“Still Ours to Lead:” Bruce Jones Explains Why the World Still Looks to the United States

Manifestoes about U.S. “decline,” have become a publishing juggernaut. But this literature is demolished in a beautifully written, persuasive new book from Bruce Jones, the Brookings Institution senior fellow. In Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and Restraint, Jones explains that the declinists have it all wrong. First, on nearly every measure of material power, the United States is the world’s dominant player—and will remain so for some time. Second, there is no plausible alternative to U.S. leadership, given weaknesses within and divisions among major emerging powers. Third, the United States remains the undeniable and indispensable pivot of world politics; it is the only player capable of forging effective global partnerships to confront pressing transnational threats. Lastly, most rising powers in today’s world have at least as many incentives to exercise strategic restraint as they do to engage in rivalry with the United States. In short, the United States is an “enduring” rather than declining power. And the world is still its to lead.

If there is a gap in this book, it is the incomplete treatment of how power translates into leadership. Jones shows that the United States dominates on  multiple measures of material power. The trick, of course, is to convert this potential into actual influence over actors and outcomes. Leadership, after all, implies “followers.” Jones offers little policy guidance on how the United States might better deploy its resources to shape the incentives of countries that are on the fence about following its lead. Nor does he fully explore the implications of what Susan Strange called U.S. “structural power”—that is,  the ability of the United States to get its way not merely by deploying incentives in one-on-one bargaining situations but indeed by determining the very context in which other countries must operate. Still, this is a concept he seems to appreciate intuitively, given his insights on the dollar’s role as the world’s main reserve currency, or of the geopolitical implications of U.S. control of the sea lanes. His analysis is weaker when it comes to “soft power”—that elusive, fragile influence the United States supposedly gains from its attractive political values, domestic institutions, and popular culture. The question the book never answers is whether—given its controversial national security policies,  corrosive domestic politics, and role in the global financial crisis—the bloom is now off the rose.

But the biggest lacuna in Still Ours to Lead is its inattention to the domestic preconditions of U.S. global leadership—specifically, the capacity of the U.S. political system to marshall the political will and domestic resources required to retain its historic role as the custodian of world order. And here there is grave room for doubt, given intense partisanship and legislative gridlock in Congress, as well as broad popular sentiments for retrenchment (if not true isolationism). To be fair, Jones explicitly concedes that he will not address this topic, leaving it to others to argue that foreign policy begins at home. And it may be too much to demand that one book do it all. In the end, Jones’ message is  a simple one: the world is still ready for U.S. leadership, if we grasp the nettle.

One of the delights of this book is its conversational tone. Manuscripts on weighty policy matters are often just that: heavy, self-important tomes laden with dense prose and groaning with jargon. Jones’ style is lighter and informal. He weaves data together with illustrative anecdotes and bits of humor to make his point. In short, it’s a lively conversation with an engaging and intelligent friend over drinks. (Full disclosure: Being one of Bruce’s lucky friends, I’ve had this pleasure to enjoy over many years).