• Diplomacy and International Institutions
    U.S. Assumes UNSC Presidency, Intelligence Report Investigates Khashoggi Killing, and More
    Podcast
    The United States assumes the presidency of the UN Security Council, with Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield newly confirmed as the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations; the U.S. intelligence community releases a report on the Jamal Khashoggi killing; and a political crisis deepens in the country of Georgia.
  • Georgia
    A Conversation With President Salome Zourabichvili of Georgia
    Podcast
    VERSHBOW: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to today’s meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations with President Salome Zourabichvili of the Republic of Georgia. I’m Alexander Vershbow. I’m Alexander Vershbow. I’m the distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, retired diplomat, and will be presiding over today’s discussion. It’s a great honor for me to be here with President Zourabichvili who, as you know, was elected president last December and, of course, was earlier, perhaps in simpler times, minister of foreign affairs of Georgia. And this was all after a thirty-year career in the French diplomatic service. Madam President, we first met in the early 1980s, when you were a French embassy officer. I was at the State Department and you were reporting on arms control and east-west relations. I’ve been dying to ask you since that time what inspired you to make the switch to return to the country of your ancestors to become foreign minister, and how difficult was the transition? Did you have this idea for a long time, or is it something that came to you when you were serving as ambassador? ZOURABICHVILI: No. (Laughs.) Neither. I always wanted to do something for the country, and especially after it became independent. What is it that you can do to help support and use your experience? But in fact, it happened without me. And it happened with two persons, one was president Saakashvili, who was a new elected president of Georgia in 2004, and the second one was the President Chirac, who died yesterday. And they met for the official visit of the President Saakashvili in Paris, and they decided it would be a good idea for me to become the foreign minister. VERSHBOW: You were the last to know about this idea? (Laughs.) ZOURABICHVILI: I was the last to know. I was three months French ambassador to Georgia when that was decided. So—and there are things that you do not refused probably in life. So that was one of them. VERSHBOW: Were they shocked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when you turned up one day as their boss? ZOURABICHVILI: They were surprised. (Laughter.) VERSHBOW: Good. Well, congratulations on an unusual and extraordinary career. But let’s get down to policy issues. Perhaps we can start with the domestic situation in Georgia. As we all know, Russia is doing everything it can to block Georgia’s path to the West and to prevent you from becoming a stable, thriving democracy. Of course, despite all of this Russian pressure, Georgia has made extraordinary strides in becoming a thriving democracy with a dynamic civil society. And of course, seven years ago there was a peaceful transfer of power from President Saakashvili to the Georgia Dream coalition. But earlier this year, there were renewed doubts about Georgia’s democracy when political unrest erupted in June, following the visit of a Russian parliamentary delegation. What do these protest say about the maturity of Georgian politics and Georgian democracy? And what do you see as the implications going forward? ZOURABICHVILI: Well, first of all, I think that demonstrations anywhere are a sign of democracy. And we have had a lot of signs of democracy in Georgia. And I think that’s good, that’s normal, and it’s part of the Georgian character to be very eloquent in these things. And I think that the Georgian civil society is very active, is very politicized, is very much active in the social network. The media are very active and very critical. And I think that all of that is very good, except for the tendency that is noted elsewhere too, which is polarization—and excessive polarization. But that’s another issue. Coming back to the—to the events of June, I think they have been a bit misrepresented outside of Georgia. There are two very different things that have to be very well understood. One is the reaction of the whole population, indistinctive of any political appearance to the fact of Gavrilov being seated in the seat of the parliament. The more time goes, the more I think that this was planned somehow. How it was planned, I don’t know. But there was a form of provocation. And that is something that we should all take into account, but it’s a reflection of what is the frustration of a country, of a nation, when after how many years—eleven years after the war and twenty-six years of frozen conflicts that have been moved to occupied regions. There is a point in time when the society, the nation doesn’t see any perspective of things being solved, being overcome. And then any incident can turn to that eruption of frustration. And that’s what happened. And I think that everybody should look at that, including our northern neighbor. Then the second phase of these events was that some opposition parties more radical than others tried to use that, as it happens also in many countries, to use that to make their aims attain, because they cannot probably win—or at least it’s their evaluation—through elections. So they try to enter forcefully the parliament. And it’s very clear when you look at the—at the pictures of how the police forces tried to resist for a number of hours were attacked very directly. And in fact, there are now inquests on these facts. And I think that any democratic country would resist the forced entry into the parliament, and especially a country that has at about thirty kilometers from the capital city Russian occupation forces and military forces that could, at any time, come to save someone of something. So I think that we are in that sense just reacting the way any democracy should react. So I’m not really concerned about that aspect. I’m concerned about the first aspect. And that was one of my main messages here when meeting with my diverse counterparts and the secretary-general of the General Assembly. And it was also my message in my speech, that we have to do something. We need movement. We cannot just sit—I was very criticized during this summer for not having gone on the occupation line when there was a new episode of Russians trying to move the fences and provoking us. Well, it’s very clear that the Georgian president cannot go on the occupation line and just look at what the Russians are doing, and how many more kilometers they are moving it forward, without being able to do anything but look. So I think that it’s not the proper attitude. But we have to do something outside. We cannot do anything there, because Georgia has unilaterally declined the use of force for any time to come. We do not have, because we’re respecting the 2008 ceasefire agreements, we do not have any military forces close to the occupation line. So we are trying to resist the different forms of provocations that vary from day to day and are almost every other day they’re closing the crossing points. People are under humanitarian, very difficult situations. And we are to balance between resisting the provocation but at the same time reacting in some ways, because otherwise you appear to be completely accepting the status quo. So we have to move outside. We cannot move on the occupation line. We have to move outside. And that means that our partners have to take upon them the issue. It is not acceptable that because they’re dealing with Ukraine they forget about Georgia. That was my very strong message. Because otherwise it sends to Russia the wrong signal, that it’s enough to go now to a third place and then we will forget about Ukraine. So it’s not logical and it’s not the right positive signal. So, one, we should have Georgia on all the agendas. And each time one talks either publicly or to the Russians in private or in multilateral formats one has to, at the same time Ukraine is mentioned, mention Georgia. And there has to be more activity in terms of trying to push for solutions, for formats to be reactivated. And I’ve been talking a lot about the Geneva format, that is a completely technical and un-useful format this stage, unless it goes back to what it was designed to do which was to be a format for real political substantial discussions. And those discussions at the first stage should be to push, and to ask, and to demand from Russia that it behaves in accordance with the cease-fire agreement of 2008. That is the first step. That’s not simply the solution to the occupied territories, per se, but for instance allowing the EU monitoring mission to accomplish its mandate, which was accepted by Russia, which is to oversee the whole of the territory, and not just the occupation line, first, would prevent a number of incidents, per se. And that would deescalate. And secondly, to give an additional sense of security to both populations living there, to the Georgian authorities. And so it would be stabilize also the region. And so there are many steps like that that can be done, if there is a real engagement of our partners. Where I think that the idea that our partners can be self-satisfied with just declaring once in a while that they recognize Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and they think that they are doing by that a very big thing, I think is not enough. It’s, of course, very important, and it should continue, and it’s something that has brought us until then. But it’s not enough. And we have to say that it’s not enough. VERSHBOW: Well, I can see why you don’t want Ukraine to get all the attention, although right now in terms of lots of publicity I think you’re probably lucky not to be in the same boat as Ukraine right now. (Laughter.) ZOURABICHVILI: I certainly do not want. And that was something I’ve been saying on and off, that I do not want Georgia to be known only for its conflict. And certainly we have many other reasons to be known and to be on the agenda. But on the conflict’s agenda, it is not possible that Georgia is not at least mentioned. Of course, the Ukraine conflict is much more open. It’s in an active phase. And it’s closer and bigger than the Georgian conflict. But that’s not a way to look at conflicts. They are whole and they are to be treated as a whole. VERSHBOW: Coming back to this issue of the Russians, beyond the games that they’re playing along the border—the so-called borderization—how seriously are the Russians meddling in your domestic politics, using disinformation, corruption, measures of all kinds? And is this something you feel the West is not helping you enough? ZOURABICHVILI: It would be very surprising that the Russians, knowing us the way they know us from the very old Soviet times, and having had all their instruments to understand the Georgian psychology and the Georgian history. It would be impossible to think that they would not use their knowledge to do the same thing that they are doing in countries which they know much less and have studied much less. So, yes, of course. They’re using fake news, for instance. They have been pushing a lot on the—just one example—on the Lugar Laboratory that is Georgia, and that is a very effective place for research and fighting the different viruses and making research. And they have started rumors that, in fact, they are trying to invent or use some biological weapons, and that the flu epidemic of this winter was generated by the Lugar Laboratory. And they’ve used that then to close all the crossing points with the Abkhazian region and Tskhinvali region during most part of the winter. And the preoccupation there is not only that it had this effect, and that was a very grave humanitarian situation, but other preoccupation is that a number of people that you wouldn’t have thought were believing that this Lugar Laboratory might be something else. That one is very transparent and, in fact, a very high level of laboratory and of protection. So that is a concern, because you have—they are reaching out to a certain category of the society that normally should be educated enough not to believe those things. VERSHBOW: The Russians are taking some new steps, just in recent days, to consolidate their control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the occupied territories. ZOURABICHVILI: That’s every day. VERSHBOW: But now they’re talking about modernizing the armed forces, establishing regular armed forces. ZOURABICHVILI: Well, there have been—in fact, commanding the armed forces in those places for now a couple of years, they have multiplied the military bases. They have military exercises of different dimensions. I think that we counted 100 in South Ossetia for the past year. Of course, what they call military exercise might vary very much in terms of numbers. So it’s just this cat and mouse game that they’re continuing, which is made of many different things. It’s made of passportization, of depriving the last part of the ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia from their passports and trying to force them to take either Abkhazian documents or Russian passports. It’s a mixture of those. So there is something at each time that varies. And the common objective of all that is to drag it into reacting in some form to the provocations, because they know that if we’re dragged into that, that’s where we cannot win. So it’s really a test of the nerves, which is not easy. But we have to know that it’s a test of the nerves. VERSHBOW: Indeed. Let’s turn to your relations with the EU and NATO. So let’s start with the EU. You’ve, of course, had your association agreement and free trade agreement with the EU, which have been quite successful for about three years now. At the same time, there are new leaders coming into positions of power within the European Union, starting in November. Do you see a more pro-Georgian attitude amongst these new people, or is it too soon to tell? And what are you saying to them as far as what should be the next stage of Georgia’s integration in the European Union? It seems like a membership perspective is a non-starter for many EU member states. But what besides a path to membership would you see as the next step that could support your reforms and also make more irreversible your path to the West? ZOURABICHVILI: Well, first of all, I think it’s irreversible anyway. The second thing that I don’t think that the European new leaders should be pro-Georgian. I think they should be pro-European—really, pro-European. The third thing is that when you were remembering that when I was appointed foreign minister and I toured the different capitals I was told that there was no way that Georgia was going to be integrated in the neighborhood policy. And just a few months later we were becoming part of the neighborhood policy. And since then, our path has been one of constant progress. First, the partnership—oriental partnership. Then the association agreement. Then free and deep trade, and visa liberalization. So almost every two, three, five years there is a very substantial step forward that has been taken, which is very clearly seen by the population. And as a result, we have today 78 percent of popular support, in the latest opinion polls. And that has been constant. It varies from one point— VERSHBOW: People aren’t losing hope. ZOURABICHVILI: They’re not losing hope. They’re not losing direction. Hope is a different thing. And I don’t think that we base anything on hope these days. Just on the realities. So reality-based, it means that we are very clear about the fact that looking at the European Union, there is no appetite today for making a political decision about candidature or membership. So that’s the reality that we have to take into account. On our side, the answer to that is we can understand that you have Brexit, populism, lack of enthusiasm for new enlargement. But on our side, we need to be seeing what is the next movement forward, the next rapprochement with the European Union, the concrete steps, again, that we can have in order to continue showing the population that this road is one of movement and not of standing still. VERSHBOW: And do you have specific asks of them? Customs union, energy union? ZOURABICHVILI: Exactly. The idea is to ask. And there has been very positive answers from different European leaders, Macron being one of them, and the new president of the council, Michel, another. When we say that we want sectoral integration and to become full members of different programs of the European Union, be it in culture, be it in energy, oil and transport, where we are almost already part of the new TNT program. So that’s the direction. So it’s a very concrete, I would say almost a physical direction to say we are ready for so many programs. We want to become a full member of those programs. And let’s forget for some time the question of the status and the political decision. But maybe in a couple of years when you will ready for political decision, you will realize that in fact a de facto Georgia is part of 60 percent, 65 percent of what the European Union is. We are already, for instance, in the peace mission in South Africa. We’re very interest in closer security and defense relationship with the EU. To which extent, that is something to be decided. We are full members of the education—the programs on education. Georgian studies are one of the first users of Erasmus. They are voting with their feet, and so on. So we have all this panoply, I would say, of different programs and we have to present, and that’s what we are now working on, present a very concrete list of where we want to be in the different programs. VERSHBOW: Well, I hope they’re responsive and they don’t cite some of the recent political turbulence as an excuse, because— ZOURABICHVILI: I don’t think so. There is no real. VERSHBOW: Yeah. Turning to NATO. It’s been eleven years now since NATO promised both you and Ukraine that you will be members, but they’ve been conspicuously unable to name a timetable. But at the same time, I think Georgia has made the most of all the different partnership tools and mechanisms that NATO has created—the substantial NATO-Georgia package, NATO has a Joint Training and Evaluations Center on Georgian territory. Do you think the Georgian people are patient and can focus on these interim measures? ZOURABICHVILI: There is a slightly less—for NATO I think it’s seventy-three or -two. I don’t know, I can’t remember the exact numbers. But also it has been constant. And I think that we are exactly in the same position towards—there is a parallelism between the two. With NATO we know, and that’s very clearly said, everybody tells us we are the frontrunners, that we are excellent, that we are doing everything that has to be done. But that we will not have MAP, because in fact giving MAP to Georgia today, everybody knows that in six months’ time we would fulfill the last things that have to be done in MAP. And so immediately after comes the question of membership. So knowing that, again, the same thing. We need—we can for some time just put the status question on the side because of realism, but at the same time we need the movement. So where can we get the movement to get closer and more involved with NATO? We have had—this year we had two military exercises. We had the committee—military committee visiting Georgia, the secretary-general. And we are having the North Atlantic Council visiting Georgia in October. So you can hardly do more in terms of high-level visits. So we need more concrete programs. So what can it be? And we have identified the two directions in which we really could do much more with NATO. One is the Black Sea security. And it’s a very important subject. And in fact, there could be an idea, which I proposed to the secretary-general and which needs to be pushed further, to have a Center of Excellence on Black Sea security in Georgia. That would give the sense of something more happening. The other issue on which we, as everybody else, needs more cooperation with NATO is the issue of cybersecurity. And there too, we have to find the new ways of having more intense cooperation, support, training, because we need—where we are located, and that concerns attacks from Russia, but not only from Russia. We’ve had also Iran and China. So we need to be consolidated in that—in that aspect. And that will give us this sense of movement that we absolutely need also on the side of NATO. VERSHBOW: Recently former NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen made a fairly provocative proposal, saying that Georgia’s membership shouldn’t be postponed inevitable by the Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He suggested that allies agree that Georgia could become a member with the proviso that Article 5 guarantees would not apply to the occupied territories until they were restored to Georgia. Was this a helpful proposal? Or do you think it will only— ZOURABICHVILI: I will not comment, because as a president I cannot comment on any particular proposal that I’ve not made. I will just say one thing on that, which is that I don’t think it’s right to say that the discussions of membership and not decision on membership is due to Russia. I think that is very dangerous to say, because first of all I think it’s not true. There are many other—it might be one of the reasons, or one of the concerns. But for someone to say that Georgia is not becoming member of NATO because of Russia, and especially from the secretary-general of NATO, that I think is a concern. The rest, I leave to him. (Laughs.) VERSHBOW: OK. One last question, then we’ll open it up to the—open up to questions and answers from the members. Just your thoughts on President Putin’s policy towards Russia’s neighbors? Do you see any hope that he may soften his—or, modify his strategy of using the frozen conflicts as a way of blocking Georgia’s and Ukraine’s path to the West? And do you think Russia is capable of ever seeing countries like Georgia and Ukraine as partners rather than vassals? (Laughs.) ZOURABICHVILI: Again, I would challenge the idea that Russia has managed to block the path of Georgia towards EU or NATO. It is the contrary that despite the conflict, despite the occupation, Georgia has managed to continue its path. And that, I think, should be something that should be mediated by the Russian leadership, that if that was the objective, that objective has not been reached. And if that is a measure of who has won this war of nerves, then we have won the war of nerves, and we continue. Because there is nothing that will divert Georgia from this path, which is the path that not only the population has chosen, but that is now inscribed in the constitution since last year. So that doesn’t make any doubt. Whether Russia can rethink its policies with the neighbors, I think that I’ve been from the very beginning, at the time when I was negotiating the military bases and I was visiting you in Moscow, from the very time I’ve always said that what we are waiting for is for Russia to rediscover the fact that it has everything to win of treating its neighbors with respect and because none of these neighbors are de facto threatening Russia in any way. So of course, we all have the hope that one day they will understand what is the rule of the international community anywhere else, but I cannot make prognosis as to when that will happen. VERSHBOW: Yeah. No, I’m not optimistic. I think Putin prefers to be feared than loved. Maybe he doesn’t think he can be loved, so he chooses to be feared. But anyway, let’s now invite members of the Council to join the conversation and pose some questions to you, Madam President. Who’d like to be the first? Please. Please identify yourself and make it a real question. (Laughter.) Q: Charles Henderson. What specifically would you like to see from the outside to deal with the Russian occupation? And also, what role would Georgia play in that cooperative approach to dealing with the Russian occupation? ZOURABICHVILI: I don’t know whether it’s a cooperative approach. First it has to be a demanding approach. But we’re expecting that our partners that are dealing and having an intensive dialogue with—more or less, an intensive dialogue with Russia, would be repeating every time, and at any of their meetings with Russia, that it would help in a general way to turn to the behavior that is a normal behavior instead of playing on the tension, the incidents, because it’s nobody’s interest in that region to have instability incidents. It’s a miracle that Georgia has managed over the years, and despite, again, the frozen conflicts, then the war, then the occupation, that Georgia has managed to be really and become a very stable country that is attracting investment, that is in the investors ratings figuring quite well, and is viewed outside as a stable country. And that’s the Georgian miracle that we have to preserve. But meanwhile, our partners have to be active, proactive with the Russians. And I don’t know what you can get, but if you do not ask then it will be considered as a closed subject. And that is what is not acceptable by us. VERSHBOW: Mmm hmm. Other questions? Please, in the back. And please stand up so we can all hear you. Q: Negar Kongary (ph). Thank you for your comments. It’s very, very, very interesting and insightful. Just a quick question. Is there any role that you think some of the countries in the far east can play—specifically Japan, China—in the same way that they’re playing a role in stabilizing some of your—the ex-Soviet republics in Central Asia? ZOURABICHVILI: That they could play in the Caucasus? The Chinese are present a little bit. They’re present like they are probably in other continents, in Africa. They’re present in infrastructure investments and works. They’re not very active otherwise. In political terms, they’re not very active. Whether any of their involvement there would add in any way to the—to the stability and be something that could be helpful one way or the other, I’m not very sure. VERSHBOW: Yes, front row. Q: David Walker. Good morning. May I pick up on the point about economic growth? Certain IFIs, such as the EBRD have been very active in Georgia. What is needed now to continue to transition to full market economy? And you mentioned Erasmus. Could you maybe make a few comments about demographics? A very empowered Georgian youth diaspora, but what role do they play? ZOURABICHVILI: Not enough. That’s one of my priorities and one of my concerns, that we are not making the right use of this experimented and education youth that is flooding around the European and American universities, because we do not have the right instruments for that—neither the salaries nor the promotions. We have to review our policy of how to attract back some of those—some of these—what has become a little bit of a brain drain. So that’s one part, for the development of the economy. And the second one is that we need more foreign investment. More foreign investment in the major projects. You have probably heard about Anaklia, the deep-sea port. That is one of the big projects. And that has become a political discussion for some reason, when it’s really an economic discussion, because this is a very important new orientation, and that fits very well with the ideas of the European Union on increasing their investments in the transport between Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Georgia through the Black Sea and then Caspian Sea, and Kazakhstan. But that needs involvement and investments in the port’s construction. And for the time being, the only investment has been budgetary investment from the Georgian state. And that is not enough. So we have in some way to mobilize more interest. One of my also work is to meet with investors and try to invite them, attract them. And maybe on our side we have also to make proposals clear—in a clearer way. What are the different segments of the economy, because—that’s one example. But we have many other examples in the economy that need today clear and forceful investments to pass the next stage. And that is the hospitality sector, these are infrastructures, again, transport, road, logistics, a cable of connectivity under the Black Sea, and everything that touches to the resorts—spa resorts, sport resorts, mountain resorts—which is a very—becoming very active. We’ve had a touristic boom the last two years. We have managed to keep these tourist attraction despite the restrictions imposed by Russia over the summer, which could have been dramatic for the touristic industry. But we have managed— VERSHBOW: You’re talking about the flight restrictions? ZOURABICHVILI: Yeah. VERSHBOW: Mmm hmm. ZOURABICHVILI: We have managed. We had alternative tourist influx in the country. We are very resilient, in fact. VERSHBOW: Definitely, that’s the case. (Laughter.) There’s another question here in the front, Peter. Q: Peter Pettibone. I want to follow up on that question, and ask whether you have any contact with China, particularly with regard to the Road and Belt Initiative. ZOURABICHVILI: We are in contact. Not that we are an active partner, but they are also promoting the Road and Belt Initiative in Georgia, as anywhere else, because we’re part of the direction and transport. Of course, it involves—it goes to China, because we have the particularity also of having the free trade agreement with European Union, a free trade agreement with China, and a free trade agreement that is in the process of being concluded with India. So we think that we can be and play an important role as a hub between these markets. And not only direct investment in Georgia, but just having companies that use Georgia as a hub for playing on their sides. VERSHBOW: Any chance of a free trade agreement with the United States? And are you asking for anything to help the U.S. to be more engaged in the economy? ZOURABICHVILI: I think they would welcome that. VERSHBOW: OK. ZOURABICHVILI: I can’t say more. VERSHBOW: OK. (Laughs.) Third row, here. Q: Lucy Komisar. I am a journalist. On the issue of NATO and whether Georgia should—could, should—become a member, are you concerned that bringing NATO right up to the border of Russia would be a provocation that would hurt the possibility of ultimately having better relations with the country, rather than put Georgia on a path to getting better relations? ZOURABICHVILI: I don’t think that we have ever been directed and influenced by any form of threats. So these are threats that are recurrent in the Russian declaration, that it might—just recently they have said that they will not prevent us by war to enter NATO, but that it would degrade our relations. Well, they are quite degraded. So we’ll see. And I remember a time when I was negotiating the withdrawal of military bases with Minister Lavrov, and his position at that time that he expressed very clearly was: You can choose any of the alliances that you want. What we need to have is a clear assurance that it’s not directed against us. So I think that we can play in this. And we certainly should not be deterred in our decision and in what is in the interest of the country by what might happen. VERSHBOW: Just a minor fact. During the Cold War the Soviet Union was on NATO’s border. Turkey and Georgia was the NATO-Soviet Union border. So it wouldn’t be an entirely new thing. ZOURABICHVILI: That’s right. (Laughter.) VERSHBOW: Here, the second row. Wait for the microphone, please. Q: Thank you very much. I’m Lee Cullum. I’m a journalist also. Madam President, thank you so much for taking time to be here this morning. It’s really heartening to hear a leader as serious and thoughtful as you are. You are interested in the EU, of course. And I wonder, you’ve been in France a long time, what do you see ahead for the EU? It’s been swimming in sea of troubles. Will it be able to regain its equilibrium and its momentum? ZOURABICHVILI: Well, I’m looking at the EU on both sides, as an old EU—(laughs)—member, and from the Georgian perspective. So that gives me two varied perspective of the EU. From my former place where I was and I worked for a long time, in fact I was teaching also EU foreign policy to students in France. What one of the conclusions I have is that EU has never progressed without crisis. All the progressions of its policies, whether it was in the security field or in the institutional field, were always provoked by major crises, whether it was Yugoslavia conflict or other forms. So what I think that Brexit is going to do is going to force an institution that has a very difficult time to find a new energy in itself, it’s going to force it to reform itself, and to find new directions, and a new dynamism, and new leaders, which they really need. And for us, looking from outside, I think that we’re very useful for the European Union. They cannot do without countries like us because, first of all, we are the ones carrying the last bits of enthusiasm for the European Union. So they badly need that. (Laughter.) And also, we are having ideas of more flexibility, of things that you can do outside of these very strict formats that you are a member or you are not a member, and what you get when you’re a member, and how many votes, and what type of majority. They have to get out of this very complex, but internal—inward-looking situation, and start looking outside at the world. And when they doubt about what they are going to become, and I was presenting a speech to a wide audience of European businessmen a few weeks ago. And I was telling them that when you doubt—the day when you doubt, you just close your eyes and try to imagine what would be the world if Europe did not exist. And I think that it’s frightening. (Laughs.) So I’m optimistic, on all grounds. (Laughter.) VERSHBOW: I recall when I was at NATO our commanders always said that Georgia was perhaps punching above its weight, far more than some of the existing allies. Indeed, and they of course bore heavy burdens by being the largest per-capita contributor to our operations in Afghanistan, something not fully appreciated. Person there in the third row. Q: David Handelman from CNN Opinion. Madam President, welcome and thank you for your remarkable career. I’m interested in the current atmosphere in Washington and how that might affect the United States’ ability to—or, willingness to react sufficiently if the Russians do expand their provocations against Georgia. And if they take advantage of this atmosphere to do so, how do you feel about that? Are you concerned about that, the atmosphere in Washington today? ZOURABICHVILI: First of all, you should tell me about the atmosphere in Washington. (Laughter.) I am ready to listen. The only thing I can say, is that in some ways that’s a tendency that has started a few years ago. The U.S. is becoming Georgian in the fact that it’s becoming polarized. And of course, it’s a concern when you’re a major partner. But there is one thing for us which is very positive, is that Georgia has always been outside of the party politics in the United States and has been a common project for both Democrats and Republicans. And I think that we cannot affect what’s happening in Washington. But what we have to keep and to strive for is to remain an issue and a policy that is not dependent on the internal political situation in Washington. VERSHBOW: Back row. Q: Thank you, Madam President. Steve Hellmann. Do you have any advice for Ukraine? ZOURABICHVILI: I would refrain. But I have very good relations with President Zelensky. I have an advice, in fact. And I’ve been proposing, and we are probably going to do it, is what I described as our policy toward the European Union and our program of demands. We are ready to share. And I think it will be useful for Georgia and Ukraine together to go to Brussels quite early on, when the new commission comes in, and present a common front on those issues that we want to be defended. And I think that there is a positive position towards that in Kyiv. VERSHBOW: Question right here, second row. Q: Matthew Hurlock. I’m a lawyer.  I don’t want this question to be too stupid, but what is your—what is, in fact, your perception of what Putin and Russia want to do to Georgia now? I mean, I understand the constant threat so you never forget them, but reabsorbing it would be—I mean, what do you think they actually want to accomplish now, and how does that inform your interactions with them? ZOURABICHVILI: Well, that’s the big difficulty, that really there is no clue about what they want. One thing that one can think is that it’s to prevent the integration to NATO and the European Union. But it’s not working. The idea that Russia could really occupy the whole sort of—is out of the realm of reality, because they know very well they have the experience elsewhere that this would provoke an armed fight that would end nobody knows when. That’s not something that is acceptable for the Georgian citizens and will never be. So it might be a protracted, terrible—and I don’t see that the Russians have this strategy. Thirdly, I don’t think the Russians have a strategy at all. I think that’s my personal analysis and view. I think that large countries and former empires do not have strategies because they always think that force is enough. So they don’t have to—we need strategies. When I’m talking about EU, I need a very clear strategy, and we have to work it out, because we are a small country, we have many neighbors around, and we need to be very clear how to play. And that’s what Georgia has been doing for twenty-seven centuries. And if I’m an optimist, it’s because Georgia has managed through invasions and wars to come to this day by being—while being a small country where everybody wanted to come in and stay. So we need a strategy. But those immense, in the case of Russia, empires or former empires do not need a strategy. So I think it’s an inertia. And for instance, if we—one looks at the 2008 war, that was very clear that Russia didn’t have a strategy. They did it. And in fact, that’s why I think that Sarkozy was very useful. Of course, he didn’t solve the issue, but he was exactly at the right time in the right place to allow Russia to stop. If it hadn’t been a kind of face-saving ceasefire agreement, there was no way that either Putin or Medvedev, and at that time they were the two heads, that either of them would have old the military stop, even if they didn’t intend to walk into Tbilisi and occupy the whole country they would have continued, because it’s like an inertia that moves forward. So it’s very difficult, looking at that in this way, to try to analyze what is it that they really want. Q: (Off mic.) ZOURABICHVILI: Yeah. And I’m strong, I have military might, so I can do anything I want. And if today I decide to do it, I can do it. So it’s very unpredictable at the same time. VERSHBOW: The danger is that the status quo is probably satisfactory for Putin. He doesn’t want to solve these conflicts. He doesn’t want to escalate either. But keeping these companies sort of off-balance, under constant pressure, suits his interests. And he’s not feeling enough pressure from the West to do otherwise. Any other questions? Yes, back here. Q: Good morning, Madam President. Thank you for being with us. I’m Chloe Demrovsky, president and CEO of Disaster Recovery Institute International. My question is a bit different. Georgia has made significant cultural contributions, not the least of which are culinary. And of course, Georgian wine. ZOURABICHVILI: Please come. (Laughter.) Q: So I was curious if you have any soft power strategies for creating rapprochement with your country or to build alliances. Thank you. ZOURABICHVILI: We didn’t have a soft power strategy, but we’ve discovered that we had won without knowing it. VERSHBOW: Cuisine. (Laughs.) ZOURABICHVILI: Cuisine, wine, landscapes, hospitality of the Georgians, and their immense tolerance. The one example that I like to use is that last year we had one million five hundred thousand Russian tourists in the country. And there was not a single incident happened that was recorded or anything. And I think that somewhere this restriction of flights that was imposed this year was maybe a reaction to the soft power, because all these Russians go back to the country very happy of their stay in Georgia. And in fact, when the restrictions on flights were announced by Putin this summer, there were quite a lot of negative reactions in the Russian social media and press. Saying, well, we want to go to Georgia. We have made our reservations and we want to go. So maybe we have a soft power. We certainly have a soft power towards the other countries, because it’s something that is very—that I’m discovering when traveling, visiting on official visits and having—everybody’s ready to come to Georgia. And I’m sure that you all are, that we’re waiting for you. So that is very important to bring investors to make aware of what is really Georgia. For the Europeans, they arrive, and they discover that Georgia is really a European country, which they theoretically maybe imagine, but they imagine more than it’s more an Asian, oriental country. I’m all the time asked: Isn’t it an exception, and isn’t it difficult to be a woman president in Georgia? Well, no, because we are European, and because it has been a tradition in Georgia to have women very powerful. And so it’s not something. But you don’t know that unless you come to the country and visit it. So, yes, this is a very strong. And I think we have to strategize it more. VERSHBOW: And if you haven’t visited Georgia, you should. But otherwise, come to Washington. We’re way ahead of New York on Georgian restaurants and availability of Georgian wine. Yes, question. Q: Madam President, I’m Kevin Sheehan with Multiplier Capital, and investment firm, but formerly with State and Defense. And I wanted to ask you a question about the historical legacy of Mr. Shevardnadze. How is he viewed by Georgia today? And what was his—what is his legacy? ZOURABICHVILI: Well, I think that he, as everything in Georgia, there are always two visions. And it’s very radically different. And that’s why I said we are a vivid Democratic society. Any subject, whatever you start, is going to be the matter for very heated discussion. But all in all, I think that it’s recognized today, with time going by, that he was the one to start Georgia on the path towards EU and NATO. He made the very strategic—he had the strategic vision that was not evident at that time. And that was probably his major input into the modern Georgia. Starting very early, having these very close contacts with German leaders, American leaders, was what really helped to move the Georgia on that direction. And then it was confronted—I think all the Georgian presidents at different times had their very clear input, even if there is a very divisive view about them politically—internal politically. Saakashvili, undoubtably, started Georgia on the path of reforms, consolidated the EU-Atlantic, but the path of reforms, internal reforms, was extremely important. VERSHBOW: Just a couple more minutes. Any other questions? Can I ask one last question? What’s your evaluation of how things are changing in Armenia, one of your other neighbors? ZOURABICHVILI: Positively. VERSHBOW: Do you think that’s going to be irreversible in terms of genuine democratization? Or more of a nonaligned foreign policy? ZOURABICHVILI: It’s always difficult to—I think that—at least their intention today is very clearly to move towards the EU and to take advantage of our experience and try to reproduce that. I think that they really want to take some distance with Moscow, although they have to do it in a—in a careful way. The concern is on the other side, is that their positions on the Karabakh conflict are a bit radical in certain ways, and how that can be managed together with the paths that they are taking is a question that I ask myself. I don’t know. VERSHBOW: OK. But follow Georgia’s example as a role model. Well, thank you very much, Madam President. Let’s give a round of applause of President Zourabichvili. (Applause.) (END)
  • Women and Women's Rights
    Women This Week: Gender Progress in Georgia
    Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post, covering November 29 to December 5, was compiled with support from Rebecca Turkington and Ao Yin.
  • Georgia
    Renewed Confrontation in Georgia
    Introduction Although the likelihood of a full-blown war between Russia and Georgia is low, one cannot rule out renewed confrontation between the two countries in the next twelve to eighteen months. Since Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia, tensions have periodically resurfaced over the disputed area of South Ossetia; Russia has never fulfilled its obligations under the Six-Point Cease-Fire Agreement (also known as the Sarkozy Plan) that ended the fighting. It has granted citizenship to South Ossetians and moved territorial markers in Russia's favor, all of which Georgians describe as creeping annexation. Russian trade cutoffs and interference with the oil pipeline that runs through Georgia, as well as alleged cyberattacks, have been other sources of friction. The current Georgian government has sought to improve relations with Moscow, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his 2015 end-of-year press conference, indicated an interest in restoring normal ties between the two countries. But upcoming events, such as the July 2016 Warsaw North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit and Georgian parliamentary elections later in the fall, could trigger renewed tensions and even a military crisis. Depending on how Georgia's status as a prospective member is handled at the NATO summit, the Kremlin could decide to ramp up pressure against Tbilisi. Should the United National Movement (UNM) party of former President Mikhail Saakashvili, whom Putin loathes, look poised to win parliamentary elections, Russia might intervene to prevent or respond to such an outcome. With U.S.-Russia relations already at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, renewed confrontation between Russia and Georgia would make matters considerably worse. The reset policy of the Obama administration in early 2009 essentially closed the short chapter on Russia's invasion of Georgia months before. That was before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, starting in late February 2014, and Russian military action in Syria starting last fall. That backdrop has produced a level of Western frustration, distrust, and suspicion toward Moscow unprecedented in the post–Cold War period; in fact, some leaders in both Russia and the United States talk about a new Cold War. Renewed conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2016 would likely trigger more sanctions against Moscow and a U.S. and European bolstering of Russia's NATO and non-NATO neighbors. Such a development would also be much more difficult for a new American administration to ignore and would have wider implications on what is left of U.S.-Russian and Russian-European relations; it could lead to an extended chill in relations, bordering on a Cold War atmosphere. Thus, the United States has a strong interest in helping to prevent the situation between Russia and Georgia from deteriorating further and aggravating an already difficult U.S.-Russia relationship. The Contingencies Renewed confrontation between Georgia and Russia could arise in several ways and manifest itself, much like in 2008, with the mobilization and deployment of armed forces by each side against one another, potentially violent clashes that result in the loss of life and the displacement of large numbers of civilians, as well as other dangerous interactions short of sustained combat operations. Three scenarios in particular deserve attention: Escalation from Russian assertiveness. In this contingency, Russia would act out of a sense of confidence that it can get away with renewed aggression against Georgia without incurring a serious response from the West, much as it did in 2008. The Kremlin could decide to wield a variety of political, economic, and even military tools with the goal of sowing discord within NATO and discrediting U.S. and Western commitments to countries in Eurasia, while also keeping Georgia within its sphere of influence. This scenario might include additional efforts to move farther the demarcation lines between South Ossetia and Georgia proper, accelerating the "passportization" of residents in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and announcing the territories' formal annexation into the Russian Federation, as has occurred with the Crimean region of Ukraine. Russia could feel emboldened if NATO demonstrates little interest in Georgia at its summit in Warsaw, just as Georgia's failure in 2008 to secure a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), seen as the stepping-stone to eventual alliance membership, may have opened the way for the Russian invasion that followed four months later. Perversely, a decision by Georgia not to request a MAP in Warsaw in 2016—avoiding the possibility of a second rejection—risks being interpreted by Moscow as a green light to do what it wants with Georgia once again. As then Georgian Foreign Minister and now newly appointed Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili said, "Keeping Georgia out of a membership action plan only encourages our northern neighbor to be much more decisive in its steps. Suspension of the issue creates problems; it does not solve the problems." Escalation from Russian defensiveness. In this scenario, a Kremlin feeling besieged on the domestic and/or foreign policy fronts might want to distract the attention of the Russian population by moving against its Caucasus neighbor. Accordingly, acting out of a sense of defensiveness, the Kremlin could seek to deny Georgia the possibility of moving closer to the West, NATO, and the European Union (EU); to increase the likelihood of a desired outcome to the parliamentary elections; and to divert the focus from domestic difficulties in Russia. Thus, in anticipation of NATO's offering Georgia the prospect of closer ties (even if such anticipation is based on a misreading of alliance intentions), Moscow could take preemptive action to undermine alliance unanimity. This could involve taking action in Abkhazia or South Ossetia to demonstrate to the West that Georgia is not in full control of its territory––ordinarily a basic prerequisite to NATO membership. It could also entail other demonstrations of Russian power, including hybrid warfare tactics, to unnerve NATO members and convince them that Georgia is not realistically defensible. In this second scenario, Russia may anticipate a defeat in the fall 2016 elections of the Georgian Dream party (GD; the party currently in power), which it prefers over the UNM (Saakashvili's party). In response, Moscow may look to tip the scale—through heightened economic pressure or military buildup along the border—in favor of the GD to prevent the return to power of a party perceived to be less friendly to Russia. Finally, even with public opinion surveys supposedly showing Putin with high levels of support, a precipitous drop in his approval rating cannot be ruled out if, for example, Russia's economy crashes or its military suffers serious setbacks in Ukraine and/or Syria. These possibilities would leave Putin looking for new distractions to deflect the attention of the Russian population and Georgia could well become that distraction. Should there be terrorist attacks on Russian soil as a result of Putin's actions in Syria, there is also the possibility that Georgia could be blamed for allowing extremists to transit through the Pankisi Gorge. Tensions over the gorge peaked more than a decade ago when Russia accused the former Georgian government of allowing Chechen fighters to travel through the area. Outside mediation was required to calm tensions. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in his January 26, 2016, press conference made ominous statements about terrorist threats emanating from there, specifically that the self-proclaimed Islamic State is using the gorge for "training, recreation, and replenishment of supplies." Georgian officials immediately rejected Lavrov's claim. Escalation due to actionsinadvertent or notof local actors. It remains possible that local authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia could take actions designed to deepen relations with Moscow, and even push for secession from Georgia. South Ossetian leader Leonid Tibilov has proposed holding a referendum on whether the Georgian breakaway territory should join Russia; this follows an "alliance and integration treaty" signed by Tibilov and Putin in March 2015. A "treaty" also exists between Russia and Abkhazia, the other unrecognized breakaway region, though there is a greater sense of separate identity among Abkhazians and less support for annexation by Russia. Indeed, South Ossetia remains a bigger concern than Abkhazia, as it is much more dependent on Russia for its survival. The degree of control Moscow has over Tibilov and others is significant; however, leaders in South Ossetia might also risk actions on their own, thinking that Moscow will have no choice but to come to their aid as they did in 2008. The possibility that Georgian authorities would launch provocations against Russia can be ruled out; Tbilisi has zero interest in stirring the pot with Moscow. Map of Georgia, Showing South Ossetia and Abkhazia Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Warning Indicators Several warning signs could suggest that the risk of renewed confrontation in Georgia is growing. Some apply to all three scenarios outlined above—notably an increasing rhetorical focus on Georgia from the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the movement of military forces to the region, increasing cyberattacks, and various forms of economic interference—whereas other indicators reflect more specific motivations. Moscow's messaging toward the NATO summit, in particular, should be carefully scrutinized for what it may reveal of Russia's intentions. The same is also true of its posture toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia, regardless of whether it accelerates efforts to change their statuses. Efforts to use Georgia to distract the Russian public from domestic difficulties could be presaged, for example, by talk in Moscow that NATO is about to expand to include Georgia, even though such an invitation is not in the offing. Other signs to look for in this case would be deployment of Russian ships in the Black Sea, buildup of troops along the border, and fabricated calls from South Ossetia (and, less likely, Abkhazia) to protect it from NATO's "hostile invasion." In addition, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's comments regarding the Pankisi Gorge should not be dismissed out of hand. An eye should be kept on separatist leaders, who may call for Russian assistance or provoke Georgian leaders, forcing Moscow's hand. An increasingly chaotic scene domestically in Georgia, including rising tensions between the UNM and GD parties, wide-scale arrests of protestors and/or more opposition leaders, and a further media crackdown could trigger Moscow to go into Georgia to "preserve order and stability" and to protect ethnic Russians or Russian speakers, which were reasons cited for the move into Crimea. Implications for U.S. Interests Renewed confrontation between Russia and Georgia would badly damage already frayed relations between Moscow and Washington. It would further reduce the already limited prospects of cooperation on a range of international issues including nonproliferation and counterterrorism, as well as various diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East and elsewhere. It could unleash a new round of American and European sanctions against Moscow and trigger movement of U.S. and NATO naval forces into the Black Sea region (as was done in 2008) as a deterrent against further aggression, and with that a spike in tensions between Russia and the West. It would also lead to further efforts to bolster NATO allies in Europe that in turn could lead to a hardening of a new adversarial relationship between NATO and Russia. Depending on how Washington responded to a new Georgian crisis, the credibility of U.S. commitments to maintaining peace and security in Europe could be either enhanced or harmed. Although Georgia is not a treaty ally of the United States, NATO members are still likely to measure Washington's commitment to their security by how it reacts to potential Russian assertiveness and aggression regardless of where it occurs in Europe. U.S. policy toward Georgia could be either reassuring to its allies or generate great uncertainty as to Washington's larger intentions. Non-NATO countries with Euro-Atlantic aspirations could likewise be encouraged or disheartened by U.S. actions. A major crisis in Georgia could also harm U.S.-Georgia relations. Georgia has been a major recipient of U.S. bilateral assistance; since 1991, it has received more than $3 billion in aid—much of it coming after Russia's invasion in 2008—to support the consolidation of Georgia's democracy and free-market economy, as well as its eventual integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. While a crisis between Russia and Georgia would have little economic impact on the United States—though it could disrupt the flow of energy transiting through Georgia from Azerbaijan—it would do serious, destabilizing harm to Georgia's economy. Georgia imports roughly 90 percent of its gas needs from Azerbaijan and has greatly reduced its dependency on Russia for energy over the past decade, although it has renewed talks with Gazprom in late 2015 about additional gas supplies. U.S.-Georgia relations have gone through considerable change over the past decade. Even the close relationship that existed between U.S. President George W. Bush and President Saakashvili did not prevent war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, and the United States under President Barack Obama has kept a much greater distance. This remained the case even after Saakashvili's party lost the parliamentary elections in 2012, and he was forced to step down as president in 2013 due to term limits; he left the country shortly thereafter and is now serving as governor of Odessa in Ukraine. President Obama has not spoken with nor met Saakashvili's successor, President Giorgi Margvelashvili, since the latter's election more than two years ago, although U.S. Vice President Joe Biden has. In addition, European countries have shown little interest in matters involving Georgia beyond the signing of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and Association Agreement in June 2014 and a visa liberalization agreement currently under discussion. In January 2009, the United States and Georgia signed the Charter on Strategic Partnership. The fifth meeting under the charter occurred in November 2015, chaired by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and former Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili. Georgia has been a major contributor to international operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, contributing the second-largest number of troops, after the United States, to NATO's mission in Afghanistan, with close to nine hundred soldiers still stationed there. Georgians arguably are the most pro-American and pro-Western population in the region, but if they perceive the United States as doing little to fend off Russian aggression, their attitudes could sour toward the West, a sentiment that could be repeated elsewhere in the region. Finally, further violations of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity would undermine international norms and the post–Cold War order in Europe and jeopardize the vision of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has already caused massive harm to this vision, but renewed confrontation between Russia and Georgia would further threaten stability in the Eurasia region, as well as create openings for illicit activity, organized crime, smuggling, and extremist forces. Preventive Options Given the implications for U.S. interests should there be renewed confrontation, the United States has strong interests in preventing such a flare-up, as do European allies, with whom the United States should work closely. Several steps, some of which are mutually exclusive, could be taken to avoid conflict: Reduce explicit/implicit U.S. commitments to Georgia so as to lower the risk of being dragged into a conflict with Russia. This option could reduce the possibility of Moscow's misreading of U.S. intentions and perceived provocations. The downsides of this approach are that it could embolden Russia to exploit what it perceives as weakness on the part of the West, alarm allies that the United States is disengaging from Europe, and create a sense in Georgia that it is being abandoned. Clearly and consistently demonstrate U.S. support for Georgia at the highest levels. This could happen through visits to Georgia by President Obama (after the Warsaw NATO summit, for example), Vice President Biden, and other senior U.S. officials to send a strong signal of support, while encouraging European counterparts to take similar steps. The cons to this approach are that it could be read in Moscow as provocative and a direct affront to Russia's sphere of interests. State clearly that the door to NATO remains open and that not offering a MAP does not mean backing off from the 2008 Bucharest NATO Communique, which stated that Ukraine and Georgia would become members. Under this option, the United States would explain to Moscow that Georgia's aspirations to deepen ties with NATO and the EU are not a threat to Russia, though Putin's zero-sum thinking reduces the odds that such an approach would be effective. Moreover, Russia may view this as provocative and take action to underscore Georgia's indefensibility, weakening Georgia's prospects for ever joining the alliance. Ramp up diplomatic involvement with both Tbilisi and Moscow with the goal of reducing irritants and tensions in Georgia-Russia relations. This can be pursued bilaterally and multilaterally through confidence-building measures, using institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This approach would be using existing mechanisms, which have proven largely ineffective to date. Encourage greater trade and interaction between Georgia and Russia by urging the removal of Russian trade barriers. According to the Georgian Ministry of Economy, overall trade volume between the Republic of Georgia and the Russian Federation has been on the rise over the past several years, although the 2015 volume declined by almost 9 percent compared to the same period last year. Through the first nine months of 2015, total trade with Russia comprised $530.3 million, or 7.3 percent of Georgia's overall foreign trade. The challenge to encouraging greater trade between the two countries is that it heightens Georgian dependence on Russia when Putin has shown a willingness to use trade and energy as political weapons. Urge confidence-building measures among officials and civil society groups in Georgia and those in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A number of Abkhazians attended a soccer match in Tbilisi in 2015 without problems; building on such interactions could ameliorate Georgia-Abkhazia ties. Replicating that with South Ossetians would be harder to do, however, and that region is a likelier source of problems. Beef up the independence of Georgia's economic and financial institutions to avoid heavy Russian influence and support efforts to develop Georgia's energy potential. Given Russia's use of trade as a punitive measure against Georgia, it is important to maintain Georgia's relatively low economic dependence on Russia. Russia, however, could view a less economically and energy-dependent Georgia with a stronger economy as a break-away threat that should be reined in. Bolster deterrence of Russian opportunism and aggression through closer bilateral military ties under the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, to include U.S. military aid to Georgia for its territorial defense, a boost in security for the pipeline that runs through Georgian territory, and an increased focus on security for the Black Sea region. This could also include closer monitoring of the 2008 demarcation line through installation of cameras and use of drones. The risk in such an approach is that it could be perceived in Moscow as provocative and could spark a preemptive move on Russia's part. Work actively with leading Georgian figures to prevent internecine political battles and encourage all sides to abide by democratic principles, due process, and free elections. Georgia went through a peaceful transfer of power in 2012–2013, and that transition should be the model to follow. Mitigating Options Were Russia to invade or ramp up its intimidation of Georgia again, the United States has several mitigating options it could pursue, each of which should be closely coordinated with the EU: Principled protest but de facto acceptance of Russian actions to avoid escalation. This option could include sanctions similar to those imposed for Russia's invasion of Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea but no military response from the United States. The risk is that such a response could feed Russian ambitions, rather than satiate them. Consensual de-escalation through mediation efforts—either by the United States or through encouragement of the EU or United Nations or OSCE efforts—to bring about a cease-fire and seek to restore the situation to the status quo ante. The problem with this option is that much damage could be done in the time it takes to reach agreement on such mediation efforts. Coercive de-escalation that would include diplomatic, economic, and/or military threats to force Russia to back down. This could entail deployment of vessels to the Black Sea and the return to Georgia of any remaining Georgian soldiers stationed outside of the country on U.S. military aircraft. These steps were taken during the 2008 war and helped end the fighting. The risk with this option, of course, is a Russian escalation and a wider war. Combination of carrots and sticks that would encourage mediation by imposition of new sanctions specifically related to Georgia. China could be encouraged to use its influence with Russia and Georgia; after all, China is the third-largest foreign direct investor in Georgia and has decent ties with Moscow. China, however, may be reluctant to play such a role. Recommendations Some will argue that U.S.-Russia relations are too important—and already too strained—to add Georgia to the list of problems. The United States needs Russia to help resolve the crisis in Syria, and Georgia should not come in the way of those efforts. Moreover, they will claim, there is little the United States can do if Moscow decides to move militarily into or against Georgia. But Russia's failure to fulfill its commitments under the Minsk cease-fire deal on Ukraine and its indiscriminate bombing of forces opposed to Bashar al-Assad in Syria that have been driving the flow of refugees into Europe belie arguments that Moscow can be helpful elsewhere. Furthermore, sacrificing Georgia's interests and aspirations, to say nothing of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in an effort to win over Russia on other issues, including Ukraine and Syria, has significant downsides and is likely to fail, given the persistent difficulty of working with Russia, even before Georgia were to be added to the equation. It is in U.S. interests, after all, to maintain strong support for Georgia, as well as other countries bordering Russia. Doing so will preserve their sovereignty and territorial integrity and support their efforts to develop into democratic, market-oriented societies more integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community. Putin exploits weakness and wavering; he understands and respects strength, and that is the face the United States should show. Renewed confrontation between Russia and Georgia in 2016, on top of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its military activities in Syria, likely would be met with a harsher reaction from both the Obama administration and an incoming American president. The overall atmosphere would be different—and worse—than it was in 2009 when the Obama administration offered a reset of relations with Moscow within months of Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia. As NATO members, the Baltic states benefit from Article 5 security guarantees in which an attack on one ally is considered an attack against all. However, Georgia, like other countries neighboring Russia but not yet members of either NATO or the EU, finds itself in a dangerous gray zone; it aspires to join NATO, and the alliance stated in 2008 that it would become a member, but in this intervening period, it has no Article 5 security guarantees while it also resists Russian pressure to join any Moscow-led coalition. It remains prone to the unpredictability of Putin and faces Russian threats of various forms without having the assurance through Article 5 guarantees that other countries will come to its rescue should confrontation resume. As with Ukraine, which NATO also stated would become a member, Georgia finds itself initially even more vulnerable to Russian pressure and aggression. And yet the United States and its NATO allies cannot remain indifferent to those aspiring countries that do not yet have Article 5 guarantees; doing so would consign them to a Russian sphere of interest and grant Moscow a de facto veto. Thus, to mitigate the risks and prevent a renewed outbreak in hostilities between Russia and Georgia, the United States should pursue the following recommendations: Reinvigorate the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership by elevating U.S. participation above the deputy secretary of state level (as was done at the most recent meeting in November 2015). The United States needs to show more interest in and concern for Georgia at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Failure to do so could be read in Moscow as a sign that the United States is not paying attention and that Russia can get away with more aggressive behavior. Work with NATO to increase its presence in Georgia. NATO's opening of a training center in the summer of 2015 is a good step in this direction. The United States should also beef up military aid to Georgia, specifically for territorial defense to include anti-tank weapons. It should also boost Black Sea security for Georgia and other countries in the region, as well as security for pipelines that cross Georgia. Together with allies, the United States should push back on Russia's efforts to redraw the demarcation line, which Georgia describes as "creeping annexation." Together with allies, renew calls for full implementation of the 2008 Six-Point Cease-Fire Agreement including full Russian withdrawal of forces to pre–August 2008 positions. Russia's failure to comply with this agreement has left Georgia even more vulnerable to pressure from its larger neighbor. It also has set a bad precedent for Russia's compliance with the Minsk cease-fire agreement in Ukraine. At the NATO Warsaw Summit in June 2016, reiterate that the door to NATO remains wide open for countries that qualify and stress that territorial disputes should not exclude any country from candidacy (to do otherwise implies a Russian veto over Georgia's aspirations). The United States should push NATO to demonstrate progress toward living up to the commitment to Georgia (and Ukraine) in the 2008 NATO communique, leading ultimately to Georgian membership down the road, assuming Tbilisi fulfills all the criteria for becoming a member. Officials should also make clear that a MAP is not a necessary step for acquiring full membership. Make clear to Moscow that no country will recognize the annexation by Russia of South Ossetia and/or Abkhazia and reiterate that both are part of Georgia. Moscow needs to understand that any moves toward annexation would lead to new sanctions, including possible expulsion from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication banking system and more targeted sanctions against officials at the highest levels, including Putin himself. Support commercial efforts to develop the energy potential of Georgia to boost its economy and reinforce its independence from Russian energy imports. The United States should encourage greater trade and investment through use of its trade promotion agencies. Push the EU to make the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, signed in June 2014, a real free trade agreement by encouraging greater EU investment in and trade with Georgia. The United States could also open discussions on such an agreement between Tbilisi and Washington. Ensure that Georgia avoids dangerous political polarization and remains on the democratic path, especially with upcoming parliamentary elections. The United States should stress the importance of and target assistance toward ensuring a level playing field, ending the politicization of the judicial process, and supporting strong and independent media and a vibrant civil society. 
  • Georgia
    A Conversation With Giorgi Margvelashvili
    Play
    Giorgi Margvelashvili discusses tensions with Russia as well as Georgia’s relationship with NATO, the European Union, and the United States.
  • Georgia
    Georgia’s New Leader Looks West
    Billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, whose party won last week’s parliamentary elections in Georgia, will forge a foreign policy based on pragmatism, not ideology, says RFE/RL’s Elizabeth Fuller.
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    Delivering Tough Love to Ukraine, Georgia
    Veteran Eurasia expert Steven Pifer says Vice President Joseph Biden’s trip to Ukraine and Georgia was meant to balance President Barack Obama’s Moscow summit earlier in the month, but in both countries, Biden had to convey tough messages.
  • Ukraine
    NATO Foreign Ministers Unlikely to Push Georgia, Ukraine Membership
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  • Russia
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    Robert E. Hunter, a former U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, says Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili miscalculated by sending troops into South Ossetia in mid-August, but in the end, "Russia is the loser here."