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CFR fellows and other experts assess the latest issues emerging in Asia today.

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U.S. President Donald Trump and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim hold up trade deal documents during a bilateral meeting at the 47th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on October 26, 2025.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim hold up trade deal documents during a bilateral meeting at the 47th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on October 26, 2025. Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters

The White House Transformed Asia in 2025: Expect Much More in 2026

In 2025, the second administration of U.S. President Donald Trump dramatically changed the trajectory of U.S. engagement with Asia through its tariff-heavy approach, a trend that seems set to continue in the year ahead. 

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Asia
Evaluating Suu Kyi’s and Thein Sein’s Trips to the United States
The past two weeks have probably been the most high-profile weeks for Myanmar in the United States since the uprisings and crackdowns in Myanmar in 1988. The much-awaited visit of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi drew crowds that could be compared, in some ways, only to visits of Nelson Mandela and the Dalai Lama. And Suu Kyi, in many ways, delivered, showing flexibility on sanctions that will allow for a much greater U.S. presence in Myanmar, displaying the humor and lightness of touch at events that was concealed by years of harsh government policy toward her, and offering a level of forgiveness of her former jailers that could help show the way forward for reconciliation in a future democratic Myanmar. Mynamar president Thein Sein, meanwhile, got much of what he wanted during his less acclaimed, but just as important, visit. His meeting with Hillary Clinton in New York demonstrated the importance the Obama administration places on Myanmar, the United States agreed to dramatic changes in sanctions policy, and Thein Sein returned home to Yangon to a hero’s welcome. But both leaders’ trips have had their pluses and minuses. Here is my take: Aung San Suu Kyi On the plus side, Suu Kyi emerged as a more complete politician and speaker, being able to leave the confining status of icon and appear as a real, funny, and down-to-earth person. She also appeared to have a solid understanding of the ways and means of the American capitol, not an easy thing to understand for even the most grizzled Washingtonian. She was consistent in her messages of forgiveness and reconciliation, and she at least tried to move forward from her previous stance of simply ignoring the issue of violence in Rakhine State. She appeared to be gaining a better understanding of what she does and does not know about the state of international relations, and of Burmese politics, today —a critical skill for any politician. She demonstrated that she was moving beyond icon to politician, and that her visits outside Myanmar would be as much about listening as speaking. On the minus side, Suu Kyi still has nowhere near the type of support network and brain trust that she will need if her National League for Democracy party (NLD) is indeed going to contest and probably win the 2015 elections, putting it into place to run parliament. Burmese businesspeople who spoke in advance of Suu Kyi’s trip noted that, although top NLD people have reached out to the business community and been getting a better sense of Myanmar’s economic needs, the NLD still has no coherent economic ideology, or even a real sense of how it wants to handle Myanmar’s economic opening and looming investment boom, other than calling for investment to broadly benefit all Burmese. Suu Kyi herself takes advice from both Burmese and foreign economists and businesspeople with great expertise, but she does not yet have a mastery of the many crosscurrents within the NLD, including some who want to open the doors to more investment and some who, like many Burmese, have a deal of (well-earned) skepticism and outright xenophobia about foreign aid and investment. During her trip, Suu Kyi still did not convince many foreign businesspeople, economists, or analysts that the NLD was prepared to be a governing party. That said, there are of course over two years until 2015, and this is a party made up of many people who focused their whole life on one cause: ridding the country of military rule. Can the party adapt now that its goals are far broader? In my next blog post, I will analyze the visit of President Thein Sein.
China
China, International Law, and Cyberspace
In a speech two weeks ago, Harold Koh stated that the United States government believes that cyberattacks can amount to armed attacks and are subject to international law. “International law principles do apply in cyberspace,” said Koh. “Cyber activities that proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be viewed as a use of force.” Self-defense, proportionality, neutrality, and distinction should all apply in cyberspace, though there remain questions and ambiguities about defining the use of force, distinguishing between military and civilian-use networks, and the continuing problem of attribution. This is not the first time the United States has made such an announcement—in 2004, for example, the U.S. and UK declared in a submission to the UN Secretary General that international humanitarian law covered the use of information and communication technologies. But as the New York Times noted, the speech is part of a greater willingness of the administration to speak about offensive cyber capabilities. In his speech, Koh also noted that this view is not “universal”: At least one country has questioned whether existing bodies of international law apply to the cutting edge issues presented by the Internet. Some have also said that existing international law is not up to the task, and that we need entirely new treaties to impose a unique set of rules on cyberspace. China appears to be both “at least one country” and among the “some” who think new treaties are necessary. Given Chinese concerns about the free flow of information, Beijing’s opposition to the U.S. position stems in part because the focus is too narrow. The International Code of Conduct for Information Security, submitted to the UN by China and Russia along with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, is much more expansive, allowing countries room to interpret the spread of rumors, gossip, and other malicious information through the use of communication technologies as a security threat. In addition, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Beijing has suggested that a new treaty is needed to “curb proliferation and use of information weapons . . .” Some Chinese analysts see extreme difficulties in applying the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) to new a domain. For example, Shi Haiming, a researcher at the National University of Defense Technology, argues that LOAC is not applicable because: cyberattacks, despite being acts of "aggression", do not threaten territorial integrity or sovereignty; there can be no neutrality in cyberspace since attacks would undoubtedly transit through neutral countries networks; it is impossible to distinguish between civilian and military assets; and the proportionality requirement is much more difficult in cyberspace because of the expanse and penetration of the Internet and the difficulty in containing unintended effects of attacks. A failure to agree on these norms is destabilizing. One country may see its action as permissible, the other as an act of war. It is unclear how wedded Beijing is to its opposition to cyber and LOAC, and we could begin to see some modification of the Chinese position. Wang Tianlong of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges writing in the Shanghai Securities News last week argued “we should study the feasibility of applying the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict to cyberspace and push for the formulation of a code of conduct for cyberconflict.” The United States has certainly upped its rhetorical pressure on China over the last year. The more open discussion of offensive cyber has been accompanied by the increasing number of U.S. government officials naming and shaming Chinese hackers (the most recent is Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stating that the pace of attack was actually increasing). Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta both raised cyber with their Chinese counterparts during recent meetings. The most important driver may be that Beijing could soon find itself isolated. Russia has been much more receptive to discussing how LOAC applies to cyber, and has been less adamant about the International Code of Conduct in multilateral meetings recently. The United States needs to keep engaging Beijing on this issue, but, as with so many issues, it is likely to get better traction with China by scheduling more meetings in other countries’ capitals.
China
The Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals: Will China Follow in India’s Footsteps?
Compulsory licensing is emerging as an additional mechanism by which developing countries can make the treatment of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) more affordable to their populace. Under the World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, compulsory licensing, which occurs when a government licenses the use of a patented innovation without the consent of the patent title holder, is a legally recognized means to overcome barriers in accessing affordable medicines. Between 2001 and 2010, twenty four compulsory licensing episodes in seventeen countries were reported. Most of these episodes ended in a price reduction for the specific drug in question through a compulsory license (CL), a voluntary license, or a negotiated discount. Also, most of the episodes involved drugs for HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases, with only five cases involving drugs for NCDs such as cancer. In 2006, India announced it would issue a CL for the anti-cancer drug Imatinib Mesylate (Gleevec), although it ended up not doing so. Beginning in 2007, Thailand became the most active issuer of CLs for drugs targetting cardiovascular diseases and cancer. In March 2012, the Indian Patent Office issued its first ever CL for Bayer AG’s blockbuster cancer drug sorafenib tosylate (Nexavar), authorizing a domestic generic drug-maker (Netco) to produce a low-cost version of the drug. This move is significant for three reasons. First, it would lead to a generic drug that is 97 percent less than the patented drug thus effectively ending the German pharmaceutical company’s monopoly over the drug in the Indian market. Second, it may signal other Indian generic producers to follow suit if the patent holders fail to supply drugs in large quantities at affordable prices. Third, it could encourage other developing countries such as China to issue compulsory licenses for drugs that treat NCDs. China is facing a major epidemic of NCDs (e.g., cancers and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases), which accounts for more than 85 percent of the total deaths in the country. Annual new cases of cancer have reached 2.8 million (20 percent of world total), while 1.9 million people (or 24 percent of world total) die of cancer annually. Because of its lack of research and development capacity in the pharmaceutical industry, China has become heavily reliant upon imported patented drugs to treat serious conditions like cancer. Almost all of these medicines remain extremely expensive. Some can cost upwards of $80,000 per year. This becomes particularly problematic in China, where the annual per capital income is only about $5,000 and a majority of the patients still have to shoulder about 90 percent of the cost for treating catastrophic illness. During the negotiation leading to the declaration of the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, China worked closely with India, Brazil, Argentina, and other countries seeking to strike a balance between patent protection and public health. Indeed, after the successful conclusion of the negotiations, China immediately launched domestic procedures and became one of the earliest members to accept the Protocol amending the TRIPS agreement. Surprisingly, thus far China has not officially used the flexibility in the TRIPS regime to produce low cost generic version of patented drugs for the benefit of its own population. It even prohibits the marketing in China of Indian made generic drugs. In June of this year, a Chinese newspaper accused the government of pursuing a series of policy measures in pricing, procurement, and reimbursement that had the effect of “protecting foreign firms and suppressing domestic firms.” In a recent conversation I had with a senior Chinese government official, I was told that the Ministry of Health did not have strong incentives to push for issuing compulsory licenses because it did not want to scare off the pharmaceutical related foreign direct investment in China. Instead, the Ministry prefers directly and quietly negotiating with Big Pharma for price discounts. In June, China revised its legal framework to enable the approval of compulsory licensing for generic medicines. This raises the hope that the government may increasingly bypass Big Pharma patents and authorizes low cost domestic generic drug manufacturing. But given the slowdown in China’s economic growth and growing social political stability concerns, the incentives to encourage foreign pharmaceutical investment continue to be strong (if not stronger). In December 2011, China further revised its rules making foreign investment in the pharmaceutical industry subject to less regulatory scrutiny. India’s move in March may make its northern neighbor a more attractive destination for bio-pharmaceutical R&D investments. In a nutshell, don’t expect China to pull the trigger on compulsory licensing anytime soon.
  • Asia
    Does the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration Even Matter?
    Elizabeth Leader is a Research Associate for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. The author’s views on ASEAN’s human rights progress do not necessarily reflect those of Joshua Kurlantzick. The Asia-Pacific remains the only UN-defined region that does not adhere to its own human rights treaty or possess a region-wide mechanism for the promotion and protection of human rights. Thus, there was seemingly a lot riding on the backs of the ten ASEAN foreign ministers who gathered in New York on Thursday —on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly— to review the second draft of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). Concern over the controversial draft (drawn up by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights) has, in the international media, far outweighed any sort of praise. Among the many aspects of the AHRD facing criticism are the possible inclusion of “public morality” as justification for suspending human rights, the opaque fashion in which the document was drafted, the limited participation of civil society organizations in its creation, and its failure to reference many of the marginalized populations who are in dire need of protection (including minorities, the LGBT community, and persons with disabilities). Regardless of the inclusion or exclusion of these aspects, the fact remains that without a corresponding mechanism for enforcement, the AHRD, no matter how forceful its language, will be largely damned to irrelevance. In his 2006 book Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, former ASEAN secretary-general Rodolfo Severino rationalized ASEAN’s inability to formalize a unified, meaningful stance on human rights:  “In the face of such wide divergences in the situations and conceptions of human rights among ASEAN countries, it is hardly feasible for ASEAN to construct a system for intervening in one another’s affair on the grounds of violations of human rights.” While citing the region’s diversity is arguably a ‘cop out’ for ASEAN’s failure to institutionalize respect for human rights, the international community must nonetheless recognize the reality that is ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making process, and how this will fundamentally preclude progress on human rights promotion and protection for the foreseeable future. One is hard pressed to find any aspect of human rights for which shared norms or common experiences unite ASEAN’s ten member states. In terms of LGBT rights (a population whose exclusion from the current draft has received international condemnation and media attention), for example, Thailand is seen as one of the most tolerant countries in Asia, while in neighboring Myanmar homosexuality is illegal. No amount of ministerial meetings is likely to bridge such a cultural divide. Indonesia’s foreign minister Marty Natalegawa was candid in his recent admission that “state interests of each nation are also different from one another. Hence, a document that must be reached via consensus will never please all parties.” Above all, national self-interest will continue to dictate member states’ decision-making.  Despite international concern for the treatment of Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, Myanmar, Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia are unlikely to intervene for fear that other countries may in turn attempt to dictate citizenship standards within their own borders. Thailand, once seen as a beacon of democracy in the region, will not chastise Vietnam’s recent jailing of bloggers for fear that its own, draconian Lèse-Majesté law and the associated Computer Crimes Act will face censure from its neighbors. As long as ASEAN remains an intergovernmental body and not a people-powered institution, the “ASEAN way” will remain one of noninterference, and it is improbable that the protection of human rights will be paid little more than lip service. Instead, the resources and efforts of Western governments and international NGOs would be better spent focusing on grassroots movements, working bilaterally with the individual governments of member states, and working multilaterally with those networks that are not bound by the rigidities of ASEAN. The Southeast Asia National Human Rights Institution (SEANHRI), for example, unites the existing, independent human rights commissions of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand (as well as that of ASEAN non-member East Timor). Its website is funded by a European Commission project entitled "Enhancing the Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Development of an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism." Contrary to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights which lacks the ability to hear cases from individuals, organizations, or groups of people, a recent article in the Bangkok Post described the members of SEANHRI as the “most accessible” human rights mechanisms in the region. There is an opportunity for these commissions to set an example for their neighbors.  In 2011, Myanmar established its own human rights commission (although the international community has yet to recognize it as independent, and it has thus far avoided investigation of human rights abuses in conflict-riddled ethnic minority areas). Earlier this month in Chiang Mai, Thailand, the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission was admitted to SEANHRI. Perhaps, in time, Myanmar’s commission will benefit from the exchange of best practices. The right of marginalized populations in Southeast Asia to be included in the AHRD is undeniable. Their inclusion in the declaration would send a powerful signal to not only ASEAN, but also the greater Asia-Pacific region and the entire international community. But, short of a miracle, a satisfactory AHRD is unlikely to come to fruition in the near future —and prospects for its enforcement are even dimmer. In the meantime, concerned governments and NGOs should continue to explore means of human rights promotion and protection that operate independently of ASEAN.
  • China
    Liaoning - Paper Tiger or Growing Cub?
    Colonel Brian Killough is the U.S. Air Force Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. On Tuesday, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) joined 9 other nations—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, India, Thailand, Spain, Italy, and Brazil—that have aircraft carriers in their naval arsenal. But what does that mean for nations in the region and how should we assess the long-term implications? For many regional observers, the announcement hardly ruffles feathers. In fact, some see it as a liability. For example, “The fact is the aircraft carrier is useless for the Chinese Navy,” You Ji, a visiting senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore, said in an interview. He continued, “If it is used against America, it has no survivability. If it is used against China’s neighbors, it’s a sign of bullying.” Chinese leaders are the first to admit the Liaoning is for training purposes only and in fact, China’s air force doesn’t even have aircraft capable of landing on the carrier. Furthermore, carriers are more vulnerable without their protective and supporting battle groups. These battle groups require technology, investment, and training over the course of a decade or more to bring them together as an effective fighting force. Meanwhile, as pointed out above, as a concentration of capabilities, resources, and manpower, a carrier quickly becomes both a high-value asset and a high-value target for adversaries. What benefit does the carrier bring to the PRC? First, it is a symbol of national pride for a nation that is rallying more and more frequently to nationalism in the waters of the East and South China Sea. Second, it serves as a testbed and developmental vessel for the next generation of up to five more Chinese carriers which have been reported to be in design and development. Third, even if the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has no desire to go into battle with other world superpowers, it would certainly give the nation an option for displaying military might in regions where the PRC has strategic interests around the globe. This hearkens back to the concept of nineteenth century gunboat diplomacy. For example, if you are a coastal African nation with significant resource trade with the PRC and there is a dispute over future rights or how Chinese citizens are treated, and a PRC aircraft carrier shows up off your coastline, it may influence your decision calculus. It also gives the PLAN a lot of staying power closer to home in the disputed areas of the East and South China Seas. If the ship is equipped with a wing of J-15 aircraft (currently under development in China), and then deployed near the Senkaku/Diaoyu, Paracel, or Spratly Islands, the PRC will have arguably established sustainable air dominance over the area. So, the question remains, is the Liaoning a significant new capability or is it a waste of money on a capability that China will never realize? The reality probably lies between the two possibilities. PRC leaders understand that with exponentially increasing demands for raw goods caused by their growing economy, they must be prepared to field a blue-water navy to protect their strategic interests. The Liaoning is a measured step in the long trek toward a globally-capable navy that an emerging superpower needs. For a nation that takes a long and measured view of history, it is a logical investment. It is also a solid indicator of intent, but not a threat … yet. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. government or Department of Defense.