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Politics, Power, and Preventive Action

Zenko covers the U.S. national security debate and offers insight on developments in international security and conflict prevention.

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Signing Off

Today is my last day at the Council on Foreign Relations after eight and one-half fun and fulfilling years. An archive of everything I authored or co-authored remains here. Subsequently, this is the final post of this blog after more than 400 posts.

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United States
Dictator’s Survival Guide
Libya's leader Qaddafi listens to Venezuelan President Chavez during the plenary session at the Africa-South America Summit on Margarita Island (Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Courtesy Reuters). Today, I have an analytical and satirical piece in ForeignPolicy.com: “The Dictator’s Survival Guide.” Based on the world’s reactions to the Arab Spring – or Arab Transition, the term of art used by some U.S. intelligence analysts – it provides seven lessons for dictators who face popular uprisings and possible foreign military intervention. Although Muammar Qaddafi remains at large, the one common thread in the comments, op-eds, and editorials published over the past two days is that the western intervention into Libya’s civil war “worked.” Ben Rhodes, deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, declared, “This is precisely the way that we had been saying the strategy was supposed to work.” He added, “we were more than able to sustain the pressure for six months, and frankly, would have been able to for many more months to come." Suddenly, the joyful images of Libyans celebrating in Tripoli have invalidated any previous critiques of the NATO-led military campaign. Like the images of Northern Alliance fighters sweeping into Kabul after the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Fidros Square in Baghdad in April 2003, or President George W. Bush’s speech before a red-white-and-blue “Mission Accomplished” banner in May 2003, such moments of “victory” are captivating and memorable. As a result, the complex political and military mistakes made before such short-lived celebrations are often forgotten. As the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan faltered in President Bush’s second term, “regime change” became dirty words. In particular, see this 2005 piece in Foreign Affairs by CFR President Richard Haass: “Regime Change and its Limits.” If more and more analysts and policymakers believe that the costs and likely consequences for regime change “worked” in Libya, it is increasingly likely that we will see calls for a similar application of force in an effort to topple dictators elsewhere. For satirical strategic advice on how those autocrats can survive, read here.
You Might Have Missed
Welcome to a new semi-regular feature of 3PA: “You Might Have Missed.” The objective of this format will be to present news articles, speeches, reports, books, and recent bits of information that could be of interest to readers of this blog, but went unreported in the mainstream media. When possible, I will also highlight quotes, facts, or data that were buried in these publications and provide analysis for how they relate to current or past events. --Damien McElroy, “Libya: rooftop sniper takes a heavy toll in Zawiyah, a city waiting to fall,” London Daily Telegraph, August 16, 2011. “Mansur Saif al-Nasr, the opposition National Transitional Council’s representative in Paris, said yesterday the movement was two weeks away from victory. Control of Zawiyah would open the way to Tripoli. “We are entering a decisive phase. This will allow the population there to revolt.”” (3PA: This puts the predicted end date of the Libyan civil war at August 29.) --Mark A. Bucknam, “Planning is Everything,” Joint Forces Quarterly, July 2011, pp. 52-58. “For a new [military] plan, a combatant commander would go through three different reviews with the Secretary of Defense. Ideally, those in-progress reviews (IPRs) would be spread over a 6-month period, though it often took 12 to 18 months to get through all three IPRs with the Secretary.” (55-56) (3PA: Jump to footnote 13 for the inexplicable reason for this: “The Secretary’s availability has rarely been a factor in these delays. For operations plans, the delays in planning have been due in no small part to DOD failure to field appropriate information technology to assist military planners.”) --United Kingdom Parliament, Commons Public Accounts Committee, The Use of Information to Manage the Defence Logisitics Supply Chain. “The Department has engaged in military operations in Libya since March 2011, which it estimates will cost £260 million [$430 million] if the operations last six months.” (3PA: Compare this to the roughly $1.1 billion that the United States has spent in Libya so far.) “Risks to supply routes can arise unexpectedly: for example, the Department told us that it had increased its target for delivering supplies to Afghanistan through Pakistan from 77-87 days to 120 days due to industrial disputes and increasing security risks.” --James Quinlivan and Olga Oliker, Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: Russian Approaches to a New Environment and Implications for the United States, RAND, 2011. “In the context of the new doctrine—because of the disconnects between the new doctrine and past exercises and evident policy directions—and absent further clarification, U.S. and U.S. Air Force decisionmakers cannot be fully confident about precisely under what circumstances Russia will consider using nuclear weapons, or what sort of nuclear use it might consider.” (xii) (3PA: The full text of Russia’s February 2010 military doctrine is available in Russian and English.) --Central Intelligence Agency, declassified history of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Four volumes: (I) Air Operations, March 1960-1961; (II) Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy; (III) Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies, 1959-January 1961; and (IV) The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs. --“One strange and contradictory note which appeared during WH/4’s staff meeting on 15 November [1960] to plan the briefing for the DDP [Deputy Director of Plans] prior to his participation with the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] in briefing the President elect [Kennedy] was the following item stating: Our [CIA’s] original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted. There will not be the internal unrest earlier believed possible, nor will the defenses permit the type strike first planned. Our second concept (1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action. Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we cannot staff nor otherwise timely create the base and lift needed.” (Volume III, 149) (3PA: In other words, the CIA never thought that its plan to overthrow Fidel Castro, which the CIA briefed to John F. Kennedy before he assumed office, would work. They were right.)
Conflict Prevention
Movie Review: The Interrupters
An aerial view of downtown Chicago is seen from Air Force One July 6, 2006 (Jason Reed/Courtesy Reuters). I want to highly recommend a new documentary film, “The Interrupters,” which provides a gripping account of conflict prevention and mediation as practiced on a personal level in inner-city Chicago. With 300 hours of film shot over fourteen months, the documentary follows the travails of three members of Project CeaseFire, a grassroots non-governmental organization that employs ex-gang members to attempt to mediate neighborhood disputes before they turn violent. The film is a collaboration of Steve James, director and producer of the brilliant 1994 basketball documentary "Hoop Dreams," and Alex Kotlowitz, author of the May 2008 New York Times Magazine article, “Blocking the Transmission of Violence,” which served as the source material for the film. In that article, Kotlowitz explores the ideas developed by Project CeaseFire’s founder, epidemiologist Gary Slutkin. After years of working to halt the spread of tuberculosis, cholera, and AIDS in San Francisco and throughout Africa, Slutkin discovered that street violence is a learned behavior that mimics the spread of infectious diseases. Just as trying to mitigate the outbreak of a disease after transmission does not work and is much more costly than prevention, Slotkin believes that more intensive policing and longer prison sentences were doing nothing to prevent the proliferation of homicides in U.S. cities. With a preventive approach, the Violence Interrupters attempt to tackle a specific “disease”—namely the idea that it is acceptable to use violence to resolve grievances. They do this through patrolling Chicago’s streets to speak directly with gang members, drug dealers, and families of victims who are on the verge of attacking someone out of revenge, or in retaliation for a perceived showing of disrespect. Their methods require that the interrupters listen and empathize with how gang members think, while also being confrontational when necessary to stop a likely imminent shooting. At one moment we see a violence interrupter laid up in a hospital bed after he was shot in the back in an unsuccessful effort to deescalate tensions at a crime scene. On a broader level, Project CeaseFire also tries to transform local norms about violence, through outreach to young children and leading protest marches in post-conflict communities. Because of the intimate access that was provided to the filmmakers, some parts of “The Interrupters” are difficult to watch. Fascinatingly, as the violence is so common, it is also highly ritualized: there are wrenching scenes of funeral speeches, family fights that turn ugly, and innumerable makeshift memorials of stuffed animals, signed cards, and liquor bottles that sprout up at each murder site and then decay as the seasons change. In one small but memorable moment, we see a shrine on a brick wall at the Atgeld Gardens housing project that contains rows and rows of names of violence victims. The camera pans to one brick that simply reads: “I am next.” In another, a funeral director describes the alarming frequency with which he buries young people and how the survivors identify with and even pose with their friend lying in the coffins during ceremonies. The movie doesn’t spend time on details, such as how much Dr. Slutkin’s approach costs versus other community-based programs, where Project CeaseFire get its funding (the State of Illinois and the Department of Justice), and, most importantly, is effectiveness. According to a 2008 Department of Justice evaluation of CeaseFire, in areas where the project was active there was a 41-73% drop in shootings and killings. Ultimately, however, “The Interrupters” is not about monitoring and evaluating a social program, but following people who care and hope to create a more peaceful community in ones where happy endings are few and far between. See “The Interrupters” this fall. You won’t have an experience over two hours and five minutes that persists as long in your mind and makes you think about the enduring problem of violence in America.
  • Defense and Security
    U.S. National Security Strategy: Rhetoric and Reality
    The seal of the President of the United States is seen on the wall of one of the rooms of the newly renovated White House Situation Room complex during a tour given to news photographers in Washington (Yuri Gripas/Courtesy Reuters). Incoming presidential administrations attempt to put their stamp on U.S. foreign policy through policy reviews and new national strategies. Done correctly, they provide strategic guidance to policymakers and bureaucrats by articulating America’s national interests and prioritizing an achievable number of objectives. The goal of policymakers, therefore, is to develop the best means based on the available resources to implement the new national strategy. The alternative to this structured approach is policy development by reacting to events that rise to the attention of political leaders. Of course, this description is not how U.S. foreign policy is made or implemented in the real world. National strategies and policy reviews are often developed over months of intensive inter-agency meetings, assisted by focus groups of outside experts, released with speeches and supporting fact sheets, and soon thereafter forgotten. Perhaps the only such review that people can recall is President George W. Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), which declared that “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” Years later, I discussed the intent of that controversial statement with somebody who was a senior Pentagon official in 2002. While he generally defended the concept of preemption, he also admitted that “actually, we never saw the Strategy before it was published.” With policymakers and scholars increasingly calling for “whole-of-government” or “whole-of-society” approaches to many problems facing America, Washington is in an era of national strategy proliferation. Under President Barack Obama, there have been at least twenty-three major strategy or policy reviews of foreign policy and national security issues, which are listed below. These do not include non-foreign policy reviews, such as the National Prevention Strategy (think health care, not conflict), or the National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship. Nor does this list include congressionally-mandated reviews or reviews, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review’s Independent Panel (co-chaired by Stephen Hadley and William Perry), The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century. I invite readers to skim through the list and read some of the Obama administration’s strategies or policy reviews. Several issues will become apparent. First, while the NSS is supposed to serve as the framework for strategy documents produced by various government agencies, it was actually released after several of the other documents were published. Second, as political and military officials repeat the mantra that “strategy should precede budget cuts,” you will notice that there is rarely any discussion about how national security spending is supposed to align with the strategic imperatives presented. Third, a constant message that runs through all of these documents is the necessity for either “building partner capacity” or “engaging with other key centers of influence” to have other countries deal with problems facing the United States. This approach assumes that the targeted country interests—as detailed in their own national strategies and policy reviews—are aligned with the United States. As America’s power wanes, this will be increasingly unlikely. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States, 2009. White House, Cyberspace Policy Review, May 2009. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, August 2009. National Security Strategy, National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, November 2009. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, February 2010. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, February 2010. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, April 2010. White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010. White House, National Drug Control Strategy, May 2010. White House, National Space Policy, June 2010. White House, U.S. Global Development Policy, September 2010. Department of State, Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, December 2010. Department of Defense/Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space Strategy, January 2011. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Guidance for 2011, January 2011. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy, February 2011. White House, National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, April 2011. White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace, May 2011. White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011. White House, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, July 2011. White House, National Drug Control Strategy, July 2011. White House, Cyberspace Policy Review, July 2011. Department of Defense, Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, July 2011. White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism, August 2011.
  • United States
    What Does Libya Cost the United States?
    A woman holds a poster of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi during a protest over the recent NATO air strike in Majar, in front of the Hungarian embassy in Tripoli August 11, 2011. Libyan officials said dozens of civilians had been killed in the NATO strike on a cluster of farmhouses east of Tripoli, but the alliance said it hit a legitimate military target (Paul Hackett/Courtesy Reuters). When the international coalition intervened militarily in Libya’s civil war on March 19, one of the criticisms that opponents most often repeated was the issue of potential costs. Senator Richard Lugar, for example, warned that “The fact is we cannot afford more wars now.” This genuine concern stemmed from the growing U.S. national debt, which has been exacerbated by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which collectively have cost the Pentagon a minimum of $1.3 trillion (in 2012 dollars) since 9/11. Even today, with U.S. combat troops in Iraq scheduled to fully withdraw in 142 days, and 33,000 troops returning home from Afghanistan over the next year, the costs to American taxpayer’s for both wars remains staggeringly high. A March 2011 Congressional Research Service report estimated that military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were costing $6.7 billion and $6.2 billion a month, respectively. (In Pakistan, foreign aid and reimbursements given to the Pakistani military for counterinsurgency operations cost the United States around$300M a month.) However, the worst fears about how much the intervention in Libya would cost have proven to be unfounded. The total direct expenditures to the United States in Libya over the past six months are less than the costs of one week of Iraq or Afghanistan. This amount for Libya includes military operations, humanitarian aid, and non-lethal assistance. That the U.S. role has been relatively affordable does not justify an intervention that was hastily assembled, legally dubious, and conducted with limited means that have failed to achieve the ultimate objective, which Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta declared was “to do what we can to bring down the regime of [Libyan leader Muammar] Qaddafi.” The cost of military operations is difficult to determine, since the Pentagon has not been forthcoming regarding Libya. Nevertheless, five data points are available either from official releases or media leaks that can be used to extrapolate current expenditures: March 30, $550 million; April 11, $608 million; Mid-May, $664 million; June 3, $714 million; and June 30: $820 million. It is unclear if these numbers include replacing known aircraft loses, including the crashes of an F-15 on March 21 (roughly $30 million) and a MQ-8 Fire Scout on June 21 ($9 million). However, it can be assumed that U.S. military operations costs in Libya per month are between $60-$80 million, with total current costs around $1 billion. The cost of humanitarian aid is easier to determine thanks to the weekly “Libya: Disaster Response Updates,” which the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has published since late February. The latest update lists the total USAID and State Department humanitarian funding at $84 million. Finally, the amount of (overt) non-lethal assistance has remained $25 million since the April 26 presidential memorandum, which authorized the “drawdown of nonlethal commodities and services from the inventory and resources of any agency of the United States Government… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya.” It is unclear if all of this non-lethal assistance has been dispersed. On May 10, the State Department announced that one shipment of halal meals, medical supplies, uniforms, boots, and tents had been made, with a second shipment arriving in Benghazi on June 17. Therefore, based on the available data, the total direct expenditures of America’s role in Libya is approximately $1.1 billion and counting. Assuredly, there are also covert funds being dispersed (hopefully, with close congressional oversight), and there will be equipment and munitions replacement costs that require additional future funds. In addition, it is impossible to calculate what U.S. personnel and resources will be needed to help stabilize and rebuild Libya after the civil war ends. (For an excellent overview on U.S. options for a post-Qaddafi Libya, read this Contingency Planning Memorandum by Daniel Serwer.) That the American role in the intervention in Libya has been relatively inexpensive does not mean it was strategically wise. Furthermore, almost six months in the end date remains predominantly in the hands of one political leader. On the eve of the military intervention, Muammar Qaddafi vowed to fight a long war "with unlimited patience and deep faith." Unfortunately, he was telling the truth, and the people of Libya are paying the ultimate price.