Israel

Israel's PM Netanyahu hugs Meir Dagan, the outgoing director of Israel's spy agency Mossad, at the cabinet meeting in Jerusalem. (Ronen Zvulun/Courtesy Reuters) Yesterday the legendary Meir Dagan retired after eight years as head of the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency. Having had some opportunity to work with Dagan while in the U.S. Government, I take his opinions and judgments very seriously—including his newest predictions about the Iranian nuclear program. Dagan now believes that Iran will not have a bomb until 2015. That the date keeps receding is, presumably, due in part to Dagan’s own efforts and those of his organization. If he is right, we have four more years to stop the Iranian nuclear program. In those four years, Iran will face another election for president and parliament (in 2013) and may well face a succession crisis. Rumors of Khamenei’s poor health have circulated for years. Moreover, increasing sanctions may damage the Iranian economy in ways that create additional political tension. So with a four year time line, the notion that this regime may become unstable or even fall becomes thinkable, as does the notion that faced with doom the regime might be willing to compromise its nuclear program away to concentrate on survival. The new Republican leaders of the House Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence Committees—respectively Buck McKeon, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and Mike Rogers—ought to make this their first order of business. They should be asking right now what more the United States and our allies can be doing to stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program, make our sanctions more effective, and support democratic dissidents in Iran. If Dagan’s information and his analysis are right, the time horizon has moved back. The question now is whether we will take advantage of the time we have.

I hope everyone is enjoying the holiday season. Check out the picture of “Father Time” above. As we bid goodbye to 2010 and say hello to 2011, it is time for that great American pastime of lists: “Best of…,” “Worst of…” “Most Influential…”, and “ Most Important…” of 2010. Here’s my take for the seven (I couldn’t think of 10) most important stories in the Middle East this year, in no particular order: 1. The Flotilla Incident (May 31) The incident aboard the Mavi Marmara on Memorial Day, in which Israeli commandos killed 8 Turks and a Turkish American, marked the end of an era of Turkish-Israeli strategic cooperation. It was a long time coming, but when this break happened, it signaled a shift in the geo-political configuration of the region. 2. Tehran Research Reactor Deal (May 17) The Tehran Research Reactor Deal was also a pivotal moment. Ankara’s willingness to work with the Brazilians and Iranians on the agreement was a coming out party of sorts for the “new Turkey.” Although Turkey has been willing to pursue different tracks from the United States on a variety of issues for some time (see, Syria), the TRR deal demonstrated Ankara’s determination to pursue a foreign policy independent of the United States. 3. UN Security Council sanctions on Iran (May 18) Kudos to the Obama administration for getting its partners on the Security Council to go along with sanctions. While the sanctions are weak, they opened the door for tougher bilateral sanctions that are affecting the Iranian regime. 4. ElBaradei’s return to Egypt (February 19) Mohamed ElBaradei will likely not end up being Egypt’s president in 2011, but his return to Egypt in 2010 certainly complicated the Gamal Mubarak succession scenario in ways that Ayman Nour, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the Muslim Brotherhood, and any number of opposition groups could ever hope of doing. With his pristine resume, Nobel prize, and Twitter feed in tow, ElBaradei seized the high ground on reform and democratic change. 5. Saad Hariri rapprochement with Bashar al Assad (July 17) Even if Lebanon has an embassy in Damascus and vice versa, the July rapprochement between Hariri and Assad confirmed Syria’s return. The “Independence Uprising” (aka Cedar Revolution) of 2005 was all for naught. Never count the Syrians out. 6. Iraqi government (December 21) Hamdulilah. It’s about time. Alf mabrook. What’s next? Keep your fingers crossed. 7. Peace Process (September 1) You cannot knock the administration for trying to forge peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. After all, wasn’t the Bush administration’s lack of trying for seven long years the problem? The denouement of Plan A suggests maybe…just maybe…the parties are not terribly interested in making peace. Contrary to the statements of various officials and former officials, it seems that the Israeli and Palestinians leaderships believe that time is, indeed, on their respective sides. We’re back to square one, out of ideas, and looking weak on this issue. Not a great place to be. (Photo Courtesy of REUTERS/Morteza Nikoubazl)

My colleague, Rob Danin, had an excellent CFR “First Take” yesterday on the administration’s change in direction on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.  It will be interesting to hear what Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has to say about the peace process on Friday at Brookings, but as Rob indicated, for now at least the Obama administration is moving back to “proximity talks.”  This seems like it is a step in the wrong direction, but there is historical precedent for this move.  The Egyptian-Israeli negotiations that began after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem ultimately became proximity talks.  To be sure, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin showed up in Ismailiyya in January 1978, but direct talks went nowhere.  Camp David, the Blair House talks, and Carter’s visits to Egypt and Israel were all essentially proximity talks that led to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Still, I am not optimistic (have I made that clear before?) on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, whether they are face-to-face or proximity talks.  Unlike Sadat and Begin, who had a number of incentives to bring their negotiations to a successful conclusion, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas have none.  Egyptian president Anwar Sadat needed to recover Sinai, and by 1977 the glow of October 1973’s crossing of the Suez Canal had faded.  If he could clinch a deal to recover Egyptian land, he would be in a better position to manage festering domestic economic and political problems.  Moreover, once he stepped off his plane in Tel Aviv on November 19, 1977 he was fully committed to seeing the process he had begun by going to Israel to end positively.  As a result, Sadat got a deal on Sinai but at the expense of all the other principles—especially Palestinian rights—that he articulated in his famous speech to the Knesset.  Begin wanted a deal because peace with Egypt would ultimately bring an end to the Arab war option.  The fact that he was able to secure an agreement with Sadat without making any serious concessions on the West Bank and Gaza Strip demonstrates Begin’s superior negotiating skills and Sadat’s relative weakness (largely of his own doing), but that’s a whole other story. It should be clear by now, but just to reiterate, President Abbas has no incentive to make a deal given his domestic political problems.  Instead, it seems he prefers rounding up international support for an independent Palestinian state in a vain effort to apply pressure on the Israelis.  Prime Minister Netanyahu has no real incentive to reach an agreement either.  He has his own political issues, in addition to the fact that there is a belief within Israel that a deal with Abbas would—unlike peace with Egypt—harm Israeli national security. Ok, now back to the Cliff Lee watch… (Photo Courtesy Reuters/Ho New)

Sorry for the light posting recently - I am finishing up my book on Egyptian politics. But I could not resist responding to  today’s headline on the settlements. Like I said a few weeks ago, I don’t get it, and ultimately, neither did the Administration. From my post on "Peace Process?": I have it on good authority, which in Washington means that I read it in Laura Rozen’s foreign policy blog at Politico and confirmed it through various conversations with colleagues who had coffee with people who know someone who used to work with the folks involved, that Ambassador Martin Indyk and Dennis Ross may soon replace Senator George Mitchell as the Obama administration’s Middle East envoys. Indyk will use his skills to work with the Palestinian Authority, while Dennis Ross would become the Israelis’ primary interlocutor, with Secretary of State Hilary Clinton supervising both envoys. My question is: Why bother? This is not a knock on either Indyk or Ross. I admire and respect both of them. Then if it isn’t the personalities involved, why my cynicism? To be honest, I am perplexed by the Obama administration on the peace process. Don’t get me wrong, I admire their collective tenacity and maybe they will get lucky, but I am a deeply pessimistic about anyone’s ability to push the Palestinians and Israelis into productive negotiations. I know, a brave position on this issue. In all seriousness, politics on either side hardly lend themselves to progress. First, it is abundantly clear that the Israelis have not given up on the occupation. As a result, Prime Minister Netanyahu has been, and will, continue to resist American entreaties that compromise the settlement project. He has apparently learned a valuable lesson from his first turn in the prime ministry—the only people who can take down a government in Israel is the right. That has been the case since the mid-1990s after Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated. Netanyahu’s unwillingness to extend the settlement freeze for just an additional 60 days should indicate more clearly than ever that the Israelis are not going to compromise on much. Second, the Palestinians are in a mess. Funny how little has been said about Hamas since September 1 when President Obama re-launched direct negotiations. Let’s review, however. There are two Palestinian Authorities: A Palestinian Authority-West Bank and a Palestinian Authority-Gaza. They are at war with each other. The PA-West Bank says that the only way to achieve Palestinian rights is through negotiations (though PA President Mahmoud Abbas spent three weeks in August trying to figure how to avoid direct negotiations), and the PA-Gaza argues that negotiations are an Israeli/American ruse that allows the Israelis more time to chew up Palestinian lands so Palestinians have no choice, but to fight. Abbas thus can’t compromise on much for fear of being perceived to be weak (actually, weaker), but that doesn’t really matter because the Israelis are not inclined to be “forward leaning” as they say inside the Beltway. What capacity do Indyk, Ross, Clinton or President Obama, for that matter, have to alter this situation? Early on, the administration tried and failed to impose costs on the Israelis for continuing its settlement policies, to no avail. Everyone seems to forget that Benjamin Netanyahu has spent far more time in Washington than Barack Obama. So if the reports are true, I say to Martin and Dennis best of luck. Yet, I also say in the inestimable words of Josh Baskin, “I don’t get it.”

Muslim Pilgrims Gather to Cast Stones at Pillars Symbolizing Satan in Mena Issandr El Amrani: Shazli Country Al-Shazli achieves in death what he would never achieve in life Preparing for Succession? King Abdullah transfers National Guard duties to son Kareem Suleiman, the first Egyptian blogger to be tried and convicted for his writings, is released Suleiman, known as Kareem Amr, has been jailed for four years for defaming the Mubarak regime The settlement freeze might happen Netanyahu says he is close to reaching a deal with the United States on a settlement freeze (Picture Courtesy Reuters/Mohammed Salem)

I have it on good authority, which in Washington means that I read it in Laura Rozen’s foreign policy blog at Politico and confirmed it through various conversations with colleagues who had coffee with people who know someone who used to work with the folks involved, that Ambassador Martin Indyk and Dennis Ross may soon replace Senator George Mitchell as the Obama administration’s Middle East envoys. Indyk will use his skills to work with the Palestinian Authority, while Dennis Ross would become the Israelis’ primary interlocutor, with Secretary of State Hilary Clinton supervising both envoys. My question is: Why bother? This is not a knock on either Indyk or Ross. I admire and respect both of them. Then if it isn’t the personalities involved, why my cynicism? To be honest, I am perplexed by the Obama administration on the peace process. Don’t get me wrong, I admire their collective tenacity and maybe they will get lucky, but I am a deeply pessimistic about anyone’s ability to push the Palestinians and Israelis into productive negotiations. I know, a brave position on this issue. In all seriousness, politics on either side hardly lend themselves to progress. First, it is abundantly clear that the Israelis have not given up on the occupation. As a result, Prime Minister Netanyahu has been, and will, continue to resist American entreaties that compromise the settlement project. He has apparently learned a valuable lesson from his first turn in the prime ministry—the only people who can take down a government in Israel is the right. That has been the case since the mid-1990s after Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated. Netanyahu’s unwillingness to extend the settlement freeze for just an additional 60 days should indicate more clearly than ever that the Israelis are not going to compromise on much. Second, the Palestinians are in a mess. Funny how little has been said about Hamas since September 1 when President Obama re-launched direct negotiations. Let’s review, however. There are two Palestinian Authorities: A Palestinian Authority-West Bank and a Palestinian Authority-Gaza. They are at war with each other. The PA-West Bank says that the only way to achieve Palestinian rights is through negotiations (though PA President Mahmoud Abbas spent three weeks in August trying to figure how to avoid direct negotiations), and the PA-Gaza argues that negotiations are an Israeli/American ruse that allows the Israelis more time to chew up Palestinian lands so Palestinians have no choice, but to fight. Abbas thus can’t compromise on much for fear of being perceived to be weak (actually, weaker), but that doesn’t really matter because the Israelis are not inclined to be “forward leaning” as they say inside the Beltway. What capacity do Indyk, Ross, Clinton or President Obama, for that matter, have to alter this situation? Early on, the administration tried and failed to impose costs on the Israelis for continuing its settlement policies, to no avail. Everyone seems to forget that Benjamin Netanyahu has spent far more time in Washington than Barack Obama. So if the reports are true, I say to Martin and Dennis best of luck. Yet, I also say in the inestimable words of Josh Baskin, “I don’t get it.” (Photo Courtesy Ronen Zvulun/Reuters)

To break the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, the U.S. should present a two-state "vision" for each side to vote on, says expert Sari Nusseibeh. Failing that, Palestinians should press to be absorbed into Israel and given civil rights, even without the right to vote.

The end of Israel’s ban on settlement building creates political problems for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and a dilemma the Obama administration in part brought on itself, says Mideast expert Michele Dunne.

If Israelis and Palestinians can’t reach an accommodation on settlement construction, talks will end and credibility on all sides--including that of the Obama administration--will suffer, says CFR’s Robert Danin.

I spent the first part of this week in Israel talking to people about the Iranian nuclear program. I thought I’d share a few observations. (While I’m writing about travel: I’ll be in Shanghai and Hong Kong next week to talk about climate and clean energy technology. If you read this blog and live in either of those cities, drop me a line.) Washington was abuzz in late August over Jeffrey Goldberg’s article in The Atlantic about the possibility that Israel might bomb. But Israelis have barely noticed the essay. That doesn’t mean, though, that they haven’t been thinking about the military option. Despite wide-ranging opinions over the wisdom of a military strike (it’s not nearly as popular an idea there as many Americans assume), one theme was consistent: people think that Israel could set the program back by 1-2 years, but that the United States could set it back considerably further, maybe by 6-8 years. (I understand that there’s often an ulterior motive to making such a point: it tends to encourage the United States to execute its own military attack. But I found the underlying arguments for the more basic technical point to be persuasive.) In the United States, setting Iran back by 1-2 years isn’t seen as sufficient to justify an attack. Israelis, though, consistently argued that sharp changes in a country’s leadership, and even basic political structure, can be quick and surprising. Few expected the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 1979 Iranian revolution, or the 2003 invasion of Iraq two years before any of those happened. From that vantage, even a 1-2 year setback has the potential to be decisive. Many Israelis also seem to have a different way of thinking about how far away Iran is from the bomb from their U.S. counterparts. U.S. analyses tend to focus on how long it would take Iran to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb given its existing facilities and stockpiles of low-enriched uranium. Other steps, like producing the actual weapons, are generally assumed to take very little time. That means that the estimated time it would take Iran to “break out” of its program and produce a bomb gets smaller and smaller. Israelis I talked to, though, emphasized the additional time that would be required to reconfigure an enrichment facility to produce weapons-grade uranium, as well as the time required to convert enriched uranium hexafluoride (a gas) into the specially shaped metal required for a bomb. These factors mean that even if Iran was to accumulate a large stockpile of low-enriched uranium, or to build up a much larger (or more capable) enrichment facility (or both), Israel might continue to judge Iran as being about a year away from a bomb. That said, the time required for Iran to produce enough material for a bomb still matters greatly to Israelis. Fissile material production, while possible to hide, may occur at known facilities. Even if production occurs at covert facilities, it may use material from known sites, and hence be (indirectly) detectable. But once Iran makes enough highly enriched uranium for its purposes, and moves it to another site, it is much more difficult (at best) to track. It’s also worth noting that for many in Israel, one bomb is not the threshold – or, more precisely, many Israelis don’t think that it’s the threshold that Iran cares about. Having one bomb crosses several important lines, and is very dangerous, but it does not yield a military (or second-strike strategic) capability. Many of my interlocutors suspected that Iran would not try to produce weapons until they were in the position to produce 5-10 of them in relatively short order. Finally, several Israelis made a special point of noting the great concern that the small Gulf states (as well as Saudi Arabia) have over the Iranian program. They already see Iran throwing its weight around more than it has in the past, and expect that to only increase as Iran moves forward on its nuclear program. It is difficult, though, for Israel and the Gulf states to cooperate on their approach to Iran, given the highly strained state of relations among them. That’s it for now. I’m spending the rest of the week talking to people in Vienna and Ankara about the Iranian program, and I’ll have more to report next week.

The win by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s party in the referendum on constitutional changes could improve Turkish democracy, says CFR’s Steven A. Cook, but fuels concerns about whether it augurs a more religiously oriented political environment.

Severe political constraints on Israeli and Palestinian leaders cloud the prospects for progress in direct talks due to start later this week, says CFR’s Steven A. Cook.

Lebanon faces new sectarian violence, and tensions along its border with Israel threaten to boil over. CFR’s Mohamad Bazzi says to help avert conflict, Washington must eventually engage with the most powerful force in Lebanon: Hezbollah.