Mali

Jacob Zenn, an analyst at the Jamestown Foundation, has written an important article, “Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention.” His central conclusion is that while Boko Haram originally emerged in northeastern Nigeria and was solely focused on domestic issues, it has come under the influence of the international jihad. As for Ansaru, he argues it broke off from Boko Haram and has from its conception been heavily influenced by outside Islamists. Zenn discusses differences and similarities between the two movements and concludes that their goals—an Islamist state—are much the same and that tactical and other cooperation between the two is likely, despite the split. The article is among other things an extensive compilation of relevant material from the Nigerian media and from Islamists websites. The content footnotes repay close reading, and in them Zenn often explains how he reached his conclusions, some of which are controversial. Sources for what is going on among Islamists in northern Nigeria are problematic. The Nigerian press is mostly southern based and frequently misunderstands northern developments. It may betray a general bias against the North. Islamist websites and Boko Haram and Ansaru videos have, of course, a particular political purpose. Travel by outside observers in the region is now very difficult, not least because of the upsurge in kidnapping that Zenn discusses. But, Nigeria observers must use what is available, no matter the limitations. Zenn’s article is an important contribution, even if his conclusions cannot be the final word.

This is a guest post by Kyle Benjamin Schneps; a dual master’s degree candidate at Columbia University specializing in international security policy and global health initiatives. He is currently completing a graduate internship with the Africa Studies program at Council on Foreign Relations. On March 27, 1996, Malian leaders and citizens from both the northern and southern regions of the country gathered in Timbuktu to burn publicly more than 3,000 small arms. The burned munitions had been voluntarily relinquished by northern Tuareg insurgents in a show of peace following five years of civil conflict with the newly democratic centralized government in Bamako. The ceremony, called the “Flame of Peace,” is commemorated to this day by a monument at the very site of the conflagration nearly two decades ago—yet the fundamental issues of Tuareg disaffection persist in today’s Mali crisis. The Tuareg rebellion of the 1990’s was a consequence of long authoritarian rule by France and subsequently by the post-independence Traoré dictatorship. Kare Lode, a Mali researcher, has interpreted the major grievances of the Tuareg at that time as (1) a lack of proper representation at high levels of government and military, (2) the absence of a policy of decentralization in support of local Tuareg business and customs, (3) a lack of Tuareg civil servants, and (4) the extensive, and often oppressive, Malian army presence in northern territories. These same issues remain fundamental to Tuareg insurgent activity since March 2012. However, unlike the rebellion of the 1990s, the issues that face Malian reconciliation today are further complicated by the flourishing of Islamic extremism and transnational organized crime in the region. In applying lessons learned from the 1990s, Peter J. Schraeder of Loyola University believes that Mali will only be able to retain a meaningful and lasting democratic peace by dealing with Tuareg grievances through “traditional conflict medicine,” a term coined by Africanists referring to precolonial mediation practices. Such mediation strategies include the understanding and promotion of economic interdependence among sedentary and nomadic populations, the use of representative intermediaries, and the strengthening of ethnic alliances through marital ties or third party mediation. Such traditional mediation tactics might be instrumental in forging a meaningful peace in Mali’s current crisis. But it is important to remember the role of the United Nations in helping to end the 1990s Tuareg rebellion. The UN demonstrated its leadership by establishing a Trust Fund which served as a demobilization and disarmament piggy bank, paying around U.S. $200 for each relinquished weapon (some of which were later burned at the Flame of Peace ceremony) and around $700 to each combatant willing to reintegrate peacefully into society. A cash infusion might be a relatively small price to pay for peace, and it might kick-start a reconciliation process such as Professor Schraeder proposes.

Reuters is reporting the claim by pro-autonomy Tuareg MNLA rebels that they have seized Mohamed Moussa Ag Mohamed, who imposed harsh Islamist rule on Timbuktu, and Oumeini Ould Baba Akmed, a kidnapper associated with the alleged al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) splinter group MUJWA. An MNLA spokesman says that the two Islamist leaders have been sent to Kidal, but it is not clear what force has custody of them. After the recovery of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal, the MNLA appears to be reasserting its leadership in northern Mali, and distancing themselves from the radical Islamists, by emphasizing their demand for autonomy or independence. MNLA says it is willing hunt down Islamists and has offered peace talks with Bamako. Some military officers rejected this offer out of hand, citing claims of rebels executing soldiers. An MNLA spokesman, Ibrahim Ag Assaleh, in turn criticized Bamako’s interim president Dioncounda Traore’s proposal to hold elections on July 31 unless an agreement between north and south is reached first. MNLA’s latest moves highlight the fragility of the Islamist coalition that controlled northern Mali for nine months. Following Captain Amadou Sanogo’s successful military coup against the Bamako government in March 2012, MNLA led the establishment of the independent state of Azawad in northern Mali. However, in a devil’s bargain, MNLA allied itself with radical Islamists groups, including Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJWA to drive out Bamako’s army. Under circumstances that remain obscure, the radicals then displaced MNLA and proceeded to impose its harsh Islamist regime, apparently with MNLA’s acquiescence or approval. While this inherently unstable coalition ruled northern Mali, relations between the radical Islamists and MNLA were obscure to outside observers, but they likely remained fluid and influenced by local factors, including rivalry for control of smuggling routes. Now, however, that the Islamists are on the run, MNLA has turned on them and returned to its initial goal of autonomy, if not independence, for northern Mali. This opens up the possibility for talks with Bamako and even the potential for a viable political settlement. But, that will require a credible response by Bamako to this latest MNLA initiative.

There has been press speculation that the United States is going to establish a drone base in Niger. They claim that the drones would initially be for surveillance, but they could later be armed. A drone base in Niger would represent a significant shift in the Obama administration’s policy toward the region, which has previously emphasized partnerships with African governments and military training over the presence of U.S. facilities or troops on the ground. Is there reality behind the headlines? Niger’s president Mahamadou Issoufou says he wants a closer security relationship with the United States. To that end, the United States and Niger signed a status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) on January 28, 2013. Such an agreement is a legal and technical document, and a common first step to a closer security relationship. Among other things it grants immunity from domestic laws to U.S. military personnel stationed in the country. Such an agreement is necessary were the larger military presence required by drones to be established at a later date. But a SOFA–in and of itself–does not necessarily imply that drones will be stationed there or even that the U.S. military presence will increase.  The U.S. has SOFAs with twenty-two countries in sub-Saharan Africa. A drone base would require a significant number of support personnel, active-duty military, contract, or both.  The spokeswoman for the U.S. Department of State has reiterated that there are no plans to commit U.S. troops to Mali: she is quoted as saying, “the U.S. military is not going to be engaged in combat operations in Mali, and we don’t expect U.S. forces to become directly involved on the ground in combat either.” It is true that a drone base in Niger would not constitute U.S. “boots on the ground” in Mali.  But, it certainly would be close–and the distinction between the U.S. military in Niger focused on Mali rather than in Mali itself would be largely lost by most West Africans—and on most Americans. This SOFA was on the table for over a year before the French intervention into Mali, and should not immediately be considered a result of the current crisis.

The confluence of a radical Islamist push toward the south in Mali, the consequent French intervention, a raid on a natural gas facility near In Amenas, Algeria, and Secretary Clinton’s congressional testimony on Benghazi on January 23, are generating the largely unexamined view that the war on terrorism with an al-Qaeda focus is underway in the Sahel-Sahara region of West Africa. The attack on In Amenas and the resulting tragic loss of life has particularly focused international attention. Scott Stewart in Security Weekly wrote a sober piece that places In Amenas in context. Far from being new, he argues that Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s goals, tactics, and the size of his force are similar to what he has done in the past. And it has little to do with al-Qaeda or the War on Terror, and a great deal with maximizing ransoms. His description and analysis of the attack itself and the Algerian response is fascinating. He also points out–as have a few other commentators–that Belmokhtar broke with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb more than a year ago. I find it hard to fault his conclusion: “militancy and banditry were fixtures in the Sahel well before the jihadist ideology entered the region. [Belmokhtar’s] history–combined with the vacuum of authority in the region brought on by the Malian coup and the overthrow of Gaddafi, the prospect of millions of dollars in ransom, and the large quantities of available weapons—means we will see more kidnappings and other attacks in the years to come.” But, this is far from “the War on Terror.”

I blogged previously that the Islamist occupation in northern Mali is inherently unstable. It includes Tuaregs as well as “Arabs,” who regard themselves as “white,” ruling over a population most of which it regards as “black.” Political maneuverings among those calling the shots amounts to little more than warlordism or competition among criminal syndicates dressed up in Islamic rhetoric. If there was a credible government in Bamako, there is a chance the northern coalition would collapse under its own weight. There are now signs this may be happening. The BBC and Reuters are reporting that Ansar Dine, one of the three Islamist groups holding the north, has split. The secessionists, who are calling themselves the “Islamic Movement for Azawad" (MIA), reject “all forms of extremism and terrorism.” They want negotiations with Bamako, which will lead to a comprehensive political settlement that includes autonomy for the north; not independence. The leader of the MIA, Alghabass Ag Intallah, was involved in negotiations with Bamako even before the Islamic takeover of northern Mali in April 2012. He is quoted by the BBC as saying, “We are a group of people from the north of Mali who have a set of grievances that date back at least fifty years.” He said some Tuaregs from MNLA, the initial organizer of Azawad, have also joined him. Alghabass Ag Intallah denies that his movement has any ties with AQIM or MUJAO, the two most radical Islamist movements in northern Mali. He was at pains to emphasize that MIA is made up entirely of “Malians,” thereby separating his group from the “Arabs” and “Algerians” in the two more radical movements. He wants a cease fire with the French and Bamako within the territory he controls around the city of Kidal. He also said he had been in touch with mediators in Burkina Faso and Algeria. As if to underscore the racial and ethnic dimensions of the Mali crisis, the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues reports the Malian army executing dozens of people, including Tuaregs, in the towns they are “liberating.” It remains to be seen how many fighters Alghabass Ag Intallah will bring with him from Ansar Dine. Nevertheless, this appears to be a positive development.

High profile, violent killings have taken place in northern Nigeria at the same time as the French intervention in Mali. On January 19, the emir of Kano barely survived an assassination attempt that wounded two of his sons, and killed four others. On the same day, a Nigeria army spokesman said that Boko Haram killed two Nigerian soldiers being deployed to Mali, and wounded five others, with a roadside improvised explosive device (IED). On January 21, “unknown gunmen” killed eighteen hunters selling “bush meat” at a market near Maiduguri. January 22, “gunmen” on “motorcycles” killed five men and injured two others playing a table game in Kano. During the same time period, the BBC, citing local sources, reports that “suspected militant Islamists” beheaded five people in Maiduguri. And, finally, a large Nigerian newspaper, Vanguard, is reporting that the titular Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau has been wounded in a gun battle and is reportedly receiving medical attention somewhere in Mali. There should be caution about placing these incidents in a single framework, or linking them to events in Mali or Algeria. In most of the incidents cited above, no group has claimed responsibility. An exception is the killing of Nigerian soldiers being deployed to Mali. An Islamist group Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (JAMBS) claims responsibility. It is a Boko Haram splinter group, also referred to as Ansaru. The bush meat hunters may be guilty of selling meat that is haram–the eating of wild animals and especially monkeys is forbidden by certain strict forms of Islam. But, buried in the newspaper account of their murder is speculation that these hunters may also have been police informants. The card players may have been gambling; also haram. More details are needed about the alleged beheadings, which are rare in West Africa. But, so too was suicide bombing, now carried out in the North. As for the attempted assassination, the emir of Kano has become a controversial figure. He is a potential target from a number of different quarters. There appears to be a grass roots, diffuse revolt in the North with many different elements, though with a shared radical Islamic paradigm. Coordinate between them should not be expected, even if outsiders label their collective activities as “Boko Haram.”

This is a guest post by Jim Sanders, a career, now retired, West Africa watcher for various federal agencies. The views expressed below are his personal views and do not reflect those of his former employers. Op-ed writers love the word "burning."  It conveys a sense of urgency, giving their advocacy immediacy, which, they hope, will increase chances something will be done about the situations they write about. The Monday October 8th, Washington Post editorial, "Mali burning," fits the mold.  Conditions in that West African country are reported to be "more appalling by the day."  Prospects of "another unhinged, failed state" threatening the region are real. Elections, the resolution of ethnic grievances, security reform, and a U.N. special envoy are needed, the Post argues. A decade ago, an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal by Princeton Lyman, "Nigeria Burns for Islam," (November 27, 2002), sounded similar alarms.  The country risks becoming a source of terrorism, he warned.  Religion had become "a safe haven and a rallying cry for the disenfranchised, the impoverished, the displaced."  The country’s status as a "bulwark for stability throughout the West Africa region" hung in the balance.  Rejuvenated aid and diplomacy, security service reform, and economic development were therefore needed. Nigeria is a bulwark for regional stability no more, while Mali has been "chopped in half," as one observer put it.  In line with the centrality of U.S. interests reflected in these two op-eds, fears of terrorism drive the articles’ tone.  Obscured, arguably, is what the so-called "burning" at the bottom of all this, is about. In his recent analysis of the Brics, Financial Times columnist Gideon Rachman wrote that in these nations, (as well as emerging markets more generally, it could be said), "endemic corruption is eroding faith in their political systems," and "popular rage against corruption is central to [their] politics." With global growth forecast by the IMF seeing a decline in the immediate future, resulting economic stress is likely to worsen corruption in such countries, as elite competition sharpens.  Security reform, special envoys, elections, and diplomatic reaching-out have not stemmed the rising tide of popular rage over the lack of "good governance" and economic improvement. As long as the interests of "the disenfranchised, the impoverished, the displaced" take second place to the "national" interests of domestic elites and foreign powers, the “burning” looks set to continue.

Syria dominates the news cycle and is probably the principal preoccupation of foreign ministries, just as Libya previously was, and is once again following the murder of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens.  Yet UN agencies, especially the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program, have, with only limited success, repeatedly warned of the potential humanitarian catastrophe in the Sahel. On September 4, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres published a thoughtful analysis of the crisis in Mali in the New York Times.   It goes beyond a wake-up call. His central argument is that the current crisis in Mali and the Sahel is the result of an "intersection of trends," including food insecurity and desertification, "incomplete democratization…marked by  social exclusion," and rampant youth unemployment. He also places the current radical Islamic groups who control northern Mali in the context of a century of Taureg rebellions and a smuggling trade that ranges from narcotics to weapons. He cites the attraction marginalized and disaffected youth in the region have of Malian radical Islamic groups . The bleak statistics he cites are not surprising, but dire nonetheless:  eighteen million Sahelians affected by, or at risk of, food shortages; 266,000 Malian refugees–mostly in Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Algeria; and 174,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Mali. Guterres warns that the Mali crisis could morph into an "arc of instability" from Mauritania in the West to the Gulf of Aden in the East, with weak state authorities and active transnational criminals.   To forestall this, Guterres urges the international community to support those in the region working for a political settlement. The high commissioner’s warning is well placed. Once aroused  –admittedly often a slow process that is  influenced by the degree of media attention– the international community will write the necessary checks, the food will be delivered, and tent cities established.  Assisting in achieving an internal political settlement in Mali  will be much more difficult than meeting immediate humanitarian needs. For example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has tried to play a leading role in Mali.  But two of Mali’s closest neighbors, Mauritania and Algeria, are not ECOWAS members and are likely to be distinctly unenthusiastic about an ECOWAS military presence in territory adjacent to their borders.

One of the radical Islamic groups operating in northern Mali has announced the September 1 “execution” – read murder – of an Algerian diplomat captured in the city of Gao five months ago. The diplomat was vice consul Taher Touati. The Algerian government is seeking to verify the claim that he has been murdered. The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in Western Africa (MUJAO) claims the murder took place following the expiration of its ultimatum to the Algerian government seeking the release of an imprisoned al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militant. On the same day, MUJAO seized the town of Douentza that had been held by a “secular” militia tied to the more moderate National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. Douentza is on the paved road between Gao and Mopti and has an airfield. Initially, MUJAO, the better known radical Islamic group Ansar Dine, and the more secular National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad cooperated in driving out of northern Mali the Bamako military. Since then, however, Ansar Dine and MUJAO have pushed aside more moderate elements, and the MUJAO take-over of Douentza fits that pattern. So, too, does the apparently cold-blooded murder of an Algerian diplomat. MUJAO appears to be a split-off of AQIM, which has had its primary focus on overthrowing the Algiers government and has resorted to kidnapping for ransom and murder in the past. But, the nature of the relationship between Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM is unclear. At the very least, however, the three are separate organizations but appear to cooperate.

With so much attention to stonings, amputations, and the destruction of world heritage sites by radical Islamists in the north and the sometimes grotesque political ballet in Bamako, it is easy to lose sight of the dawning humanitarian nightmare of malnutrition, and internal displacement and refugees, all of which encourage disease.  As of the present, the international community is ill-prepared to cope. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 53,000 Malians have fled to Niger and 96,000 to Mauritania. UNHCR estimates that 174,000 Malians are internally displaced. The World Food Program (WFP) has enough food to feed 60,000 Malians until the end of September.  A WFP official estimates that 77,000 need food aid – other estimates are much higher. Malnutrition often combined with malaria is not new among children in the south. In 2011, before the present political crisis became so acute, a government survey found 150,000 acutely malnourished children.  Medicines sans Frontiers estimates that 30,000 of them were treated by aid agencies and the government.  Nobody seems to know what happened to the other 120,000. There is anecdotal evidence that the situation is much worse this year. In the north, malnutrition in the past was less prevalent because the diet was protein-rich among pastoralists:  meat, milk, and tea.  But, now pastoralists’ access to pasture is reduced, animals are dying, and cereal prices are high because of the pervasive drought and conflict. There are also estimates that rice production will be reduced by 20-30 percent this year. Aggravating the food and health crisis, many health workers fled and clinics closed with the coming of the Islamists. The international community must help.  But, according to the UN, the World Food Program has a 36 percent budget shortfall. The shortfall for UNHCR is 66 percent.   Overall, the funding shortfall for UN agencies working in Mali and the Sahel is about 58 percent. Yet, as a practical matter, it is these agencies often working closely with NGOs that are the means by which the international community responds to disaster. Governments need to open their wallets--now. Agencies need lead time to buy and stockpile food and medicine. And, for WFP at least, the food runs out in September.

In an expert brief on August 3 I suggested that Ansar Dine and other radical Islamists groups that have taken control of northern Mali have little popular support. Developments over the past few days illustrate that reality.  The New York Times reports the spontaneous formation of militias seeking to take back control of local areas from the Islamists.  At present they are unarmed, but in a country awash with weapons that may change. On August 5, a crowd in the northern Malian city of Gao prevented the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao), a radical Islamist group similar to the better known Ansar Dine, from amputating the hand of an alleged thief. The alleged thief was a member of Mujao and accused of stealing weapons to sell them.  Radio France Internationale reports a local resident as saying, “We don’t want to know what this young man did, but they are not going to cut his hand off in front of us.”  This reaction recalls the anger of a crowd that Ansar Dine forced to witness the stoning to death of an unmarried couple. Lack of popular support may feed Islamists’ viciousness.  The Islamist-appointed police chief said publicly that he ordered the beating of a Malian radio presenter for having reported that the local people prevented the amputation from going forward and had his body dumped outside of the local hospital. As of now, the presenter has survived.

On May 21, demonstrators in Mali’s capital of Bamako stormed the office of interim president Dioncounda Traore, seventy, and beat him unconscious.  He was hospitalized and has subsequently been released, according to press reports.  The mob, numbering several hundred, traversed the city with no interference from the army—or anybody else. The mob attack appears to reflect popular opposition to a deal brokered by the relevant regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), whereby Gen. Amadou Sanogo, thirty-nine—the  leader of the coup that overthrew the ostensibly democratic government of President Amadou Toure—would step aside and Traore would serve as interim president for a year rather than for just forty days as prescribed by the constitution.  That would give him sufficient time to organize new elections, while forty days is too short. Sanogo would receive the trappings – and the pension – of a former head of state. The mob beat Traore, who has been acting president since the coup, apparently because he supported the deal. The mob, the army, and much of the local population appear to want Sanogo to become interim president when Traore’s forty-day term expires.  This is unacceptable to ECOWAS, which has threatened sanctions.  The United States is supportive of the ECOWAS position. Meanwhile, the northern half of Mali is controlled by fundamentalist Islamic Tuareg rebels and the country as a whole faces a potential catastrophe because of drought. In a May 17, 2012, guest post on this site, Jim Sanders raised the question of the extent to which the military could be a vehicle for popular discontent against the old elites in Africa—and elsewhere.  Traore, a former president of parliament,   is certainly a member of the traditional elites, while Sanogo is not. Mali had the forms of democracy for twenty-one years, including regular, credible elections. The mob attack on May 21, and the apparent army support in Bamako, raise the question of how meaningful democratic forms were to a population increasingly in crisis outside the elite circle. That could be what is happening in Mali.