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China

Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of August 23, 2013

William Piekos and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia this week. 1. Bo Xilai defiant in trial. Standing trial on charges of bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of power, former Communist Party official Bo Xilai was surprisingly defiant during his two days in court. The trial, which began on Thursday, was expected to be simply another piece of scripted Chinese political theater—albeit one with much more press and its own official microblog—but Bo put on a spirited defense, refuting testimony and casting doubt on his wife’s mental state. Some analysts have postulated that Bo might have agreed to a predetermined prison sentence in exchange for the opportunity to express himself at the trial. 2. U.N. criticizes Australia over asylum policy. The United Nations Human Rights Committee called Australia’s indefinite detention of refugees “cruel” and “inhuman” after reviewing complaints of forty-six recognized refugees. The committee called on Australia to release the refugees, many of whom have been held for more than two years, and offer compensation. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced last month that refugees arriving to Australia by boat will be sent to refugee processing centers in Papua New Guinea and will be considered for asylum there; none who arrive in Australia by boat without a visa will be granted asylum. The majority of the detained refugees are Sri Lankan Tamils; there are also Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar and a Kuwaiti. 3. High levels of radiation detected near Fukushima water tanks. Tokyo Electric Power Company detected high levels of radiation coming from two water tanks containing contaminated water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant that suffered three core reactor meltdowns in 2011 after an earthquake and a tsunami. Approximately 300 tanks are currently being used to store contaminated water, and about 300 tonnes of highly contaminated water leaked from one such tank this week. Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority declared the power company and inspectors "careless" for allowing the water tanks to operate in such poor conditions. 4. China attacks Western values. The New York Times published a report this week on China’s Document Number Nine, a secretive directive issued by the leadership of the Communist Party warning against the dangers of Western ideas. The document warns against seven perils, including "Western constitutional democracy," "universal values" of human rights, media independence and civic participation, and pro-market "neo-liberalism." Economic reform, aimed boosting stagnant growth, has been at the top of Beijing’s agenda for some time; political reforms, argue some liberals, might logically follow. If Document Number Nine is any indication, it seems President Xi Jinping has other ideas. 5. South Korea and U.S. negotiate troop presence. South Korea and the United States remained polarized after a third attempt to negotiate sharing the cost of U.S. troop presence in the country. The negotiations are an attempt to renew the five-year Special Measure Agreement which will expire in 2013. Washington wants Seoul to contribute $89.6 million more than it is willing to pay. Bonus: Inflation concerns plague underworld, too. Trillions of dollars will be burned in the next few weeks for this year’s Hungry Ghost festival, when Chinese burn "ghost money" and other paper luxuries for their ancestors in the afterlife. "What we have right now is hyperinflation," said one University of Hong Kong economist. "It’s like operating in Zimbabwe." Closely mirroring the real world, those in the afterlife need money to buy houses and cars, and even pay off corrupt officials.

by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound August 23, 2013 Asia Unbound
China

Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of August 16, 2013

Will Piekos and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia this week. 1. North and South Korea agree to reopen Kaesong complex. After seven rounds of negotiations, the shuttered Kaesong complex, closed for months following a period of particularly high tensions, is set to be reopened, though there is no timetable yet. The complex was a major source of hard currency and jobs for North Korea until it was shut down, and it is one of the few symbols of cooperation between the two Koreas. The agreement includes a pledge from both sides to prevent any future shutdowns, an agreement to try to attract foreign companies to the complex, and permission for South Korean managers to use the Internet and mobile phones. 2. Abe avoids Yasukuni Shrine. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did not visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine on the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II, instead sending an offering. The compromise was meant to satisfy his conservative, nationalist base while not inflaming regional tensions. A number of Japanese lawmakers still visited the Shinto shrine, which honors all of Japan’s war dead, including convicted war criminals. In response, the Chinese government summoned Japan’s ambassador to protest the visit, while South Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement denouncing the visit. As an annual occurrence, however, the anniversary will likely pass without further incident as it has in the past. 3. Oil regulator in Indonesia arrested in bribery investigation. The Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia detained Rudi Rubiandini, chairman of oil and gas regulator SKK Migas, for allegedly accepting bribes of more than $700,000. Two men later identified as representatives of Kernel Oil, an oil trading company, were at Mr. Rudi’s home at the time of the raid and were also arrested. The arrest comes as Indonesia prepares for the 2014 elections, where government corruption is likely to be a major campaign issue. Indonesia was previously a member of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and a net energy exporter, but its annual oil output has halved since the 1990s. 4. China to change organ donation system. A senior Chinese official has said that starting in November, China will no longer take organs from executed prisoners, who account for as many as two-thirds of transplant organs in China. Though the number of executions in China are a state secret—estimated at 3,000 executions in 2012—this number has reportedly decreased substantially in the past decade. The current organ donor system will be replaced over time by a voluntary donor system. 5. Tourism to China falls in 2013. Between January and June of this year, tourism to China fell by 5 percent, and travel to Beijing fell by 15 percent. The China National Tourism Administration blames the drop on China’s strengthening currency, the outbreak of H7N9 bird flu, and dead pigs floating near Shanghai’s rivers. Worsening levels of pollution—January’s "Airpocalypse" being one such example—are undoubtedly also a factor. Said one travel agent: "All the news which is coming from China concerning non-touristic things are bad, frankly speaking." China is the world’s third most visited country for tourists after France and the United States. Bonus: Chinese zoo under fire for disguising dog as lion. The People’s Park of Luohe in Henan replaced zoo animals with common species, according to the Beijing Youth Daily. The zoo was caught in the act when an “African lion” began barking. The zoo also labeled two coypu rodents as snakes, a white fox as a leopard, and a dog as a wolf.

by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound August 16, 2013 Asia Unbound
North Korea

Salvaging of Kaesong: A Potential “Reset” for Inter-Korean Relations

Following seven rounds of arduous working-level negotiations stretching over the last six weeks that involved plenty of stubbornness and brinkmanship on both sides, North and South Korea announced a joint agreement today that establishes a new framework for reopening and jointly managing the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). The complex has remained shuttered and immobilized since North Korea pulled its workers from the complex on April 9. The agreement paves the way for the resumption of operations at the complex, but more importantly it constitutes a potential “reset” both for how the complex is managed and helps to stabilizeinter-Korean relations. Negotiations had stalled over South Korean insistence that North Korea take responsibility for having closed the complex and pledge never to do so again. The text of the inter-Korean joint statement pledges both Koreas to “guarantee the normal operation of the complex” including stable access to the worksite, protection of corporate assets, and the quarantine of the complex from political developments in inter-Korean relations. It also establishes an “Inter-Korean Joint Committee on the Kaesong Complex” through which the two Koreas will jointly manage access, communications, and clearance of goods to and from the complex. The establishment of a joint committee makes both sides responsible for managing transit and access issues within the zone rather than subject to often adversarial negotiations between South and North Korean institutional intermediaries. More notable than the efforts to put the operation of the complex onto a stable footing, the joint statement pledges both sides to work through the Kaesong Joint Committee to “develop the complex into one with international competitiveness,” including efforts to meet international standards in labor affairs, tax, wages, insurance, and the setting of tariffs on exports, and to promote international investment into the complex. The inclusion of these issues could potentially enable a revised payment scheme for North Korean workers at Kaesong while protecting companies in the complex from arbitrary shakedowns or levies of unanticipated taxes and fees by the North. On paper, the joint statement identifies, reframes, and attempts to depoliticize the most obvious operational and business strategy issues that must be addressed for KIC to have a future in its own right. In practice, addressing each of these issues will be inherently political, practically challenging, and absolutely necessary if Kaesong is to be commercially viable. The framework for joint management combines the stakes of both Koreas in the success of the project and aspires to transform Kaesong from an exceptionalist political experiment into an internationally competitive, operationally viable entity. Although skepticism regarding North Korea’s credibility remains, the salvaging of the Kaesong project avoids the worst for North Korea’s economic situation, given the negative signal Kaesong’s closure would have sent to the world regarding North Korea’s potential as a business partner. The North Koreans waited for South Korea to announce that it would settle insurance claims of companies operating inside Kaesong before coming out with a unilateral public statement from the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea on August 7 that it would lift its temporary suspension of operations at Kaesong, allow return of South Korean company representatives to the complex, provide safety guarantees for South Korean personnel at the complex, and pledge to ensure normal operation at the complex. This statement set the stage for the resumption of negotiations and inter-Korean joint statement on August 14. In addition, the resumption of KIC opens the way for the two Koreas to addess other thorny issues in the relationship, including humanitarian issues such as divided family reunions, economic and cultural cooperation measures, and the establishment of a peace park at the DMZ. Former Pyonghwa Motors CEO Park Sang-kwon reported to the media his conversation with North Korea’s top official dealing with the South Kim Yang-gon in the week prior to the resumption of official negotiations that “if things go well with the Kaesong Complex, things will also go well with the DMZ park” proposed by Park Geun-hye. Inter-Korean negotiations on these issues are unlikely to be easy, but it is now possible for such negotiations to proceed on the basis of a recognition of overlapping concrete interests in cooperation through the resumption of Kaesong. Despite the salvaging of Kaesong, one major obstacle to North Korea’s economic prosperity and integration with its neighbors remains: the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee tied itself last March announced that North Korea would pursue the twin objectives of economic improvement and nuclear development. The economic development objective is bolstered by North Korea’s decision to salvage Kaesong on South Korean terms, but the nuclear development objective continues to stand as a major obstacle limiting Kim Jong-un’s ability to deliver on pledges that the North Korean people will not again have to “tighten their belts.”

by Scott A. Snyder August 14, 2013 Asia Unbound

North Korea

Are North and South Korea Back in Business?

North and South Korea seem likely to reopen the Kaesong industrial complex, despite the economic risks Seoul assumes in dealing with Pyongyang, says expert Marcus Noland.

with Marcus Noland and Bernard Gwertzman August 14, 2013
Trade

Abe’s Diplomatic Agenda

Now that the Upper House election is over, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party-led coalition has control over both houses in parliament, many expect Abe to begin addressing the difficult domestic policy issues on his agenda. In an article I published yesterday for the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, I point out that Abe’s foreign policy choices will also greatly affect Japan’s future, particularly when it comes to how he manages three critical relationships: China, South Korea, and the United States. The first two will require Abe to address issues of deep historical distrust, while the last will test Abe’s ability to move forward long-overdue conversations on Japan-U.S. military cooperation. Beyond these three relationships, Abe has also made important visits this year to Southeast Asia, Russia, and the Middle East. While much of what Abe has done in his travels is to argue that “Japan is Back,” he has also pursued economic deals that stress his administration’s interest in pursuing energy and investment opportunities abroad. Indeed, as Bloomberg points out, much of Abe’s efforts to stimulate economic growth at home will have positive effects on some of Japan’s neighbors, especially in Southeast Asia, and inject a bit more competition into its relations with its commercial rivals, such as South Korea. The prospect of a Japanese economic recovery has attracted considerable interest, however, and Abe’s economic focus resonates deeply with many in the region who are more than happy to see Tokyo actively seeking to breathe new life into the effort to sustain and expand the economic performance of the Asia-Pacific. While there are certainly concerns in Northeast Asia about Prime Minister Abe’s geopolitical ambitions, I argue that his diplomatic vision to date looks more like a return to Japan’s much vaunted economic diplomacy. You can read my article here.

by Sheila A. Smith August 14, 2013 Asia Unbound
Trade

Sean Connell: Lessons from KORUS for Japan and TPP

The agreement by the eleven Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) member nations on April 22 to include Japan in their ongoing negotiations was a significant breakthrough, both for advancing the high-standard “21st century” regional trade agreement envisioned in TPP and for Japan’s quest to revitalize its economy. With Japan now formally participating in the negotiating rounds, TPP covers 40 percent of global GDP, increasing its potential to shape the Asia-Pacific regional economic environment and global trade rules. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made TPP a core element in his economic growth strategy, ensuring that structural reform issues that Japanese policymakers have long struggled to address will be front and center on his agenda. In announcing his intention to seek Japan’s inclusion in TPP, Abe contrasted the potential risks of Japan’s inward-looking tendencies with other countries that are rapidly opening themselves to economic growth, singling out Korea and its free trade agreements with the European Union and the United States. It is impossible to discuss Japan’s participation in TPP without considering the role of Korea and the impact of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (also known as KORUS). There are more than a few parallels between Japan’s participation in TPP and the experience of KORUS. It is worthwhile to consider the lessons learned from KORUS in looking at ways TPP could not only promote new economic growth, but also bring new momentum to the Japan-U.S. partnership as KORUS did in Korea-U.S. relations. First, the goals of TPP build upon strong provisions and protections included in KORUS. Indeed, TPP is often described as a “KORUS-plus” agreement in its intended scope and provisions. Several of KORUS’ twenty-four chapters—ranging from services and intellectual property rights (IPR) to investment and technical barriers to trade, among others—are likely to serve as a basis for the twenty-nine chapters under discussion within TPP. Beyond the traditional challenge of eliminating high tariffs, these agreements target removing non-tariff barriers in order to facilitate new trade and investment. Examples include bringing regulations and standards into greater alignment with international best practices, establishing a level playing field, and strengthening protections in areas such as investment, IPR, and competition policy. KORUS successfully demonstrated ways to address these often complex issues, setting important benchmarks for future trade agreements. As a result, it has reshaped trade negotiations in Asia, providing the template for Korea’s trade agreement with the European Union and offering models for other global trade discussions. KORUS is instructive in the level of commitments Japan will be expected to make in TPP, both in regards to non-tariff barriers and to opening its agriculture and other protected sectors. On several key issues, such as IPR, anti-corruption, and environment and labor protections, it is worth noting that Japan has strong rules and shares many goals with the United States, presenting important areas for cooperation within TPP. A second parallel is the momentum that bold measures can build. Many in the United States were initially skeptical of Korea’s readiness to enter into comprehensive FTA talks, due to long-standing challenges—such as the screen quota protecting Korea’s domestic movie industry—that Korean governments had pledged to address yet deemed too politically sensitive to tackle. With a narrowing window of opportunity to launch negotiations, however, the Korean government acted decisively to reduce the screen quota and settle other trade disputes up front, demonstrating its commitment. Throughout the negotiations, Korea continually took bold steps, including on agricultural and other highly sensitive issues, to ensure the successful conclusion of KORUS. Bold actions that build confidence of Japan’s readiness to meet TPP’s ambitious goals stand to generate strong momentum for the negotiations. There is similar skepticism of Japan’s readiness to commit to the agreement’s market opening goals. The actions on autos, insurance, and other issues that Japan committed to in its April 12 bilateral agreement with the United States are an important start. These represent the kinds of compromises that Japan and other TPP partners will need to make for negotiations to succeed. Actions like these could also send positive signals to U.S. and other foreign investors that Japan’s market is open for business in ways it sometimes is seen as not. A third parallel to consider is the opportunity to build new awareness in both countries of the importance of the bilateral relationship. The KORUS experience infused new energy into a bilateral partnership historically defined by, and sometimes divided over, security and geopolitical issues. When KORUS negotiations began in 2006, the U.S. public had relatively limited awareness of the considerable economic linkages with Korea supporting domestic jobs and growth. Perceptions of Korea as a closed market did not reflect significant reforms Korea made following the 1997-1998 financial crisis, which supported its remarkable economic recovery by opening its doors wider to foreign trade and investment. KORUS put the economic relationship front and center on the bilateral agenda—and there were many positive stories to share. These ranged from small U.S. businesses already successfully exporting to Korea and looking to grow their sales, to communities across the country experiencing new job growth and economic revitalization through Korean investment. Japan’s participation in TPP could, similarly, increase awareness of the profound economic interconnections with the United States. Not unlike Korea, public perceptions of Japan’s economy among Americans can reflect past experiences rather than current conditions. Often unrecognized is the deep integration of the U.S. and Japanese economies and supply chains, and the hundreds of thousands of jobs in both countries this supports. The unanticipated disruptions to U.S. supply chains resulting from Japan’s devastating March 2011 earthquake and tsunami surprised many Americans by revealing just how tightly interwoven they are. TPP offers a chance for people in both countries to update perspectives and more fully appreciate the ways they benefit from these linkages every day. It is easy to forget today that, just a few years ago, some voices in Washington and Seoul raised doubts about the future of the Korea-U.S. alliance amid sometimes-thorny differences over North Korea policy and the U.S. military footprint. KORUS showed what can be accomplished when national visions are refocused around ties that connect, rather than issues that divide. Strong leadership, a willingness to make tough decisions, creative solutions by trade negotiators, and active efforts by a broad range of interests to build support in both countries all factored into the success of KORUS. It is an outcome that Japanese and U.S. policymakers should be mindful of as they explore the full potential through TPP to strengthen their partnership and forge new areas for growth. Sean Connell is a Japan Studies Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington, DC, and a former CFR International Affairs Fellow in Japan. He was executive director of the U.S.-Korea Business Council during the KORUS negotiations and congressional approval process.

by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound August 13, 2013 Asia Unbound

North Korea

North Korea’s Next Provocation: When and Why?

Following an extended period of North Korean threats and inter-Korean tension during March and April of this year, North Korea prepared then abandoned a missile launch opting instead to shift back to charm diplomacy. Low-level inter-Korean talks over a possible restart of Kaesong drag on, as the North Korean leadership has turned its focus toward economic improvement, and Kim Jong-un presided over an unprecedented military “fatherland victory” parade to mark the sixteeth anniversary of the armistice in late July. But it would be a mistake to think that recent calm will be sustained. In fact, North Korea analysts including Bruce Bechtol argue for a three-stage North Korean strategy that consists of brinkmanship, charm offensive, and renewed provocation; suggesting that the time is ripe for new North Korean provocations. Plus, the annual U.S.-South Korea Ulchi Freedom Guardian military exercise is scheduled for mid-August, providing North Korea with its latest pretext for testing the patience of the United States and South Korea. Certainly, the North Korean system’s seemingly inherent need for instability—and the frustrations of its current situation—provide every reason to be on guard against new provocative actions by North Korea. But exactly what sort of provocative actions should South Korea and the United States prepare to meet? Ken Gause analyzes the situation in a new paper from CNA on North Korea’s Calculus in the Maritime Environment, in which he distinguishes between North Korean motives for covert versus overt provocations as a critical distinction in signaling of North Korean intent, and therefore, as a factor that should have a bearing on the preferred type of U.S./ROK political/military response. The main argument is that motivations for overt provocations require North Korea to justify its actions before its own people and the outside world, but that covert provocations “are almost entirely tied to internal reasons, namely leadership dynamics” for which the regime does not want to be held accountable. Since covert actions may be tied to political consolidation and not to external objectives, Gause concludes that there is no “umbrella deterrent” to North Korean provocations and urges consideration of regime intent as part of the decision on how to respond. But Gause’s most sobering point is one that contradicts widely held conventional wisdom among U.S. analysts and policymakers that North Korea’s provocation strategy is primarily designed to frame international negotiations and to secure short-term economic concessions. Gause argues that this element of North Korean strategy (that was part of North Korean modus operandi under Kim Jong-il) has changed under Kim Jong-un toward the goal of reshaping North Korea’s relationship with the United States. Why? Because the North Koreans said so when they stated that: “the U.S. is seriously mistaken if it thinks that the DPRK had access to nukes as a bargaining chip to barter for economic reward.” This conclusion is particularly concerning in light of the outcome of the Korean Worker’s Party Central Committee plenum held last March which affirmed the simultaneous development of the economy and North Korea’s nuclear program as regime priorities because it ties Kim Jong-un’s success as a leader to perpetuation of North Korea’s nuclear program. The bottom line: expect more nuclear and missile tests and/or other North Korean provocations sooner or later, because Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy and his prospects for survival may depend upon it.

by Scott A. Snyder August 8, 2013 Asia Unbound
China

Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of August 2, 2013

Sharone Tobias and Will Piekos look at the top five stories in Asia this week. 1. Cambodian opposition makes historic gains in election. Cambodia held elections last Sunday, with the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) almost doubling the number of seats it holds in the national assembly. The CNRP said on Monday that they rejected the results of the election, hoping to gain a majority in the national assembly, and accused the government of Prime Minister Hun Sen of large-scale cheating; a number of monitoring organizations reported voting irregularities. The leading Cambodian People’s Party won by its narrowest margin in its twenty-eight years in power, claiming to have received 55 percent of votes (in 2008, the party received 73 percent of the vote). Despite the political setback, the Prime Minister has so far been pragmatic and conciliatory, expressing a willingness to speak with the opposition and an acceptance of an independent electoral commission. 2. China’s maritime disputes continue to make headlines. Tensions between China and Japan remain high, as China’s recently consolidated coast guard sent four ships and a turboprop early-warning airplane to patrol in disputed areas of the East China Sea last weekend. The ships proceeded to confront Japanese patrol vessels and “strictly declared” China’s sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Meanwhile, Chinese president Xi Jinping stated that China wants to resolve its territorial disputes peacefully but would not compromise on issues of sovereignty or defense. Beijng also lodged a formal complaint with the United States after the U.S. Senate passed a resolution expressing concern over disputes in the South and East China Seas. 3. South Korea announces aid for the North. Seoul promised $7.4 million in aid to North Korea, part of the new administration’s policy to continue humanitarian aid regardless of political issues. South Korea also proposed “final” talks on the fate of the shuttered Kaesong joint industrial zone, which has been dormant for several months. South Korean officials insisted that the offer of aid and the proposal to restart negotiations on Kaesong are unrelated. 4. China orders audit of government debt. The Chinese government, worried that government borrowing might be out of control, ordered a nationwide audit of all government debt. The last audit was published in 2011 and showed the debt level to be 10.7 trillion yuan as of the end of 2010. Though the amount of sovereign debt stands at around 8.4 trillion yuan (or 16 percent of GDP) as of the end of 2012, the amount of local government debt is unknown; private sector estimates of total public debt in China range from 46 percent to 78 percent of GDP. 5. Vietnam bans social media news posts. The government of Vietnam has ordered that social media websites like Facebook and Twitter should only be used to “provide and exchange personal information,” rather than political opinion or information on current events. It is not clear how the law will be implemented or what the penalties for breaking the law will be. The statement was signed by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung on Wednesday. This year, Vietnam (along with Bahrain, Syria, China, and Iran) was branded an “enemy of the Internet” by Reporters Without Borders, an organization that protects press freedom. Bonus: Taoist master or “vulgar magician”? Wang Lin, a spiritualist advisor who focused on Taoist qigong breathing techniques, was the target of a massive Chinese media offensive this week. He was the subject of two documentaries aired on state-run CCTV accusing him of selling bogus health techniques to the masses and celebrities. Wang fled to Hong Kong this week, and it is not clear whether he will face any charges.

by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound August 2, 2013 Asia Unbound
North Korea

The Korean Armistice: Sixty Years of “War By Other Means”

This weekend President Obama will commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the war fight on the Korean peninsula. But in so doing, he will have no choice to acknowledge that the war has not ended despite dramatic changes in both the international context and local conditions on the Korean peninsula. In my own thinking about the significance of an enduring armistice alongside dramatic changes surrounding the Korean peninsula, I found Sheila Miyoshi Jager’s new book Brothers at War particularly useful. My own thoughts in reflecting on the armistice and the unfinished Korean War are that there are four major changes in the international context that no one would have anticipated when the treaty was signed: The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 was a product of American mistrust of Rhee Syngman and an instrument that restrained Rhee from breaking the armistice while committing a U.S. military presence to keep the peace. Now the defense treaty is the foundation of a strong military alliance that is only one component of a comprehensive partnership between countries with shared values and purposes. The normalization of China-ROK relations marked a dramatic turning point in 1992, yet despite enormous growth in Sino-South Korean relations, Seoul has still not gained Beijing’s strategic backing in its pursuit of a South Korean-led Korean reunification. Stalin was the puppetmaster and major influence behind the scenes of the Korean War, and his death was a primary factor enabling the armistice to finally be signed, but today Russian influence on the Korean peninsula has drastically waned. The normalization of the Sino-U.S. relationship ended fighting between two main protagonists of the Korean War but ultimately did not end the inter-Korean contest for legitimacy. This shift changed the Korean division from a source of direct confrontation between China and the United States to a situation where a divided peninsula with a U.S. military presence came to be seen as a source of regional stability. Unfortunately, continuities exist that remain obstacles to ending the Korean War. China remains geo-strategically concerned about U.S. influence on the Korean peninsula. Beijing still prefers sustaining a North Korean buffer state and divided Korea over the prospect of a reunified democratic Korea allied with the United States. On the peninsula the competition for legitimacy remains despite dramatic changes in context and circumstances. The ruling Kim family cannot afford to allow the Korean War to end without risking its own survival. North Korea perpetuates its competition for legitimacy against the South despite having clearly lost the economic competition long ago. By pursuing nuclear weapons, North Korea is fighting against the world and the United States. North Korea’s nuclear weapons have become a source of domestic legitimization for Kim family rule. More importantly, the arsenal is a tool with which the regime extends conflict, which it perceives as necessary to perpetuate its rule. Despite North Korea’s calls on the United States to end a “hostile U.S. policy,” it is North Korea’s need for conflict that perpetuates the war, and it is this need that is now the greatest obstacle that blocks efforts to finally bring the Korean War to an end.

by Scott A. Snyder July 25, 2013 Asia Unbound
South Korea

South Korean Civil Society

Overview Rooted in the country's long struggle for autonomy and democracy, South Korea's robust civil society has long been credited with allowing and encouraging ordinary citizens to involve themselves in social movements. Though recent scholarship suggests that social activism spurred by South Korea's many civic societies has little direct influence on policymaking, the mobilization of progressive organizations around a number of issues pertinent to the U.S.-ROK alliance opens a society-wide conversation on the development and future of South Korea's partnership with the United States. In this Program on U.S.-Korea Policy Working Paper, Dr. Andrew Yeo of the Catholic University of America argues that the United States should see South Korean civil society as a means of gauging South Korean public sentiment on the changing U.S.-ROK relationship and as a tool for advancing policy debate.

Report by Andrew Yeo July 18, 2013
China

Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of June 28, 2013

Sharone Tobias and Will Piekos look at the top five stories in Asia this week. 1. Julia Gillard is ousted as Australia’s prime minister, replaced by Kevin Rudd. Australia’s first female prime minister was ousted by the Labor Party on Thursday over fears that the party would lose September’s election with her at the helm. She was replaced by Kevin Rudd, who previously served as prime minister until a 2010 party coup. Chief among the Labor Party’s concerns is Australia’s faltering economy and slowing mining boom. Rudd, a fluent Mandarin speaker, also urged China to finalize a free trade agreement with Australia. Chinese farmers are worried that their businesses could be hurt by the free trade agreement because of the size of Australia’s agricultural output. 2. Haze pollution in Southeast Asia reaches historic levels. In the past week, smoke and haze from forest fires used to clear plantation land in Indonesia have caused severe air pollution in Singapore and Malaysia. Pollution levels reportedly hit a 16-year high in Malaysia, and the pollutant standards index reached its highest reading in Singapore. Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono has issued an apology for the haze, but as CFR’s Elizabeth Economy points out, a number of obstacles stand in the way of ending the annual problem of haze, including regional governance issues, weak forestry law enforcement, and local corruption in Indonesia. 3. China and South Korea hold summit in Beijing. Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean President Park Geun-hye met on Thursday, pledging closer diplomatic and economic ties and calling for a return to talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The two sides issued a joint statement following the meeting, agreeing to work together to resume the stalled six-party talks and bring a halt to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, which they labeled a “serious threat” to stability in East Asia. Whether or not the joint statement will lead to appreciable action is another story; it seems unlikely that North Korea will agree to rejoin the six-party talks without any concessions from the other countries. 4. Snowden allowed to leave Hong Kong, despite U.S. extradition request. Edward Snowden, the U.S. government contractor that leaked details of NSA surveillance programs, left Hong Kong last Sunday and is now reportedly in a Moscow airport. Prior to his departure, the United States filed a request for Snowden’s arrest and extradition; the Hong Kong government claimed that not enough information had been provided to issue a warrant. The New York Times reported that it was the Chinese government that decided to allow Snowden to depart. The episode, still far from over, has already had an impact on bilateral relations: Washington blamed Snowden’s departure on Beijing, China and Hong Kong are concerned about the extent of U.S. spy operations in their territory, and the United States is investigating the leak as a possible Chinese intelligence operation. 5. Unrest returns to Xinjiang. Clashes in China’s far western province of Xinjiang resulted in the deaths of thirty-five people, according to state media. Though the cause of the violence has not been publicized, a group of Uighurs with knives reportedly attacked a police station and a government building and set fire to police cars. Xinhua denounced the violence as a “violent terrorist attack” by Uighurs, a Muslim, Turkic-speaking group who chafe at the increasing number of Han Chinese in the region. Bonus: Mayhem breaks out in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. Clashes broke out in the island’s legislature this week as a representative bit her colleague and several representatives had coffee thrown on their faces. One man received tetanus shots after being bitten. Jostling in the legislature between Kuomintang and Democratic Progressive Party representatives is not an uncommon occurrence.

by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound June 28, 2013 Asia Unbound
China

China and the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

People’s Republic of China president Xi Jinping has taken a noticeably stronger rhetorical stand against North Korea’s nuclear program since he came to office in March on the heels of North Korea’s third nuclear test on February 12, 2013. China backed a new UN Security Council resolution condemning North Korea’s test and clearly distanced itself from North Korea, in contrast to its decision to embrace and defend North Korea as a strategic asset following North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009. There has been a slowdown in high-level contacts with Kim Jong-un and a striking chilliness to Sino-DPRK interaction following meetings in July and November 2012 between Kim Jong-un and high-level Chinese officials in Pyongyang. Last week DPRK Vice Minister held a “strategic dialogue” with his PRC foreign ministry counterpart Zhang Yesui that was devoid of the party-to-party interaction that has long made China-DPRK interactions “special” rather than “normal.” The rhetorical shift has emerged clearly since President Xi first stated at the Boao Forum in March that “no one should be allowed to throw a region and even the world into chaos for selfish gains.” Moreover, Xi delivered a harsh message to North Korea’s top military figure Choe Ryong-hae during Choe’s late May visit to Beijing days prior to the Xi-Obama Sunnylands summit. During that meeting, Xi emphasized that “all the parties involved should stick to the objective of denuclearization, safeguard peace and stability on the peninsula, and resolve disputes through dialogue and consultation.” President Xi reiterated China’s commitment to the unacceptability of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state in his summit discussions with President Obama in Sunnylands in June, aligning China’s policy priority on denuclearization with the respective positions of the United States and South Korea. The clarity of this statement bolstered the confidence of the Obama administration that the United States and China might actually be able to cooperate in achieving a denuclearized Korean peninsula, and it has become the major concrete hope for better U.S.-China relations that is most directly associated with the idea that the United States and China can forge a “new type of great power relationship,” in which both powers can cooperate to achieve “win-win” results. But North Korea has emerged near the top of the U.S.-China agenda not so much because of a convergence of interests, but because it is the least difficult of an array of regional security challenges facing the United States and China. The Xi-Obama commitment to build a “new type of great power relationship” provided a big boost to South Korea’s Park Geun-hye, who has come into office with a vision of cooperation in Northeast Asia that involves development of an improved South Korean relationship with China, but not at the expense of the U.S.-ROK alliance. A positive framework for U.S.-China relations provides South Korea with an opportunity to establish much more comprehensive cooperation with China without feeling that it has to choose between China and the United States. It also created hopes that South Korea could finally achieve a strategic breakthrough in its relations with China, at least to the extent that Seoul might be able to win recognition from Beijing that it is likely to be the dominant and most beneficial partner for China on the peninsula. South Koreans have consistently held the yet unrealized hopes for China-South Korea strategic cooperation ever since Roh Tae-woo pursued China-South Korea normalization over two decades ago. Although South Korea and China may look to build more comprehensive cooperation through a joint statement that expands the scope of Sino-ROK cooperation, and Xi has repeated that it seeks North Korea’s denuclearization, it is still the case that the respective parties have conflicting secondary priorities regarding the end state of the Korean peninsula that are likely to inhibit cooperation. In this respect, it is notable that Xi emphasized to Park that “China resolutely safeguards the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region, opposes any party that disrupts peace and stability and adheres to resolving problems through dialogue and negotiations.” Following North Korea’s third nuclear test, China’s declaratory policies regarding North Korea have swung into alignment with those of the United States and South Korea, but China has not sacrificed its priority on stability and there is no indication as of yet that North Korea will return to the path of denuclearization. Park’s outreach to Xi and the joint China-South Korean effort to improve the relationship therefore represent not a breakthrough, but the beginning of an effort that will require considerably more investment before it sees real results.

by Scott A. Snyder June 28, 2013 Asia Unbound
South Korea

Nuclear Power in South Korea’s Green Growth Strategy

Introduction Nuclear power has been an important, if understated, aspect of South Korea's National Strategy for Green Growth, a set of policies reflecting the idea that economic growth and environmental protection can be compatible activities rather than conflicting. Former president Lee Myung-bak did not mention nuclear power when he announced his administration's national vision for green growth in a 2008 speech, although nuclear power later made an appearance as one of ten major green growth policy objectives.[1] Arguing that nuclear energy use improves energy independence while mitigating carbon emissions, Lee championed a green growth framework that provided a new justification for South Korea to expand nuclear power at home and promote it abroad.[2] Plans are under way to increase nuclear power's share of the country's electricity generation from 33 percent to 59 percent by 2030.[3] In addition to the twenty-three reactors currently operating, five new reactors are under construction and eight more are planned.[4] However, recent reports of safety and quality-control problems at nuclear power plants in South Korea have undermined public trust in the safety and reliability of the country's cheapest source of electricity.[5] Although South Korea has experienced no major nuclear accidents since its first reactor began commercial operations in 1978, the nuclear power rethink in many countries resulting from the March 2011 nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, has created an atmosphere that only heightens these concerns.[6] At the same time, the government must also secure public acceptance of new storage sites for radioactive waste from spent nuclear fuel—an issue that highlights how doubts about nuclear power's green credentials can clash with the desire to meet rising electricity demand with low-carbon sources. Complicating this situation is the new South Korean president Park Geun-hye, who must decide how to put her stamp on green growth. Linking Nuclear Power and Green Growth South Korea's 1970s-era decision to adopt and expand nuclear power long predates the green growth initiative, although the two efforts share a common motivator: the quest for energy security in a country that is poor in energy resources and relies on imports to meet almost all its high energy demand. Currently, South Korea consumes more energy than all but ten other countries.[7] Added to the country's long struggle with energy security are the global economic slowdown of 2008–2009, a growing consensus about the need to tackle climate change, and the concomitant inability of global climate talks to achieve meaningful action on emissions reduction. These dynamics have recently given rise to the concept of green growth, which, under Lee's rubric, aims to curb carbon emissions while improving energy independence, create new engines of economic growth, and enhance South Korea's international standing. Although nuclear power—already firmly entrenched in South Korea's energy mix—seems tailor-made for achieving all three of these overarching goals, its broader impact on South Korea's energy landscape renders its use much more complex. In an era of widespread concern about climate change, the emissions mitigation potential of nuclear power generation, which emits no carbon, provides a new leg on which South Korea's nuclear expansion ambitions can stand. According to a recent report by the International Energy Agency (IEA), South Korea's per capita CO2 emissions increased 115.4 percent between 1990 and 2010.[8] The same report noted that electricity demand from all sectors "has grown significantly since 2000," while "production of nuclear electricity increased by almost 50 percent over the same period.[9] In 2009, the government of South Korea announced a voluntary target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent below the expected level by 2020.[10] The challenge of following through on this commitment while meeting increasing electricity demand provides double justification for South Korea's plans to expand nuclear power. Expanding nuclear power is not the only way South Korea is attempting to reign in its carbon emissions. There is already a program in place that requires the country's top emitters to meet designated emissions reduction targets or face a financial penalty. An emissions trading scheme (ETS) is expected to take effect in 2015 and the government is aggressively pursuing a smart-grid strategy aimed at reducing demand by providing real-time consumption and pricing information to consumers. But these efforts remain works in progress, whereas nuclear power is longstanding and proven. Determining the relationship between improved energy independence and nuclear power in South Korea requires an assessment of the country's electricity sources. Together, coal and natural gas account for two-thirds of electricity production in South Korea and nuclear energy accounts for most of the remaining third.[11] Coal—the majority of which is imported—is the largest single source of electricity, making up 45 percent of total electricity production.[12] Nuclear power expansion can offset the need for additional imports of coal and natural gas, diversifying the energy mix and improving energy independence. Moreover, indigenous technology is now used in critical systems in new reactors; at a groundbreaking ceremony for two new reactors last year, President Lee noted that South Korea had "achieved the dream of independent nuclear technology."[13] However, South Korea is wholly reliant on imported uranium and uranium conversion services to fuel its reactors.[14] This means nuclear energy is not entirely an autonomous power source for the country. There is evidence that nuclear power expansion can create new engines of economic growth. A 2009 paper published by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute found that "the total net contribution of nuclear technologies as a percentage share of GDP amounted to 2.38 percent in 2005."[15] This amount includes economic activity generated from the construction and operation of nuclear power plants as well as industrial output stimulated by the electricity produced from nuclear power. Furthermore, South Korea's aggressive pursuit of new export opportunities for its nuclear expertise has already boosted economic growth. In 2009, a South Korean consortium won a bid to build four nuclear reactors in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), prevailing over competitors from Japan and France. According to projections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), global demand growth for nuclear power is expected to continue, although at rates lower than predicted prior to the Fukushima accident.[16] Strategic marketing of nuclear power as a zero-carbon alternative to fossil fuels may enhance the country's efforts to capture more of this market. In 2010, President Lee wrote in the journal Global Asia, "Nuclear is one of the most efficient power generation methods that will lead us to a low-carbon society, and I intend to make sure that [South] Korea keeps up with its role as one of the major suppliers of these zero-carbon power plants."[17] He went on to say the nuclear reactors South Korea is building in the UAE would equal "40 million tons of carbon mitigation."[18] This UAE deal was a critical initial win in the country's quest to export eighty nuclear reactors by 2030, which could reportedly total $300 billion in sales for South Korea.[19] However, experts question the feasibility of this goal, noting it would require a significant uptick in production of nuclear reactors at a time of diminishing human resource capacity in South Korea's nuclear industry.[20] Therefore, nuclear power's future contribution as a green growth export engine is questionable. Finally, nuclear power can serve the third pillar of the green growth strategy—enhancing international standing—in three ways. First, South Korea's contract to build four nuclear reactors in the UAE is a major opportunity for South Korea to show it can deliver a nuclear power plant export on time and on budget while building safety credentials. One executive who was involved in the UAE contract decision cited "world-class safety performance" of South Korean plants as one reason for the win.[21] Other sources have emphasized the South Korean project's smaller budget relative to those of other proposals.[22] Second, whereas some countries, such as Germany, responded to the Fukushima accident by retreating from nuclear power production, South Korea is taking the opportunity to promote nuclear safety, beginning at home. Following Fukushima, President Lee emphasized, "We must learn from the Fukushima accident and redouble our efforts to enhance nuclear safety in keeping up with new technology and demands of the times, and to restore public confidence."[23] South Korea already houses the world's first International Nuclear Safety School to train safety experts from other countries. This can be a basis for bolstering international collaborative efforts on nuclear safety. Finally, nuclear power could also strengthen South Korea's international standing in an indirect fashion by serving as an important means for the country to deliver on its voluntary emissions reduction target. A report released by South Korea's Ministry of Knowledge Economy projecting electricity supply and demand indicates the country may overshoot the target by 10 percent in 2020.[24] In any case, if South Korea can meet its target, or make significant emissions reductions in later years, nuclear power will surely have played a role. Nuclear power has an important role to play in South Korean green growth, especially as a near-term tactic for meeting rising electricity demand without increasing emissions. Its future as a green growth engine is buttressed by the cost advantage it enjoys over other forms of electricity generation. However, this potential is complicated by the task of regaining public trust in the safety of nuclear power and the debate over nuclear power's green credentials at a time when the government must secure public acquiescence to new storage sites for nuclear waste. Bolstering Public Trust in Nuclear Safety Public confidence in the safety of nuclear power plummeted in South Korea after the March 2011 nuclear accident at Fukushima, Japan.[25] The monumental accident ultimately resulted in the idling of almost all of Japan's nuclear power plants. Promoting the expansion of nuclear power in South Korea might have been difficult enough in such an environment, but domestic safety problems and a quality control scandal that unfolded during the closing months of 2012 have further hampered these efforts. In February 2012, a power loss at a South Korean nuclear plant went unreported until authorities discovered it.[26] The revelation that falsified quality-control documents had been used to certify more than seven-thousand reactor parts led to the temporary closure of two reactors in November of that year, sparking fears of power shortages at a time of unusually cold temperature forecasts and record-high levels of electricity consumption.[27] One month later, hundreds of falsely certified parts were discovered in two other reactors, as well as in their water-cooling systems.[28] These reactors have remained online during replacement work. Discerning the implications of these events on public opinion was made more difficult after Fukushima, when the Korean Nuclear Energy Promotion Agency (KONEPA) declined to publish its regular polls on the public opinion of nuclear safety in South Korea.[29] According to a report by Reuters, South Korean opposition lawmaker Woo Yoon-guen has called on KONEPA to resume publishing the polls and has also revealed some of the agency's data himself.[30] A September 2012 KONEPA poll indicated that public confidence may have begun to regain its footing, showing that 53.3 percent of respondents viewed nuclear power plants as safe compared with 41.5 percent who did not.[31] However, public confidence dipped to 34.8 percent by the end of 2012 as the quality control scandal was unfolding.[32] The Fukushima accident galvanized existing antinuclear movements and gave rise to new ones in South Korea, but these do not appear to have gained widespread traction. The situation in the east-coast town of Samcheok, where there are plans to build a nuclear power plant, may illustrate a measure of ambivalence about nuclear power among some citizens in South Korea. According to a March 2011 survey of residents taken before the Fukushima accident, 75 percent of respondents favored locating the new plant in their town.[33] Seven months later, following the accident, support dropped to 50 percent.[34] A local group tried to recall the pronuclear mayor, though the effort failed.[35] By contrast, some residents seemed to value the need for economic resurgence over safety concerns. According to a report by Reuters, even after the Fukushima accident, local pronuclear activists based their support for building a nuclear plant in their town on the estimation that the construction and operation of the plant would pump 6.2 trillion won ($5.7 billion) into Samcheok's economy.[36] Public opinion of nuclear power expansion seems to result in part from a complicated mix of safety perceptions and self-interest; the citizens were conflicted between concerns about the government response to the recent scandals and the recognition that nuclear power is, for now at least, a low-cost electricity source that can bestow economic benefits on the communities where plants are located. Nuclear power may be the one piece of the green growth strategy most vulnerable to changes in public perception, especially because its expansion requires some level of public acceptance to manage the tangible problem of storing spent nuclear fuel. There was no broad public debate over the ETS, which passed the National Assembly with little fanfare. Investments in smart-grid technology and new forms of renewable energy, including wind and solar power, do not attract as much opposition due to safety concerns as nuclear power does. In January, the government announced new measures responding to the quality control scandal and safety problems. These include new procedures for procuring reactor parts and dealing with mechanical problems.[37] However, any indication that the government is suppressing data that reflects negatively on nuclear power—such as the refusal to publish KONEPA polls—could undermine public trust and ultimately backfire. Cost Advantages of Nuclear Power Nuclear power has one advantage that would make it difficult to dislodge from South Korea's energy mix: it is the cheapest source of electricity in the country.[38] The IEA report notes that "while the Korean consumer price index increased by 254 percent from 1982 to 2011, electricity prices increased by 29.9 percent in the same period."[39] Although the initial investments and operations and maintenance costs are higher for nuclear power plants than coal or gas plants, the cost advantage of generating electricity with nuclear power instead of using imported fossil fuels outweighs the start-up costs of a nuclear power plant in South Korea.[40] When a carbon price is added to the cost of fossil fuel electricity generation, nuclear power's cost advantage becomes even starker.[41] South Korea's ETS may eventually result in a carbon price, making nuclear power even more affordable relative to fossil fuels than it already is. The country also seems to be well positioned to build new nuclear power plants at a lower cost than many other developed countries, due to its recent experience and lower construction costs.[42] Nuclear power's cost advantage is even clearer when compared with renewable forms of energy such as wind, solar, and tidal power. According to one researcher at the Korea Energy Economics Institute, the wholesale cost of power from alternative sources in South Korea is six times higher than that of nuclear power.[43] The green growth strategy sets out a goal of increasing the share of renewables to 11 percent of total primary energy supply by 2030 (though it is unclear how much of that share is intended for the electricity sector versus other sectors, such as transportation).[44] South Korea has a long way to go on this score. Renewable energy sources currently make up a meager 1.5 percent of the country's electricity generation, with the bulk of that supply coming from biofuels and renewable waste.[45] Although solar and wind power are growing in South Korea, they still account for only a tiny share of renewable energy.[46] Moreover, as is widely noted, "their intermittent and variable supply make them poorly suited for large-scale use in the absence of an affordable way to store electricity.[47] In addition, as the IEA has noted, South Korea's climate and geography present a steeper challenge for the development of renewable energy compared with other IEA countries.[48] Nuclear power is the only major energy source that South Korea can rely on for wide-scale, zero-carbon electricity in the near term as more costly renewable energy sources struggle to gain a foothold. Han Seung-soo, former prime minister of South Korea and then chairman of the Seoul-based Global Green Growth Institute, acknowledged this in 2011 when he said, "If we pursue clean energy, we need to accept nuclear power as a reality until we have better options readily available."[49] Is Nuclear Power Really "Green"? Although nuclear power can help meet energy needs without emitting carbon, there is disagreement over whether it truly serves the purpose of green growth. The Lee administration emphasized nuclear power as a "clean" source of energy, focusing on its zero-carbon characteristics, but some environmental groups, such as Green Korea United, reject its no-carbon credentials, arguing that emissions from the mining and refining of the uranium fuel source must be taken into account.[50] In addition, the problem of finding new storage sites for high-level radioactive waste from spent nuclear fuel further tarnishes nuclear power's "green" image and is likely to be a pressing challenge for the government in the coming years as it runs up against storage limits at current sites amid "not in my backyard" opposition to new sites. The three reactor sites where spent nuclear fuel is currently stored in South Korea are projected to reach capacity in 2016.[51] Reprocessing spent fuel is a strategy for managing nuclear waste, but South Korea does not have this option. A longstanding agreement with the United States that was recently extended for two more years prohibits this practice over concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. Although the South Korean government is pressing for the right to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, in part to help manage the storage problem, the United States remains reluctant to agree to this. Nuclear power expansion will create more nuclear waste that must be handled without reprocessing spent fuel. The real challenge for the near term may be overcoming public opposition to new storage sites for spent nuclear fuel. The government already spent 300 million won ($247 million) in cash and other benefits to tamp down local opposition to a low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste storage site at Gyeongju.[52] Construction of this repository was twice prolonged due to "weak bedrock and groundwater problems," a situation that does not bode well for public acceptance of new storage spaces for high-level radioactive waste.[53] Government-sponsored public discussions to help determine new locations for storing high-level waste from spent nuclear fuel are expected to begin in the coming weeks. If these talks are a true give-and-take between citizens and government, they could help build the "culture of transparency" in the nuclear power industry that President Lee called for.[54] Regardless, the challenge of managing nuclear waste that remains radioactive for centuries is a powerful argument against labeling nuclear power as "green." However, the need for a zero-carbon electricity source to meet rising demand is likely to win out, as long as the government can gain enough public acceptance to new storage sites. Conclusion When it comes to nuclear power in South Korea, green growth is a new banner for an old strategy. South Korea's long experience with nuclear power, its reliance on this form of energy to meet rising demand, and its recognition of nuclear power's carbon mitigation potential together render a natural and convenient relationship between nuclear power and South Korea's green growth strategy. Public trust in nuclear safety has faltered but can recover, as polls have shown. Going forward, President Park is likely to continue the aggressive nuclear agenda she inherited from President Lee. She has indicated that she does not support closing all of the country's aging nuclear plants.[55] However, working with the public to find new storage sites for nuclear waste from spent fuel will be an important task during her tenure—one that complicates the challenge of selling nuclear power as "green." In an early signal that she may decouple nuclear power from green growth, her newly appointed environment minister, Yoon Seong-kyu, publicly questioned nuclear power's relevance to green growth in a recent hearing.[56] In any case, Fukushima did not stop South Korea from breaking ground for two new reactors a little more than one year after the accident, a signal of how important nuclear power is to meeting the country's electricity demand. Nuclear power expansion is likely to continue in South Korea. It is less certain whether President Park is as eager as her predecessor to embrace green growth as a justification for it. Endnotes ^ Yonhap News Agency, Text of South Korean president's liberation anniversary address, August 15, 2008. ^ According to Korea's Future in Green Growth, a 2009 report of the Presidential Committee on Green Growth, nuclear power expansion is mentioned as one of ten major policy directions for the purpose of reducing the use of fossil fuels and improving energy independence, p. 10. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Polices of IEA Countries: The Republic of Korea 2012 Review (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2012), pp. 102–3. ^ Ibid. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Polices of IEA Countries: The Republic of Korea 2012 Review, OECD/IEA, 2012, p. 109. ^ A report by the UAE Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism noted South Korea's nuclear safety record, as cited in Xinhua News, "Will S. Korea's nuclear power ambition make sense?" February 16, 2010. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Polices of IEA Countries: The Republic of Korea 2012 Review (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2012), p. 9. ^ Ibid, p. 35. ^ Ibid, p. 77–78. ^ Kim Young-won, "S. Korea likely to fall short of emissions reduction target," Korea Herald, February 12, 2013. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries, p. 77. Oil, hydro, and other sources together make up a small share of electricity production, about 4.4 percent. ^ Ibid. ^ Yonhap, "South Korea starts work on two nuclear reactors," May 4, 2012. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries, p. 105. ^ Manki Lee, Kee-yung Nam, Kiho Jeong, Byungjoo Min, and Young-eek Jung, "Contribution of Nuclear Power to the National Economic Development in Korea," Nuclear Engineering and Technology, vol. 41, no. 4, May 2009, p. 549. ^ International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA Updates Its Projections for Nuclear Power in 2030," September 25, 2012. ^ Lee Myung-bak, "Shifting Paradigms: The Road to Global Green Growth," Global Asia, vol. 4, no. 4, January 2010, p. 11–12. ^ Ibid. ^ Meeyoung Cho, "South Korea urged to restore trust in nuclear power," Reuters, Nov. 22, 2012. ^ Center for Strategic and International Studies and Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Report from a Workshop on South Korea as a Responsible Nuclear Supplier, February 18, 2013. ^ Andrew England, Peggy Hollinger, and Song Jung-a, "S. Koreans win $20bn UAE nuclear power contract," Financial Times, December 28, 2009. ^ Ann McLachlan, "Lauvergeon: French lost UAE bid because of expensive EPR safety features," Nucleonics Week, January 14, 2010. ^ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Address by President Lee Myung-bak at High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security," September 22, 2011. ^ Kim Young-won, "S. Korea likely to fall short." ^ Yonhap News Agency, "Seoul to overhaul operator of scandals-hit nuclear power plant," Yonhap, January 8, 2013. ^ Sangim Han and Yuriy Humber, "Nuclear Halt in South Korea Seen Boosting Coal: Energy Markets," Bloomberg Businessweek, April 13, 2012. ^ See "Looming blackout threat," Korea Herald, December 6, 2012, and "Electricity consumption shoots up to record high," Korea Herald, January 3, 2013. ^ Park Si-soo, "More fake certificates for nuclear reactor parts found," Korea Times, December 6, 2012. ^ Jack Kim and David Chance, "Secrecy cloaks South Korea's civil nuclear program," Reuters, Nov. 13, 2012. ^ Ibid. ^ According to an unpublished poll revealed by Woo Yoon-geun, as cited in Kim and Chance, "Secrecy cloaks." ^ According to the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, as reported by Yonhap, "Seoul to overhaul operator." ^ Survey data cited in article by Yoon Ja-young, "Yeongdeok, Samcheok tapped as candidates for nuclear power plants," Korea Times, Dec. 23, 2011. ^ Ibid. ^ Kim and Chance, "Secrecy cloaks." ^ Ibid. ^ Yonhap, "Seoul to overhaul operator." ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Polices of IEA Countries, p. 109. ^ Ibid, p. 99. ^ International Energy Agency and OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity: 2010 Edition (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010), p. 75. ^ Ibid. ^ Ibid, p. 50. ^ States News Service, "Reactor Shutdown in South Korea Raises Blackout Fears," July 31, 2012. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Polices of IEA Countries, p. 98. ^ Ibid, p. 93. ^ Ibid, p. 93. ^ Ernest Moniz, "Why We Still Need Nuclear Power," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011, p. 84. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries, p. 98. ^ Cho Jin-seo, "Green growth is second industrial revolution," Korea Times, June 26, 2011. ^ Green Korea United, "Green Growth Policy of the Korean Government and its Critics," http://green-korea.tistory.com/101. ^ Seongho Sheen, "Nuclear Sovereignty versus Nuclear Security: Renewing the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2011, p. 276. ^ "Nuclear waste a growing headache for S. Korea," Associated Press, March 26, 2013. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Polices of IEA Countries, p. 106. ^ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Address by President." at High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security, Sept. 22, 2011. ^ Lee Sun-young, "Major environmental policy change unlikely under Park," Korea Herald, Dec. 27, 2012. ^ Shin Hyon-hee, "Park ditches 'green growth' in environmental policy shift," Korea Herald, March 28, 2013.

Report by Jill Kosch O’Donnell June 28, 2013
China

North Korea’s Defiant Proposal for Denuclearization Talks

Only one week after proposing and then pulling the plug on inter-Korean dialogue over protocol differences, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)’s National Defense Commission on June 16 issued a surprise proposal for “high-level” U.S.-DPRK talks on easing of military tensions, establishment of a peace regime, and “various other issues both parties want to address, including the building of a nuclear-free world proposed by the United States.” A White House statement in response to the offer emphasized the necessity of North Korea taking actions to show its commitment to denuclearization before the United States would accept talks. It stated that such actions would involve North Korea “living up to its obligations to the world, including compliance with the U.N. Security Council resolutions, and ultimately result in denuclearization.” In other words, without accompanying actions that show a North Korean willingness to enter “authentic” negotiations, the Obama administration assesses North Korea’s proposal as a non-starter. While it is certainly preferable for North Korea to pursue diplomatic rather than missile or nuclear tests, all of North Korea’s neighbors by now are well aware of North Korea’s history of diplomatic initiatives as just another tool through which North Korea has sought to consolidate gains following periods in which North Korean brinkmanship has driven political tensions to high levels. To simply accept North Korea’s dialogue proposal and come back to the table as though nothing has changed since the last six party talks were held in 2008—or since North Korea’s dramatic reversal only two weeks after concluding the 2012 Leap Day understanding—would imply acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests. South Korean media report that Xi Jinping flatly opposed a proposal from North Korea’s top military official Choe Ryong-hae during his visit to Beijing in late May that China accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. One of the major accomplishments of the Xi-Obama summit talks at the Sunnylands estate was the securing of a public pledge from China’s top leader that China will not accept a nuclear North Korea, while China continues to emphasize that the standoff be resolved peacefully through dialogue. The timing of North Korea’s proposal to resume direct talks with the United States appears primarily designed to discern fissures in the converging positions of the United States, China, and South Korea on North Korea’s denuclearization. The North Korean proposal tests Sino-U.S. relations since the United States has conveyed that North Korea must take concrete actions to show its sincerity as a precondition for the resumption of nuclear talks while China has emphasized the importance of returning to dialogue even while affirming it will not accept a nuclear North Korea. It also tests the U.S.-ROK alliance by tempting the United States to bypass resumption of inter-Korean dialogue only a week after the North refused participation in proposed talks with Seoul in favor of U.S.-DPRK negotiations that would marginalize South Korea. Regardless of the intention behind North Korea’s proposal, the National Defense Commission statement begins to lay the foundations for a North Korean climb down from its assertion of nuclear status through its statement that “the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is the behest of our leader and our general and the policy task that must be carried out by our party, state, and millions of soldiers and people without fail.” Since this statement stands at odds with North Korea’s inclusion of its nuclear status in the preamble of its constitution and its acknowledgment of nuclear weapons development as one of Kim Jong-il’s main contributions, sincerity of the statement will remain suspect absent accompanying concrete actions reinforcing the statement’s credibility. Although North Korea’s statement provides Pyongyang’s first public recognition of the need for an exit strategy from its current situation, it is cloaked in defiance and makes an odd call on the United States to drop preconditions for talks while adding preconditions of its own. The preamble to North Korea’s offer of “high-level” dialogue demands that the United States stop “all forms of provocation, including sanctions.” In addition, the National Defense Commission statement claims that “our legitimate status as a nuclear weapons state will be maintained without the least wavering, regardless of whether others recognize it or not, until the denuclearization of the entire Korean peninsula is realized and nuclear threats from outside are put to an end completely.” In other words, North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons program when hell freezes over, but let’s talk about it.

by Scott A. Snyder June 17, 2013 Asia Unbound
China

Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of June 14, 2013

Sharone Tobias and Will Piekos look at the top five stories in Asia this week. There will be no Friday Asia Update next week, June 21st. 1. Leaked NSA information could hurt U.S.-China ties; Snowden makes it to Hong Kong. Edward Snowden, a twenty-nine year-old Booz Allen Hamilton employee and contractor with the National Security Agency (NSA), fled to Hong Kong shortly before leaking information about a secretive NSA program called Prism. From Hong Kong, Snowden told Hong Kong newspaper South China Morning Post that the U.S. government has been hacking into computers in Hong Kong and mainland China for years. The unverified records show specific dates and IP addresses of computers in Hong Kong and the mainland and suggest a 75 percent success rate. The U.S. Congress is currently probing Snowden’s background to discover if he has any ties to Chinese authorities. Multiple Chinese news sites have dedicated entire pages to the Snowden case, declaring “China opposes cyberattacks,” “the U.S. is a hacking empire,” and “Uncle Sam, Double Standards!” The case has overshadowed the recent meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping and will make cooperation on cybersecurity between the two countries even more difficult than it already was. 2. Obama and Abe discuss cooperation in the East China Sea. U.S. President Barack Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe discussed the territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea during a phone call on Wednesday. Though the White House has tried to avoid taking a hard position on ownership of the disputed islands, Japan is a treaty ally of the United States. The two leaders also discussed nuclear threats from North Korea, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Obama’s recent meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. 3. Vietnam’s leader takes a hit in confidence vote. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung survived Vietnam’s first confidence vote, with almost a third of lawmakers giving him a “low-confidence” ranking. Most of the low confidence votes were because of Dung’s economic policies and the country’s economic leaders—State Bank Governor Nguyen Van Binh received the largest numbers of low confidence votes. Vietnam’s economy is expected to grow only 5.5 percent this year, the first time since 1988 that it will be below 6 percent. 4. Chinese communist and Taiwanese nationalist leaders meet in Beijing. Chinese President and Communist Party Secretary Xi Jinping hosted Taiwanese Kuomintang (Nationalist) Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung in Beijing in a high-level meeting on Thursday. Xi called on both sides to “heal the historical trauma” of the 1949 split between the mainland and Taiwan. At the same time, the leader of Taiwan’s opposition (and pro-independence) Democratic Progressive Party, Su Tseng-chang, said that he would boost military spending if elected in a speech in Washington, DC. 5. Meeting between Koreas cancelled. Talks between North and South Korea to diffuse tensions were abruptly cancelled after the two sides could not agree on the composition of the delegations. Seoul originally intended to send its Minister for Unification, but Pyongyang only put forward a vice minister; taking this as a slight, the South downgraded its delegation to the Vice-Minister for Unification, and in response the North withdrew its offer of talks. Pyongyang failed to answer calls from Seoul on the newly reopened communication line between the two countries. There has not been a minister-level meeting between the two governments since 2007. Bonus: Fake European village is setting for Chinese wedding photographs. Thames Town, a mock English village with Tudor buildings and churches outside Shanghai, serves as the backdrop for hundreds of Chinese weddings. See the pictures here.

by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound June 14, 2013 Asia Unbound