Indonesia

On his current visit to Indonesia, Vice President Mike Pence appears likely to play a role he is quickly becoming accustomed to---the low-key, reassuring, figure who provides continuity in U.S. foreign policy. On Thursday, Pence toured Indonesia's largest mosque, after earlier calling the country's moderate form of Islam "an inspiration," and met with Indonesian religious leaders from various faiths. This is just the kind of public diplomacy that would have fit right into the regional soft power strategies of the Obama or George W. Bush administrations, and Pence is, in private, likely to offer broad reassurances of the importance of the U.S.-Indonesia relationship for Washington. But Pence’s visit comes at a time of strain in the U.S.-Indonesia relationship, which in the post-Cold War era has never been as strong as Washington’s ties with other regional partners like Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and now Vietnam. Although the two sides have signed a series of partnerships over the past eight years, often these partnerships have been filled in with little substantial progress on reducing trade barriers, fostering greater strategic cooperation, or other critical issues. Under President Jokowi, Indonesia’s leaders remain focused---with some good reason---on domestic challenges, including a weak education system, failing physical infrastructure, entrenched poverty in parts of the country, high levels of graft, and the continuing process of political decentralization, which has been going on for nearly two decades now. Unlike his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Jokowi has not tried to aggressively promote Indonesian regional leadership. Jokowi’s attempts to enunciate a foreign policy have often been muddled, and his government also has taken a different approach to China than some other regional powers like Vietnam and Singapore. The Jokowi administration has aggressively wooed Chinese investment in infrastructure, although it has not built as close diplomatic ties to Beijing as some regional powers like Thailand. Jokowi has generally tried to avoid siding with any claimants or other major actors with interests in the South China Sea, and has focused mostly on the Natuna islands, according to a comprehensive analysis of Jokowi’s foreign policy by the Lowy Institute. This comes at a time when Vietnam and other countries are not only building up their defenses but more closely partnering with the United States. In addition, the Jokowi administration has recently squabbled with several major U.S. investors, creating clouds of uncertainty about the U.S.-Indonesia economic relationship. A report by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and AmCham Indonesia, released last year, suggests that the bilateral economic relationship is worth roughly $90 billion annually. Yet in recent years Indonesia has taken an increasingly tough approach to some foreign investors, such as Google and Freeport-McMoran, a potential sign of growing economic nationalism in Indonesia. More complications to Indonesia’s peaceful, secular, and democratic path emerged this week---challenges that Pence may have to at least acknowledge. This week, incumbent Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama lost the gubernatorial election to his leading challenger---losing by a larger margin than expected. The campaign was marked by massive rallies in Jakarta by groups that denounced the Christian governor for alleged blasphemy, and that promoted a militant version of Islam. (The governor is indeed still on trial for blasphemy.) In the New York Times, Bonar Tigor Naipospos of the Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace, offered a relatively common viewpoint on the worrisome nature of the campaign, and the growing power of militant movements in Indonesia. “It shows to me that Islamization is deepening in society, especially in urban areas and cities,” Mr. Bonar told the Times. It’s a worry that has been building in Indonesia.

Over the past year, as the Islamic State (ISIS) has suffered multiple losses in Syria and Iraq, the group has clearly been looking to widen its impact, taking the fight to countries outside of the Middle East. Increasingly, ISIS leaders have used social media to call on Islamic radicals to stage attacks in countries in the West like France and the United States, where the Orlando gunman, the San Bernardino gunmen, and the Nice attacker, among others, have publicly identified themselves with ISIS. In most of these cases, the attackers were lone wolves (or duos) who had not received any training or funding from ISIS, and often had not even traveled to Islamic State-controlled territory to train and fight. (To be sure, some recent attackers in Western nations had traveled to ISIS-controlled territory and fought with the group.) At the same time, ISIS leaders also have stepped up their campaigns to train, advise, and influence potential radicals in South and Southeast Asia, which are home to the largest number of Muslims in the world. As coalition forces advance on ISIS centers like Mosul in Iraq and, eventually, Raqqa in Syria, this campaign to win over South and Southeast Asians is likely to intensify. South and Southeast Asia are home to the majority of Muslims in the world, but ISIS is not looking to the region just because it has a potentially large pool of recruits to draw from. These countries might seem like environments conducive to ISIS for several reasons. For more of my analysis of how South and Southeast Asia may be turning into ISIS’s new recruiting grounds, see my new piece for the Carnegie Council.

Having already launched a grim, brutal war on drugs that has reportedly led to thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of arrests, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is now turning his eye to southern Philippines, where a collection of insurgent groups/terrorist organizations/bandits have wreaked havoc for decades. (Southeast Asia is also now home to more piracy attacks than any other region of the world, and the waters of the southern Philippines are part of this massive piracy problem.) In recent days, Duterte has, in his usual tough guy style, vowed to step up the government’s war against the Abu Sayyaf, which in the past year has allied itself with the Islamic State group, increased its number of kidnappings, and appeared bolder in its ability to stand toe-to-toe with Philippine army troops in gunfights in the deep south. Duterte now has promised to have the army totally destroy the Abu Sayyaf militarily. In early September, the president vowed that he would “eat [the Abu Sayyaf] alive,” and declared that the Abu Sayyaf were trying to build a caliphate in the southern Philippines. But destroying the Abu Sayyaf, a wily group with havens in some of the most remote and lawless areas of the southern Philippines and the waters between the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, is going to be very difficult. For fifteen years, Philippine presidents, and the Philippine army, have tried and largely failed with various strategies to destroy the Abu Sayyaf. These have included all-out wars (including plans by the Aquino administration to declare martial law in the deep south), special operations designed to kidnap the top Abu Sayyaf leaders while pressuring their followers to surrender, and putting feelers out to the Abu Sayyaf for a negotiation that would lead to a permanent ceasefire. Duterte has not explained how his war on the Abu Sayyaf will differ from those of previous administrations, and the Philippine armed forces face the same challenges in their battle now as they did during the Aquino or Macapagal-Arroyo administrations. The army has limited intelligence about the Abu Sayyaf’s strongholds. Graft remains a huge problem in the Philippine armed forces, as is keeping details about impending maneuvers secret. Meanwhile, the Abu Sayyaf is widely reviled in the deep south, but the army’s history of brutality in the south---and its inability to protect informants---badly undermines its chances of effectively tracking the Abu Sayyaf’s movements. The Duterte administration has shown few signs that it has a new approach that could comprehensively eliminated the Abu Sayyaf, or lead to some kind of negotiation in which the Abu Sayyaf would join other southern groups in accepting a peace deal for Mindanao and the deep south. It doesn’t help matters that Duterte’s brusque, wild style could alienate many of the regional partners whose support he needs in the fight against the Abu Sayyaf. Duterte has, in recent weeks, condemned the United States for criticizing the abuses that have become common in his war on drugs, but U.S. assistance and training has been crucial in helping Philippine troops learn modern counterinsurgency strategies and develop battle plans for combating the Abu Sayyaf. It will be challenging for the Duterte administration to take the fight to the Abu Sayyaf if Duterte is serious about reducing U.S. assistance for the Philippine army and coast guard. In addition, although the new president has not yet alienated Malaysia and Indonesia and Singapore, whose cooperation he needs to improve the quality of patrols in the lawless Sulu Sea, don’t count out the possibility. Duterte needs Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur’s cooperation to implement a deal the three nations made in August to allow their navies to pursue Abu Sayyaf members who have taken hostages into each others’ territorial waters. But earlier this year, Duterte slammed Singapore publicly. Given his personality, it is probably only a matter of time before he says something that alienates leaders in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, further undermining cooperation in combating the Abu Sayyaf and piracy in general.

In early May, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, three countries that often have trouble cooperating on transnational challenges, and have long disputed some of their adjacent waters made a major announcement. They would begin coordinated patrols at sea, and would launch a tri-country hotline to discuss kidnappings and other militant activities. The announcement came after ten Indonesian sailors had been kidnapped in the southern Philippines by the Abu Sayyaf, a militant group operating in the lawless deep south. Although the Abu Sayyaf has existed for more than fifteen years, it had in the previous months launched multiple high-profile kidnappings, killings, and other terrorist attacks, including the capture and beheading of a Canadian man, John Ridsdel. Perhaps even more worryingly to Southeast Asian governments, Abu Sayyaf, once derided by some Philippine army and national security advisors as a ragtag group of bandits, appeared to be linking up with the Islamic State, and possibly attracting new recruits from other parts of the world. In early 2016, the Abu Sayyaf used a video to publicly proclaim its allegiance to ISIS, and even before the public pledge it had begun utilizing increasingly brutal ISIS-like tactics, such as beheadings of captives. At least one Abu Sayyaf commander had traveled to Syria to fight with ISIS, and other Abu Sayyaf militants may have joined ISIS’s wars as well. In the spring of 2016, Philippine military forces launched an operation in to hunt down one of Abu Sayyaf’s most wanted men, an experienced bomb maker from Morocco. Yet while the Philippine army operation managed to kill the bomb maker, Mohammad Khattab, the Abu Sayyaf trapped the Philippine soldiers in a day-long firefight. Eighteen Philippine soldiers were killed, an embarrassment to the government and the army. For more of my take on the growing threat of radicalism in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia’s strategy to defeat it, see my new Current History article.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Lincoln Davidson, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Indonesia sinks illegal fishing boats. In a move intended to assert sovereignty over resource-rich waters surrounding the Natuna Islands off the Borneo coast, Indonesia sank sixty boats impounded for illegal fishing. While Indonesia has no official territorial disputes with China, the exponential increase in the Chinese fishing fleet (instigated by increasing domestic appetite and state subsidies) and the decreasing fish supply in Chinese coastal waters have resulted in heightened confrontations between Chinese fishing vessels and Indonesian coast guard vessels. Chinese activities in the Natuna Islands area has raised fears that Beijing is attempting to expand its influence through its fishing fleet rather than official naval vessels in the oil- and gas-rich area as a more cost-effective approach. Beijing has in the past described the area around the Natunas as a historical fishing ground, even though it lies almost 1,250 miles from the Chinese coastline and within Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. Not including the sixty ships scuttled this Wednesday, Indonesia has previously sunk more than 170 fishing vessels impounded for illegal fishing. Jakarta has emerged to take the hawkish lead on maritime security within the ASEAN regional community and has recently agreed to joint patrols with Malaysia and the Philippines. 2. China sees major uptick in cardiovascular disease.  A study published this week from the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health shows that China is currently facing an epidemic of cardiovascular disease that is likely to worsen over the course of the next two decades due to increased incidence of high blood pressure and obesity. Data was collected from 26,000 people throughout nine provinces from 1991 through 2011, and the researchers attributed observed trends to changing lifestyles accompanying China’s rapid economic development. The authors note that in 1979, around the time the Chinese government began to open its economy, the prevalence of high blood pressure was 7.7 percent; by 2010, it had risen to 33.5 percent, a rate comparable to that of American adults. In fact, 44 percent of the 6.8 million deaths among Chinese above the age of 35 were related to heart disease. Contributing societal changes associated with China’s urbanization and industrialization include a major shift to “Western” diets—with greater consumption of red meat, sugary drinks, and salty foods—as well as decreased physical activity and high rates of smoking. 3. Japan plans new long-range missiles. After months of tension between Beijing and other Asia-Pacific states over disputed territorial claims, Japan has announced its intention to develop a new tactical ballistic missile. The new surface-to-ship missile will be the longest-range missile ever built by Japan, and is allegedly aimed at countering Chinese military strategy regarding the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Persistent tensions between Beijing and Tokyo most recently made news when Tokyo lodged a diplomatic protest with Beijing over the exponential increase in Chinese coast guard vessels and fishing ships around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, in addition to another protest lodged last week. The new missile system, properly positioned in places such as the Okinawan island of Miyako, would work to discourage Chinese naval aggression due to its long-range (300 km) capability. Japan’s move to develop these new missiles is not unanticipated given the China-centric 2013 revisions to the National Defense Program Guidelines, which called for a bolstering of Japanese island defenses and a strengthening of domestic military equipment development process. An August 14th report stated that the new missile system has an expected deployment date of 2023. This announcement was made amidst reports that China, Japan, and South Korea are considering a meeting of their respective foreign ministers despite tensions between the countries. The meeting is projected to lay the foundation for a three-way summit that will discuss the resolution of regional issues, such as the threat posed by North Korea’s plutonium processing. 4. North Korea resumes plutonium production. On Wednesday, in its first-ever response to a foreign media inquiry, North Korea’s Atomic Energy Institute confirmed that the country had resumed plutonium production for nuclear arms. The plutonium is gathered from spent fuel from a reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, which Pyongyang shuttered in 2007 and restarted sometime before last year. The Institute also asserted that North Korea will not discontinue nuclear tests—the fourth of which took place in January—as long as perceived threats from the United States remain. A U.S. Department of State spokesman called the report “a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions which prohibit such activities,” and suggested that North Korea’s escalatory actions would only further steel international resolve to counter them. But given that the United Nations has already enacted its strongest sanctions yet against North Korea, it is unclear if any amount of pressure from international players, besides China, will have any hope of changing North Korea’s tack. 5. Beijing police permitted to use weapons to defend doctors. The Beijing municipal government announced this week that police there are now permitted to use weapons to defend medical professionals from attacks by patients. The new measure is part of a year-long campaign aimed at reducing hospital violence, a widespread occurrence in the country. Many patients, unsatisfied with their treatment, growing medical costs, overcrowding, or corruption in hospitals, have responded by attacking doctors; some attacks have even been fatal. According to one study, nearly 60 percent of Chinese medical staff have been verbally abused and 13 percent have suffered physical assault by patients. In 2014, Beijing hospitals made plans to recruit 1,500 “guardian angel” volunteers to mediate tense doctor-patient relations in order to prevent violence against staff. Sadly, it seems divine intervention was not enough to keep doctors safe. Bonus: Kurds struggle for acceptance in Japan. Refugee status has never been given to a Kurd living in Japan, but that has not deterred those seeking asylum. Approximately 1,200 Kurds live in two of Tokyo’s northern suburbs. While they are often not authorized for employment and on temporary six-month permits, many Kurds work in the construction industry, which is increasingly reliant on foreign labor. A number of Kurds have also assisted with earthquake-relief projects. However, gaining acceptance in Japan is challenging since the country is known for its reluctance to accept immigrants. In 2015 alone, over 7,500 people sought refugee status in Japan but just twenty-seven received it. Currently, non-Japanese make up a mere 2 percent of the country’s population, although demographic pressures may force the adoption of a more accommodating immigration stance. The country does have a burgeoning Muslim population, though, which is estimated to have grown from just over 5,000 in the mid-1980s to as large as 70,000 to 80,000 in recent years. Other tensions have trailed the Kurds as well, including clashes with Turks living in Japan during the 2015 Turkish elections.

Ashlyn Anderson, Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, and Gabriella Meltzer look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Duterte ahead in Philippine pre-election polls. Leading candidate Rodrigo Duterte is currently the mayor of Davao city on the southern island of Mindanao, where he is considered to have effectively cracked down on crime and improved the local economy. Duterte has pledged to do the same for the nation if elected and and to act decisively as president. He leads in current opinion polls with roughly 32 percent of the vote, and is trailed by Senator Grace Poe with 25 percent, and Interior Minister Mar Roxas with 22 percent. In the vice-presidential race, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son of the nation’s previous dictator, leads in polls. Duterte has stirred up considerable controversy during the campaign, however, earning him comparisons to Donald Trump. The Economist magazine called Duterte’s candidacy “downright alarming.” Among his questionable remarks were a joke about the rape of an Australian missionary (for which he subsequently apologized), a proposal to jet-ski to territory reclaimed by China in the Spratly Islands and plant a Philippine flag, and a threat to declare a “revolutionary government.” Duterte has also proposed bilateral negotiations with China over joint resource exploration. The Philippines’ over fifty four million registered voters head out to the polls on Monday, May 9. 2. Chinese agriculture authorities meddle as pork production plummets. Pork prices in China have climbed 35 percent year-on-year, responding to a 5.9 percent decline in production. Local governments, hoping to ease the burden on Chinese consumers—the country consumes more than half of the world’s pork—have released stocks of subsidized pork. It’s not likely to have much effect: they’re only adding 3,050 metric tons of pork over the course of two months to a market that consumes fifty seven million metric tons annually. That may be a good thing, though. Like so much instability in the Chinese economy, the rise in pork prices can be partially attributed to regulators tinkering. Analysts have pointed to the shutdown of many small pig farmers by authorities as a contributing factor in the production decline. There’s hope for Chinese bacon lovers, though. Chinese regulators are taking baby steps towards liberalizing grain markets, and feed prices are dropping in response, with corn down 19 percent from this time last year. 3. Fight against tobacco takes center stage in India. This week, India’s Supreme Court ordered tobacco companies in India to comply with regulations to cover 85 percent of cigarette packages with pictorial and text health warnings, making India one of the world’s strictest countries on label regulations. With more than one million smoking-related deaths in India each year, the ruling was welcomed by India’s public health advocates. ITC Limited, India’s top cigarette company, shut down manufacturing on May 4 until “the company is in a position to comply with the interim requirements.” Not everyone has welcomed the move, however. Despite the health warnings, India’s tobacco industry is valued at $11 billion and employs millions of workers. Moreover, legal cigarettes only make up 11 percent of tobacco consumption in India. Much of the tobacco smoked in India comes from a largely unregulated market in the form of “bidis,” crushed and dried tobacco rolled in tendu leaves. Bidi production employs five million people in India, mostly women. Farmers employed by big tobacco, makers of bidis, and the Tobacco Institute of India have all voiced their disapproval of the regulations. Others have pointed to the need for a comprehensive tax policy to regulate the sales of cigarettes and bidis, arguing that tax increases are a better deterrent against smoking. 4. Domestic abuse alive and well in China. Two months ago, Li Hongxia, a twenty-four year old woman from Henan province, was strangled to death by her husband in her hospital bed while recovering from a post-miscarriage surgery. Li’s parents have refused to bury the mangled body in an effort to raise awareness about a silent epidemic that impacts at least one out of every four Chinese women, according to estimates from the state-affiliated All-China Women’s Federation. Since coming to power in 2012, Xi Jinping’s administration has made a concerted effort to prioritize domestic violence in its social policy agenda and characterize it as a unified, legal issue to address in courts, rather than simply a familial, private phenomenon. China’s first official anti-domestic violence legislation came into effect on March 1 (two days prior to Li’s murder). Despite these advances, anti-discrimination groups such as Yirenping argue that the law is still “far from enough” to curb the pervasive culture of domestic violence, as it fails to address sexual violence, as well as domestic violence between same-sex couples. 5. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia commit to joint patrols. The three nations announced plans for joint patrols in the Sulu Sea at a trilateral meeting in Yogyakarta, Indonesia this Thursday. They also plan to establish domestic crisis centers and a coordination hotline. The decision comes after multiple recent incidents of piracy and kidnapping. Over the past two months, four sailors from Malaysia and fourteen from Indonesia were taken from ships; many believe the abductions were the work of Abu Sayyaf, a militant group operating from the southern Philippines. Ten Indonesians kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf in March were recently released, but the Indonesian security minister expressed concerns that continued piracy would revive an image of lawlessness for the sea routes in question and affect shipping traffic. Details have not been finalized, but one model the new trilateral effort could follow is that of patrols in the Malacca Straits conducted by Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Thailand, which include both marine and aerial surveillance. Bonus: PLA enters the rap scene. In the latest in a series of musical forays by the Chinese government, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) released a recruitment video this week. The video, titled “Battle Declaration,” includes patriotic lyrics chanted as images of China’s newest military hardware and of soldiers in action flash by. Lyrics include “kill, kill, kill" and “responsibilities are always upon a soldier’s shoulders / passion always in his chest / war can break out any time / are you ready for it?”. While the PLA does not actively need to recruit more soldiers (in fact 300,000 troops are being cut), it does need to boost morale, especially as the military comes under closer scrutiny in the anti-corruption campaign. The video’s mixed reception among Chinese netizens suggests additional approaches may still be required.

Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Gabriella Meltzer, Gabriel Walker, and Pei-Yu Wei look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Nearly a quarter of India’s population affected by drought. After two years of weak monsoons, over 330 million Indians are suffering from the debilitating effects of an intense drought. In some locales, forecasts predicted temperatures climbing to over 113 degrees—their highest seasonal levels in over a hundred years—and across the country reservoirs are at 29 percent of their storage capacity. India has faced extreme droughts throughout history, but water shortages have been especially acute in recent years because of rapid population growth, urbanization, and deforestation. The poor and agricultural workers are especially effected by the drought, forcing many farmers to sell their livestock and migrate to cities to work as construction laborers. The extreme conditions may also cause a spike in farmer suicides as well because of increased crop losses and economic hardship. Local and central authorities have taken a variety of methods to combat water shortages, including sending water-laden trains to parched regions and banning borewells deeper than 200 feet. 2. Chinese vaccine scandal heightens public’s distrust of health system. Late last month, police in east China’s Shandong Province arrested thirty-seven people involved an illegal vaccine ring that had been in operation since 2011. The mother and daughter–led black market ring had sold $88 million worth of expired vaccines produced by forty-five licensed pharmaceutical companies for diseases such as a polio, rabies, chickenpox, and Japanese encephalitis to health institutions across twenty-four provinces. Since then, 357 government officials will either lose their jobs or be demoted for their involvement in the scandal, and an additional 202 individuals have been detained for further investigation. Over 1,000 protesting parents, seventy of whom have filed lawsuits, gathered this week at Beijing’s National Health and Family Planning Commission, where they complained of “intimidation and arbitrary arrest by security officials.” Their fears have been not been assuaged by China’s World Health Organization branch, which simply stated that “improperly stored or expired vaccines rarely cause a toxic reaction and the most common risk is that they are ineffective.” This latest episode has fanned the flame for widespread distrust of the Chinese food and medicine regulatory system, and many view it as further evidence of Xi Jinping’s governance style that fails to prioritize people’s health amidst a crumbling health infrastructure. 3. Indonesia holds conference to reflect on anti-Communist purges. The two-day symposium, examining mass killings perpetrated and encouraged by the Indonesian government in 1965 and 1966, was the first such meeting with the government’s official sanction. At the conference, coordinating minister for political, legal, and security affairs Luhut B. Pandjaitan declined to pursue a criminal investigation of the atrocities, but left open the possibility that the government could release a statement expressing “remorse for past events” at some point. The “past events” referred to are the well-documented murder by the military and government-supported groups of an estimated 500,000 people suspected of being Communists following an incident the government claimed was an attempted coup by the Indonesian Communist Party, known as the PKI. Hundreds of thousands of others were imprisoned for up to ten years. Some human rights groups suspect that the U.S. government, concerned with fighting communism in Southeast Asia and the ongoing war in Vietnam, was complicit in the atrocities. The purges led to the removal from office of Indonesia’s first postcolonial leader, Sukarno, and ushered in three decades of rule by a dictatorship. 4. United Nations wary of Thai junta’s tightening grip. On Friday, Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein, the UN high commissioner for human rights, expressed growing concern about the increasing authority of Thailand’s military government. Rather than strengthening the military’s powers, as would be the case under a new draft constitution, Zeid exhorted the government to “strengthen the rule of law… not undermine it.” The statement coincides with a recent spate of increasingly authoritarian measures, such as one that grants Thai officers broad, police-like powers of arrest, and a new law that imposes a ten-year jail sentence on anyone who campaigns ahead of an August referendum on the new constitution. Just a few days ago, a former minister of social development and human security, also a prominent critic of the draft, was detained for speaking out against it. Since the beginning of the year, at least eighty-five people have been summoned or detained in Thailand for “attitude adjustment.” 5. First AIIB Projects in Central Asia and Pakistan. The first investments of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will go toward building a ring road in the Kazakh city of Almaty, a new road connecting the Tajik capital to the Uzbek border, and a Pakistani highway. The recipients of the AIIB’s initial investments are all nations that enjoy warm relations with China and are part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and are also included in China’s massive “One Belt, One Road” initiative. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang announced the AIIB in October 2013 during trips to Southeast Asia, and the bank became operational in January 2016 with fifty-seven founding members. The AIIB provoked controversy and initial opposition from the United States and some American allies; particular concerns were raised as to whether it would adhere to the lending standards used by other development banks such as the World Bank.  However, the president of the AIIB, Jin Liqun, has recently emphasized that the bank will adhere to strong governance standards. Indeed, all of the initial projects will be financed in conjunction with other international development banks including the Asian Development Bank, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Bonus: Beijing jianbing come to NYC. Jianbing, or Chinese pancakes, have become the latest Chinese food trend in New York City. Made from eggs, cilantro, chili, scallions, shards of fried dough, and sauce spread on a crepe of mung bean and wheat flour, jianbing is a street food from northern China and is a ubiquitous breakfast food found throughout the streets of Beijing. Jianbing is said to have originated from Shandong province as early as the Three Kingdoms period (220–280 AD), when famed military strategist Zhuge Liang told his soldiers to cook pancakes made from rice and flour on their shields over fires after all woks the army brought were lost. Now the jianbing is making waves in New York, with several food trucks selling the snack appearing around Manhattan. Most of the founders of the trucks learned the art of jianbing-making in China, though some have added variations to the typical jianbing one would find in Beijing. For example, Flying Pig Jianbing adds lettuce to its concoctions, while Mr. Bing touts a menu with sweet options, which is a break from the traditional savory jianbing in China. Authentic or not, jianbing is undoubtedly one of the best new soft power tools China has.

Earlier this month, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter visited the Philippines, an increasingly important U.S. security partner. In the Philippines, where he observed the annual Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder) exercises, Carter made several important announcements. He revealed that the United States and the Philippines are, and will be, conducting joint patrols in the South China Sea. Carter also offered specifics on new U.S. assistance to the Philippines as part of the new U.S. Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia, a program conceived by the Senate Armed Services Committee and designed to provide U.S. aid to Southeast Asian nations to bolster their maritime capabilities. The Diplomat reported that “much of the [Initiative’s] funding goes to support for a maritime and joint operations center; improvements in maritime intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR); maritime security and patrol vessel support and sustainment; search and rescue operations support; and participation in multilateral engagements and training.” The majority of the 2016 Initiative funding will go to the Philippines, which, along with Vietnam, is one of the two Southeast Asian nations most aggressively trying to combat potential Chinese militarization of areas of the South China Sea. The concept of the Maritime Security Initiative seems to dovetail perfectly with the rebalance to Asia, and also to respond to growing demands by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia for a more assertive response to China’s activities in the South China Sea. In fact, the rebalance to Asia has, since its inception, made bolstering bilateral security ties in Asia a centerpiece of the strategy. In addition to the Maritime Security Initiative, the White House signed a new, ten year enhanced defense cooperation agreement with the Philippines last year, the Obama administration has overseen closer defense ties with Malaysia and Vietnam, and the White House inked an enhanced defense cooperation deal with Singapore late last year as well. Yet have closer defense ties under the rebalance, cemented with cooperation agreements, joint exercises, port calls, and other programs, actually led to greater overall outlays of U.S. security assistance to Southeast Asia? As a new CFR Infographic shows, at least until the Maritime Security Initiative was announced, the answer is no. In fact, between 2010 and 2015, U.S. security assistance to most Southeast Asian nations actually fell, and it remains unclear how the Maritime Security Initiative will alter that trend. For more details on U.S. security assistance to Southeast Asia under the rebalance, check out the new CFR Infographic.

After the attacks in Jakarta in January, in which a group of gunmen, apparently overseen by a man affiliated with the self-declared Islamic State, shot and bombed their way through a downtown neighborhood, Southeast Asian governments began to openly address the threat of Islamic State-linked radicals. The region’s intelligence agencies, and especially Singapore intelligence, had been warning for at least two years that Southeast Asian men and women were traveling to Islamic State-controlled territory for training and inspiration, and that the region’s governments had no effective way to track these militants’ return. According to estimates by several regional intelligence agencies, between 1,200 and 1,600 Southeast Asians had traveled to Islamic State-controlled areas and possibly returned to their homelands. Other estimates put the figure even higher. The Islamic State clearly recognizes the potential for radicalizing Southeast Asians, one of the largest pools of Muslims in the world. The Islamic State has released a series of videos, posted on the Internet and social media, appealing directly to people speaking Bahasa (Malay or Indonesian.) The group has created a brigade of fighters in Syria for incoming Malaysians and Indonesians, a brigade known as Katibah Nusantara, or “Malay archipelago.” The brigade reportedly has been involved in battles with Kurdish forces, capturing territory from the Kurds last year. Returning to the region, Islamic State-trained militants may plan attacks to demonstrate their devotion and establish themselves as leaders to be feared. The Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) wrote in early February that in the coming months, “more terrorist attacks in Indonesia are likely as local ISIS leaders compete at home and abroad to establish their supremacy.” Following the Jakarta blasts, Indonesian authorities arrested at least two dozen people (the exact number remains unclear) suspected of possibly planning future attacks. Sensing that the number of Islamic State-inspired radicals was higher than original estimates, in March the Indonesian National Intelligence Agency drew up plans to hire roughly 2,000 more intelligence agents focused on counterterrorism. The Jokowi administration, and the Indonesian parliament, also is considering passing “preventive detention” laws that would allow the authorities to hold terror suspects for up to six months without charging them. Yet the Jakarta attacks did not send Southeast Asian governments most vulnerable to the Islamic State threat---Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand---into a total panic. After all, the Islamic State, though a danger, is not as much of a threat to Southeast Asia as the group is to countries in the Middle East, Africa, or Europe. For one, many regional leaders and intelligence analysts understand that, compared to regions like Europe and the Middle East, the number of Southeast Asians who have traveled to Syria or Iraq to receive training and funding is relatively small. This number remains small in part because of the openness and democracy of countries like Indonesia, which allows Islamists to air their grievances heard through the political system. Even if 2,000 or 2,500 Southeast Asians have made the journey, as some Malaysian intelligence officers believe, this figure pales in comparison to the number of Tunisians or French and Belgian citizens who have traveled to join the Islamic State. For more on my analysis of why the Islamic State does not pose a great threat to Southeast Asia, see my new piece on Southeast Asia and the Islamic State in The Diplomat.

Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. U.S. admiral proposes reviving naval coalition with Australia, India, and Japan. On Wednesday, Admiral Harry B. Harris, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, proposed reviving an informal strategic coalition between the U.S., Australian, Indian, and Japanese navies. Although Harris did not specifically name China in the proposal, and instead mentioned powerful nations seeking to “bully smaller nations,” the alliance would likely serve as a military tool to balance China’s maritime expansion in the Indo-Pacific region. While some analysts are skeptical of India’s willingness to get involved in the South China Sea dispute, India has increased its naval cooperation with the United States in the past few years as China has furthered its plans for a “maritime silk road” through ports in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. One expert called India’s increasing involvement a “tit-for-tat” response to perceived growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. Asked about joint naval exercises between U.S., Indian, and Japanese vessels to be held later this year, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Hong Lei stated, “We hope the cooperation of relevant countries will benefit regional peace and security, and not harm the interests of third parties.” 2. Jailed Afghan women subjected to virginity tests. The Independent Human Rights Commission in Afghanistan reported that officials often require imprisoned females to undergo invasive virginity tests. Such tests are intended to provide evidence in adultery cases, although the World Health Organization has proclaimed the procedure inaccurate and in violation of women’s rights. The commission found that over 90 percent of the fifty-three women interviewed in twelve provinces had received the test. While there have been significant gains in women’s rights since the fall of the Taliban, considerable challenges remain. Human Rights Watch reported in 2013 that approximately six hundred Afghan females were jailed for “moral crimes,” including adultery and running away from home. Today the number of Afghan women imprisoned for all crimes is approximately 750. In Afghan women’s prisons those jailed for moral crimes are often mixed in with those imprisoned for other more violent crimes, which can lead to an unstable and dangerous environment. Afghanistan’s Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women was passed in 2009 by executive order but without the support of the country’s parliament. Concerns about the protection of women’s rights and sustained funding for development programs will likely intensify following the eventual withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan. 3. North Korea readies warheads after new UN sanctions. Earlier this week, after the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously approved new sanctions on North Korea, which greatly broaden the scope of previous measures, the country’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un has raised the stakes. According to North Korean state media, during a missile drill on Friday, Kim urged the military to have its nuclear warheads deployed and ready at all times for national self-defense. The same day, it also released a statement that called the new UN resolution a “heinous provocation.” While there is no consensus on whether North Korea actually has nuclear-tipped missiles, it is estimated that it possesses around a dozen small nuclear explosives. Furthermore, in the past North Korea has increased its threatening rhetoric before annual U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises, which it views as aimed at overthrowing the North Korean government. This year’s drills, set to take place next month, will be the largest ever and will involve 15,000 U.S. troops, twice as many as last year. 4. TEPCO execs indicted over nuclear disaster. Three former executives of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) were charged this week with negligence related to their role in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear incident. Nuclear reactors at the power plant suffered a meltdown after being struck by an earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011. The executives—a former TEPCO chairman and the former directors of the company’s nuclear division—have been accused of contributing to the deaths of forty-four people who died as a result of a government-ordered evacuation of the area twenty kilometers around the plant. Prosecutors earlier declined to charge the executives, citing the difficulty of proving they were criminally negligent by not protecting the nuclear plant from a tsunami, but two citizen committees overturned that decision, and the executives will now face charges in court. Meanwhile, the 160,000 people who evacuated the area around Fukushima Daiichi are still unable to return to their homes five years after the fact. 5. Indonesia’s budget in question. Indonesia’s finance minister announced this week that the nation planned to reduce spending as the fall in global oil prices slams the Indonesian economy. Already the drop in oil prices is projected to reduce government revenues by approximately $6 billion. The reduced revenues come in the midst of strife within the Indonesian parliament over a proposed tax amnesty bill. While the government argues that the new revenue generated under the bill is needed for the budget, some lawmakers have attempted to connect its passage to another law limiting the power of Indonesia’s anticorruption agency. Currently out of Indonesia’s 250 million citizens, only 900,000 pay the full amount of income taxes owed.  The tax amnesty bill would let citizens declare assets inside Indonesia and abroad and then pay low taxes on those assets. The Indonesian finance minister has declared the share of tax revenue to GDP must rise from 11 percent to 13–14 percent. In the absence of strong oil revenues, greater tax revenue could help pay for new infrastructure projects, a priority of President Joko Widodo’s platform for the presidency in 2014. Bonus: Chinese government cracks down on selfie sticks. This coming week, when thousands of delegates convene in Beijing for the Chinese government’s most significant two meetings of the year, called the lianghui, one thing will be missing: selfie sticks. Last year, the devices were a favorite among meeting delegates eager to snap pictures of themselves at the important event, but this year both delegates and journalists have been banned from using them in the Great Hall of the People. The ruling comes during a tense start to the meetings, because of China’s recent uneasy political climate for members of the Communist Party and the Chinese media. Luckily, even without the handy sticks, attendees’ enthusiasm for taking selfies appeared happily undiminished.

Rachel Brown, Sungtae “Jacky” Park, Ariella Rotenberg, Ayumi Teraoka, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. China puts missiles on disputed island. The Pentagon has claimed that China has deployed surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island, one of the Paracel Islands disputed in the South China Sea. Based on satellite imagery, China has deployed two batteries of eight HQ-9 missile launchers on the island, which Taiwan and Vietnam also claim. In response, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has accused China of “an increase in militarization” of the South China Sea. Despite the uproar that the deployment has caused, the Woody Island has a military garrison and has been militarized for quite some time, and the deployment of the missiles would not seriously alter the military equation in the region. What concerns the United States, and its allies and partners, is that the deployment represents a step toward China’s further militarizing and building infrastructure throughout the rest of the South China Sea, particularly in light of China’s recent artificial island–building in the region. 2. Taliban in Afghanistan reported to be increasing use of child soldiers. According to a Human Rights Watch report released this week, the Taliban in Afghanistan have been recruiting an increasing number of child soldiers. Specifically, child soldiers as young as ten were used by the Taliban in their latest battle to overrun the city of Kunduz last year. Most of these children are educated at Taliban-run schools, where they begin indoctrination as early as age six. By the time these boys reach thirteen, many of them are trained in the production and deployment of IEDs as well as how to use various firearms. While the Taliban has been recruiting and using children as fighters since the 1990s, recruitment of boy soldiers is believed to have increased significantly since 2015 due to the expanded Taliban operations against Afghan government forces. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid has denied that the Taliban enlists boys to their ranks. 3. United Nations report states that Kim Jong-un should be told he could face trial. In a thirteen-page United Nations (UN) report released on Monday, Marzuki Darusman, a UN human rights investigator, stated that the UN should officially notify Kim Jong-un that he and his close staff could face trial for heinous crimes. This report will be presented next month to the Human Rights Council in Geneva. Darusman’s comment echoes the conclusion of the UN report he coauthored in 2014 that stated that North Korean security chiefs, and possibly Kim Jong-un, should face the International Criminal Court (ICC) for ordering systematic torture, starvation, and killings. Last December, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein also testified before the Security Council to call for such an action. Whether the international community can successfully garner support for the Security Council to refer North Korea to the ICC, however, faces the typical challenges for any punitive measures against North Korea: China’s reluctance and its veto power as a member of the UN Security Council. Given increasingly imminent risks of North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons program, combined with the unimproved human rights situation in the country, the international community should keep seeking for ways to overcome this conundrum. 4. United States to ban seafood imports caught with forced labor. Last week, Congress passed a bill to ban imports of all goods made using “convict, forced or indentured labor.” The bill, which included a number of other trade provisions, passed 75–20 in the Senate. President Obama is expected to sign the bill into law next week. The passage of the bill coincided with a measure from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration requiring American firms to better report the sources of their seafood imports. Previously, under the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, a loophole permitted the import of products made using slave labor if there was no alternative way to fulfill consumer demand. While such a ban could cover over 350 products, much attention has focused on the effect on seafood imports produced with slave labor in Southeast Asia. Last year, a flurry of reporting exposed rampant abuses in the Thai fishing industry including the trafficking of Rohingya migrants and indentured servitude of Cambodians working on Thai ships, as well as the supply to major American grocery chains of seafood produced by enslaved workers. Such seafood is often used in pet food and approximately 90 percent of American seafood is imported from abroad. The annual value of Thailand’s seafood industry is more than $7 billion, and significant economic consequences could arise if adjustments to current labor practices are not enacted. 5. Seoul urges citizens to avoid North Korean restaurants. This week, as part of a move to increase economic pressure on North Korea after its nuclear and missile tests earlier this month, South Korea’s foreign ministry urged the country’s citizens to stop eating at North Korean restaurants. Around 100 of the 130 total establishments, which employ North Korean waitresses and often attract South Koreans traveling abroad, operate in China. On Friday, the South Korean embassy in China reiterated concerns about the safety of the restaurants for South Korean expats and travelers there. The restaurants reportedly bring in around $100 million annually for the North Korean government, a small part of the $1–2 billion it collects in foreign currency from a broad range of business activities abroad. Last week, South Korea severed its last economic ties with the North by shuttering the jointly operated Kaesong Industrial Complex, an act that Pyongyang equated to “a declaration of war.” Bonus: Indonesian government asks apps to remove LGBT emoji. Over the past week, the Indonesian Communications Ministry expressed concern over LGBT-themed emoji offered by a variety of social media platforms. The ministry wrote in a statement that the images were “causing unrest in society, especially among parents,” because the colorful images could be particularly appealing to children. The ministry also demanded that several apps remove the emoji or be banned in the country. Though one company has already complied, popular services like WhatsApp and Facebook have not yet responded. Indonesia has 73 million internet users and 72 million active social media accounts, so the outcome could set an important precedent for internet companies operating in countries with a large user base.

Over the past three weeks, several events have dramatically highlighted the growing appeal of the Islamic State based in Southeast Asia. First, on January 14, a group of militants reportedly run by an Indonesian man who had traveled to Syria carried out an attack in a busy neighborhood in Jakarta, leading to at least seven deaths. Several weeks before the attack, the Indonesian police had made a string of arrests of other Indonesian cells linked to the Islamic State. Then, last week, Singaporean authorities made a major announcement. The city-state announced that it was using its Internal Security Act, which allows for detention without charge, to hold 27 Bangladeshis who it claimed had become radicalized, and were considering launching terrorist attacks. It was the Singaporean authorities’ broadest use of the Internal Security Act in three decades. According to several news reports, the Singapore police claimed that some of the Bangladeshis were planning to return to Bangladesh to carry out terrorist attacks. Most of the Bangladeshi laborers were quickly deported from Singapore. Do these events add up to a serious threat from the Islamic State to Southeast Asia , either by Islamic State recruiting and funding of Southeast Asian militant cells or simply by Islamic State inspiration for Southeast Asians? As I mentioned in a previous post, IS created a brigade in Syria for visiting Southeast Asians, including Indonesian fighters. IS also may be providing a small amount of seed money to some militant groups in Southeast Asia, and the Islamic State clearly hopes to spread its ideology more widely. Its propaganda arm has produced videos, shared online, in Indonesian/Malay and targeted at Indonesian and Malay youths. Indonesian, Malaysian, Philippine, and Thai authorities believe between 600 and 1,200 Southeast Asians have traveled to Syria and Iraq in recent years to fight with the Islamic State and then have returned to Southeast Asia. In addition, several existing militant groups in Southeast Asia have taken public oaths of loyalty to the Islamic State in the past two years, probably both because they share beliefs with the Islamic State and because the loyalty oaths bring them greater media attention. What’s more, as Zachary Abuza of the National War College has noted, the growing influence of Islamic State in Southeast Asia may be leading to a kind of competition among Southeast Asian militant groups to see who can carry out the most brutal attacks, following in Islamic State’s use of extremely brutal, well-publicized tactics. Such brutal tactics, Abuza notes, are easily spread through social media. But overall, the level of threat to Southeast Asian nations varies widely. It is true that Indonesians have traveled to Syria to fight, and even taken part in their own brigade, but Indonesia also is one of the most open societies in the region, with a government and a religious establishment that has a record of effectiveness at combating militancy. Indonesia’s biggest religious organizations have launched campaigns to combat the influence of IS and other groups. Indonesia’s decentralized, free politics filter Islamists through the political process. In the Philippines, the Aquino government is close to completing a landmark peace agreement that could end much of the fighting that has plagued Mindanao for decades. Although there are holdouts unwilling to accept the deal, the completion of the peace process, combined with a flow of investment and aid to Mindanao, could dramatically undercut any public support for militants in the southern Philippines. In contrast, Thailand, Malaysia, and Myanmar have political environments that could be conducive to growing militancy. All three are either outright authoritarian regimes or are currently somewhere between democracy and autocracy; the lack of political freedom means there are few legitimate avenues for Islamists to engage in politics. In Thailand, harsh army rule in the three southern provinces has added to southerners’ anger, made it harder to gain cooperation with army units hunting for militant cells, and potentially has fostered radicalization of young men and women. In Myanmar, there has been little violent reaction so far from Muslim populations that have been terrorized for four years now, particularly in Arakan State; many Muslims are so battered that they are focusing all their energy on survival. Still, it is not hard to imagine that years of attacks on Myanmar Muslims might eventually lead to the emergence of militant Myanmar Muslim groups, perhaps with inspiration or even training from Islamic State. And in Malaysia, the environment is perhaps even more favorable for militants inspired by the Islamic State. Since the 2013 Malaysian general election, the Malaysian government has “been competing...to show the Malay heartland” its Islamic credentials, according to Murray Hunter, a business consultant with thirty years of experience in Southeast Asia. Hunter notes that the ruling coalition also has been publicly burnishing its Islamic credentials in an attempt to tar the opposition as dominated by ethnic Chinese. Such strategies are fostering religious and ethnic divisions in Malaysia. “This is a perfect environment for Islamic State dogma…to breed,” Hunter notes.

In the wake of the attacks last week in Jakarta, which killed seven people, fears are growing that the archipelago, the largest Muslim-majority nation in the world, is going to be hit by a wave of Islamic State-linked bombings and shootings. The potential for mayhem seems obvious. Indonesia’s open society and high social media penetration make it easy for young Indonesians to access Islamist and Facebook pages, and Islamic State has released several videos in Indonesian in an apparent recruiting effort. Indonesia is a country of thousands of islands with porous borders, and many soft targets: The militants launched bombs and opened fire in broad daylight in one of the busiest shopping and office neighborhoods in downtown Jakarta. And Indonesians have fought in Syria and Iraq and returned. The Soufan Group, a consulting security consulting group, believes that at least six hundred Southeast Asians have traveled to Syria to fight with the Islamic State and then come back to their home countries. Indeed, the alleged ringleader of last week’s Jakarta attacks, a militant named Bahru Naim, is currently living in Raqqa, the Islamic State’s hub. But in reality, Indonesia has enjoyed far more success than most nations against Islamist militants, including those linked to the Islamic State. The country has witnessed numerous militant attacks over the past fifteen years, but unlike in some of its neighbors, the Islamic State and other militants have not gained broad public support, and the Indonesian government has not resorted to draconian measures in an attempt to crush militant cells. In many ways, Indonesia’s political leaders, security forces, and religious leaders offer lessons for combating the appeal of the Islamic State. For more on Indonesia’s successes, read my new Bloomberg piece.