe in it.  So we think we should now take this approach, not dealing with Muslims as foreigners or people with a certain ethnicity, because it's no more the case.  And it's no more relevant; it's less and less relevant.  And to deal with (honestly ?) the people who think that they were Muslims have a religion which now is a Western religion, and to take them on the same level as all the other religions is the way to deal.And I say that because many so-called Muslims didn't consider themselves as Muslims, and for different reasons.  There are people who said, "I don't have the faith.  Why should I enter into the category of Muslims?  Why should I be automatically given a hallal plateau when I go to the school, you know, to the eating room at school?  I have a Muslim name, but I don't care."  And we have even some people like -- (inaudible) -- and -- (inaudible) -- who say, "I am an atheist Muslim.  I don't believe in God, so I don't care about hallal.  I drink wine," so -- welcome to the club.  And so these people, there is the sense of -- you know, the idea of being categorized -- as Muslim because they don't have the faith.  (Inaudible) -- but also we have conversions on both sides. And this is something which is underestimated, that a lot of writings about Christians converting to Islam, and specifically the young guys, you know, joining al Qaeda.  But nothing is said about Muslims converting to Christianity.  Near my hometown we have a huge evangelic church which is exclusively made of lots of Christian Arabs who converted to Protestantism. They claim 10,000 people in France.  Maybe it's a bit slightly exaggerated, but it's a growing movement.And by the way, they are Zionists, because they are -- (inaudible).  (Laughter.)  But they claim to be Arab, they claim to be Arabs.  So things are a bit more complicated sometimes, you know -- (laughter) -- specifically with religions, by the way.NASR:  Well, 10,000 is definitely much higher than a century of Christian missionary activity accomplished in the Middle East in the 19th century.  So it is a notable figure, without a doubt.I would like to at this time invite members to join the conversation.  Please raise your hand if you have a question and wait for the microphone and speak into it so everybody could hear.  Yes, sir?QUESTIONER:  I'm Aristide Zolberg.  I teach at the Graduate Faculty at the New School, and I work on international migrations, including what you're talking about.  And I'm wondering whether you would agree that prior to 9/11 the American approach to the incorporation of a new religion actually worked quite well, and it's only since 9/11 that these kind of counterproductive policies have been initiated, unfortunately, as far as I'm concerned, because I know at the time of 9/11, I even organized a meeting here in New York about Muslim representatives, and everybody was very in agreement that this was a very unfortunate kind of thing.  I mean, it was very easy to start a new mosque anywhere in the city of New York.  And I think it still is much easier than in Britain, or France, or the Netherlands, or Belgium, or Germany. ROY:  Yeah, it's because Mexicans are not Muslims.  (Laughter.)  A part of the suspicions in Europe is because there is a link, which is a true link -- it's true, you know -- between a labor organization and Islam.  So it allows to connect many different forms of rejection.  The Christian right, which is opposed to Islam, a part of secular rights which is -- (inaudible) -- let's say -- people of the left who are thinking that immigration is changing too much the patterns of our society like that.  And as long as Islam will be associated with -- (audio difficulty) -- there will be more suspicion in Europe against Islamic religion than in the States.But this is changing in Europe, because what we see now is two different patterns.  One is the increase of the Muslim middle class. If you go to a hospital now in Europe and you look at the names of the surgeons, you have now Muslim names, which of course didn't exist 20 years ago.  If you go to look at the -- (inaudible) -- you will find Muslim -- (inaudible) -- and we have now Rachida Dati, the minister of justice.  And it's a news story.  She's born in France and she doesn't claim to be a Muslim.  She never said anything about religion.  And she's representative -- she's not an exception, she's representative of a new trend.The second thing is that migration now are less and less linked with the Muslim world.  Migrations are now diverse.  We have a lot of Chinese for instance now in Europe, people from different -- Africa who are not Muslim and things like that.  So the association between immigration and Islam is less strong than it used to be 20 years before.QUESTIONER:  I'm Allison Silver.  I'm from Charlie Rose.  And you talked about how this, what's going on now, is like the Red Brigades or the Baader-Meinhof in the '60s.  But is it also like the young people?  Is it also like a cult, like the Jim Jones cult about rejecting their family and forming their own family?  And how do you de-program that sort of thing? ROY:  Yeah, you are right.  I think we are confronted with some sort of violent phenomenon among the youth which sometimes do find political framework it's al Qaeda or to the left -- and sometimes don't find the political framework, and so is treated as an individual phenomenon.  But take for instance -- suppose that schoolboys will go to school and kill or try to kill their fellow countrymen, Muslim countrymen.  It's quite close of the individual motivation to go to al Qaeda to make news, to kill, to commit suicide or to be killed in action.  So we have here a psychological profile which sometimes could fit with organizations like al Qaeda, especially for the converts for instance.  Many of the converts would have done something.NASR:  John?QUESTIONER:  John Entelis of Fordham University.  I always wanted the opportunity to be able to ask you in person, in light of your writings of the past -- back in 1994 you wrote a book on the failure of political Islam, and you and your colleague Gilles Kepel predicted that political Islam was a waning phenomenon.  Yet, the very aspects that you've been discussing today, the sociological and political and social and economic aspects you have been talking about today, have been developing over a long period of time.  Obviously September 11th transformed the framework of your discussion.  But what is it in your analysis that a decade ago led you to conclude that political Islam is a failure, and now you're using the same evidence to predict that it is a success? ROY:  Well, form al Qaeda was not political Islam.  Political Islam is a failure, and it's why because -- it's why political Islam failed that we have al Qaeda.  What is political Islam?  It's a political project to create an Islamic state, an Islamic society, an Islamic economy, an Islamic justice, or to manage a country in the name of Islam -- not only in the name of Islam but by using Islamic concepts and, not precisely, by using an Islamic ideology.  So political Islam is a Muslim Brothers, the Jamiat -- (inaudible) -- in Pakistan, the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and so and so -- and it's a total failure. It doesn't work.  In Iran you do not fight an Islamic justice, an Islamic economy and Islamic -- (inaudible) -- the Iranian society is the most secularized society of the Middle East.  People don't care about -- they may have a definite faith -- I am not speaking of that.  But religion is no more -- that the people are fed up with political Islam in Iran.  Of course Ahmadinejad is in charge and it's still a problem on that.  But the society is more Westernized and more secularized than ever now in Iran.  So I stick with what I said. So it's why the people who are going -- who are looking for violence to fight the West, they are no more doing that in the -- (inaudible) -- state because it doesn't work.  And they are going to go jihad.  They do not have a territory.  They are outside the space of a nation-state.  It's both their strength -- they are everywhere and nowhere. It's also their weakness:  they do not have a social basis.  Al Qaeda has no social basis.  But al Qaeda is not a political organization -- (inaudible).  As I said, al Qaeda and bin Laden never speak about an Islamic state, they never say what he will do the day after, because for him there's no day after he doesn't care.  You know, he doesn't care at all.  It's not a political organization.NASR:  If I may just push you to maybe elaborate a little bit more about the debate about Caliphate, which obviously has some resonance among policy makers in the U.S. as well, in the context of this issue of Islam.  If they're not following an Islamic state, where does this debate fit in?ROY:  Caliphate is not so -- we may have mentioned caliphate from time to time, but what he's doing has nothing to do with building a caliphate.  The caliphate has a territorial basis by definition.  And al Qaeda, as I said, is a de-territorialized organization, which is not so much interested by the Middle East.  Al Qaeda was almost never involved in the Israel-Palestinian conflict.  More exactly, more precisely, the forerunner of al Qaeda, Abdullah Azzam, they left the Middle East because they thought the situation was hopeless. And why?  Not because of the American presence in the Middle East, but because for them the Middle East struggles were stuck in nationalism.  The main accusation of this people against Yasser Arafat were that Arafat in fact was a nationalist -- which is true, by the way.  And Abdullah Azzam said if liberating Palestine means to have another -- (inaudible) -- like Nasser in Palestine, I don't like this struggle.  It's not my struggle.  I am a Muslim.  I fight for the umma.  The Palestinian struggle is important for umma, of course.  But if it's to have some sort of basis Palestine, I am not interested.  He decided to go to Afghanistan, which is not an Arab country, and it's not part of the Middle East, except for the State Department -- (laughter) -- which is not necessarily a mistake under the present circumstances.  He decided to go to Afghanistan precisely because they considered the jihad of the Afghan mujaheddin as a global jihad against a superpower and not to liberate just a given territory.If you look at the most popular jihad among the al Qaeda's people, it has always been outside the Arab world.  It was in Afghanistan, in Kashmir, in Chechnya, in Bosnia -- it went to Malaysia, to Indonesia to New York and so- but almost none of them went to Israel Palestine.  And in Iraq -- they go to Iraq now -- they go to Iraq because now they go everywhere the Americans are.  They have no project for Iraq.  What they do is to a certain extent to (preside ?) a different conflict -- to try to manipulate different conflicts and to recast local conflicts in a global narrative as a fight for -- against America globally speaking.  But they do not have any concrete agenda on Iraq.  And it's why, by the way, they are not so successful in Bosnia, in Iraq, and so -- because they don't care about the local agenda.  The problem is that there are too many agendas in Iraq.  But none of them does fit with al Qaeda's global agenda. QUESTIONER:  Bill Drozdiak, American Council on Germany.  Do you think the inclusion of Turkey into the European Union would help deal with these challenges of integrating Muslims into Europe?  Or is the matter of Turkish membership, as you suggest with the Palestinian issue, totally extraneous to their cause? ROY:  The issue of Turkey into Europe is not so much popular among European Muslims, except among the Turks of course, because it will make things far more easy, you know -- but not so much for the others.The idea that Turkey has a model of good Islam doesn't make sense.  First, it's a government Islam.  And Muslims in Europe are not looking for a government Islam.  They are fed up with governments.  They have a good opportunity to have a free Islam, an independent Islam, to have imams who are not paid by the government, one who are given orders by the government or by state authorities.  And they are happy about that.  So Turkey is an issue for the Muslims in Europe because it has been recast into the terms of relations between Europe and Islam.  And because that is an issue, and many people think that we have rejected the Turks because they are Muslims -- but we will reject -- I hope so -- the Russians too -- I hope so -- for different reasons, you know -- yeah, for good reasons -- they are Russians.  (Laughter.)  And the Turks are, for me, too nationalist to be Europeans, but not too Muslim -- it has nothing to do with religion.  They are too nationalist. We have already a lot of nationalists.  So the Turks are trying -- the government of Turkey is trying to say we have -- we can deliver good Muslims.  But I think it is a mistake.  It's once again to recognize the issue of Islam in Europe with the Middle East.NASR:  The gentleman in the back.QUESTIONER:  Hi.  Marty Gross from Sandalwood Securities.  I'm still a little bit confused about your definition of radical Islam.  It's kind of like the war on terror:  you're defining this group of people by what they do.  I think -- I'd like to know your view.  I think that what you have to do here is decide to what extent the imposition of Shari'a law in place of, quote "Western law in Europe" is the key to defining radical Islam.  It's clearly true that a lot of the riots in France are for social reasons, having nothing to do with anything but jobs.  But there's no aspect of fundamentalist radical Islam that you've described that didn't have a violent component to it.  For example, are the Danish cartoons part of radical Islam's move into Europe to get us to think differently about how we view our own laws?  So if you could address the non-violent aspects of radical Islam, I'd appreciate that.ROY:  I will call radical Islam jihadi Islam.  The people who consider to make jihad is is mandatory for everybody, for me these are radicals.  Then we call the -- I will not use the term -- (inaudible) -- Salafi or Wahhabi -- people who think that Shari'a -- a good Muslim is somebody who lives exclusively in the framework of the Shari'a, Islamic law.  So I think this difference is important.And now in Europe the issue -- you're right, the issue is not about the jihadists, the jihadists are a minority.  The issue is about the Salafis, the Wahhabis and they are very affluent -- (inaudible) -- because they use the narrative, the discourse of multiculturalism.  The term multiculturalism on the side -- they say, okay, we are -- you're right, we are a different population.  We are very different.  And because we are different we should have our own domestic laws.  And there's a lot of confliction among certain circles to divide Europe into compatible Shari'a.  We don't contest your state.  We don't contest that it's a Christian country.  We just want Shari'a for us.  That means in marriage law, in -- (inaudible) -- and things like that.  In Canada you have the Ontario stories in the same way too.And usually there is rejection.  Sometimes after a discussion, after debate -- in France there is no debate -- it's totally out of -- it will never be taken into consideration.  But there have been some debates in Canada, in -- (inaudible) -- and at the end the idea of separate law has been discarded everywhere -- for two reasons.  One, it doesn't fit with our legal and constitutional principles, which are based on individual freedom.  And the issue is how -- what I said -- how to make a difference between an ethnic minority group and a faith community.  If you say that Shari'a should be applied to the Muslims, who is a Muslim?  And then you describe individual freedom, which is -- (inaudible).So the other issue is, okay, let's take the faith community.  We are grown-ups, a free people, and we decide to live according to the Shari'a between us.  Okay, why not?  But there should be no state regulation of that.  If people decide for instance to practice polygamy between themselves, it's not against the law as long as there is no -- only one marriage is registered.  But you can have like the French cuisinier Mr. Bocuse -- he has three wives, you know, which they are in the same building.  And people say, "Oh, what a man."  (Laughter.)  But if -- (inaudible) -- Karim has the same thing, people will say oh, he's a fundamentalist.  No.  But it's not against the law if you don't register different marriages. So we have some faith communities -- and, by the way, not just among the Muslims, but also among the Jews, among -- (inaudible) -- people, among some different cults who decide freely to live according to their own rules between themselves.  But for me the state doesn't recognize that and should not recognize that.As far as the cartoon affair is concerned, it's not a European affair.  You know, if the demonstration in Europe have been -- and certainly, we think, as usual -- I'm French.  (Laughter.)  You have no demonstrations in Europe.  The demonstrations were in Damascus, in Cairo, in the Gaza Strip, in Pakistan as usual -- you know?  And all these demonstrations were assimilated by a people who had an interest in designing, almost in constricting the Muslim population in Europe as a diaspora.  But in France we had 700 demonstrators to protest the Danish cartoons -- which for the French no doubt is very, very low -- and they didn't burn one car, which is not very French, you know.  (Laughter.) NASR:  Judith. QUESTIONER:  I think everybody can hear me.  Judy Miller.  I'm a journalist -- can you hear me?Very interesting, as usual, Olivier.  A question for you.  In New York, the New York police department recently did a study of radicalization, which traced four different phases, but found that radicalization was most likely to occur, or just as likely to occur, even among the middle class that you talked about -- let us remember the doctors' attack or attempt in England.  What does one do about the radicalization phenomenon, given the fact that this is a youth phenomenon and this youthful population is likely to be disproportionately large for some time in Europe?  And, secondly, why do you think mainstream Muslim clerics and guides have been so hesitant and reluctant to condemn and separate their own populations from the jihadis? ROY: It's true that radicalization has nothing to do with social uprootedness you know.  But it's the same with all the extreme revolutionary movements.  Lenin was not an outcast.  So it has to do I think with expectations.  And it's interesting to see that in fact -- you asked about the doctor -- often people with a scientific background are more prone to some sort of radicalization, strangely enough, to religious radicalization, but it's true it has nothing to do with social status.  And usually we have intellectuals coming from the middle class followed by people of lower social status.  You know, that's very typical.  What was your second question?QUESTIONER:  Why isn't the mainstream clerics -- ROY:  Mainstream clerics.  The problem with the mainstream clerics is there is no mainstream clerics.  This -- the social changes among the Muslims didn't bring until now a new generation of imams.  And that's a big problem.  It's a big problem.  As you know, Islam is more than Protestantism you don't have an institution.  And when you have a state institution, which is some sort of -- (inaudible) -- there is a depth of change -- not only adapted imams.  For years in Iraq the imams used to come from Pakistan, from the Gulf, didn't speak European languages, and had a lot of problem to grasp with the local entities.  So especially when these people used to come from the Middle East, they used to bring the Middle East issues into the mosques.  And for these guys to fight the Americans in Iraq is not bad.  So they had a problem to make a distinction between terrorism and nationalist struggles.But what we see is a growing discrepancy between the present, the actual congregation, and their imams.  The problem is the children of this new middle class -- (inaudible) -- because you cannot make a lot of money.  You have to be a real -- really committed to your faith to be an imam.  The community -- not in the Islamic states but in Europe -- the Muslim communities are poor. They don't have a way to pay an imam, so there are ways to good pay now, but somebody who has a diploma after five to seven years, he doesn't want to go to work for a salary of $1,000 a month.  And so there is a big problem of recruitment.  In every European country now there is an endeavor to create schools.  But the point is who should teach and what to teach.  And here we have another problem, the theological problem -- oh, we should teach good Islam.  But what is good Islam now?  And if you ask most of the European politicians, good Islam it's liberal, definitely Islam.  Okay, liberal definitely.  Well, look at the Catholic Church.  Look at the Jews -- (inaudible) -- We have to accept that we can have decent, conservative religious people.  It's a discovery, especially in France.  But there might be some decent conservative religious people.  And these are the guys who will build the congregations, you know, by the -- (inaudible) -- will be the imams now.QUESTIONER:  I'm struck by your continuing emphasis in this very important talk on the disconnect between policy makers and the reality of the community.  And I'm thinking in the international discussions, in the international discourse, that very serious disconnect.  And I'm wondering will it make a difference if we change the terms of that discourse, if we bring in more of a development perspective, if there's more of a recognition of what the real issues are rather than the -- they are real issues but that one could bring in these other sets of issues and perhaps make changes there that might then lead to more rootedness of youth in these societies -- in Europe, United States, and Muslim societies? ROY:  At least -- at last, I think that we should de-ideologize the debate. To speak about Islamic culture, what does the Koran say it's -- (inaudible) -- no.  We should not discuss about Islam; we should discuss about Muslims, about people, about real people, about citizens, you know.  Those are the concerns -- what is acceptable, not acceptable -- negotiable, not negotiable.  To take that, in a broader sense, a social and political issue and not as a psychological, metaphysical, or strategic issue.  That's for me.  So we have to give up all these speeches about dialogue of civilization.  Dialogue of civilization is based on the -- (inaudible) -- and clash of civilizations.  We are different.  We are very different.  Now, we may be different, of course, but in the framework of a political society we are citizens, and there should be no debate about civilization.  We share the same civilization.So that's why, yes, I think we should give up this way to speak with big words about the issue of Islam and to address people more than to address ideas. NASR:  Unfortunately, we are at the end of our time, and I want to take this occasion to thank Olivier Roy for a very rich and enlightening discussion.  Thank you, Olivier.  (Applause.) ####      (C) COPYRIGHT 2007, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE.NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA.  ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.  ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED.      UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION.      FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.  NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES.      FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL JACK GRAEME AT 202-347-1400.      THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.-------------------------
  • Religion
    The Future of Radical Islam in Europe
    Play
    Watch French author and academic Olivier Roy discuss his views of Islam in Europe, noting a rejection of radicalism among the mainstream and bemoaning government policies that "stir up the problems we wish to diffuse."
  • Pakistan
    Haass: In Pakistan, Radicalism Is ’Spreading’
    After a recent trip to Pakistan, CFR President Richard N. Haass says there is a good chance for considerable political change in that country, but warns that extremists are beginning to spread out into Pakistan’s urban areas.
  • Pakistan
    Schaffer: Pakistan Facing Question on How to Handle Extremists
    Teresita C. Schaffer, a former State Department official with extensive experience in South Asia, says the violence that has spread in Pakistan since President Pervez Musharraf ordered a crackdown on the Red Mosque in Islamabad may lead to some rethinking among army leaders in Pakistan on the value of keeping the extremists in Pakistan alive as a political force.
  • Russia
    Instability in Russia’s North Caucasus Region
    Russia’s troubled North Caucasus region continues to struggle with a low-level Islamic insurgency, but a heavy-handed approach to counterinsurgency has not addressed the root causes of separatism in the region.
  • Middle East and North Africa
    Challenges within the Muslim World
    Testimony by Dr. Rachel BronsonDirector of Middle East StudiesCouncil on Foreign Relations Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (The 9-11 Commission) July 9, 2003 Chairman Kean, Vice Chairman Hamilton, Board of Commissioners, thank you for the invitation to speak before the 9-11 Commission about the challenges confronting the United States in the Muslim world. While much public attention has focused on the question of whether we are now embarked upon a “clash of civilizations,” I would like to offer an alternative lens to view the current crisis. Today, America is involved in a political and economic struggle, rather than a cultural one. This, in many ways, is good news. It is much easier to respond to political and economic challenges than to overcome cultural differences. But it is not a palliative. Many of our political and economic policies are the result of decades of hard work, careful consideration, and evolving political realities. They have been constructed for good reason and have strong domestic support. Acknowledging that our policies have caused, and are causing, friction does not offer ready-made policy options. I bring to you today no easy solutions. In the Middle East, political and economic problems are becoming entwined with faith and national identity. It makes it feel as if we are engaged in a clash of civilizations. But if we allow this superficial understanding to take root within American policy toward the Arab and Muslim world, we will create a self-fulfilling prophecy. We will abandon the dwindling number of American supporters in the region; those who cling to the ideals America espouses and silently root for our victory over the radical Islamic groups that are systematically destroying centuries of culture and progress. We will hand a victory to our enemies who would like nothing more than to see the wrath of America turned against Arab/Islamic civilization. We will become complacent, believing that policy options simply do not exist. We must avoid this at all costs. The Problem We Face After September 11th, Americans fully confronted the rage and humiliation experienced by many in the Arab and Islamic world. But anti-Americanism had been on the rise before the terrorist attacks. In a prescient article written in summer 2000 entitled “The World’s Resentment” Peter Rodman, now Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, suggested that rising resentment was inevitable, often healthy and something we could do little about. What was not expected was how quickly genuine support for America would sink. A recent PEW survey found that in Indonesia those viewing the US favorably fell from 61% to 15% over the course of the past year. In Turkey, 71% of the population is worried that their country will be the target of an American attack. Anti-Americanism has become the flavor of the day in the political circles of America’s closest friends such as South Korea and Germany, as well as in the capitals of other traditional partners like Saudi Arabia. A majority of respondents in five of seven NATO countries support a more independent relationship with the United States. According to the same poll “the bottom has fallen out of support for America in most of the Muslim world.” Far are we from the day in 1962 when Prince (later King) Faisal of Saudi Arabia told President Kennedy, “after Allah, we trust the United States.” Radical Islamic groups are setting the parameters of local debate, even as they offer fewer and fewer political solutions. Their ardent anti-Americanism receives a receptive audience throughout the Arab and Islamic world. After September 11th, finding ways to reverse this appeal and re-attract America’s supporters is an urgent foreign policy priority. Choices We Have Made Today’s fight against al-Qa’eda and other Islamic radical groups flows directly from policy choices American decision makers and their Middle Eastern counterparts made in order to win the Cold War. In Afghanistan in the 1980s, American leaders were convinced that bringing down the Soviet Union was worth the costs of empowering religious radicals. In the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, “What was more important in the world view of history? The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? A few stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?” Had our leaders known that the cost of bringing down the Soviets would be over 3,000 dead Americans, the destruction of New York’s World Trade Center, an attack on the Pentagon, simultaneous embassy bombings in Africa, the disabling of the USS Cole and radical cells sprinkled across the globe operating against the United States, it is almost certain that they still would have deemed the costs acceptable. During the Cold War the United States also chose a strategy of working alongside states for geo-political reasons, rather than ideological compatibility. Determined not to recreate the British imperial experience, the United States steadfastly refused to pressure allies too hard on domestic reforms. As early as the 1950s, Britain’s Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister were beseeching the United States to use its influence to press the ruling Saudi family on their domestic and foreign policy. The United States steadfastly refused. Eventually, Islamic radicals such as Egypt’s Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s right hand man, used such refusal against the United States in order to draw recruits to their cause. Zawahiri’s argument that “the U.S. claims to stand for human rights and democracy [but] forces corrupt regimes on the Muslim world” resonates with citizens throughout the region. The lack of imperial design also allowed the United States to quickly abandon countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan when the Cold War ended. As neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan were pressing geo-political concerns in the new world order, the US withdrew most of its presence from both countries. It left behind divided fractured countries awash with weapons and in the grips of state collapse. The environment provided fertile ground for organizing an anti-western crusade. More recently, policies designed to restrain Saddam Hussein deeply damaged American standing in the Middle East in general, and in the Gulf in particular. In the early 1990s the Clinton Administration engaged in a policy of “Dual Containment” against Iran and Iraq. Washington was forced to rely heavily on Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Gulf States. The willingness to allow Saddam Hussein to stay “in his box” while millions of Iraqis suffered severe deprivation, had a profoundly negative effect on America’s regional standing. Statements that ’the containment of Iraq was worth the lives of half a million Iraqi children’ ricocheted throughout the Arab world and provided grist for America’s critics. Worse, the inability to bolster American military presence with social or economic policies that addressed pressing local problems led many in the region to ask “where, if anywhere, is American policy taking us.” Anti-Americanism did not begin after September 11th. It had been steadily growing in the Gulf for a decade. Choices Our Partners Have Made Our Middle Eastern partners have made their own set of choices that have allowed radical Islamic groups to flourish. During the 1970s and 1980s leaderships across the region chose to fund local Islamic opponents who were also at odds with the regimes’ more secular political opposition. For example, during the first Intifada, Israel supported radical Islamic groups as a counter to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which the Israelis considered far more dangerous. Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat did the same in Egypt in order to counter his secular rivals. The policy was mimicked in Tunisia. Radical Islamic movements were further strengthened by the economic windfall Arab Gulf states accrued from high oil prices in the 1970s, the Iranian revolution (and Saudi response to it) and the return of the “Afghan Arabs” in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Gulf Arabs poured significant resources into schools and mosques across the globe but then failed to restrain what was being taught. Saudi Arabia sent significant funds to Pakistan, Afghanistan and eventually Central Asia, Africa, and beyond. In addition, in Afghanistan during the 1980s, the Saudis matched American covert funding in Afghanistan “dollar for dollar” in the fight against the “godless” communists. Many Middle Eastern states used this growing Islamic opposition, which they had originally encouraged, as an excuse for enacting emergency decrees and erasing civil liberties, further motivating religious opposition. The result has been increasingly authoritarian states that are challenged by the most venal religious opposition. The United States has also become a target as it is the key backer of such regimes. Since the press in most of the Arab world is dissuaded from directly criticizing their local regimes, America is also used as a synonym for the regime itself. Things We Can Do American and Middle Eastern policies have contributed to the very real challenges we face today in the Muslim world. New policies are required to reverse mounting anger and rage. While we cannot and should not expect to attract the good will of the entire population, especially of the violent fringe, we must try to win back some of the good will that existed toward the United States in the days immediately after September 11th and during the early 1990s. This is a battle for the political center. And at the moment, we are losing. Several policy areas require urgent attention. (1) Engaging the Israelis and Palestinians Active American involvement in the peace process will help reduce the appeal of Islamic radicals. Such groups feed off the seemingly endless violence. The conflict fuels protests, demonstrations and anti-U.S. sentiment throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Moderates throughout the region regularly advise that tamping down the violence would significantly help their cause. The President deserves credit for realizing the importance of engaging his Administration directly in the peace process. His promise of a free trade agreement for the region was creative and helpful. The Administration however does not seem to have contingency plans for when radical groups attempt to thwart progress. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s response of “I hope not,” to Charlie Gibson’s question “one very significant incident, and doesn’t the entire roadmap come apart?” did not provide much assurance. Such contingencies will be needed, as violent challenges to the process are predictable. The contours of a final settlement were drawn for us at Camp David and Taba. While we cannot drag the parties back to where they were, we can serve as a catalyst for change. And that is a role we should whole-heartedly embrace. (2) Committing to Nation building The world watched overwhelming American power defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan in a matter of weeks, a victory that eluded the Soviet Army for a decade. But the world also watched how quickly American interest and commitment flagged in the post-conflict reconstruction. America’s inability to offer a convincing path to a better Afghan future led many in the Arab and Muslim world to question whether the United States could do anything better in Iraq. Perceived apathy was one reason for the lack of support we received in the run up to “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” It also fed the myth that America cares very little about what happens to Muslims around the world. The current problems the United States is confronting in Iraq, further compounds the notion that America does not take seriously the problems of Arabs and Muslims. It is not lost on the rest of the world that when the United States is serious about something, it is able to follow through. Consider the case of Germany after WWII, a project we were deeply committed to seeing through to the end. While in many ways Germany is significantly different than Afghanistan or Iraq, it was also an easy case: a country with a history of democracy and a culture and language familiar to many Americans. Nonetheless, the United States kept more than 200,000 troops within the American sector of Germany. U.S. military commanders ordered approximately 30,000 war weary soldiers to retrain for policing duties in what became a U.S. constabulary force. These constabulary troops were responsible for law and order and border patrol and given new training in order to police the peace. They were equipped with horses and motorcycles to tackle their new responsibilities. No such commitment has been made to Iraq, nor to Afghanistan. In addition to contributing security forces, America made a significant economic contribution to the reconstruction of Germany. Between 1948 and 1952 Washington committed 8 billion dollars in Marshall Aid, most of it coming in the two years between 1948 and 1950. This is a far cry from the 1.7 billion dollars that US officials have stated is the only money American taxpayers will be asked to contribute to Iraq’s reconstruction. Our failure to fully commit to nation-building directly empowers our detractors in the region. It bolsters the arguments of those who say the United States cares little for Arabs and Muslims and is content to allow them to live in chaos and deprivation. It provides for the anarchy in which radical groups can thrive. In Iraq, the post-conflict plan called for a reduction of troops from 150,000 to 30,000 within a few months of the end of combat operations. After reality set in, the Administration appropriately readjusted its position and extended the stay of troops serving in Iraq. Had the United States gone in and stated strongly that 150,000 would stay indefinitely, it would have been a very different message than the current one, which suggests that we planned badly, and resistance has been tougher than expected. It also would have allowed America an earlier withdrawal. History shows that a serious and early commitment to law and order is necessary to build a functioning economy, a free and fair political system and a healthy civil society. The reluctance to commit to a serious law and order campaign from the very beginning and to flood Iraq with resources has only emboldened opposition and is enticing troublemakers from around the region to drift towards the fighting in Iraq. (3) Focusing on our friends as much as our enemies America will not be successful by force alone. While military action is sometimes required, as it was in the case of Iraq, the United States will draw supporters if it is engaged in a broad effort to help its friends, not only destroy its enemies. The social and economic challenges facing the Middle East are tremendous. Across the region, almost half the population is below the age of 15, economic growth is sluggish and unemployment is increasing. These are the concerns that are consuming local leaderships, as well as their populations. One very senior Saudi official told me in the summer of 2000 that unemployment was the country’s number one national security threat. Serious American attention must be given to devising policies that help address these mounting concerns. The Administration has taken an important first step by requesting $145 million for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), an initiative devoted to expanding grass roots economic, political and educational opportunities in the Arab world. But as of yet, there is considerable confusion among local populations as to how to access it, or how to draw America’s attention to worthy local projects. The embassies do not yet appear to be reaching out to the local communities and planning seems to be happening mostly in Washington. MEPI is an important first step. Increased attention must be given to improving the communication between the embassies and local figures. The United States must also think seriously about promoting sounder education as an integral piece of its foreign policy. The Administration has correctly raised the issue of Saudi funding for radical Islamic schools and mosques. Such pressure must continue. But cracking down on this kind of funding is only part of the solution. Many parents send their children to such schools because they offer hot meals and lodging, not because of the religious content. America should be in the business of championing schools that offer skills and opportunities to local citizens. It requires a long term strategy to wean away recruits from al-Qa’eda’s grip. (4) Improving communication channels between Washington and the World In the wake of September 11th, considerable attention was given to the fact that the United States was not mounting a successful public diplomacy campaign and was losing the battle of hearts and minds to its radical opponents. Unfortunately, attention to public diplomacy has seemed to dissipate. America’s efforts to build international constituencies must be rejuvenated, not only to better explain current U.S. policy, but also to transmit back to Washington concerns of the local populations. In the lead up to the war in Iraq, for instance, there was considerable concern in the Middle East that the United States did not have a serious “day after” plan. US policy makers appeared unconcerned with the potential of Iraqi civilian casualties and the effect on neighboring populations if Saddam released chemical or biological weapons. These very real fears were shrugged off, rather than seriously considered. Had they been engaged, the US might have received additional support. Even where concerns were exaggerated or misplaced, precious little was done to provide facts to the contrary. The fear that there would be untold numbers of civilian casualties came from the belief that tens of thousands of Afghan civilians had died in the American attack. This number was put forward by the Taliban and barely refuted by the United States. What the world saw was a notable callousness toward Muslim citizens. The United States did little to show how those numbers were inflated. In fact, even now, it is exceedingly difficult to get estimations of casualties from any branch of the US government. Another fear was that if Saddam Hussein used WMD against Americans in Iraq, the deadly content would spread throughout the region. Again, little was done to show the scientific unlikeliness of such a scenario. American disregard for Arab life seemed reinforced. A better communication strategy, one that explains America’s rationale to foreign publics, but also incorporates their concerns, would significantly help our friends defend their support for us. Into the Future The challenge radical Islamic groups pose to the United States will not simply go away. To be convinced, one needs only to look at the landscape of current and future political hot-spots. Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippians, Indonesia, Palestine and Sudan all require American attention. In each case, the United States is likely to side against organized Islamic opposition. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is already confronted with the thorny question of how to separate constructive from destructive Islamic opposition. Given political realities, it will be exceedingly difficult for the United States to claim it is not engaged in an anti-Muslim crusade. Failing to make the case will antagonize a significant portion of the world’s population. PEW’s poll results cited above suggested that the antagonism is already beginning. Avoiding an anti-Islamic crusade (i.e., a clash of civilizations), must become a principle American foreign policy goal. Ignoring it will not make the problem go away. It will only ensure that it becomes a pressing problem on every foreign policy decision maker’s agenda.