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Energy, Security, and Climate

CFR experts examine the science and foreign policy surrounding climate change, energy, and nuclear security.

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Employees work on the production line of solar panels at a workshop of Jiangsu DMEGC New Energy Co., Ltd. on July 22, 2025 in Suqian, Jiangsu Province of China.
Employees work on the production line of solar panels at a workshop of Jiangsu DMEGC New Energy Co., Ltd. on July 22, 2025 in Suqian, Jiangsu Province of China. Xu Changliang/VCG/Getty Images

Trump’s UN Speech Cannot Steer the Global Climate Effort

Despite the president’s remarks criticizing global efforts to address climate change, other countries will pursue a clean energy transition or—like China—use the U.S. retreat to their advantage.

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Renewable Energy
Why We Still Need Innovation in Successful Clean Energy Technologies
Today is my last day at CFR. I’m joining ReNew Power, India’s largest renewable energy firm, as their CTO. I’m excited for a new adventure but sad to leave the Council, which has given me support and autonomy to study the innovations needed for global decarbonization. As I leave, I wanted to share a new article in the energy journal Joule that I published along with John Dabiri at Stanford University and David Hart at ITIF and George Mason University. In it, we write: Solar energy, wind energy, and battery energy storage are widely regarded as the three most prominent clean energy technology success stories. In 2017, the International Energy Agency listed them as the only technologies being deployed rapidly enough to help limit climate change. Power from solar and wind farms is now routinely sold at prices below that of electricity from fossil-fueled generators, and cheaper batteries are fueling rising sales of electric vehicles as well as a building boom of grid-scale electricity storage projects. Governments around the world might conclude that innovation in solar, wind, and storage is no longer a priority. Such a conclusion would be a mistake. The impressive performance and promising projections for these three technologies obscure an underlying stagnation. In each case, a single dominant technological design has emerged, which private industry is presently scaling up. As Figure 1A reveals, crystalline silicon panels have strengthened their near-monopoly in solar photovoltaic energy in recent years. Figure 1B demonstrates that a similar trend is emerging in grid-scale energy storage, as lithium-ion batteries relentlessly increase their market share. And in wind energy, horizontal-axis wind turbines have enjoyed a virtually 100% market share for decades. Figure 1. Global Market Shares of Dominant Designs in Solar Photovoltaic and Nonhydro Grid Energy Storage (A) Percentage of global annual solar photovoltaic panel deployed capacity by technology (Source: Fraunhofer ISE). (B) Percentage of global annual grid-scale energy storage deployed capacity by technology, excluding pumped hydroelectric storage (Source: International Energy Agency, Tracking Clean Energy Progress, 2018). While these ‘‘dominant designs’’ have made clean energy more competitive with fossil fuels in the near term,  they pose a significant risk in the long term: ‘‘technological lock-in.’’ Technological lock-in has been documented across a range of industries in the past—especially in legacy sectors with entrenched incumbent firms and regulatory inertia. Once it sets in, new technologies struggle to achieve commercial traction even if they are superior to existing ones. The warning signs of lock-in are clear across all three fields. Private industry is devoting virtually no investment to the development of next-generation technologies, while making massive bets on the rapid deployment and incremental improvement of existing technologies. If new solar, wind, and storage technologies are ‘‘locked out,’’ global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions could fall well short of those needed to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. To be sure, it is impossible to be certain that new technologies will be needed, but a prudent risk management strategy would be to prepare for the likely scenario that they are. Governments around the world should step in to boost funding for research, development, and demonstration of new solar, wind, and battery technologies that have the potential to outperform the current market leaders. These technologies will not attract substantial private investment without such public support. Well-designed policies would spread public funding across a diverse range of technologies and phase out that support as technologies mature, ensuring maximal return on public investments in innovation. Governments are not the only—or even the primary—entities needed to advance clean energy innovation. The private sector is center stage for the development and commercialization of new technologies, and I’m eager to help my new firm establish itself as a technology leader. Still, I’ve learned through my time at the Council that supportive public policy can unleash private innovation. At the Council, I am grateful to all of my colleagues who have made my time here enjoyable and stimulating. I’m especially thankful to Richard Haass and Jim Lindsay for their support of my work. I’m also indebted to Michael Levi for taking me under his wing (and trusting me with his blog!). None of my work would have been possible without my two superb research associates, Sagatom Saha and Madison Freeman, and our dynamic interns. Finally, I’ve been fortunate to work with world-class collaborators, who have opened my mind to new ways of thinking. I’ll miss the vibrant DC policy ecosystem and would love to host visitors over a cup of chai in New Delhi!
Asia
An Asia Super Grid Would Be a Boon for Clean Energy—If It Gets Built
Through an initiative known as the Asia Super Grid, or ASG, the countries made plans to build an ocean-floor power network to connect their electricity grids and enable a cleaner and more efficient pan-Asian electric power system.
Nuclear Energy
America Risks Missing Out On A Global Nuclear Power Revival
Background reading on the future of the global nuclear trade and the commercial opportunities and national security risks that it presents to the United States.
  • Energy and Climate Policy
    Blockchain and Energy: We Sifted Hype from Reality So You Don't Have To
    This blog post is adapted from a new discussion paper from the Energy Security and Climate Change Program: “Applying Blockchain Technology to the Electric Power Sector.” 
  • Russia
    The Oil Context of the Trump-Putin Meeting
    There appears to be a list of conflicts and other kinds of issues that U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin touched upon during their meeting in Helsinki, and progress on any of them is bound to be slow. Oil made a headline during Putin’s remarks in the public session: Specifically, Putin reminded the U.S. president in front of the international media that “neither of us is interested in the plummeting of (oil) prices and the consumers will suffer as well” and called out oil as an area for collaboration, as expected. Whether it’s a threat or an offer is always hard to say with the Russian leader. But there are good reasons for U.S. officials to be cautious in the coming weeks and months about looking to Russia for “assistance” in the complicated geopolitics of oil and gas. Like many other conflicts and issues, Putin is promising all sides goods he likely cannot fully deliver. The United States should think longer and harder about what assistance Russia could actually provide to U.S. interests. My view is the bilateral dialogue should stick to more achievable priorities like arms control and improved bilateral lines of communications among top U.S. and Russian military brass to avoid accidental direct clashes. Unilaterally reducing vulnerability to the national security and cyber threats Russia can make against U.S. domestic targets should remain top priority, but oil perhaps belongs on the back burner. The reality is that Russia has made a policy of offering its assistance to national oil sectors under siege, including those who become targeted by U.S. sanctions. That policy has subjected Russian oil companies to all kinds of negative consequences that will hinder their balance sheets and make it more difficult for Russia to play a balancer role in the global oil market down the road. The United States needs to weigh any pledge of oil “cooperation” with America against Russia’s active involvement in troubled oil sectors as diverse as Venezuela and Iran. In the run up to the Helsinki summit, Iran’s senior advisor for international affairs Ali Akbar Velayati met with Putin last week and agreed to $50 billion in oil and gas sector investments. Russian giants Rosneft and Gazprom are in talks with the Iranian oil ministry about upstream investments. Earlier this year, Russia’s Zarubezhneft signed an oil field development deal with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to refurbish the Aban and West Paydar oil fields. Iran could believe that turning to Moscow will shield its oil and gas sector not only from attack by Arab separatists but also even (perhaps a little more far-fetched, but probably not in the minds of Iranian hardliners) Israel and the United States. The opposite could come to happen. If proxy wars escalate, Russian companies could get caught accidentally in the cross fire. In fact, both Tehran and Moscow alike could lose from deepening their collaborations in Iran’s domestic oil and gas sector. Iran may want to consider what happened to Turkmenistan, whose energy exports were forced into Russia at cheap domestic Russian prices to allow Russian companies to export more of their own gas at higher levels to European buyers. That is one reason many Central Asian countries eventually turned to China for assistance with energy and electricity as the conflict of interest and strings attached were less onerous. For its part, Russia could find that Russian oil workers will be in a vulnerable position to spontaneous local protests and attacks, both inside Iran and Iraq, regardless of the overall tone of high level, government to government interactions. The latest example is Iraq, where angry local protesters lashed out this week at a number of targets but notably gathered to threaten an oil field operated by Russian firm Lukoil. The event, which so far hasn’t resulted in major oil supply cutoff, is a reminder that Iran has the means to punish Moscow on the ground, not only via its proxies on the ground in Syria but also in Iraq, should Moscow cross a redline on any of Tehran’s regional interests.  Iran has threatened that the United States would be mistaken if it thinks Iran would be the “only” country unable to export its oil. Most analysts took that threat to be alluding to Saudi Arabia, which is involved in proxy wars with Iran in multiple locations and whose oil industry has been subject to cyber, drone, and sabotage attacks. But Iran may also want to make sure that Putin knows Iranian proxies can make trouble for Russia (in addition to Saudi Arabia) if Tehran feels double crossed. Moscow could be finding that its “partnership” with Iran is double-edged, constraining its freedom of movement on a host of critical issues ranging from its ongoing operations in Syria to its desire to remain the senior partner in oil market management with Saudi Arabia. From the U.S. point of view, this is highly material to U.S. and Israeli hopes that Russia can be an effective partner. Any Russian promises to help with Syria’s border areas or oil markets could become subject to Iranian backlash and therefore not reliable. In other words, U.S. policy makers could overestimate the value of collaboration with Moscow on Middle East conflict resolution. For Russian oil companies, operations in special assignment regions like Iraq, Venezuela, Libya, and Iran come with extremely difficult operating environments. Local conflicts are disrupting oil production, limiting payments in kind (e.g. oil exports) that were expected to reimburse Russian firms like Lukoil and Rosneft for its massive capital outlays and manpower. Money spent in oil and gas fields in these far-flung places is capital not available to make steady and possibly more reliable profits in Russia’s own domestic oil and gas fields, and it remains to be seen if Russian firms would be able to hold onto the barter style deals, should the governments change in any of the troubled locales. When all is said and done, it remains to be seen whether in the hindsight of history, Vladimir Putin’s deal making in oil over the past year or so will be viewed as triumphantly as it now might appear. In the glare of Europe’s response, the sudden cutoff of Russian natural gas supplies to Ukraine back in 2006 proved a misstep by giving impetus to not only the installation of several major liquefied natural gas receiving terminals in southern Europe and Poland but also giving added stimulus towards a major push towards renewable energy on the continent. Russia’s current moves into troubled states could similarly come back to bite its oil and gas industry, which was already struggling from high indebtedness, limited access to future financing, and the threat of additional U.S. sanctions.