South Africa

Africa's first COVID-19 vaccine trial began on June 24 in South Africa. The trial started in Johannesburg, the commercial capital, and Pretoria, the national capital, in Gauteng province, and will gradually spread to other parts of the country. In Johannesburg, some participants are residents of Soweto township. The vaccine, developed by Oxford University's (UK) Jenner Institute, will inoculate two thousand South Africans. It is appropriate that South Africa host the vaccine trials. It has by far the most developed medical infrastructure in Africa and a tradition of medical innovation. The Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town was the site of the world's first heart transplant, now a generation ago. It is winter in the southern hemisphere, the season in which influenza of various types are most prevalent.  Trials of the Jenner Institute’s vaccine are taking place in Brazil, South Africa, and the United Kingdom; the other trials also appear to have begun on June 24. According to the WHO, there are 220 vaccine candidates in development. Thirteen are in clinical trials: five in China, three in the United States, two in the United Kingdom, including that developed by the Jenner Institute, and one each in Australia, Germany, and Russia. The Jenner vaccine is currently manufactured in the United States; production is expected to shift to the Untied Kingdom in the autumn. South Africa is the African country that has been hardest hit by the virus, up to now. As of June 24, there were 111,796 cumulative cases—one-third of the continent's reported disease burden—and 2,205 people have died from the virus. About 57,000 have recovered, so there are about 53,000 active cases. South Africa has by far the most extensive testing regime of a major country in Africa, with 1.4 million tests conducted so far out of a population of 58 million. The WHO recently announced that all African states have the laboratory capacity to test for the virus, though others still lag far behind South Africa’s testing ability. Nigeria, for comparison, has conducted just 122,155 tests out of a population of about 200 million, with 22,020 confirmed cases as of June 24. In the United States, 30 million tests have been conducted out of a population of 328 million, with about 2.9 million positive tests reported. The government of President Cyril Ramaphosa has aggressively imposed various protocols to control the spread of the disease. Enforcement, however, has resulted in instances of police brutality which undercut popular support. In response, some of the restrictions have been lifted. South Africa's official statistics are credible. However, those of other African countries are less so and many observers estimate that cases are under counted. Hence, it is hard to know the true proportion of Africa’s COVID-19 cases made up by South Africa. What is clear is that of the continent's largest states—Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo—South Africa's efforts to control the virus have been the most extensive.

As president of South Africa and head of the ruling African National Congress, Cyril Ramaphosa seeks to restore South Africa's economy and consolidate his position within the party. He still faces opposition from supporters of ousted President Jacob Zuma, regarded by outside observers as a corrupt facilitator of and participant in state capture. The coronavirus looks to be an economic disaster for the country, but it does provide the opportunity for the president to demonstrate his leadership. In short, the political space in which he is operating in is particularly complex. For many, the question is how is Ramaphosa doing? As of May 28, there were almost 26,000 cumulative confirmed coronavirus cases in South Africa, out of a total of about 125,000 in Africa. While the South African statistics are credible—they have conducted over 600,000 tests—those for much of the rest of Africa are less so. It is likely that other countries have a greater number of unreported cases. Initially, Cyril Ramaphosa established an anti-virus regime that is now familiar in the developed world: social distancing and a lockdown. And the virus "curve" indeed appeared to flatten. More recently, however, he has come under criticism. The messaging of his government—especially about the reopening sequencing—has been inconsistent. Some of the regulations, particularly the bans on alcohol and tobacco, have caused resentment and had not been adequately explained. Though there were compelling reasons for the bans, there is now a flourishing black market in both commodities. Worse, perhaps has been police brutality in enforcing the lockdown, and some police now face charges in court. According to the National Police Minister, 230,000 South Africans have been arrested for breaking the lockdown regulations. So, Ramaphosa has to thread the needle, to keep in place regimes that seem to work with an increasingly restive population. As in other countries, Ramaphosa is gradually reducing lockdown restrictions. For example, as of June 1, churches may reopen, but with only fifty worshippers at a time. Again as elsewhere, the South African government has failed adequately to take into account the consequences of the lockdown on the poorest of the poor, for whom social distancing is largely impractical, and where their work is largely face-to-face. Further, if they do not work, they do not eat. The South African government has increased the social allowance drawn by the poor, but, critics would say, not by enough. As to how Ramaphosa is doing, the jury is still out. He gets good international press, and international health experts applauded his lockdown and its strict enforcement. On balance, he does appear to be threading the needle. This real issue is how South Africans will perceive his leadership.

CFR Senior Fellow for Africa Studies Michelle Gavin interviews writer, lawyer, and governance expert Judith February.

CFR Senior Fellow for Africa Studies Michelle Gavin interviews writer, lawyer, and governance expert Judith February.

Easy to overlook among the COVID-19 headlines is a positive development involving the prosecution of former President Jacob Zuma. It has the potential for reaffirming, perhaps reanimating, South African commitment to the rule of law and trust in government, which flagged considerably during Zuma’s tenure. For the past decade, Zuma has fought charges and indictments related to his alleged acceptance of bribes, employing every means available to obstruct the judicial process. His final appeals have been rejected by the constitutional court, South Africa's highest, or withdrawn. Since the coming of "non-racial democracy," Zuma has been a leader in government, becoming deputy prime minister in 1999. Often involved in party infighting, he successfully engineered the resignation of then President Thabo Mbeki and his own election as president in 2009, in which position he served until his resignation in 2018. Throughout his government service, he has been dogged by criminal accusations, most notably rape (on which he was acquitted on a technicality) and accepting bribes as deputy president from a French company in conjunction with South African arms procurement. More generally, as president, he become the face of government corruption and "state capture." Nevertheless, he remains popular among the poor and his fellow Zulus, the largest ethnic group in the country, and continues to enjoy some support within the ANC. Of course, there is a reason that COVID-19 is dominating the headlines in South Africa. The country has the largest number of reported cases of the virus on the African continent, with over 5,600, but it also has the most developed public health sector of the larger African countries and has instituted the continent's most extensive testing regime, with over 200,000 tests conducted. Hence the presence of the disease is more readily measured in South Africa than elsewhere where testing is less widespread. President Cyril Ramaphosa, leader of the ruling African National Congress, has so far received high marks from international public health experts for his strict application of the COVID-19 control orthodoxy: social distancing, sheltering in place, and, in effect, the shutdown economic activity. Further, if belatedly, the government has increased the social allowances paid by the government, which nearly all poor South Africans receive, to help cope with the economic consequences of the lockdown. Though there are indications that the strategy is working, domestic criticism is mounting. There is the sense that many of Ramaphosa's regulations are excessive, such as his ban on the sale of tobacco and alcohol. The administration's public messaging has also been contradictory and confused. Most at issue, however, is the use of excessive force to enforce lockdown rules by the South African police. As of April 20, eight people have reportedly been killed as police and soldiers enforced the lockdown, and two hundred cases of police brutality have been recorded. Some of the actions have included the use of whips, rubber bullets, beatings, and the destruction of private property. At least some government officials have been reassuringly contrite upon news of security service brutality. “We hang our heads in shame,” said Defense Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula. “We will not at any point defend what has happened.” He said that investigations were underway. But other officials, have appeared less than sympathetic. Early on, the police minister apparently explicitly encouraged police to “not be nice to suspects,” and President Ramaphosa seems to have initially defended the excessive force in the interest of stopping the pandemic. Some human rights organizations have filed petitions in court concerning the rights violations. For all its faults, this is what sets South Africa apart from its peers on the continent: an independent, if imperfect, judicial system. Though such police brutality should not have occurred and those people should not been killed, there is a peaceful avenue toward accountability. Similarly, though Zuma’s comeuppance has long been delayed, he is now one step closer to it. He is scheduled to stand trial in June, depending on how soon South Africa’s society can return to a semblance of normal. While it is by no means certain that he will be convicted—the episode for which he will be tried occurred more than a decade ago, and evidence goes stale—the whole exercise is itself an achievement. His trial means that a former African chief of state will be forced to account for his alleged crimes by a court of law. This is good for African democracy and for the rule of law.

Since assuming office in 2018, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has consistently disappointed those who hoped that he would usher in a new era of South African leadership in foreign policy.  With a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and the 2020 Chairmanship of the African Union, South Africa was poised to seize the mantle of continental leadership had it been so inclined. But much like President Buhari in the region’s other giant, Nigeria, President Ramaphosa has been inwardly focused, preoccupied by contentious domestic politics, economic woes, and energy shortfalls. With the notable exception of efforts to make implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement a reality, South Africa has wielded little regional influence to correspond to its rhetoric about principled foreign policy, whether in responding to the crisis in neighboring Zimbabwe or the flawed elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  None of those domestic pressures have dissipated; if anything, the situation has grown even more dire, and the political peril intensified. Last month, South Africa’s own serious coronavirus outbreak coincided with terrible economic news when it lost its investment-grade credit rating from Moody’s. Growth is sluggish, confidence is low, unemployment is high, and powerful factions of the ruling African National Congress remain at war with each other. Yet as the pandemic threatens to induce not just a humanitarian crisis but a devastating economic disaster across the continent, Ramaphosa seems to have found a new gear. Not only has he been decisive and bold in dealing with the domestic outbreak, but he has found time and energy for elevating the broader regional outlook as well. He is using South Africa’s status as the only African member state of the G20 to insist that the group grapple with the continent’s looming economic crisis. Last Friday, he convened the African Union Bureau by phone, bringing heads of state together and driving an agenda aimed at keeping leaders informed with the latest facts and science, mobilizing coordinated action, and ensuring that Africa speaks with clarity and unity to the rest of the world about urgent COVID-related needs. He has spearheaded efforts to establish an African Union Covid-19 Response Fund to which African states have begun making pledges, emphasizing African buy-in and ownership even as he calls for more assistance from abroad. To be sure, Ramaphosa is not alone in asserting much-needed leadership. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has also used his stature to insist that global leaders respond to Africa’s urgent needs. Economic Commission for Africa Executive Director Vera Songwe has been direct and savvy in framing African priorities as well. But the reemergence of South Africa as an assertive and proactive continental leader is an essential and welcome development.  If, as Arundhati Roy suggests, this moment is a gateway between one world and an unknown future, African leadership on the issues that affect us all, from global health to climate change, will be essential to establishing a new order better than the one that is failing so many now.  One hopes that thoughtful South African foreign policy vigorously working to assert African equities will outlast the crisis at hand. 

On March 27, President Cyril Ramaphosa and Health Minister Zweli Mkhize imposed on South Africa one of the strictest lockdowns outside of China to stop the spread of the coronavirus. Among the prohibited activities: dog-walking, jogging, the sale of alcohol, and leaving a place of residence (except for emergencies). At the time restrictions were put in place, South Africa had around 1,000 cases and had just recorded its first deaths.  Though many at first did not heed the lockdown orders, the new rules have since been stringently enforced by the army and police. As in Kenya, there have been reports of South African security services using rubber bullets, whips, and beatings to enforce the lockdown. As of April 4, at least three deaths have been attributed to security service brutality, and the defense minister condemned the heavy-handedness of soldiers. South Africa’s record of protecting of human rights amid the coronavirus crisis has so far been mixed.   As of April 7, it had 1,749 cases and 13 deaths, and the health minister acknowledged that testing must be vastly expanded to contain the outbreak effectively. As of April 6, the total number of tests conducted [PDF] was 58,098, but South Africa’s National Health Laboratory service has plans to increase testing to 36,000 every day by the end of April. According to the president, about 10,000 health workers have been mobilized to visit homes and screen residents for symptoms. This effort appears to be by far the greatest in Africa.  The health minister provides daily, forthright briefings that are perceived as credible. He warns that the crisis has hardly started. Social distancing and hygiene are a challenge in the huge urban townships and informal settlements outside of South Africa's big cities. Residents are poor, if not as poor as elsewhere in Africa, and, presumably, frightened; confrontation with the security services would seem to be all but inevitable. For now, President Ramaphosa and his health minister are getting high marks. Since he became president in 2018, Ramaphosa has worked to establish his authority over the bitterly divided governing African National Congress (ANC), where the allies of discredited former President Jacob Zuma are still active in opposing his reforms. If South African opinion leaders continue to see Ramaphosa as exerting strong leadership during this crisis, it will likely strengthen his hand within the ANC, and once the crisis is over, facilitate implementation of his reform program.

This blog post is part of the Women and Foreign Policy program’s interview series on Gender Equality in Foreign Policy, reflecting on initiatives to promote gender equality in the defense, development, and diplomatic sectors.

Africans and their friends have recognized that the new coronavirus had the potential to devastate a continent that is poor, has weak public health systems, often limited bureaucratic capacity, and governments that frequently enjoy little popular confidence. But the hope had been that specifically African factors might mitigate the danger. The young appear to be better suited to survive COVID-19, and Africa’s population is young. The elderly, who are much more vulnerable to COVID-19, by and large live with younger relatives at home, as opposed to in elder care facilities that tend to facilitate transmission of the coronavirus. Further, some medical professionals are speculating that, like the season flu, cold and dry conditions facilitate the spread of the virus.  But on Monday, the Associated Press reported that thirty of fifty-four countries in Africa have reported the presence of COVID-19, and the list is likely incomplete. The virus had been slower to appear in Africa than in most other regions of the world. The youth that many though would help mitigate the spread also likely masked it, as young, healthy people with the disease are less likely to exhibit symptoms. As elsewhere, the coronavirus was usually introduced by travelers from other continents, notably Europe. All of South Africa’s sixty-two cases, as of Monday, were from abroad, according to the health ministry. African governments are taking steps that are now familiar: closing borders, restricting travelers, instituting testing regimes, albeit with scarce numbers of testing kits. The World Health Organization says that all African countries will be able to test for the virus “soon.” According to their March 10 situation report on COVID-19 in Africa [PDF], thirty-nine countries had the capacity as of then. That estimate gains credibility from the donation of Chinese billionaire Jack Ma of one million testing kits, six million masks, and sixty thousand protective suits. International agencies are also making monetary pledges to help fight the virus. In many countries, there are vigorous public education campaigns. But, borders in Africa are porous and the efficacy of travel restrictions in curbing the spread of the virus remains unclear. The Mail and Guardian has run the numbers for South Africa, which has one of the most developed health infrastructures on the continent. It finds that the number of those infected by the virus is growing by 61 percent per day, which means 180,000 cases by early April if nothing changes. Health Minister Zweli Mkhize estimated that 15 percent of those ill would require hospitalization, and 5 percent would require intensive care. According to the minister, while South Africa has over 87,000 hospital beds, they have fewer than 1,000 designed for intensive care. Hence, under the Mail and Guardian’s projections, the South African medical system could be overwhelmed by April.  In South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa has declared a national emergency, restricting travel and planning to close schools, among other things, to slow the daily growth of COVID-19 cases. That would seem to be imperative, and yet not so easy, as experience in richer and more developed countries shows. 

The bad news is that coronavirus seems to be spreading, if slowly, in Africa, with new cases in Togo and Cameroon and cases in the giants, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Africa. As of March 10, eleven countries in Africa have reported cases. The good news is that the number of cases remains remarkably small, despite the fact that China is Africa’s largest trading partner. The index cases in Africa, however, appear mostly to be travelers from Europe.  With weak public health systems, teeming cities, and pervasive poverty, a reasonable assumption is that coronavirus would spread rapidly in Africa. There is no real consensus as to why this has not happened. Hypotheses include the apparently successful efforts by African states to control and monitor travelers from virus hot spots, the fact that Africa’s young population makes it less vulnerable to the virus, or, conversely, that weak public health systems likely miss much of the instance of the disease. Whatever the reasons, unlike past outbreaks of Ebola, the presence of large numbers of virus victims is not obvious in Africa's medical facilities or on the street.  Still, the economic impact of the disease is likely to be worse in Africa than elsewhere. The disease’s negative impact on the world economy has already translated into a decline in demand for the primary products that Africa exports, such as oil from Angola and Nigeria and rare minerals from Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example. Nigeria’s finance minister is recalculating the national budget to take into account the fall in international oil prices, and South Africa has entered a recession, aided, if not driven by, the global impact of the coronavirus. Tourism is down, as international travelers stay home, hurting the economies of South Africa and Kenya, among others. Investors, confronted with a litany of unknowns about the disease and its consequences, are fleeing from emerging markets, at least for the time being. 

Thirty years after South African President F.W. de Klerk ordered his release from Cape Town’s Victor Vorster Prison, Nelson Mandela’s reputation as a genuine hero of the twentieth century holds up. With de Klerk and others, Mandela led the successful transition from apartheid to non-racial democracy, forestalling the race war that many thought was inevitable. Nelson Mandela’s outreach to the privileged white minority preserved South Africa’s modern economy, unlike in Zimbabwe where liberation movements expelled or made settlers unwelcome and the economy collapsed. His unswerving commitment to democracy and the rule of law grounds South Africa’s constitution, which is regarded as among the world’s best in terms of protecting human rights. Nelson Mandela faced criticism from Robert Mugabe, the deceased Zimbabwe tyrant, and many others. That criticism was and still is, essentially, that Mandela conceded too much when he agreed to continued control of the economy by whites and that he did not follow a policy of redistribution of white wealth to the black majority. These criticisms are ahistorical. The transition was a negotiated settlement between the liberation forces of which his African National Congress was the most important. The apartheid-era National Party maintained control of the state and its security apparatus. In other words, the end of apartheid did not represent the liberation movements’ defeat of the National Party. Without the compromises Mandela made, a peaceful transition would have been unlikely and the prospect of a race war and economic collapse would have increased. Today, South Africa faces slow rates of economic growth, the persistence of poverty, especially among the black majority, and poor governance exemplified by the Jacob Zuma administration. Despite these challenges, the institutions established by the constitution enables South Africa to persevere, because it provides a framework for addressing the challenges that persist. 

Nigeria and South Africa are the giants of Africa, with the two largest economies on the continent. Both have had long-term relationships with Iran, though South Africa’s has been the closer. Thus far, the official reaction to Soleimani’s death from Nigeria and South Africa has been muted or non-existent, reflecting caution. Though the Nigerian inspector general of police has put his forces on “red alert,” likely fearing action by the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) or other alleged Iranian proxies, there has been no apparent word from the government. In South Africa, the fiercest reaction came from the African National Congress (ANC), while Naledi Pandor, the South African foreign minister, called for calm. The South African relationship with Iran is robust and growing. Under apartheid, there was a largely clandestine trade between the two countries. After apartheid ended, Iran was one of the first countries openly to resume trade with South Africa, and the two countries have since signed a number of trade and defense agreements, and South Africa is an ally of Iran in multilateral fora.  The Iranian relationship with Nigeria is more complicated. Iran has a large diplomatic presence in Nigeria, but also funds a number of schools and cultural institutions. (So, too, does Saudi Arabia.) The most well-known is the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), which has long received financial support from Iran. It is led by Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, a Shia cleric who received some education in Iran shortly after the Islamic Revolution. The Muslim Nigerian political class is Sunni, and is viscerally hostile to the Shia and to the IMN. Indeed, the Nigerian security services have attacked Shia religious processions and protests, and Zakzaky has been in government custody with his wife since 2015. It is no surprise that both the IMN and ANC roundly condemn the U.S. killing of Soleimani. Elites in most African states tend to dislike unilateral action by great powers and, in general, favor multilateralism. They are quick to speak out against the violation of the sovereignty of weak states by great powers. Media often portray the Iranian conflict with the United States as one of David vs. Goliath. In the case of the IMN, its statement reflected Iranian sentiments about U.S. provocation, imperialism, and genocide, and expressed sympathy for the Iranian regime.  But there are important nuances. Some media reports, relying on Western security sources, allege that in the aftermath of the Trump administration's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, Soleimani had ordered the establishment of a network of West Africa terror cells in Sudan, Chad, Ghana, Niger, Gambia, and the Central African Republic. Except for Ghana, all are weak states. If true, Iranian terrorist cells would be anathema to African governments, most of which face homegrown security threats and know that they are too weak to do much about them.  The bottom line is that if there are attacks on American interests in West Africa as a result of the Soleimani killing—and that is a big “if”—they are likely to come from Iranian elements, not from indigenous African groups. It is noteworthy that, thus far, there have been no mass anti-American demonstrations in West Africa following Soleimani’s killing. 

Kitaneh Fitzpatrick is an intern for Middle Eastern history and geopolitics at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. She is pursuing a master of arts in Near Eastern studies at New York University.  In November 2019, hundreds of Iranian intelligence reports were leaked that shed light on Tehran’s success in bolstering Iranian influence throughout the region. Syria and Iraq featured heavily in the reports and are usually the focus of international attention on Iran’s foreign influence. But the Islamic Republic’s reach extends far beyond the Middle East. Recently, Iran has turned its attention to Africa. Faced with crippling sanctions and diplomatic isolation, Iran has developed a close partnership with South Africa. South Africa has long been a cornerstone of Iran’s South-South strategy, which aims to strengthen ties with African and South American states. Strongly promoted by President Ahmadinejad, the South-South strategy intends to boost Iranian international credibility and promote trade. The Islamic Republic was one of the first countries to resume trade with South Africa following the end of apartheid, and the two countries have enjoyed strong relations ever since. Trade has been an integral element of this relationship, with Iranian officials estimating the value of Iranian Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa in 2018 at roughly $135 billion.  South Africa has proven to be an unlikely ally, calling the U.S. withdrawal from of the Iran Nuclear deal “regrettable” and publicly reaffirming its commitment to building an Iranian-South African relationship. South Africa has also advocated for Iranian interests at the UN, siding with Iran on critical issues at the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency. South Africa’s commitment to maintaining diplomatic ties with Iran in the sanctions era has allowed the two countries to engage in joint business-tech forums, scientific cooperation, and tourism. Operating within the framework of the South Africa-Iran Joint Commission of Cooperation established in 1995, Iranian and South African foreign ministers meet frequently to discuss enhancing cooperation.  South Africa has become an important defense partner. Tehran has sought to leverage its longstanding relationship with South Africa to support Iranian naval expansion outside of the Middle East, and has conducted limited out-of-area naval operations in South Africa, according to a recent U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report. Iran and South Africa have also signed basic military cooperation agreements, and Iran’s deputy minister of defense met with South Africa’s chief of defense force staff in Tehran this May to discuss “the development of defense cooperation [that would achieve] long term and strategic engagement.” While deepening defense ties with South Africa is important to projecting Iranian military might, Iran’s navy frequently faces maintenance issues and its deployed forces are largely symbolic. However, naval expansion to South Africa is still a powerful demonstration of Iranian political influence in spite of economic hardship and domestic unrest.  South Africa is part of Tehran’s effort to offset the cost of U.S. sanctions and increasing diplomatic isolation from the West. The relationship still has room to grow, but it and others will provide an essential lifeline to Iran and will undermine U.S. pressure.

The South African Police Service (SAPS) has ended a sit-in at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) compound in the capital, Pretoria. Some two hundred people have been arrested, according to the media, and others are being held to determine their immigration status. The sit-in had lasted for a month with up to seventy participants, identified by the media as refugees and asylum seekers. The protestors were demanding that the UNHCR resettle them in other countries because of their fear of xenophobic violence centered in South Africa’s townships. The episode has been highly problematic. The protestors were demanding what the UNHCR could not do. Under international law, the UNHCR has a role with respect to persons outside their own country because of a well-founded fear of persecution based on religion, ethnicity, political views, or membership in a particular social group. While media reports are unclear, it is highly unlikely that most of the protestors had gone through the South African adjudication process to qualify for asylum or refugee status. In South Africa as in the United States, adjudication of refugee or asylum claims is a lengthy process. It is likely that most of the protestors were economic migrants. The UNHCR has no remit for those who go to another country seeking economic betterment.  South Africa has by far the most advanced economy on the continent. As such, it is a magnet for immigrants, documented and undocumented. Borders are highly porous; the largest number of foreigners in South Africa appear to be from close neighbors, especially Zimbabwe and Mozambique. This population, usually very poor, ebbs and flows depending on conditions in the home country. There are also higher-profile migrants from countries further afield, such as Congo and Nigeria. Wealthier, they attract sensationalized media attention. Nigerians, for example, are frequently identified as drug dealers. As is nearly always the case, the clearing of a sit-in is a public relations disaster for the police. In racially-charged South Africa, there are international media shots of a white policeman pepper-spraying a black mother and her child, though, according to the New York Times, the SAPS racial make-up mirrors that of the population, which is 80 percent black.  Stepping back, South Africa is dealing with what is likely to become more common: the unregulated movement of people from poor areas and countries to wealthier ones. Like most countries, South Africa does not have in place a solution to this new challenge. As elsewhere in Africa, borders are porous and fundamentally artificial—they were drawn by colonial governments without reference by and large to the indigenous peoples. For example, the Tswana people are to be found on both sides of the Zimbabwe-South Africa border.

Recent attacks that appeared to target immigrants have underscored South Africa’s struggle to combat violence and limit tensions with the rest of the region.