Nuclear Power and Proliferation: Rising Energy Demand and Global Security Risks

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi discusses the growing interest in acquiring nuclear weapons among nation-states, advancements in nuclear technology, the increasing global demand for nuclear energy, the evolving nuclear weapons programs in North Korea and Iran, and the impact of these historic trends on nuclear security, nuclear energy, and the viability of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

MURRAY: Hello. Good morning. And welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations’ meeting today on Nuclear Power and Proliferation: Rising Energy Demands and Global Security Risks, with Rafael Grossi, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. I’m Lori Esposito Murray. I’m a senior fellow for national security here at the Council and managing director for CEO Programs. And it is truly my privilege to welcome you today.

GROSSI: Thank you.

MURRAY: Rafael sits at the top of—at the tip of the spear of the international consensus to stop the spread—the nonproliferation regime—stop the spread of nuclear weapons. And also, the mission to ensure that nuclear energy is used for peaceful, civilian purposes to benefit societies. This has been a longstanding goal of the international community and of the United States. President Truman, when he announced the dropping of the first atomic bomb, had talked about how atomic energy in the future could actually supplement the energy that was coming from fossil fuels and from water. And that this was the hope that we were going to continue to research, seeing it—seeing that we had unleashed the power of the sun, to use it for peaceful purposes.

And Rafael Grossi is actually leading at a time, as we all know, when the international order is under attack, major upheaval. And that includes the nonproliferation regime. But it’s also a time of incredible opportunity. And we see this on the nuclear energy side, where the challenges of climate and the needs and demands of technology for a rapid technological global economy, actually, nuclear energy can play a very significant role in having us optimize those opportunities. And so we have a lot we’re going to discuss today, a lot on the nuclear agenda.

But I want to start with Iran. And we are really privileged to have you here because you’ve just come back from the talks in—the U.S.-Iranian talks in Italy. And you’ve also attended the first round of talks. You’ve been talking with the Iranians ever since the—throughout the time period of the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. And as a starting point, since the IAEA’s gage of breakout is usually what people rely on to determine the state of the Iranian nuclear program, how close is Iran to actually having a nuclear weapon? And what are the significant changes that have happened in the program since 2018, since the collapse of the JCPOA, that actually complicates constraining that program?

GROSSI: Yeah. Well, thank you very much. First of all, it’s a great pleasure to see you again and to be with so many friends, new and old friends. And indeed, like you say, these are important times, times of big challenges and hopefully opportunities, like you say.

In the case of Iran, well, this is a long story. The story goes back many, many years. Some of you in the room have been playing different roles in this story and history. And I would say that we are at a particular phase which is fraught with opportunity, but of course pretty sensitive, if not dangerous, because, to answer part of your question, Iran is not far from having a nuclear weapon. They don’t have it. We know it. And I always try to repeat so as not to confuse people internationally. But the great difference is that the material for it is already there, to make a few warheads. And that they have in the past, as we all know, conducted research and even testing some of the necessary elements for a nuclear device, which have remained in some form present, or at least we don’t have full confidence that they are—they have disappeared completely.

So of course, you know, dates are always arbitrary. But they are not far. It would be, you know, a matter of months not years, indeed. So this is why we, I believe, have a huge responsibility on our shoulders to try to prevent that from happening. And all these talks, all these meetings these days, are aimed at that. I think the Iran negotiations, the process has, of course, over the years, seen different phases, ups and downs, and moments of great dynamism followed by moments of impasse and limbo, so to speak. And I would say—I would characterize the past few months, and perhaps year, as more or less fitting in that category. The category of not seeing real progress. Talks continuing. You should remember that the IAEA continues to inspect. It’s not that there is a gap—there’s a complete gap. There is, I would say, insufficient, I would say, degree of visibility as we see it necessary.

So now, of course, with the new administration, there is an opportunity. And in here you have to remember that we are an impartial, international organization. And we are trying to solve problems with the cards that are dealt on the table. So we are—this I say especially in Washington, because approaches and political views and perspectives can play, and should perhaps play, a role. But for us, what’s—I’m always trying—I should be professionally optimistic, but very prudent. And when I say “professionally optimistic” is that when we see an opportunity we have to try to go for it. And we see an opportunity here, and it’s obvious, because we see Iran and the United States talking directly in a way that had never happened before, I should say. There was in the previous administration a very useful, very professional back channel, as we know. But that was running in parallel with more formal negotiations. And it was a little—sort of an in between.

Now there is a process. You see the faces. You see the people. You see the places where these talks are ongoing. The important thing is to—of course, to get it right, and to try to get Iran to accept the kind of restrictions that are indispensable to get—or for us, for example, for The IAEA, to give the international community the assurances that things are more or less OK.

MURRAY: So the Iranian foreign minister said that there is, after the second round of talks—and he said this on the record—that there are—there’s a better understanding of the principles and the goals heading into now this third round of technical talks, and then another meeting among the principals involved in the negotiations. Can you share with us what that better understanding is? And of the—what are these principles and goals that you think are providing a framework?

GROSSI: There are limits to what can be shared, but I would say something which I think is important. First of all, the process continues. And this is very important for me. Saturday was very important because the first meeting in Oman had been an exploratory meeting, then Saturday. So there is an incremental. There is an incremental process, like in any negotiation. Of course, there is no guarantee of success in negotiation, in particular this kind—this type of negotiation, which is so peculiar, half direct, half indirect. Can, you know, fail at any—at any time. But I think it’s important that after the sessions there is, of course, an incremental—an incremental level of mutual knowledge and ideas that are put on the table.

So it is obvious that—I’m not revealing any secrets here—that the enrichment chapter is a very big chapter. That is part of that conversation. And the weaponization chapter is another very important part of that conversation. Of course, you can decline these two into so many configurations of what can be done, and in what way. But it’s important that the key areas are being covered.

MURRAY: And another major change that has happened since the negotiations of the JCPOA, of course, is what’s happening with Russia and China, their relationship with both Iran and North Korea. And we’ll get to North Korea in just a minute. But how is that—you know, these are U.S.-Iranian talks, but how are Russia and China playing in this? And do you see it as a more difficult time than earlier, when it was a broader consensus on nonproliferation?

GROSSI: Well, yeah, it is more complex, in a certain sense. But I guess there’s one important and positive thing. I was also in Beijing discussing with Wang Yi just a few days ago, the foreign minister—who is a very important senior figure in the Chinese system, I would say, apart from his formal duties and responsibilities. And what we can see, what I got from him, was a first—was a very firm support for the—for the process. And the—a very firm commitment, rather—yeah, commitment and conviction that we should not have an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. So that, I think, for me, is very, very, very important.

So how will this impact the negotiating process? I think indirectly, because unlike the past, where they had a place at the table, they don’t. Neither do the Europeans. So it’s a different sort—although they are gravitating around it, they are influencing it very, very decisively because they have their talks, they have their privileged channels of communications. Let’s not forget that now Russia and Iran share a different and much higher level of political, I would say, including some agreements in the defense area and others. So all of this is influencing the nucleus, if you want. But the nucleus continue to be a bilateral, which is United States and Iran.

MURRAY: So, given the complexity of the problem since 2018, given the short timeframe that President Trump has put on the road forward—I believe it’s sixty days, he had actually used a number—how optimistic should we be?

GROSSI: I think it’s really important that the process continues. It’s really important that we don’t—we don’t have a breakdown in the process. And that, as I said, incrementally that is a deeper or higher—depending on how you want to characterize it—degree of knowledge and depth in the discussion. So from the big enunciations—Iran says we don’t have anything, there’s nothing to hide, OK, the United States has a different—and in general, the international community, because we, I, as director general of the IAEA, I have repeatedly, and before any process started, said that there is no justification for enrichment at 60 percent. And that Iran is the only country not having nuclear weapons that is enriching material at this level.

So I think that the discomfort exists. And they have to—they have to address it. The Iranians need to address it. They don’t deny this for the moment, which is important. This is one of the things I was telling Mr. Araghchi the other day when he’s professing all these things. I said, well, you can say all what you can say, but there is no confidence, all right? So you want to—you want to restore the confidence? There are certain things that you must do. Not the United States, or the IAEA. It’s in your hands, completely in your hands. So it’s the ongoing conversation. I think we are good insofar as we are rowing.

MURRAY: So if we can quickly turn to North Korea, you have been a strong proponent over the years for reengaging with North Korea. And similarly, can you give us an update? Since their last engagement, North Korea, U.S. President Trump directly engaged, how has the program advanced? And have we reached a level where disarmament of the Korean Peninsula, you know, and the non-nuclear peninsula, is that a feasible goal?

GROSSI: Well, you you’ve heard a very important foreign minister saying that this is off the table, and we have to face the realities. Of course, you know, countries will have their views. I think since we left, or were invited to leave the country in 2009, a lot has happened. And the IAEA, by the way, continues to be the only—the only institution continuing to provide technical analysis of what is going on. There used to be U.N. group of experts that was disbanded. And we have a pretty good idea of what is going on there. It has spawned exponentially. The program is no longer, you know, the complex at Yongbyon. It’s Kangson. It’s other places also in the country. It’s a light water reactor. It’s a second and perhaps a third enrichment facility being built at the moment. It’s a reprocessing campaign, which is ongoing as we speak. And there’s, you know, a nuclear arsenal that exists.

The thing there is, I believe, to—and I have also been—I mean, I’m criticized every day for everything I do—(laughter)—but it’s part of the job. But I have been saying that we need to engage. I mean, you cannot have a country like this, which is completely off the charts with this nuclear arsenal. And with such a big—it’s something I was discussing in China and in other places—with such a big program, nuclear program, with all these facilities, without us having any clue of any safety or security measure which is being applied to it. So I believe, at any rate, engaging—being a diplomat, for me that’s part of my DNA—engaging is indispensable. I know that for some—and I understand, I have great respect for them—you have to have—you know, it’s only they disarm or we don’t talk. Well, unfortunately, things are a bit more complicated in international life.

And you’re not—you’re not going to get everything you want, especially when a country has acquired such a big nuclear arsenal. (Laughs.) So I think you have to start by talking. And so I this is why I believe—and I’ve been saying this in many places—presidential diplomacy is important, is important. Because big decisions are taken bottom down, not top bottom. We are all great experts here. It’s not because we make a great paper that, you know, we are going to see something—a breakthrough. It’s when the leaders are convinced that it’s the moment and something needs to be done. Of course, we can, you know, advocate. We can convince. We can explain. We can highlight the problems. But we need—we need engagement from the top. And this is—you know, these exchanges of letters between President Trump and the leader—it was not the leader himself. He was a governmental collective sort of letter coming back. I think it is—it is important, for all the deficits this may have.

MURRAY: So how—with North Korea, the relationship with Russia is even more advanced, with the resurrection of the defense treaty as well as the nexus with China. How is that impacting a reengagement?

GROSSI: Well, it’s not impacting it, since there is no reengagement at all.

MURRAY: Or the possibilities of a reengagement?

GROSSI: I think that could be worked out.

MURRAY: Do you think Russia and China would be encouraging of reengaging with North Korea? Or is it radio silent?

GROSSI: I don’t see them—I don’t see them being against. Of course, you have to define what kind of engagement. But I don’t think they would be a priority against some form of engagement. Again, I say this with enormous prudence because you will have all the prerequisites that are, you know, presented from one side or the other. The alternative is to have this continue. And maybe we can be—all be very happy in our conscience that we are not compromising on any principles, while a nuclear stockpile grows, and grows, and grows, and grows. It’s an alternative. It’s a choice.

MURRAY: So, stepping back and looking at the global dynamics, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine debates and conversations are actually happening publicly around the world as to how important having nuclear weapons is for deterrence. You also have questioning of the U.S. extended deterrence, the U.S. nuclear umbrella. What are you hearing and seeing and talking to leaders around the world in terms of what’s happening to the nonproliferation consensus?

GROSSI: Well, it’s eroding. This is very clear to me. I think there should be, and I’m happy to see that there are, opportunities to discuss this. And there is an awareness of the need to discuss about this. Next Monday I’ve been invited by the French foreign minister, Jean-Noël Barrot, to come to New York, to the Security Council, to talk about what’s happening in nonproliferation. And I welcome this. Of course, they will ask about Iran, and what have you. But simply because all these developments that we are discussing here, what is happening between Russia and Ukraine, what is happening with North Korea, in other parts of the world as well, obviously is having a huge impact on the nonproliferation regime, which is at a bigger risk than ever before, in my opinion.

And the reason is very simple. And this is something you will hear me say a lot these days. Let me put it like this. In the past when we talk about the NPT and the nonproliferation regime, you would expect that these basic pillars—the pillar of the NPT would be challenged or questioned by one or the other nation/country in the fringes of law—in the Middle East, maybe Iraq—or, the Iraq of Saddam Hussein would be challenging it. Now it’s different. Now we are seeing countries in very good standing with the NPT asking the question: Is it good? Is this what we need? Isn’t it the time to start thinking about something else? And I’m talking about very important countries here. Allies of the United States as well.

So we are seeing a challenge coming from a place, or a challenge, or a question—put the name you want to it—from an unexpected place, from unexpected actors. So—and we can imagine. We can only imagine what would be the fate of the NPT, or the nonproliferation regime writ large, if all of a sudden, we would start to have countries popping up with nuclear weapons programs. Or I would say—I’m from Argentina, you know. Forty years of diplomacy. I’ve seen it all, not only in my country, in everywhere. You know, at G-77, nonaligned, we left the nonaligned. I was in every table. That’s the advantage I had. I was with the IAEA. I was with the OPCW. I was in NATO when Argentina was associated with it. So I’ve been in all the tables.

And the thing was that the big criticism, especially from the countries in the, I don’t know how they call them now, the emerging countries or the Global South, I don’t know, was that the problem, the big problem was that the big powers were not disarming. And that was the—that was the real challenge for the NPT. But not anymore. I mean, they can continue saying that, but now we have another problem. Now there are all sorts of questions coming from everywhere. Of course, developing nations, and rightly so. I don’t want to be disrespectfully ironic. They have a claim to say, well, we entered this contract where it said that nuclear disarmament had to happen. And it never happened.

But now also, other countries are saying, well, I think, you know what, nuclear weapon thing is perhaps something we should think about. So go figure what kind of—what kind of equation we might—I am not saying this is going to happen. But I think it’s important that you, as analysts, and we, as responsible for the integrity of the regime, think about it. And this is—since you were asking me what we are discussing, the privilege of my position is that it gives me the opportunity to talk to some of these very important people. And these are ideas that I try to leave with them when I discuss these things with them.

MURRAY: OK, so you have the challenges to the nonproliferation regime, writ large, coming from unexpected places. And then we have the potential of a renaissance and nuclear energy.

GROSSI: Yes.

MURRAY: You’ve been a leader in providing diplomatic leadership on these issues, as you mentioned, for over forty years. You’ve been through these cycles of optimism, expecting a renaissance in nuclear energy. Why is this different? And what are the most important drivers in terms of—

GROSSI: Well, this is a reflection of life. Life is full of contradiction and opportunity. It doesn’t mean that because we have all these challenges—the economies are not moving, innovation continues, people want to have good solutions for their economy, their—I mean, everything that moves us collectively. And the difference now, in terms of what we are seeing in the nuclear field, is that—I mean, there are many differences, but let me cite an example which is completely new, or that has not—has never happened before. For the first time, you have private sector demand driven ask for nuclear. This never, ever happened before. So nuclear was, you know, utilities. Nuclear was mainly state-oriented, or pushed from the public sector if you want. But now you have what we see every day.

You have all the companies—and not only in the AI sector. Because, I mean, this is the obvious one that everybody knows about. You know, Meta and Google and all these contracts that have been signed, and people saying that we want twenty SMRs by 2035, and all of these movement. And the IAEA is pretty much on top of this, as you know. But you have the shipping sector. You have the steel sector. You have people coming to us, again, from unexpected places. And what we are trying to do is to frame this, to federate this in an intelligent way because, obviously, for more nuclear you need intelligent regulation, you need capacity building, you need workforce, and so on. So this is one big difference, if you compare the nuclear renaissance of the 1990s, when people were talking about the end of the 1990s, where people were saying, oh, it’s coming back, et cetera. And that did not materialize. So what we see now is a different thing.

And then—that’s one factor. Which, again, I would—then is completely new. The other important factor is the energy security debate. And more than debate, the energy security problems that many countries are having. The geostrategic tensions that we have make it so that countries regret overreliance on certain suppliers, that they want to have a margin of maneuver that, as we know, nuclear as part of its many advantages provide. So this is why we see the urgency in Central and Eastern Europe. I mean, it’s so obvious. So you will see Czechia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, every country—even the only big one, Poland, which did not have nuclear energy, moving even faster than the others because they need to catch up—introducing and pushing very, very hard to have nuclear energy.

So with these two examples I think I’m giving a very clear difference between previous moments—I don’t want to talk about renaissance. You know, I always say I like to talk about a return to realism more than renaissance. Good old commonsense realism. You’re not going to make it without nuclear. You have a big economy, if you need dispatchable energy, if you don’t want to, you know, make the climate thing going worse than it is, it is obvious that is one of the tools. We are not rabid militants of nuclear energy. (Laughs.) We are not. But we see that the configuration of factors around the nuclear energy possibility is very, very different from the past.

MURRAY: So one question before we open it up. And that’s on Zaporizhzhia, and what is happening there, the basic takeover of the power plant by the Russians. How is that impacting—and you’ve been there. Obviously, this is the IAEA’s responsibility—one of its major responsibilities. How is that impacting the debate about nuclear energy, watching a power plant that actually is the major power plant for Europe occupied in during a war? And what needs to be done to deter this? So is that having a reaction in terms of enthusiasm for nuclear—

GROSSI: Well, I would say—it’s an excellent question. I would say that people are very reassured that we are there. And we would never say, never, mission accomplished—(laughs)—because until there is a ceasefire or until there is—let alone peace. But until we see much less military activity in the vicinity of the plant, the possibility of having something serious of cannot be excluded. But the fact that we are here, we managed to make—to elbow out our way into the plant, and stay there, and continue staying there and doing our job independently—in spite of all the pressures and, you know, the difficulties that is obvious—is one very important factor. So I believe that this has not been blown out of proportion because there is a certain degree of restraint which is being exercised. And I don’t want to take credit when credit is not due, but I wouldn’t say that it is indifferent that we are there.

Anything could happen at that plant, but we have our people. And we had several occasions, several occasions, where the plant was either shelled or attacked with drones. Or, you may remember, last summer, there was this—they had the cooling tower up in flames. So there were very, very critical moments where the fact that the IAEA could immediately say what was going on, if there was a danger in terms of radiological levels and things like that, was, you know, invaluable. Invaluable. You remember the beginning of the war, the Russian troops seized not only Zaporizhzhia but Chernobyl, hmm? And at that time, there was talk—even at very high level of leaders, which should think twice before they, you know, saw panic in the population—saying now we are on the verge of having another Chernobyl—Chernobyl 1986. And of course, we went there. We took the measurements. We deployed a team which stayed there. And of course, perhaps that did not accommodate the political narrative of some, I don’t know. But this is our job, to stay the course and to be impartial.

MURRAY: And a very important job. So let’s open it up. A reminder, this is on the record.

GROSSI: Hello.

Q: Hi. Barbara Slavin from the Stimson Center. Pleasure to have you back in Washington.

GROSSI: Thank you.

Q: In the talks that are going on between the U.S. and Iran, we know that Foreign Minister Araghchi is a very experienced diplomat, former negotiator of the JCPOA. Steve Witkoff, not so much. So can you give us your impression of the American team that is backing up Steve Witkoff? Does he have sufficient expertise from the Trump administration to advise him on the technical aspects of negotiating a new deal? Thank you.

GROSSI: Well, as you can imagine, I wouldn’t judge either way whether the Iranian team is fantastic or the American team is less so, or—I think this is a group of very committed professionals. They know the huge responsibility they have, on both sides. And they know that peace in the Middle East, if not in the world, depends on them having a successful operation. I’m pretty confident there is—the necessary expertise is there. And from the side of the IAEA, we are trying to help. We are trying to help. And I know you understand that I should not perhaps go too much into detail, but this is how we see it. It’s a moment of huge, huge, huge responsibility for everybody.

MURRAY: Let’s go all the way back.

Q: Hi. Beth Sanner from German Marshall Fund.

GROSSI: Hello.

Q: I had a question about—I think this is really one of the most important things raised today, which is about the risk of proliferation, coming out of the—you know, our realities today. But I want to skip over why we’re there, and really welcome your point about having a conversation about why that matters. And I think too often right now, we kind of fall back on defending institutions just because they’re the institutions we know, understand, and believe in. And what I’m asking you today is, if I was trying to explain to, you know, my mom or my kid why does this matter, why does counter-proliferation, why does preventing proliferation—or, what are the risks involved in proliferation? Because I think we’re kind of skipping over those ideas. And we need to kind of get the basics down. Too many people right now are just talking about it like it’s no big deal. And I would love more vocabulary, rather than “that’s scary.” (Laughter.)

GROSSI: Well, I—thank you for that question. As a multiple father, I have—I have eight kids. And I have been confronted because I would not be at a soccer game or a birthday. I had to explain many times. And I’m very serious about this, because it goes right to your heart, why aren’t you there, dad? And you have to explain. You have to explain, why is it important that you are doing a certain thing? And I think it’s the best analogy that you can have why this counts. I think the risk in terms of proliferation is that you lower dramatically the bar of the possibility of nuclear weapons really being used in the many conflicts that you see around the world, or people even provoking or moving into situations of conflict because of the renewed, between quotes, “confidence” that they would get out of believing that they have a nuclear weapon, and they can alter a longstanding territorial dispute or ethnical dispute with another country.

And I know this has been the traditional position of the United States. I think the NPT has been tremendously successful. Tremendously successful. And I don’t know why we were shying away from that to say it loud and clear. This is perhaps the most successful international treaty that exists. The fact is that we created a system whereby we need to say it collectively again every five years. And we believe that if we cannot come with A united voice saying the NPT is fantastic, then the NPT is failing. The NPT does not depend on the final statement of a conference. Imagine if we had to have a review conference of the U.N. Charter every five years, or any other convention that exists.

Of course, you are going to answer depending on the realities of the day. Look at those politicians that go for a referenda, believing that people are going to be focusing on the big thing, and maybe they are voting because of taxes, and maybe they are voting—and I’m not talking about Europe. Let’s say Colombia, where the peace plan was rejected because people were not happy with the government of the day, or what happened with Brexit, et cetera. So I think it is very, very important that we keep in mind why it’s important to have these norms, and what these norms have given us. Yeah, they have not given us perfection. But there is no such thing under the sun.

MURRAY: We have about 200 people online, so I think we’ll turn to an online question.

GROSSI: Yeah.

MURRAY: Is that coming through? OK. (Laughs.) We’ll go to Dan.

Q: Hi, can you hear me?

MURRAY: Oh, here it comes.

Q: Yes. Yes, hi, Director General. It’s Pamela Falk from U.S. News and World Report.

GROSSI: Hello, Pamela.

Q: Hello, Director General. Good to see you.

GROSSI: Yeah.

Q: You got a lot on your—in your toolbox these days. My question is, how do you foresee the U.S.—if there is a U.S.-Iran agreement, in terms of the IAEA verifying compliance? You’ve met with Witkoff. You’ve met with the Iranians. What is your view of how it would work? Would the parties of the JCPOA be involved, or would it just be bilateral? And how urgent is it? Thank you so much.

GROSSI: Thank you, Pamela. You know, it’s an important question because we all know that for any agreement, and especially an agreement of this type which will hopefully include very specific parameters and objectives and commitments, somebody has to verify those. And the natural institution to do that should be the IAEA, in our opinion. Of course, this is a bilateral agreement. And at least theoretically nothing would prevent the parties to the agreement to say, well, I don’t know, we will create a corps of inspector—I don’t know. I think it will be so complicated and so politically complex to do that, while having, you know, the international authority that is—on top of that, is there, and at the very least will have to set the baseline for the negotiation, because we are there, and we are the ones that are able—the only ones that are able to say Iran has so much of this, so much of that, et cetera. So I think the logical expectation—and I haven’t heard—let me put it like this. I haven’t heard, neither from Ambassador Witkoff nor from the Iranian foreign minister, that they do not see the IAEA helping and playing this role, if they hopefully come to an agreement. Thank you.

MURRAY: Dan.

Q: Dan Poneman, Council on Foreign Relations. Welcome back to Washington.

GROSSI: Thank you.

Q: Two related questions. Between COP-28 and -29 we now have over thirty governments having pledged to triple nuclear capacity by 2050. In your judgment, with all the people you’re seeing—I won’t say, can it happen—what would it take to achieve that, and the role of the IAEA in making sure it’s done safely? And the corollary to that is there’s a bow wave, as you well know, of enthusiasm in Africa—the only continent which will have a greater population in 2050 than it does today. From, you know, Togo in the west, to Kenya, down to Namibia. IAEA has had a traditional role in addressing energy poverty and other nuclear applications, including agriculture and medicine, and not just regulating safeguards but also enabling countries to move safely into that direction. So, A, on COP, how can we get there? What’s the role of the IAEA? And, B, a special comment perhaps on Africa and the role of the agency?

GROSSI: Yeah. Well, thank you, Dan. It’s great to see you again.

Well, on the first one and how to materialize this tripling or doubling or, depending on—I mean, considerable increase in—there are many, many things that need to happen. On some of them, the IAEA is working and can help. Some others, perhaps less. And it’s rightly so. It’s part of the private sector. It’s part of the entrepreneurship that is into the activity, of course. But I would cite a few. One important one is financing, which is, of course, key when it comes to—you are mentioning Africa. I can say that after a couple of meetings this morning I will be heading to the World Bank, where I started, for the first time, a conversation on this. You know that there are some arcane old documents in that great institution that prohibit financing anything nuclear. And when I start digging—I started digging and asking Ajay Banga to dig with me—and I praise to him, because he said, yeah, we should look into this. Why?

And then we discovered that really this has never—had never been approved by the board of the World Bank, et cetera. I mean, it doesn’t matter. But what is good is that now he has instructed their teams to work with our ours, and we are going to be moving into, hopefully, having these restrictions lifted so that people and countries, if they so wish—if they so wish, nobody is forcing anybody to do anything—(laughs)—if they so wish, a country, a middle-sized country in Africa or in Central America or in South America or in Southeast Asia, would require some support from the IFC, or the World Bank, or the Asian Development Bank, can do it without looking at this as if this was some delinquent activity that they would be—so it’s absolutely crazy what we had. So that is one thing that we tackle—I tackled head on. And I am grateful to the president of the World Bank for having accepted try to go into this.

We are talking to banks. We are talking to the money people. And the money people, when they talk to us they ask the questions on the safety and on the nonproliferation angles. So, again, we are the standard setters, in terms of internationally agreed nuclear safety regulations and principles. We work with countries on the capacity building. We are talking about Africa, and in some countries they have quite a thin, you know, capacity in terms of human resources. And we are helping them. The regulatory capacity, which is, of course, indispensable. You cannot host a nuclear power plant or anything nuclear if you don’t have a good regulator. And in the IAEA we have something which is called the milestones approach, which is a nuclear for dummies sort of thing, from one to nineteen. It’s nineteen steps.

You know what? There is one country that follow that, and it’s called the United Arab Emirates. From zero—they followed the book of the IAEA. And from zero to four nuclear power plants. A third of the energy of Dubai and Abu Dhabi comes from nuclear power plants, all right? So here you have an example of the—of some of the ways in which the IAEA can facilitate, can put oil in the wheels. And then it’s the private sector. And we are engaging in—we are embracing the private sector, something that the IAEA did not do so much in the past. We are bringing them. In December we are going to have a big meeting of all these companies in the AI, IT sector, and countries, and regulators, to bring them together and to see how you do what you want to do. Because this issue of datacenters, for example, there are many developing countries that are interested in that, and interested in having microreactors, and small modular reactors. And of course, they come to us. What do we need to do? So that’s more or less how it goes. Thank you, Dan.

MURRAY: And you’ve been at the forefront of engaging early the private sector.

GROSSI: Oh, yes. Well, it’s indispensable. It’s indispensable. You know, some people were saying, why are you doing this? Well, you know, the statute of the agency I lead talks about promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And who is doing the things? You know, it’s a private sector. We have to embrace them. We have to work with them. We have to help them, I would even say. What’s wrong in helping a company that wants to go somewhere, and us telling them, you know, look into this thing, look into that factor, engage with the regulator? So this is what I think was long overdue. But we are trying to do it.

MURRAY: Laura.

Q: Good morning. Good to see you here in Washington again.

GROSSI: Hi, Laura.

Q: I wanted to continue on this theme of nuclear energy. And before I left in January, you were putting forward the ATLAS conversation, to look at that kind of newcomer concept. Well, not to the U.S. nuclear Navy, but of shipping and how do we decarbonize that slice? Can you give us an update on the ATLAS efforts and where that’s headed?

GROSSI: Yeah. Thank you very much, Laura, indeed. And you were instrumental in starting this process. So I thank you very much for the role you played on that, and so many other things historically. So, Ambassador Laura Holgate.

So this is the shipping industry. And you know that the shipping industry is responsible for around 10 percent of global emissions. Not as sector, as a subsector in transportation, in general. So they themselves have decided that they need to decarbonize their operations. And they have been looking into technical alternatives and are, you know, approaching, if not a consensus—because this is not a political, but rather technological and commercial effort—they are realizing that we have, and I think your reference, Laura, to the Navy, it’s important, because we do know how to put reactors at sea and operating them very, very safely, without any problem. Only thing is that they have been, you know, used only in, you know, for nuclear subs. In Russia, they are icebreakers as well. So it’s been used. And they see with a lot of interest.

Now, they are, you know, adding up, you know, one plus one, because they say, well, now there is these small reactors, the microreactors, all these things that could be put to good use. So, again, we try to do the thing that we are supposed to be doing, which is articulating. And so we are—we launched the process that this acronym, you know, you need a catchy name, it’s called ATLAS, for Atomic Technologies Licensed for Applications at Sea, which includes floating nuclear power plants which are a very interesting alternative that it’s been explored. Not only in Russia—the Russians already have them, but there are other places. The Koreans are developing one. Very, very interesting for countries with small grids and things like that. So it’s floating nuclear power plants, but also propulsion. Also propulsion.

And here, we have to work with our friends from the IMO, the International Maritime Organization. We are working with ports. We are working with shipbuilders, the big shipbuilders in the world, and us, and the nuclear regulators. This is a process that certainly I will not see come to fruition, because the industry is talking about a conversion that might take fifty or more years. But they are—certainly the insurers, I was mentioning this to you, Lloyds in London and others. The Swiss groups are looking into this very intensely, to see what is needed. So what we are doing at this point is identifying the areas, you know, the ports, the regulations supports. So we have to facilitate, to untie knots that here and there, to make this a reality, a possibility.

MURRAY: Right there in the middle.

Q: Hi. Thank you very much. Joe Cirincione.

GROSSI: Hello.

Q: First of all, eight kids? (Laughter.) Wow! I don’t know how you do it.

I have a lot of questions for you, but let me—let me just limit them to this: For most of this century the problem of proliferation has been identified as the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists, or so-called outlaw states. But now we have this different, I would say, bigger problem of developed nations considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons. What you call “unexpected places.” First, why do you think this is occurring this year? Two, what’s the main way we can counter this? And, three, do you think that some of these countries’ increased interest in nuclear energy is a way of their developing the infrastructure for nuclear weapons? I’m thinking of Poland.

GROSSI: Yeah. Well, good to see you again.

No, I don’t think so. I’m talking about the last part of your—of your very important question. You know that we have never seen a case where a big, developed program is, you know, being used as the basis for nuclear weapon development. These things are rather, you know, done in parallel, or hidden, or—and if you look at the historic cases, you will—you can have an exception here and there, but it’s mainly—and at the level of sophistication of IAEA safeguards, it would be—for a country, let’s say a country in good standing, a country in Europe, let’s say, or in Latin America, that, you know, buys a nuclear power plant.

Well, immediately, as you know, they have to have an agreement with us. They have to have these reactors inspected in a very intense way, constantly, et cetera. And if these countries have an additional protocol, which is what everybody should have, we have an opportunity and a possibility to look in a wide sense—in a wider sense into that. So I don’t see, provided that the IAEA is there, provided that the IAEA is supported and is able to do its job, a possibility for a country X to say, OK, we’re going to have our little nuclear power plant, or an SMR, for example, and then we’re going to take the nuclear material and go and develop a nuclear weapon. It’s practically impossible.

And on the other issue, it’s more of an issue of judging intentions, and the reading of the political tea leaves of the times. And countries—some countries believe that they should revisit the idea of having their own nuclear deterrent. And I think this is—this is what we need to avoid. And to avoid it, I think it’s important that the political dialogs exist, that the strengthening of the NPT is very clear from every side, and that we make it very clear that it’s not by adding nuclear weapons to the fray that we are going to have a safer world. On the contrary. So I think it’s very important that we have these conversations. And people like you and others here that are very respected and read all over the world can certainly contribute.

MURRAY: Yes.

Q: Yes. Hi. My name is Alex Thew. I’m from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

I think that there can be an argument made that the United States has perhaps tacitly permitted proliferation at certain periods of time in history when it contributed to our interests, namely the United Kingdom, maybe to a lesser extent France, in developing their own nuclear weapon. For that reason, I’m curious to hear you say that China has taken the stance, at least privately to you, that they are against Iran’s nuclearization. Can you expand on that, and perhaps lend some perspective on what you think China’s perspective is on proliferation?

GROSSI: Well, I think it has to do with the advent of the NPT. When France acquired nuclear weapons, or the United Kingdom, you didn’t have a discussion on nuclear proliferation. It was a completely different world, where this idea of a certain restriction did not exist. I think the evolution of things—and you remember the Kennedy warning in the early ’60s, which might be revived maybe. Twenty, twenty-five countries was his saying? So perhaps that was at the origin of the idea of having an NPT, by saying, oh, OK. I mean, what are we seeing? This technology is spreading. How do we make this more predictable, less potentially destabilizing?

And the best we could come up with internationally was an order like the one we had in the NPT, which is limited. It has so many things. As I was saying because of my own history, this idea of the discriminatory, et cetera, et cetera. But we drew—a line had to be drawn somewhere. And it was drawn at that time. So I think when you—and I go to the second part of the question—when you look at China or Russia, these countries, they—all they’re saying is that the NPT regime, or the NPT should be sustained. So I’m not surprised in that sense. And I think it’s good that they say so. I don’t see any point of criticism. I think we need, especially the P-5 countries, especially the countries that are recognized by the NPT as being legal or legally owners of nuclear weapons. So I think it’s very important to have this discussion with all of them—all of them.

MURRAY: So please join me in thanking Director General Grossi for joining us. (Applause.)

GROSSI: Thank you very much. It’s been a pleasure.

(END)

This is an uncorrected transcript.