John F. Kennedy Solicits Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Advice—The Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Two
President John F. Kennedy works to project a sense of normalcy as his predecessor urges a miliary response.

By experts and staff
- Published
James M. LindsayCFR ExpertMary and David Boies Distinguished Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy
Presidents of the United States are at once heads of state, heads of government, and heads of their political parties. They switch roles repeatedly over the course of their day. One minute they are running meetings on complex policy matters. At the next they are exchanging empty pleasantries with visiting foreign dignitaries, carrying out the ceremonial duties of their office, or whipping up the passions of their fellow partisans as another election approaches. But perhaps no president ran the gamut of presidential roles quite the way that President John F. Kennedy did on Wednesday, October 17, 1962.
The ExComm Meets Again
Most of the members of the ExComm assembled in a conference room on the seventh floor of the State Department at 8:30 a.m. to assess how to respond to the discovery that the Soviet Union was installing nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba. The group was joined for the first time by CIA director John McCone, who was fresh back from escorting the body of his stepson, who had been killed in a car crash in California, to Seattle for burial.
Kennedy’s advisers debated why the Soviets had taken the risky and provocative step of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. Undersecretary of State George Ball argued that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had simply misjudged the ramifications of the action. Most of the other officials in the room, including McCone, insisted that the Soviet leader knew full well what he was doing and that it was part of a conscious effort to gain leverage over Kennedy in the ongoing confrontation over Berlin, where a year earlier the Soviet-backed East Germans had built the infamous wall dividing the city.

Eisenhower Weighs In
McCone and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy left the meeting early to head over to the White House to brief the president. Kennedy directed McCone to go to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, to brief former president Dwight D. Eisenhower on the situation and to solicit his advice. McCone immediately set out on the eighty-five-mile trip.

The former president and five-star general agreed that the United States could not tolerate Soviet ballistic missiles based ninety miles off the U.S. coast. The Soviets and Cubans would use any negotiations as a delaying tactic to finish installing the missiles. Once they were operational, it would be impossible to force their removal. In Eisenhower’s view, the only course of action looked to be a preemptive airstrike on the missile sites.
Kennedy Acts As If All Is Normal
As McCone headed to Pennsylvania and other presidential advisers discussed possible U.S. options, Kennedy carried on with his previously arranged schedule. At 10:00 a.m., he met with the West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder to discuss the situation in Berlin. He then attended a brief National Day of Prayer service at St. Matthew’s Cathedral. After a lunch with the Crown Prince of Libya, he flew to Connecticut to attend campaign events for Democratic candidates in the upcoming congressional midterm elections, which were just three weeks away.

The News Gets Worse
By the time Kennedy returned to Washington late that night, the news from Cuba had become grimmer. Maj. Richard Heyser’s initial U-2 spy flight had found evidence that the Soviets were installing SS-4 medium-range ballistic missiles. With a range of up to 1,000 miles, they could hit cities in the southeastern United States.

A subsequent U-2 flight had discovered, however, that the Soviets were also installing longer range SS-5 missiles that could hit every one of the forty-eight continental states except for Washington. Unlike the SS-4, the SS-5 required sophisticated launch sites and support facilities, making it virtually certain that the installations were intended to be permanent and not temporary. Unless, of course, the U.S. military destroyed the missiles, or Kennedy found a way to force the Soviets to withdraw them.
Oscar Berry and Jack Patton assisted in the preparation of this article.
The United States celebrates its 250th anniversary in 2026. To mark that milestone, I am resurfacing essays I have written over the years about major events in U.S. foreign policy. A version of this essay was published on October 17, 2012.
Other Posts in This Series:
- “Andrei Gromyko Tells a Lie at the United Nations,” September 21, 1962
- “Major Richard S. Heyser’s U-2 Mission Discovers Soviet Missiles in Cuba,” October 14, 1962
- “The United States Discovers Soviet Missiles in Cuba,” October 15, 1962
- “JFK Learns That Soviet Missiles Are in Cuba—The Cuban Missile Crisis, Day One,” October 16, 1962
- “Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko Lies to President John F. Kennedy—The Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Three,” October 18, 1962
- “John F. Kennedy Campaigns While the ExComm Debates—The Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Four,” October 19, 1962
- “President John F. Kennedy Fakes a Fever—The Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Five,” October 20, 1962
- “President John F. Kennedy Prepares to Tell the Nation About Soviet Missiles in Cuba—Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Six,” October 21, 1962
- “President John F. Kennedy Tells the World That Soviet Missiles Are in Cuba—Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Seven,” October 22, 1962
- “Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev Warns President John F. Kennedy of “Catastrophic Consequences”—Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Eight,” October 23, 1962
- “‘Eyeball to Eyeball’—Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Nine,” October 24, 1962
- “Adlai Stevenson Dresses Down the Soviet Ambassador to the UN—Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Ten,” October 25, 1962
- “John Scali Has Lunch With a Soviet Spy—Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Eleven,” October 26, 1962
- “Black Saturday” Threatens a Calamity as President John F. Kennedy Makes Two Offers—Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Twelve,” October 27, 1962
- “President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev Make a Deal—Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Thirteen,” October 28, 1962
- “Soviet Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Cuba—Cuban Missile Crisis, a Coda,” October 29, 1962
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