The Future of Cybersecurity, With Jami Miscik and Adam Segal

Jim Lindsay:

Welcome to The President's Inbox, a CFR podcast about the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. I'm Jim Lindsay director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is, the future of the internet.

Jim Lindsay:

With me to discuss how the United States should adapt to a changing cyberspace landscape are Jami Miscik and Adam Segel. Jami is CEO of Global Strategic Insights, a strategic international consulting firm. Before entering the private sector. Jami spent more than two decades at the Central Intelligence Agency, eventually becoming deputy director for intelligence, the agency's most senior analytic post. Adam is the Ira A. Lipman chair in emerging technologies and national security and director of the digital and cyber space policy program at CFR. He is most recently the author of The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age. Jami is the co-chair and Adam is the project director of the CFR sponsored independent task force on cybersecurity. The task force recently released a report titled Confronting Reality in Cyberspace, Foreign Policy for a Fragmented Internet is available on cfr.org. Jami and Adam, thank you for joining me.

Jami Miscik:

Thank you.

Adam Segel:

Good to be here.

Jim Lindsay:

Jami, I'd like to begin with you. As I mentioned, the reports title is Confronting Reality in Cyberspace. What is the reality that the United States needs to confront in cyberspace?

Jami Miscik:

Well, thank you. The reality is that the era of the global open internet is over. And that the United States needs to recognize that and change its approach accordingly. One of the first things we would want to recognize is that the United States does not control fragmentation. There are governments out there that want to close their societies, wall off their population's access to the internet. We won't control that, our allies won't control that. So we have to accept that the internet is fragmented and we need to do more to recognize that, to keep pace with this changing reality.

Jim Lindsay:

Okay. Adam, I want to bring you in here. We're talking a lot about fragmentation. It's a big topic. When we talk about cyberspace, two questions for you. One, what do we actually mean by fragmentation? And number two, why should we care about fragmentation?

Adam Segel:

So there are different ways of fragmenting. The archetypal case is, China with the great firewall, which keeps certain types of content out, prevents Chinese citizens from using US services, keeps US social media companies out of the domestic market. And then with a new set of regulations, cybersecurity law, the data security law, putting increasing demands on foreign companies who do business in China to keep data on Chinese citizens local. And so we see those trends are no longer just contained to China. They're actually spreading quite widely. And lots of US friends and allies have economic and national security law enforcement reasons to try to keep data local.

Adam Segel:

And so the idea that the data, as Jamie said at the beginning, is going to flow freely across national borders is really not the case any longer for specific types and certain types of data. I think the US is concerned about it primarily for two reasons. One is, as Jami mentioned at the beginning, when the internet first came, the US adopted this idea that the free and open internet was going to be good for democracies and bad for authoritarian states. And so we have adopted this idea that the open internet is good for democracies and pushes it the same way that US foreign policy does on values and human rights.

Jim Lindsay:

Wasn't it more than that, Adam? It seems to me back in the day when the internet was first taking off, not only did we think that the internet would be good for democracy, we also believed that the internet couldn't be controlled. I remember in March of 2000, president Bill Clinton dismissed Chinese efforts to try to control the internet and control free speech by saying it was like nailing jello to a wall. Well, it appears the Chinese have figured out how to nail jello to the wall.

Adam Segel:

Yeah, I think that's right. I think we thought it would be good for us and bad for our adversaries. And that they would be on the wrong side of history. And so there was also a strategic push for that. And also it was an economic one. There was US companies that were globalizing the internet and taking advantage of those trends. And as you said, turns out the Chinese are really good at nailing jello to the wall. Other countries have been learning from that and other countries have also questioned, why do all the economic benefits of openness flow to US companies and to the US economy? So we're seeing a lot of pushback for all of those reasons. And right now most of the fragmentation is on content. What you can see and who can see it. It's increasingly on data. And it may, as the US and China compete over the next generation of technology standards, it may in the future be on the actual interoperability of the technologies.

Jim Lindsay:

So Jami, maybe you want to jump in here, but I'm curious, why should Americans care if the Chinese can't see the same things we do? And why should the person in Tacoma be worried about that? But I think there's also a question here of, why would things like data localization be bad? I suspect if I walked around most American cities and said, should American data be here in the United States? They would say, yeah, USA, USA, USA. So why can't the Chinese feel the same way the Egyptians, the Laotians, and the Brazilians and the rest?

Jami Miscik:

Well I think it is interesting that our report, our task force, was trying to focus on the international aspect, less on the domestic. And going back to the points that Adam was making on the fragmentation, I think the goal of having a free and open internet was the right goal. We don't want to walk away from that. The point we are trying to make is that the fragmentation has happened. We need to confront that reality. We need to change our approach. So when it comes to the future, things like digital trade agreements will become the basis of economic strength moving forward. We, the US government, have to play an active role in formulating those agreements, not standing back and letting them happen to us. And I think that's where these rules on fragmentation truly affect Americans in Tacoma, or wherever they may be.

Jim Lindsay:

Okay. Let's talk just a bit about that because digital trade agreements are a hot topic, but right now in the United States, we seem to be allergic to anything that is related to doing trade or a trade agreement. So what exactly would a digital trade agreement do? I mean, I think people understand about the movement of cars, or grain, or clothes. What does a digital trade agreement do?

Adam Segel:

Well, I think that touches to the earlier point about why Americans should care. And the reason why Amazon cloud, and Microsoft Azure, and the Googles, and the others have become so successful is that they build these infrastructure that supports it at a global level and you don't have to recreate it everywhere you go. So if every country in the world said, you have to store our data locally, then you have to build 193, whatever it is, data centers. Incredibly expensive. It no longer scales. It no longer makes any economic sense. That said, as you said, there are legitimate reasons to keep some data local. And what the digital trade agreements do are decide what type of data do we all agree can be kept local, which type of data we all say, you know what, this can flow freely. There's no problem with it.

Adam Segel:

Or if we allow it to flow freely, what can happen to that data in another country? And so that's been a problem with the United States and Europe. We, for a while, had an agreement that said, oh, European data can come to the United States, no problem. But then because of the Snowden revelations and disclosures about some types of US intelligence gathering, the European court of justice rule that, no, European data was not being protected adequately. That agreement was then overthrown. And then the president just announced a new agreement that said, we now have some new measures in place that protect European data. So basically I think there's a reason to be more optimistic about digital trade agreements than we are about traditional trade agreements, because they quite honestly, they require much less giving and taking from the countries as opposed to, we've all agreed on the standards about how the data should be treated.

Jim Lindsay:

I should note that the transpacific partnership, which had been an American initiative, was going to set the gold standard for digital trade agreements. President Trump pulled out of it, but the Trump administration actually took a number of the elements about digital trade from TPP and plopped them into the revised NAFTA agreement. And it's now considered, I think, to be a gold standard, at least for those three countries. I want to come back to this issue of trade and how to think about cooperation between the United States and Europe. But Jami, I want to talk about another finding in the task force report, which is that the internet has become much more dangerous. It's not just that it's less open, more fragmented, it is more dangerous. How so?

Jami Miscik:

In my view, there's no question that cyber crime, which has escalated dramatically in the last few years has become a national security interest. When it attacks hospitals, our infrastructure. And when it goes as far as influence operations, inside our own countries, that undermine public confidence in our institutions, then I think we have to treat it as a very serious issue and hence a very dangerous one. One of the recommendations we make in the report is that working with a coalition of allies, we should consider developing an international cyber criminal center to share information across countries. To date, what we have tried to do to thwart criminal activity with indictments or sanctions hasn't been effective enough. We haven't found the right tools to put together to really address that issue the way it needs to be addressed.

Jim Lindsay:

Speaking about cyber crime, one of the interesting things that the report flags, are the links that exist between state actors, I'm thinking primarily China, Russia, I think also Iran, North Korea, and criminal gangs. In essence, they are sort of third party actors for state governments. How do you deal with that, Adam?

Adam Segel:

Yeah, I think that's been one of the great challenges for the US in this space as well. The US, our cyber capabilities are tightly controlled in the military and in the NSA. As far as we can tell, we have a lot of legal and other discussions about when the US can conduct offensive operations and the Russians and North Koreans and Iranians in particular use these proxy actors, which gives them a level of deniability because the US' attribution capabilities have significantly improved over the years. And makes it much harder for the United States to respond and sanction or punish the right individuals. You want to impose costs on the people conducting the actions to try and change their calculus. But if the people that are conducting the actions are two or three people removed from the people that are ordering it, makes it harder to design those sanctions. And so the US, I think, has had a very difficult time finding the pressure points for those types of attacks.

Adam Segel:

You know, one of the points that the report makes is that, the vast majority of cyber operations are espionage. So it's the theft of data.

Jim Lindsay:

And we think espionage is okay? That's the official position of the US government. That's what governments do to each other, correct?

Adam Segel:

Yes, essentially the US has said, all states are going to conduct cyber operations for intelligence perspective. That is going to happen. Our responsibility is to defend against it and disrupt it the best we can, but there's going to be no international agreements about it. Theft of intellectual property and business secrets, we say should be off limits.

Jim Lindsay:

So I can spy on you if I want to figure out whether you're going to invade another country, but I'm not supposed to spy on you so I can take intellectual property, plans for that new weapon system, so I can give it to my local companies. Or take plans for that new semiconductor and give it to a local company. We say that's illegitimate. The Chinese don't seem to feel the same way.

Adam Segel:

Yeah. Well, weapon system is hard, because that's defensive purposes. But the way that president Obama used to say it was, you can break into my iPhone to listen to what I'm saying to my cabinet. You can't break into Apple and take the information and give it to Huawei. But the Chinese, for a moment seemed to have agreed. So the US mounted a very public campaign against China, naming and shaming, calling them out. We indicted PLA hackers from the people's liberation army.

Jim Lindsay:

Well, let me ask you a question then, is there a distinction between cyber criminals and patriotic hackers?

Adam Segel:

The US and the liberal democracies say they are often the same. And states should not rely on these proxies, but the other countries often rely on them. And go off on a further tangent we're in this weird situation now where the Ukrainians are mobilizing patriotic and outside hackers to go after Russia, which from a perspective of the US supporting Ukraine's IT infrastructure and its war effort doesn't seem like a terrible idea. But from the US' efforts to shape global norms is not-

Jim Lindsay:

We're legitimizing the behavior we say is illegitimate.

Adam Segel:

Yes. I think generally we have said, this shouldn't be happening, but we don't say it very often and very loudly.

Jim Lindsay:

Jami, I want to come to the reports third main finding, which is that the United States has failed to impose costs. Some of Adam's comments have alluded to that. Talk to me a little bit about what that means in a practical sense.

Jami Miscik:

Well, I think that means that we continue to see these attacks and that they are not thwarted to the extent we want to stop them. One of the things that the task force report talks about is whether or not we can lead by example in a couple of key areas. Can we, the US, say that we will not do certain things, no tampering with election infrastructures, no attacks on financial institutions, hospitals, off limits. If we could get agreement from a coalition of countries to those kinds of norms, we can maybe lead by example, put some things off limits, nuclear command and control being another key element of that. Now we are not under any illusions that our adversaries are going to sign up to agree to this, but that could be a helpful step for a majority of countries.

Jim Lindsay:

Well, let me jar you up more on this because I can imagine some people listening to this conversation, wait a second, the United States is arguing that governments shouldn't snoop in or act in other countries computer networks. But wait a second, the United States started this as the task force report noted, the United States government launched Olympic games, which is an effort to disrupt centrifuges being operated by Iran. So in some sense, the United States has legitimated behavior it says we shouldn't do. How would you respond to that?

Adam Segel:

So I think the answer isn't what... When Jamie was discussing the kind of, self restraint that the US would adopt, it's part of a larger shift in US cyber strategy. So one thing we know that's happened, started under Trump administration has continued under President Biden, is that the US has adopted a more forward leaning, what they call defend forward. So trying to disrupt the attackers before they get to the United States.

Jim Lindsay:

Is this persistent engagement?

Adam Segel:

Persistent engagement, defend forward, so that is happening. And so part of the reason why the self restraint is important is you want a signal to your potential adversaries, what type of systems you're going to be on in disrupting. But we also say we have to have some more transparency about what we're doing and why we're doing it. And so I think one of the critiques you can make about US operations in particular, as you mentioned, Olympic games or the Stuxnet attacks on the Iranian centrifuges, was that the US probably had a legal justification in mind when they conducted those attacks. And so it probably would've been better that after the attacks became public, that the US said, under these conditions, these types of attacks are justified. You can imagine what legitimate uses of cyber operations they were. So in some ways I would think that it was a missed opportunity for the US to help define those norms. Because we do have very few instances of operations that crossed the threshold and caused physical destruction or disruption.

Jim Lindsay:

Let me ask this question as a way of follow up. One of the things that people expected once Russia invaded Ukraine was for the Russians to launch major cyber attacks. They seem not to have, is this because the Russians don't judge cyber attacks to be useful? Is it because US efforts at persistent engagement have discovered the Russians? In essence, we've deterred them? Something else?

Adam Segel:

So I think there's a big debate going on right now about how useful the cyber has been in this conflict. And Foreign Affairs, in fact, published two pieces saying the exact opposite. One saying, as you said, doesn't seem to have played the role that we expected it. The other is saying, no, look for example, on the Viasat, which is a satellite broadband provider, which did in fact affect the Ukrainian communications. I think there's probably several explanations. One is, the Russians seem to have thought that the war was going to go very quickly. And they would essentially capture Kiev, decapitate the leadership, put in a new leadership. And so they probably wanted communications infrastructure to remain in place so they can continue messaging and signaling. So the speed of the operation probably means that they, in fact, weren't ready to take down a lot of the systems because you do need to have persistence and a lot of planning.

Adam Segel:

I think defense did help. The US and NATO and the EU all sent teams forward in the months in advance helping to protect and defend. So I think there was that. I think also the Russians, we think that the Ukraine is winning the information war, which they are, I think in the context of messaging to the US and Western Europe. But I think if you look at Russian messaging to developing economies, Africa, those places, it's not clear to me that we're winning that information war. And then those countries have been more supportive of Russia's position than I think we would've hoped.

Jim Lindsay:

And clearly Russia is winning the information war in Russia. This gets back to your point at the beginning, about the fragmented internet, they're able to control what information people access and these other countries are following the Chinese model of developed ways. In some sense, disconnect their countries from the internet for at least some periods of time. And so the internal narratives get shaped differently.

Adam Segel:

Yeah, that's right. And I think the US has struggled, between some tech companies pulling out of the Russian market, others saying no we're providing services to Russian citizens so they can get some more information. And so that is an important point thinking about how should the US signal to companies, what their role should be in this space.

Jami Miscik:

And I agree with what Adam just said in terms of what's going on in Ukraine. One of the key things that we've tried to distinguish in the task force report is the difference between cyber and information ops. And information operations, the kinds of things that you were just talking about, the information being shown on Russian media, the messages being sent to the developing world from Russia, those are information operations trying to influence the cyber piece of it. I think we have seen a number of cyber attempts or attacks vis a vis Ukraine that a lot of US companies and the government support, allied support, has been helpful in trying to limit, contain, and thwart. Doesn't mean it will be off the table for the duration of the war.

Jim Lindsay:

I take that point, but now I want to really sort of focus on recommendations for the US government. And Adam's point, Jamie, about how the United States worked with NATO allies to help the Ukrainians deal with any potential Russian cyber attack sort of leads into what I take to be one of the main recommendations of the report, which is that the United States should build a coalition of trusted partners. Tell me what you mean by that and how it would operate?

Jami Miscik:

What the task force report focuses on is building a group of like-minded partners who agree to a certain set of operating principles where data could be trusted. So trade data flows would be efficient and trustworthy, that those countries may be democracies, they may be less than democracies, but we should not limit it to a values based approach. It should be a willingness to sign on and be on board approach.

Jim Lindsay:

So we're not going to say only democracies are part of the coalition, the argument is if you accept the rule of law in this area, then we're happy to work with you.

Adam Segel:

Yeah. I think we want to shift away from the sense that we're going to judge which countries are democracies or not, but we can judge, oh, do you have some domestic provisions in place for how data's turned over? Do we agree on those norms, those kind of issues? And I think the Biden administration released this declaration for the future of the internet in April, which essentially is a kind of, re-embracing of this view of global open and interoperable. There had been early discussions that it was going to be a democratic alliance, they decided to drop that. But from our perspective, the fact that some big players, India and others, did sign onto the declaration is a real issue. Now, again, we don't want to give India a free card for the crackdown on the internet. The shutdowns, the-

Jim Lindsay:

India actually is a country that has quite frequently shut down the internet.

Adam Segel:

Yeah. So it leads the world on internet shutdowns. And just this month we have this case of a Muslim reporter being prosecuted for his tweets supposedly offending other religions. And in one of the most ironical things, freedom house tweeted that internet freedom declined in India and they were forced to take it down. So we don't want to give India a complete get out of jail card on those issues. And as Jami said, those are things we still want to push back on, but there's still lots of things we want to work on with India and calling them undemocratic in that context on data flows and other things is not particularly helpful.

Jim Lindsay:

Jami, as you think about building this trusted coalition, how do you deal with the issue that our most trusted allies, our closest allies, the Europeans, have a different view on a number of these critical issues about privacy than we have? And Adam mentioned earlier, this has been a thorn in US, European cooperation on some of these issues. Can we surmount that division?

Jami Miscik:

Well, that certainly is one of our recommendations that we have to recognize that in some areas the Europeans have led on protecting personal data and privacy. The United States, frankly, has taken a backseat to some of the international efforts to regulate behavior on the internet. And we wind up being the recipient of decisions made elsewhere. Our recommendation is for the United States to get back to leading and influencing where those international forums take these types of issues. So whether or not it's the exact adoption of something that's already in place or a modification of that. But that is where we need to go, working with allies on these issues to find common ground, to advance this. Because data security, data privacy, digital trade agreements, is going to be the basis of a lot of geopolitical power in the future. And we cannot just be a passive recipient of that.

Jim Lindsay:

Are you optimistic, Adam, that you can bridge differences across the Atlantic?

Adam Segel:

I think there's a reason to be more optimistic than normal in this space. I mean, right now, what is happening is that in the US, the states are leading. So we have seven or eight states now have adopted data privacy laws, California being the big one. The companies themselves want a national data protection law because-

Jim Lindsay:

Oh, I imagine that's a lot better than having 50 different data laws you have to follow.

Adam Segel:

Exactly. They don't want to have 50. And they also want to have a pretty big hand in shaping them so they're not as oppressive as they would be. But I think there is a growing bipartisan support on actually getting those policies in place. Now, my pessimism has to do about how politicized the whole tech regulation space is now with the Democrats and Republicans wanting to accomplish other things at the same time, about content moderation and things like that. But I do think we are going to make more progress on data than I would've.

Jim Lindsay:

I have to ask you then, can you give me a short tutorial on what these divisions are? Because all I know is when I watch MSNBC in the morning or CNN or other shows on my cable channel, I am flooded with advertisements, which are telling me that Congress is about to do something totally un American to my internet. And I don't know who's sponsoring these ads or what the actual underlying political divisions are.

Adam Segel:

So essentially there are several bills, they do several things. But one is the companies could no longer what's called self-referencing. So Google could no longer push Yelp findings down and only show you the Google reviews at the top. They'll also, for example, open the Apple store. So that more apps can be in Apple and also allow you to download other apps from outside of the Apple store. There's antitrust regulation. So are the companies in the same business or are they expanding and other things? And then there's a lot of focus on content moderation. What are the companies allowed to take down to protect users and also to prevent misinformation or disinformation? Now, depending upon which side you're coming from, it's either violates the first amendment. It's government's big hand in the market. It's creating a cybersecurity threat because Apple does a really good job of keeping out bad apps. Forcing them to share data opens other... So across the spectrum, there's a whole range of arguments about why it's bad and why it's good.

Jim Lindsay:

But this, Jami, gets us to one of the red flags you raise the end of the report, which is the inability of the United States to actually get its house in order. Walk me through that.

Jami Miscik:

Well, I think it goes back in part to what I was saying earlier, that for the last several years, kind of taken a backseat and let other countries, the Chinese in particular have been very effective in these international organizations, getting their people in to help set those standards. One of the areas that I actually have some optimism on is that tech security, digital security, cyber security seems to be one of those areas where there is bipartisan support, bipartisan recognition that we have to do more. So, that gives me some optimism there. One of the key things that we have to keep an eye on is pace. And we need to accelerate the pace here because we are going to fall behind. If we don't get some of these policies and recommendations in the report moving forward. Now I think there is a lot of work going on in the current administration and on the Hill that is positive.

Jami Miscik:

But keeping that focus is going to be really important over the next two or three years. One of the issues that we have to work on, and this report is not focused on that, is the public private partnerships that are required here and the talent expertise getting into government that we need to have there. So while these green shoots, if you will, are promising, they really need to be nurtured. Because right now we are not at a pace where we are going to be leaders in this space and we really, truly need to be.

Jim Lindsay:

Well, I have to ask you, Adam, given that Jami just flagged the issue of pace. It's not only the American pace that matters. It's the pace of others. China clearly is a pace setter, or trend setter, in these areas. Should we be worried that China is lapping the field? Or is it the case that president Xi and his effort to shut down the internet is basically killing the goose that laid the golden egg?

Adam Segel:

So, I think it's a little of both. I think both the Chinese pace, and rolling out the set of regulations over the last five years. And the Europeans keep... We had just this last week, the Digital Service Act and the Digital Market Act both be pushed forward. So I think there is, as Jami said, a real issue that the US has been talking about this legislation for a long time. And it's not clear we're that much closer to getting it there. Now the uncertainty about the effects of the regulation, I think is to some advantage for us. The Chinese definitely seem to have been willing to impose significant costs on their tech firms, trillions of dollars wiped off the books for Alibaba and Tencent and others. And there's been a long standing critique about the Europeans, is that they keep innovating on the regulation side, it's because they have no companies that are actually innovating. And so that's the way that they project forward.

Adam Segel:

And the US, the reason why our tech industry was and continues to be so innovative is that we have had such a light hand on it. But I do think we're entering, and the task force notes, we're entering a new stage of innovation. We have artificial intelligence and quantum and web 3.0, whatever that might mean-

Jim Lindsay:

I don't know what any of those three things mean. And I'm not going to ask you to explain it to me.

Adam Segel:

Coming forward. And is that going to work again? The first time, the hands off approach worked, probably because there was nobody else out there. And this time I don't think we're so confident that the hands off approach is going to be as effective.

Jim Lindsay:

Well, we're certainly seeing efforts to draw up legislation that would have the government more involved in trying to subsidize in direct... We used to call it industrial policy back in the day. Do you think that's the answer?

Adam Segel:

I think it depends what type of sector we're talking about. I think, for example, around the chip industry, yes. The government probably does need to lend a hand. If you look at the studies for how Taiwan, Singapore, Israel, South Korea, all built the chip industry, it required massive amounts of government subsidies just because the capital expenditures and building a new semiconductor equipment plant are so important. And semiconductors are the enabling foundation of all of the other technologies that we use. So I do think there is probably a strong argument to be made on the government's needs to have a stronger hand, and we have bipartisan support for the Chips Act, but just has not been passed yet.

Jim Lindsay:

That gets back to your observation about the need to get your house in order.

Jami Miscik:

Yes.

Jim Lindsay:

You can't simply talk, you have to do.

Adam Segel:

Yeah.

Jim Lindsay:

Jami, I want to close with you because you spend a lot of time watching things in Washington, thinking about these issues. Are you optimistic that we can maintain the pace or raise our pace to do what we need to do?

Jami Miscik:

I think we need to raise our pace and I am optimistic. I see a lot of good work in embryonic stages, but nonetheless positive direction. I also think that there's a geopolitical component to this that has helped accelerate the pace. Russia's invasion of Ukraine brought countries, who might have been trying to sit on a fence, beginning to edge more towards this is not what we want. We want to join in something like this trusted coalition of countries we've talked about. And I think that Chinese behavior in some of these areas exporting to other countries, how to close down your internet, has caused, again, countries that we're maybe trying to sit on the fence to say, you know what we do need to think about joining together in a common trusted environment. So put me down as an optimist, but I understand the effort that needs to go into this to keep that pace moving forward.

Jim Lindsay:

On that optimistic note, I am going to close up The President's Inbox for this week. My guests have been Jami Miscik, CEO of Global Strategic Insights and Adam Segel, the Ira A. Lipman chair in emerging technologies and national security, and director of the digital in cyberspace policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations. You can read the CFR task force report, Confronting Reality in Cyberspace, Foreign Policy for a Fragmented Internet on cfr.org. Jami and Adam, thank you very much for joining me.

Adam Segel:

Thank you.

Jami Miscik:

Thank you.

Jim Lindsay:

Please subscribe to The President's Inbox and Apple podcast, Spotify, wherever you listen. And leave us your review. We love to get feedback. You can find the books and articles mentioned in this episode, as well as a transcript of our conversation, on the podcast page for The President's Inbox on cfr.org. As always opinions expressed in The President's Inbox are solely those of the host or our guests, not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Today's episode was produced by Rafaela Siewert, with senior podcast producer Gabrielle Sierra. Brian Mendivez was our recording engineer. Special thanks to Margaret Gach for her assistance. This is Jim Lindsay. Thanks for listening.