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Follow the Money

Brad Setser tracks cross-border flows, with a bit of macroeconomics thrown in.

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Can China Continue to Export its Way Out of its Property Slump?

Chinese growth has relied on exports to an unprecedented extent in 2024 and 2025?   Should that continue, or is it time to pivot?

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Capital Flows
Is the balance of financial power shifting?
The IMF has about $200 billion that it can lend out. About $75 b is currently lent out, mostly to Brazil, Turkey and Argentina (data link), leaving a bit over $100 billion that could be lent out in an emergency.Japan has about $800 billion in reserves, four times as much money as the Fund. China is rapidly heading toward Japan’s level. Taiwan and Korea both have over $200 billion in reserves. Singapore and Hong Kong (tiny city states) have over $100 billion. They all have more reserves than they need, meaning that some of their surplus reserves could be lent out to help other countries short on reserves. That is the basic idea behind Asian currency swaps: a country in trouble swaps its currency for the hard currency reserves of another country. That effectively is a loan, similar to an IMF loan. The country that feels it needs more reserves gets more reserves. Right now, about $36 billion is available through this swap arrangement; and there is talk of doubling it. After all, there is no shortage of reserves in Asia. That leads to the obvious question about Asian regional monetary cooperation: who in the region might actually need the money? Korea has enough reserves of its own so that it won’t have to turn to Japan or China. Malaysia and Thailand are in a similar position. Right now, there are more lenders than there are potential borrowers inside East Asia. But there still are a few possible borrowers. The Philippines is not a financial rock, and Indonesia’s domestic and external debt load remains quite substantial. The other question is who would decide what type of conditions would be attached to any loan. Both China and Japan -- for obvious political and historical reasons -- don’t relish imposing austere economic policies on other Asian economies. Yet they also want to get any money they lend back; they would be unlikely to lend to say the Philippines without a commitment from the Philippines to raise additional revenues/ pare back its fiscal deficit. Right now, access to the network of Asian currency swaps still hinges on an IMF program -- East Asia in this case has outsourced its dirty work to a DC based multilateral institution. William Pesek supplies the key quote: Yet Kawai agrees ``full IMF delinkage would not be desirable at this point.’’ One reason: Nations involved in the Chiang Mai Initiative don’t have the bureaucratic infrastructure to conduct the kinds of economic surveillance and data collection done by the IMF. Similarly, talk of recycling more Asian savings inside Asia runs well ahead of the current reality. The Asian bond fund’s $3 billion pales in comparison with the roughly $2.5 trillion Asian central banks hold in reserves. Recycling savings inside Asia requires Asian borrowers as well as Asian lenders. That is a bit hard when the region’s natural borrower -- a very large, still quite poor country that is in the midst of an investment boom -- is adding to its reserves, and lending to the rest of world, not borrowing from it. Still, it feels like something is changing -- and not just because of talk that the Asian currency swap arrangement is a proto-Asian Monetary Fund. If East Asia puts up the bulk of the money the next time an Asian economy gets into trouble, I suspect the IMF will pay more attention to Asian views on the appropriate nature of IMF conditionality. I don’t agree with every Asian complaints about how the IMF handled the last crisis (a topic for another day) but there is little doubt that Asia is egregiously underrepresented on the IMF board. Unless Asia feels like the IMF does a decent job of reflecting its growing financial power, there is a risk that Asia may in some meaningful sense (though probably not in any formal sense) opt out of the IMF. Let’s jump way, way ahead and engage in a bit of wild speculation. Suppose Brazil were to get into financial trouble again. Its economic relationship with China has deepened considerably over the past few years. Iron ore and soybean exports to China have fueled is post 2002 recovery and China is increasingly interested in investing in Brazil. Would China also be willing to come to the rescue if Brazil needed to supplement its reserves? Would it be willing to lend out its reserves on less stringent terms than the IMF? Would it be willing to supplement the IMF’s own resources with a bilateral loan (the US as a matter of policy now disapproves of supplemental bilateral packages)? And if so, how much say would it expect over the IMF’s conditions? More Beijing consensus, less Washington consensus? Remember, it was the US decision to provide a large bilateral bailout to Mexico that pushed the IMF to expand the size of its lending to crisis countries. The IMF wanted to remain relevant -- and it worried that if most of the money came straight from the U.S. Treasury, the IMF’s relative influence would wane. No doubt this speculation jumps far ahead of the current reality. But with so many dollars sitting in East Asia, the United States -- or even the IMF -- is no longer the only place to look if you are an emerging economy that is running short on dollar reserves. Indeed, the actual foreign exchange reserves of the US government seem quite puny relative to the vast stockpiles in Asia. $40 billion in bank deposits and marketable securities sounds like a lot, but it is far less than say Thailand has on hand. Of course, if the US really needed money, it could always go out into the market and borrow it ...
Economics
The US economy, in a nutshell?
90s: Hi-tech.00s: Real estate.Check out this nugget from the Washington Post (emphasis added):"Jackpot" is how Ileann Jimenez-Sepulveda describes it. Like Klein, she bought a house in Columbia Heights when the neighborhood was still known more for its crime and lack of amenities than for its gentrification. But the $300,000 house she and her husband bought four years ago was recently appraised at $850,000, and that equity has changed their lives.They used their growing equity to buy another house three blocks away and renovate it to sell it. Then they bought a house in South America, and soon they’ll close on a large single-family home in the upscale Crestwood neighborhood off 16th Street NW. In the meantime, Jimenez-Sepulveda, who had worked in the high-tech industry, quit her job to join her husband in the real estate business; he’s a loan broker, she became an agent. Now they encourage their clients to use the equity in their homes to buy investment properties. "It’s very easy, it’s very tangible for people to understand because they see their neighbors doing it -- taking the money out, buying something else, or investing in starting a restaurant," she said. "It’s exciting to see people recognizing it and running with it." Jimenez-Sepulveda dismisses the analogy she sometimes hears likening this kind of leveraged real estate investing to the frenzied investing in technology stocks of the late 1990s. She argues that real estate assets are bound to increase in value over the years, even if it’s at a far slower rate than in the past few years. Alas, in the background, some economists -- often those who have worked on emerging markets over the past decade --are still muttering dark thoughts. They worry that all this (paper?) real estate wealth ($4 trillion over the past four years) hinges on sustained inflows of financing from abroad: without those inflows, mortgage rates would be higher - and homes would be a lot harder to sell at current prices. The funny thing is that the foreigners buying the securities that Americans are issuing to buy houses are not, generally speaking, making much money on their investment in the US. To quote from a forthcoming paper by Philip Lane and Gian Maria Melesi-Ferreti (no link yet, sorry): Real dollar returns on foreign investment in the US have on average been negative over the past four years, and even more so when expressed in the currencies of most foreign investor countries. But for the game to continue, the same foreign investors have to keep pouring more money in ... UPDATE: Some economists are also muttering dark thoughts about the sustainability of China’s boom. I don’t agree with Xie’s policy conclusions, but I like his description of China’s economy: China is an export and investment-driven model and the connection between exports and investment is basically that the state banking system takes the money earned by exports and puts it into investment regardless of returns ... That model is likely to last until the crisis.
Economics
The Neiman Marcus economy powers on …
Luxury retailers are doing better than retailers that sell to poor folks ... that probably reflects the difference between those who are trying to get by on stagnant wage income in the face of higher gas prices and those sitting on big capital gains from rising home prices -- if not the profits from curve flattening trades (see the comments section of my previous post on the thirty year bond).One possible explanation for the Federal Government’s higher than expected April tax revenues: "Income growth was more concentrated than expected among high-tax rate taxpayers." There is an argument that if China wants to give away its products, the US should happily take the gift. My problem: while the current US debt for Chinese goods trade helps some, it also hurts others. Those who work in the service sector get cheap goods and cheap mortgages. The result = a boon for the construction industry (Kash over at Angry Bear has nicely illustrated this point), real-estate brokers and those who work in the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach . But those who work in US manufacturing do not not gain. And to the extent that Chinese demand is putting upward pressure on the price of oil and other commodities, that takes away some of the gains from cheap Chinese goods. Listen to Chris Dialynas of PIMCO: It really comes down to a distribution issue. Shareholders benefit, at least in the short run, from the low cost of labor in other countries and the whole globalization process, the availability of low cost, quality goods benefits the U.S. consumers, but U.S. workers lose in this arrangement. ... As our debts get larger and larger, the need to dedicate resources toward repayment of that debt becomes greater. It also becomes more difficult because the industrial base, which can be relied upon to produce goods to sell abroad, is diminished. China is not responsible for GM’s woes. GM is. Health care costs are. And with oil at 50, the big bets GM and Ford placed on big SUVs certainly have not helped their competitive position. But at the current exchange rate and with surplus capacity in China’s domestic auto sector, China certainly is a competitive threat to US parts suppliers. I bet the real estate market in small Ohio manufacturing towns looks a bit different than the real estate market in San Diego. Protectionist pressure in this case is not coming out of the ether -- it reflects growing imbalances inside the US economy. If Fred Bergsten of the pro-globalization IIE says that you have to "threaten protectionism to avoid protectionism," it is time to take notice. The US does not particularly need an American-owned car industry. But like any external debtor, its life will be a bit easier if it has at least a few thriving export industries.
  • Capital Flows
    it is a good thing Mozambique’s Millennium Challenge Account grant was on the front page of the Wall Street Journal …
    Because apparently, that is the only grant the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) has made to date.Full disclosure: I have several friends who work for the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which administers the Millennium Challenge account -- the Bush Administration’s much hyped new approach to development. I understand why it is taking a long time to get the money out the door. The structure of the program almost guarantees it. First a country has to score high enough on the MCA’s range of tests to be declared eligible. But that is only the beginning. Then the country has to come up with a project, and the MCA has to decide to fund the project. And since the MCA doesn’t want to fund just any standard aid project, finding a match between what the country wants and what the MCA wants is going to take time. For all the gory details, look at this GAO report; or just check at the Center for Global Development’s MCA blog. There is a trade-off between doing something new and different and getting dollars out the door quickly. The Administration has not been able to get aid dollars out the door that fast in Iraq, and no one doubts the Administration’s commitment there. My problem: the surplus of Administration rhetoric around the MCA has almost guaranteed that the program’s rhetoric to results ratio would be bad -- particularly since quick "results" are hard if you are setting up something new. It is hard for the Administration to be taken seriously in development circles if, after three plus years, the Administration’s new approach to development boils down to one $55 million grant ($110 million over four years). That is one 3% of what Denmark gave away in 2003. There is a serious point here. The US is not a big player in the African aid game. In terms of funding, the MCA looks like the aid agency of a small European country; $1.5 billion a year is a bit less than Denmark’s development aid budget. If a country doesn’t get funding from the MCA, there are lots of other potential sources of funding -- that is one reason why I doubt its ultimate impact will live up to its founding rhetoric. One last point: The GAO says that the MCC is also negotiating with Cape Verde, Georgia, Honduras and Nicaragua -- so I suspect it would not be a total surprise if the President announces something during his visit to Georgia.
  • Budget, Debt, and Deficits
    Systemic risk and the thirty year bond …
    I have long worried that as the carry trade gets less profitable (i.e. the difference between the interest rate on short-term and long-term debt falls), hedge funds would respond by doubling up their bets. From what Jim Melcher of Balestra Capital says, that seems to indeed be what has happened.Mr. Melcher is talking his book, but his message still strikes me as important. From the FT:Jim Melcher has anticipated nearly every market meltdown of the past 25 years and profited from them, including the stock market crashes of 1987 and 2000, the bond woes of 1994 and the emerging market crisis of 1998. ... While a market disruption may not come to pass, if it does, "it could be a very nasty scene", he says. The manager’s bet revolves around the remarkable resiliency and popularity among hedge funds of the "carry trade" - the practice of borrowing money at low interest rates and investing it in higher-yielding issues such as junk bonds, emerging market debt and mortgage-backed securities. Hedge funds and other investors have made vast sums over the past two to three years on the spread between short-term US Treasuries and the longer-dated issues. The spreads have narrowed considerably in the past year, making the trade less profitable. Rather than unwind their positions, it is widely believed that many hedge funds have simply used leverage, which sustains the outsize profits on a diminishing trade but heightens downside risks considerably. ... . "The carry trade has been a way for hedge funds and others to make easy money," Mr Melcher says. "But it’s become overcrowded, and any overcrowded position is dangerous when it unwinds." ... "I am worried about the fairly broad systemic effects here," he says. The preponderance of hedge funds in the carry trade is partly what unnerves Mr Melcher. "Hedge fund guys have a very quick trigger finger. When things start going against them, they get out," he notes. If there’s any sort of rush to the exit, "there is no easy way out. And because our financial system is interconnected as it never has been before, everybody is going to get hurt". DeLong’s hard landing scenario hinges, in part, on the assumption that hedge funds will bet wrong on dollar, causing financial distress. I would worry a bit more that hedge funds will get caught betting the wrong way in the fixed income market, whether betting to heavily on curve flattening (a falling spread between short-term and long-term treasuries) or spread compression (a falling spread between risky and risk-free assets; if you borrow short to buy long-term corporate debt, you are hoping to pick up the interest difference, and hoping that the price of the long-term bond rises/ the interest rate on the bond falls). It seems that Randy Quarles -- the future Under Secretary of Domestic Finance at the Treasury -- is considering reintroducing the 30 year bond. I am all for it. And despite the denials, the prospective financing needs associated with partial privatization of Social Security probably has something to do with the idea. After all, the cash flow savings from "Social Security reform" that offset the upfront costs are VERY long term (and I would say, very uncertain). It is the sort of thing that should be financed with long-term debt. Moreover, even in the absence of partial privatization, with deficits as far as the eye can see (using realistic assumptions) the Treasury probably does need to reconsider its heavy reliance on two and three year notes. Remember, lots of two and three year notes issued to finance the 2003 and 2004 deficits will start coming due soon (for data on the surge in two and three note issuance, see pages 7, 16 and 19 of this document), and they will need to be refinanced even as the Treasury is seeking to raise new money to cover the 2005 and 2006 and no doubt 2007 deficits. That said, there is a big difference between replacing $20-30 billion of issuance with two-year notes with thirty-year bonds, and replacing $20-30 billion of ten-year notes with thirty-year bonds. We don’t know if the Treasury is reconsidering its overall plan (see p. 13) to shorten the maturity of the US debt stock. Lengthening the maturity of the debt -- or just no longer shortening it -- does not require resuming issuance of thirty year bonds. It would require issuing more ten-year notes, and fewer bills and short-term notes. What is the link between the Treasury’s issuance plan and hedge funds making ever-more leveraged bets on the carry trade? It is tenuous, but there potentially is one. The yield on long-term bonds has pushed down by structural demand from pension funds looking to do a better job of matching their assets to their liabilities, no doubt. But given the volumes involved, my hunch is that two other factors are even more important: demand from foreign central banks across the entire Treasury curve, and the Treasury’s decision to radically shorten the maturity of its debt stock. The net result has been to squeeze the supply of ten-year notes in private hands, and a slow reduction in the available supply of long bonds. But even as the Treasury is (rightly) reconsidering the risks that arise from the combination of a rising debt stock and a shorter-maturity on that debt stock, demand from central banks for Treasuries may be shrinking somewhat, albeit from an extremely high level. Central banks right now are all talking about diversifying the composition of their dollar reserves, and put less of their still growing reserves into the Treasury market. That supports the case for resuming issuance of the thirty-year bond. It might bring new demand into the Treasury market even as central bank demand fades. Since central banks generally prefer shorter maturities, a shift in the Treasury’s issuance pattern would help to match the bonds the Treasury issues with the bonds the market most wants. But it is at least possible that the Treasury could end up increasing the supply of long-term debt in market just as demand for those Treasuries starts to fade a bit. Who knows, that might even put pressure on rates and some hedge fund might get caught with too large a leveraged bet ... (Note the complaining at the end of this New York Times article). Is it likely a surge in long-term Treasury issuance will change the dynamics of the market? My guess: No, not on its own. But it might interact with something else in the market in an unpredictable way. My bottom line: the Treasury should have started issuing more long-term debt - be it ten year notes or longer term bonds -- back in 2003, even if there was a cost advantage to issuing more short-term debt at the time. The Treasury does need to take steps to reduce its own refinancing risk. But it is at least possible that it may not be able to do so in 2006 without putting more pressure on the market than it expects ... UPDATE. For those with an interest in the Treasury market, this presentation is pure gold.