South China Sea

Global Conflict Tracker: Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea
China’s sweeping claims of sovereignty have antagonized its neighbors in the region. This tracker will help you get up to speed and stay informed.

by Center for Preventive Action Jun 27, 2018

Military Confrontation in the South China Sea
The trade war, fallout from COVID-19, and increased military activity raise the risk of conflict between the United States and China in the South China Sea.

Contingency Planning Memorandum by Oriana Skylar Mastro May 21, 2020

China’s Maritime Disputes
Disputes over overlapping exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea have intensified in recent decades, while the territorial row over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea dates back to the nineteenth century.

Timeline by Beina Xu, Eleanor Albert, Lindsay Maizland, and Clara Fong May 22, 2024

China’s Modernizing Military
The People’s Liberation Army is aiming to become the dominant force in the Asia-Pacific, strengthening China’s hand toward Taiwan and international disputes in the South China Sea.

by Lindsay Maizland Feb 5, 2020

  • Southeast Asia
    Vietnam and India Cement an Increasingly Vital Relationship in Southeast Asia
    In addition to bolstering strategic ties with the United States, Vietnam is also building a strong strategic relationship with other partners, particularly India, that are skeptical of China’s growing power in the Asia-Pacific.
    by Joshua Kurlantzick March 9, 2018 Asia Unbound
  • Indonesia
    Keeping the U.S.-Indonesia Relationship Moving Forward
    Overview “The relationship between the United States and Indonesia has long underperformed its potential,” writes Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations in this Council Special Report. “Instead of seeking unlikely goals,” Kurlantzick argues, “the two nations should embrace a more transactional approach,” focusing on “three discrete security goals—increasing deterrence in the South China Sea, combating militants linked to the Islamic State, and fighting piracy and other transnational crime in Southeast Asia.” Produced by CFR’s Center for Preventive Action, the report makes the case that “Indonesia could be a critical security partner and a larger destination for U.S. investment and trade in the next few years.” Kurlantzick explains that a relationship with Jakarta “that achieved important goals could be an asset if Washington’s relationships with other Muslim-majority nations are threatened by shifting U.S. immigration policies. Maintaining productive ties with the country that has the world’s largest Muslim population could help U.S. officials argue that the new immigration policies are no barrier to working with Muslim-majority countries but simply a narrow effort to stop militants from entering the United States.” Kurlantzick’s recommendations include the following: Upgrade bilateral cooperation on South China Sea challenges. “The United States should increase funding for International Military and Education Training program for Indonesian soldiers by at least 50 percent from the current amount of $2.4 million annually.” The United States should also encourage Indonesia to conduct freedom of navigation operations with Australia and consider joint U.S.-Indonesian exercises in the South China Sea. Bolster bilateral strategies to combat the self-proclaimed Islamic State. The United States should help search for and vet returnees to Indonesia from Islamic State–held territory in the Middle East; consider creating a small, permanent force of police officers to lead foreign police trainings; and suggest that Indonesia join the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which would provide greater access to shared intelligence. Crack down on piracy. A greater U.S. presence could also serve as a deterrent to Islamist militant networks, pirates, and other organized crime groups that have historically flourished in the Sulu Sea. The United States could also join air patrols that are critical for identifying pirate boats. “While leaders in Washington and Jakarta reshape the relationship to focus on security, the two nations should also ensure that the economic relationship does not deteriorate,” writes Kurlantzick. He notes, “Any long-term U.S. economic strategy toward Southeast Asia must recognize that Indonesia is the largest economy in the region and the biggest untapped market for U.S. firms in Southeast Asia.” Read translated excerpts from this report in Bahasa Indonesia.  Baca kutipan dalam bahasa Indonesia. Professors: To request an exam copy, contact [email protected]. Please include your university and course name. Bookstores: To order bulk copies, please contact Ingram. Visit https://ipage.ingrambook.com, call 800.234.6737, or email [email protected]. Include ISBN: 978-0-87609-739-7.
    Council Special Report by Joshua Kurlantzick February 20, 2018 Center for Preventive Action
  • Indonesia
    Secretary of Defense Mattis’s Trip to Southeast Asia: A Few Thoughts
    Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis traveled to Southeast Asia this past week, and during his first stop in Indonesia signaled a desire to improve strategic aspects of the U.S.-Indonesia relationship including on the South China Sea, training, and defense modernization.
    by Joshua Kurlantzick January 26, 2018 Asia Unbound
  • Philippines
    Trump's Visit to the Philippines: A Budding Bromance but Few Positive Outcomes
    Part Two Read Part One here.  So, the bilateral meeting between U.S. President Donald J. Trump and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte appears to have gone well, at least on the surface. Earlier in the visit, Duterte actually crooned a Philippine love song at a leaders’ dinner, reportedly at the request of Trump. But while the bilateral meeting appears to have been warm, and the two men have developed a kind of mutual admiration society over months—partly, it seems, because the U.S. president admires other strongmen including Duterte, Xi Jinping, and many others—there is only so much that the United States can do to sway Duterte from many of his policy positions. Indeed, in addition to the fact that Trump’s meeting with Duterte probably hurt the cause of human rights in the Philippines, it is unclear whether the meeting achieved anything substantial on key issues including the South China Sea. In fact, according to some news reports, Trump did not even bring up the South China Sea in his meeting with Duterte. Instead, the two leaders talked about the self-proclaimed Islamic State and counterterrorism, among other topics. Duterte definitely is increasingly realizing that he needs U.S. assistance in counterterrorism, piracy, and other issues related to the Islamic State than he had imagined a year ago. Since the battle in Mindanao this past year, the Philippine armed forces are exhausted, and unprepared for another breakout of major conflict in the south. Duterte has lined up new counterterrorism assistance commitments from Singapore and Australia, but these countries’ counterterrorism assistance cannot match the levels of potential aid from Washington. But on the South China Sea, Duterte seems resolute—though it makes little sense that Trump did not even bring up the issue in their bilateral meeting. After all, much of the Philippine military and security establishment still hopes to take an assertive approach to the South China Sea, one in line with the position of the previous Benigno Aquino administration. Trump should have at least raised U.S. concerns about Duterte’s South China Sea policy. To be sure, Duterte appears determined to let Beijing dictate terms on the South China Sea, even as the Philippine military establishment tries to convince him otherwise—and to circumscribe his ability to completely overhaul Manila’s South China Sea policy. It is not wrong that the White House is eager to prioritize counterterrorism in its relationship with the Philippines—this is an issue where real, win-win cooperation is possible. In addition, Trump and Duterte both share goals of reducing piracy in the Sulu-Celebes Sea, a highly lawless area that is rife with pirates, human traffickers and Islamist militant groups—including organizations that combine all three activities. But in the White House’s vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” in which the United States and its partners would defend freedom of navigation, among other interests, it is hard to see how Duterte and his South China Sea approach would fit in. For the past year, nearly every time China has applied pressure on Duterte to take a relatively accommodating position regarding the South China Sea, Duterte has complied. Most recently, earlier this month the Philippines’ defense chief announced that Manila would end any work on a sandbar at Sandy Cay, near Thitu Island—after pressure from Beijing. Earlier in the year, Duterte also canceled a planned visit to Thitu, probably after pressure from Beijing, telling China he’d done so because he valued Beijing’s friendship. The Philippine leader, who this year serves as the chair of ASEAN, also has done little to rally ASEAN nations to come up with a coherent position on the South China Sea. He has, in some ways, seemingly been an obstacle on any ASEAN unity on the South China Sea. And, despite Duterte’s desire for greater U.S. assistance on counterterrorism and other domestic security challenges, there is little evidence that Duterte plans to move Manila back, even modestly, toward the Aquino administration’s tougher approach to the South China Sea.
    by Joshua Kurlantzick November 13, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • United States
    VICE Special Report: A World in Disarray
    A World in Disarray, a VICE special report, draws on Richard Haass's eponymous book and explores the disorder in today’s international landscape using four regional case studies: Syria, Ukraine, the South China Sea, and North Korea.
    by Richard Haass November 1, 2017
  • South Korea
    Podcast: A Shrimp and Two Whales
    Podcast
    In a half century, South Korea has transformed itself from an impoverished, war torn country into a thriving, soft power giant known for its cars, cell phones, and cosmetics. The New Koreans: The Story of a Nation, by veteran consultant and journalist Michael Breen, sets this astonishing trajectory within the context of the country’s history, politics, and culture. Breen combines his decades of experience in the country with masterful research and analysis to describe how the “shrimp caught between two whales” has made a place for itself in Asia and in the world. Now, global tensions are escalating with their volatile neighbors to the north, and Seoul is caught in a tough position between the United States, China, and nuclear war. Tune in to this week’s Asia Unbound podcast to learn more about the changing dynamics of South Korea’s political, economic, and security culture. Listen on SoundCloud >>
    Podcast October 31, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • Southeast Asia
    ASEAN, China, and the Lasting Divisions Over the South China Sea
    Following the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) foreign ministers meeting earlier this month in Manila, China and Southeast Asian nations announced that they had agreed on a framework for negotiating a code of conduct in the South China Sea. In theory, a code of conduct would set guidelines on activities allowed in the Sea, including militarization and land reclamation. Both Philippine and Chinese leaders touted the adoption of a framework as a serious step toward reducing tensions in the South China Sea. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also announced that Beijing would be willing to launch negotiations about a code in November. Yet although the two sides have agreed on a framework, it will be almost impossible for Beijing to get ASEAN nations to agree to an actual code of conduct. For more on why a code is unlikely any time soon, see my new article for World Politics Review.
    by Joshua Kurlantzick August 21, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • Southeast Asia
    Southeast Asian Perspectives on U.S.–China Competition
    In April 2016, the Lowy Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations' International Institutions and Global Governance program held a workshop on Southeast Asian perspectives on U.S.–China competition, which informed this publication. That workshop was made possible in part by the generous support of the Robina Foundation. This report is a collaboration between the Lowy Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations. The views expressed in this report are entirely the authors' own and not those of the Lowy Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, or the Robina Foundation. Overview More than any other region, Southeast Asia has become a venue for strategic competition between the United States and China over the past decade. The People’s Liberation Army challenges the U.S. military’s dominance in the South China Sea, American and Chinese diplomats face off over the nature of the regional order at summits in Southeast Asian capitals, and leaders of both countries tour the region touting the relative advantages of economic engagement with one over the other. Too often, however, Southeast Asian perspectives on U.S.–China competition have been regarded by analysts and policymakers in both Washington and Beijing as peripheral to debates over that competition and the future of the region. In Washington, China specialists naturally dominate the conversation about the future of the region; likewise in Beijing, policymakers focus on understanding American views of the region more than they do on the region’s view of itself. Yet Southeast Asians are the ones who inhabit the region that U.S. and Chinese competition will shape over the years to come. And as Cambodia’s chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2012 and the Philippines’ pursuit of arbitration over the South China Sea disputes from 2013 to 2016 have demonstrated, Southeast Asian governments will also shape that competition and their region. In order to explore and elevate Southeast Asian perspectives on U.S.–China competition, the Lowy Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations convened nearly two dozen Southeast Asian scholars and policymakers from around the region to discuss their perspectives and those of their governments at a 2016 conference in Singapore. This report, jointly published by both organizations, is a distillation of some of the insights produced by the conference. No such report can fully capture the region’s diversity; the ten states of ASEAN boast vast differences in population, economic development, political system, culture, and geography. The report nevertheless attempts to put forward a representative sample of the insights of some of the region’s most percipient scholars on some of the most important issues to Southeast Asians today.
    Report by Aaron L. Connelly, Joseph Chinyong Liow, Evan A. Laksmana, Richard Javad Heydarian, Huong Le Thu, Chit Win and Elina Noor August 3, 2017
  • South China Sea
    The False Choice of War or Accommodation in the South China Sea
    I appreciate Hugh White taking the time to critique my essay in the current edition of Foreign Affairs, which recommends a course correction in US strategy to deter and, if necessary, deny Chinese control of the South China Sea. In fact, I agree with core elements of Hugh's perspective. He's right that the United States has yet to take seriously the severity of the China challenge, that there has been inadequate debate among America's leaders and its public about the very real stakes, and that current trends, including deficient US policy, portend a China-dominated region. But Hugh and I diverge significantly on the question of whether the United States can and should do anything to arrest the slide toward a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia. He offers three reasons why my recommendations for a more robust US policy in the South China Sea would pose little chance for success, while likely risking war. First, he argues that 'it is very unlikely that the Southeast Asian claimants would accept American help to fortify their islands, or that other regional allies like Australia or Japan would be willing to play their part'. But US and allied support for rival claimants is not, as Hugh describes, the 'first' and 'second' steps in my recommended strategy. Rather, I readily acknowledge that regional concerns about economic retribution for standing up to Chinese revisionism is a major obstacle for the United States. That is precisely why I argue that additional non-military measures would be necessary at the outset, including a return of US participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, or some equally ambitious initiative on trade and investment that offers regional states an alternative to growing economic dependence on China. I also recommend an informational campaign aimed at shining a brighter light on China's illegal activities in the South China Sea, creating political space (if not domestic pressure) for governments to push back. Moreover, this is a deterrence strategy – I argue the United States should move forward with proactively supporting regional states only if China reclaims Scarborough Reef or deploys advanced military capabilities to its new bases in the Spratly Islands. China taking these extraordinary steps would likely be provocative enough to alter political dynamics in Southeast Asia, heightening concerns and opening new opportunities for cooperation. Taken together, the execution of the proposed strategy would occur, as compared to today, in an environment much more conducive to attracting regional support. Hugh's second critique is that the only choice for the United States is accommodation or war, and that Washington isn't willing to risk the latter. Hugh's characterisation of my argument that the United States should 'unambiguously commit to help defend other claimants' island bases' is simply a misreading – nowhere do I suggest such a commitment. Regardless, here's the line that I really disagree with: 'The reality is that there is now no way to push back effectively against China in the South China Sea itself without a high risk of war.' This view overlooks a number of important political, diplomatic, and institutional brakes on armed conflict between the United States and China, as demonstrated by the fact that we haven't see anything remotely approaching the brink of war (much less a major military crisis) even as the relationship has grown significantly more competitive. In fact, the current glide path toward Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia poses a much more serious risk to US security and prosperity. In other words, uncontested Chinese dominance, not major power war, is the biggest threat facing the United States (and Australia, for that matter) in Asia today. Besides, China is itself deeply risk-averse and has backed down in almost every instance in which the United States has stood firm on interest and principle. President Xi Jinping is likely aware that a war with the United States would severely damage both China's economic development and its aspirations for national reunification. Despite loose talk about China's 'core interests', recent experience suggests that China could certainly be compelled into a more moderate approach in the South China Sea, if only the United States and its partners were willing to make a serious go of it. Promoting the misperception of China as ready to run up the escalation ladder is both wrong and counterproductive: China has instead been pushing on an open door, surprised at its ability to do so cost-free. As a more general comment, I tend to think Hugh's analyses would benefit from less certainty about the futility of deterrence, and greater scepticism of China's own willingness to fight. Finally, Hugh suggests that a more robust US policy won't work because Beijing currently doubts Washington's resolve. Now again we agree: that this is a serious problem, but also that it could be resolved by US leaders being clear at home and abroad about the intensity of the China challenge and the commensurate importance of America's enduring commitment to Asia. There's no question that, as Hugh says, 'this is a tall order, especially as things stand in DC right now.' It was never going to be easy, and it's only getting harder by the day. But now at least there's a viable plan on the shelf if and when US policymakers are willing to admit that US efforts are faltering, and to commit for real to preventing Chinese dominance of the South China Sea. This post originally appeared in The Interpreter, published by the Lowy Institute.
    by Ely Ratner June 30, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • South China Sea
    Two Cardinal Sins of U.S. South China Sea Policy
    In previewing this week’s inaugural U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, acting Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton took a question from Anne Gearan of The Washington Post about the Trump Administration’s approach to the South China Sea. Thornton’s short response neatly embodied two major deficiencies in current U.S. policy that are paving the way for a Chinese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. (I address both in deeper detail and offer alternatives in the July/August edition of Foreign Affairs in a piece entitled, “Course Correction:  How to Stop China’s Maritime Advance.”)   First, Thornton repeated the oft-heard U.S. call for China and the other claimants in the South China Sea to cease ongoing militarization of their occupied islands. Thornton noted that, “what we think should happen is that all parties should freeze any construction or militarization of features that they have outposts on.” But here’s the problem: a U.S. preference for non-militarization is not going to change China’s behavior unless it is backed up by clear and credible consequences for what the United States is prepared to do if China continues down the current path of transforming its artificial islands into advanced military bases. As long as China faces little to no costs for its actions, what the United States thinks “should happen” will remain irrelevant.   Second, and related, Thornton concluded by noting that, “We think it’s important that tensions are lowered over these issues.” This revealing comment illustrates the endemic risk aversion in U.S. policy that has come to submerge vital U.S. interests in Asia. Consistent with over a hundred years of U.S. grand strategy, the principal goal of the United States in the South China Sea should be to prevent domination by a rival power, in this case China. Sometimes that may mean trying to lower tensions, but at other times the United States must be comfortable with a more contentious and competitive dynamic. Simply seeking to lower tensions as a policy goal in and of itself has instead created a permissive environment for Chinese assertiveness and militarization. As I wrote with Elbridge Colby in Foreign Policy back in 2014, “China is taking advantage of Washington’s risk aversion by rocking the boat, seeing what it can extract in the process, and letting the United States worry about righting it.” This is still the case today.   If the Trump Administration is serious about preventing Chinese control of the South China Sea, it will have to stop committing these two cardinal sins of U.S. policy.
    by Ely Ratner June 20, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • Southeast Asia
    The Thirtieth ASEAN Summit: Winners
    Over the weekend, the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations held the Thirtieth ASEAN Summit, in Manila—the Philippines is the chair of ASEAN this year. As has become usual, much of the discussion before the summit centered on a potential joint statement about the South China Sea, which has become one of the most divisive issues in Southeast Asia. Countries growing closer to China, like Cambodia and Thailand (which also have no direct claims in the South China Sea), and those that have direct claims and are increasingly suspicious of Beijing’s activities, like Vietnam, have faced off over South China Sea statements at many ASEAN meetings. In addition, the summit provided an opportunity for Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to play up his role as a statesman and host. The fact that, over the weekend, U.S. President Donald Trump invited Duterte for a White House visit, essentially praising Duterte for his brutal approach to narcotics and claiming that the two had a very friendly chat, only further bolstered Duterte’s image in the region—and probably at home. Duterte, of course, then reacted with bizarre mixed messages, making it sound like he was too busy to visit the White House in the near future. This is probably bluster by the Philippine leader to make it clear that: he takes orders (or even invites) from no one; and, that he will continue to chart an independent foreign policy, even if he visits the White House. Some of the winners from the summit: 1. China While Southeast Asian states may still be divided about how to respond to China’s approach to the South China Sea—the region is witnessing a rapid arms race, led by countries like Vietnam, yet Beijing is supposedly pushing for a Code of Conduct, which seems to further befuddle many ASEAN nations—the ASEAN summit produced a relatively tepid statement on the Sea. In fact, the final statement was one of the most tepid on the South China Sea released by ASEAN in years. As Rappler reported, “The ASEAN Chairman’s Statement on Sunday merely ‘took note of concerns expressed by some leaders over recent developments’ in the South China Sea.” Any discussion of China’s land reclamation projects in the South China Sea, which supposedly had been included in earlier drafts of the statement, was gone by the time the final statement was released. A reference to all parties respecting “legal and diplomatic processes” related to the South China Sea, essentially a reference to the need to respect last year’s Hague tribunal ruling, was gone by the time the final statement was released as well, another victory for Beijing. As the Cambodia Daily noted, the final statement also omitted a mention of China’s “militarization” of parts of the South China Sea and claimed that Southeast Asian states and China were cooperating more effectively on South China Sea issues—a dubious claim. 2. Rodrigo Duterte Duterte seems to have incurred little public backlash in the Philippines for shifting Manila’s approach to the South China Sea and Beijing in general—a strategy that was on display in the weeks leading up to the summit, and possibly at the summit as well. Earlier in April, Duterte had vowed to visit Thitu, an island in a disputed area of the South China Sea. Reportedly after pressure from Beijing, he abruptly cancelled his visit to Thitu. On Duterte’s watch, the ASEAN Summit then ultimately released a statement sure to please Beijing. Yet Duterte’s high popularity ratings at home seem unchanged, even though some data also suggests that Philippine citizens desire a tough approach to protecting Philippine claims in the South China Sea. 3. Thailand’s Military Timed to the ASEAN Summit, President Trump also called the leaders of Singapore and Thailand over the weekend and extended an invitation for a White House visit to them as well. The invitation for Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was completely uncontroversial. But Thailand’s prime minister is coup leader Prayuth Chan-ocha, the path to future elections in Thailand still seems unclear, and the military essentially enshrined its long-term power over government with the new constitution; any return to real and robust democracy in the kingdom is far off. Yet Prayuth’s legitimacy, and the Thai military’s actions, are going to essentially be endorsed by the White House with a visit to Washington. To be sure, former president Barack Obama included Prayuth as part of the U.S.-ASEAN summit last year in California. But Obama could at least claim that Prayuth was invited as part of the entire group of ASEAN leaders. Inviting the coup leader to the White House individually connotes a stronger endorsement of Prayuth.
    by Joshua Kurlantzick May 1, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • Philippines
    The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance
    The Philippines is one of the United States’ oldest allies in Asia-Pacific and the long-lasting defense relationship is at the heart of U.S. policy in the region.
    by Eleanor Albert October 21, 2016
  • China
    China Policy and the U.S. Presidential Election
    Play
    The president of the United States will have to deal with a rising and more assertive China on a wide range of issues, including Asia-Pacific security, trade, and cybersecurity. U.S.-China relations will likely continue to be a mix of competition and cooperation. The central question for bilateral relations is: Can the world’s two largest economies avoid increased competition and even conflict?
    Explainer Video with Jeremy Sherlick January 28, 2016
  • South China Sea
    Conflict in the South China Sea
    Territorial disputes in the South China Sea continue to be a source of tension and potential conflict between China and other countries in the region. Though the United States takes no position on sovereignty claims in the South China Sea—including those of its ally, the Philippines—it is deeply interested in maintaining maritime security, upholding freedom of navigation, and ensuring that disputes are settled peacefully. For these reasons, a 2012 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Contingency Planning Memorandum, "Armed Clash in the South China Sea," argued that the United States should help lower the risk of conflict in the region, including the potential for dangerous military incidents involving U.S. and Chinese military forces. New Concerns Beijing's intention to exert greater control over the South China Sea appears undiminished. In 2012, China forcibly seized control of the previously unoccupied Scarborough Reef during a standoff with Philippine maritime vessels, despite agreeing to a mutual withdrawal brokered by Washington. China has seemingly been emboldened by this easy, cost-free conquest: it has since begun construction of artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago that will enable it to extend the range of the Chinese navy, air force, coast guard, and fishing fleets in just a few years. Once sufficient capabilities are in place for round-the-clock maritime and air presence over the South China Sea, Beijing is likely to declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ), similar to the ADIZ it declared over the East China Sea in November 2013. The scale and pace of China's dredging activity has alarmed rival claimants Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. The dispute between China and the Philippines over the Second Thomas Shoal deserves immediate attention. Since 1999, a small contingent of Philippine marines has been deployed on a vessel that Manila beached on the submerged reef. In 2014, Chinese coast guard ships attempted unsuccessfully to block delivery of food, water, and fresh troops to the military outpost. The condition of the beached ship is rapidly deteriorating and it is expected to slide into the sea in a matter of months unless it is reinforced. This situation could lead to another confrontation between Chinese and Philippine forces should Beijing decide to seize the shoal. The U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty could be invoked if, for example, a Philippine naval or coast guard vessel is attacked, a Philippine military aircraft is shot down, or members of the Philippine armed forces are injured. A military clash between China and Vietnam is also a concern. In May 2014, China deployed a deep-sea oil rig in Vietnam's two hundred–nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), leading to a seventy-three-day crisis in which Chinese and Vietnamese ships rammed each other repeatedly before the rig was withdrawn. Although Vietnam's military capabilities are dwarfed by China's, Hanoi is nevertheless determined to defend its maritime rights. Worries persist in Hanoi that Beijing could deploy the oil rig to contested waters again, risking military confrontation. Similar clashes could take place in the nine oil blocks along the coast of Vietnam, for which China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) invited foreign companies in 2012 to seek oil exploration bids, or near the Vietnamese-occupied Vanguard Bank. In addition, the risk of a dangerous incident involving U.S. and Chinese forces within China's EEZ remains a concern given the possibility of military escalation. Following several dangerous near-misses—notably in December 2013 involving a Chinese amphibious dock ship and a U.S. guided-missile cruiser and in August 2014 involving a Chinese fighter aircraft and a U.S. surveillance plane—the U.S. and Chinese militaries struck a groundbreaking deal on rules of behavior for safe military encounters between surface naval ships at sea. Such confidence-building measures may help reduce the potential for accidents in the future. However, individual commanders may still display aggressive behavior that could have dire consequences. Policy Implications U.S. interests in the South China Sea include freedom of navigation, unimpeded passage for commercial shipping, and peaceful resolution of territorial disputes according to international law. Failure to respond to Chinese coercion or use of force could damage U.S. credibility, not only in Southeast Asia, but also in Japan, where anxiety about intensified activity by Chinese military and paramilitary forces is growing. Conflict in the South China Sea would put at risk the more than $5 trillion in trade that passes through those strategic waters annually. Also at stake is the U.S. relationship with China, including Washington's efforts to gain greater cooperation from Beijing on global issues such as combatting terrorism, dealing with epidemics, confronting climate change, securing a deal on Iran's nuclear program, and persuading North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons. Recommendations Although China may have moderated some of its intimidation tactics for now, it continues to seek greater control over the sea and airspace in the South China Sea. Moreover, various attempts to persuade China, along with the other claimants, to freeze destabilizing behavior such as land reclamation have not succeeded. Beijing continues to drag its feet on negotiating a binding code of conduct (CoC) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and has rejected Manila's attempt to resolve its territorial dispute through arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Halting Chinese land reclamation activities may not be possible, but the United States can press China to be transparent about its intentions and urge other nations to do the same. While remaining neutral on sovereignty disputes, the United States should encourage all parties to pursue their claims peacefully and in accordance with international law. The United States should also press China to accept constraints on its behavior in a CoC and dissuade China from taking actions that increase the risk of conflict. Several of the recommendations in CFR's 2012 analysis of potential conflict in the South China Sea remain to be implemented; in particular, the United States should ratify UNCLOS. In addition, the United States should take the following steps: In the absence of progress between China and ASEAN on a binding CoC to avert crises in the South China Sea, the United States should encourage ASEAN to develop its own draft CoC containing risk-reduction measures and a dispute-resolution mechanism. The United States should then work with ASEAN to convince Beijing to sign and implement it. The United States should continue to help the Philippines and Vietnam enhance their maritime policing and security capabilities, for example through better surveillance systems, so they can deter and respond to China entering the water and airspace in their EEZs with impunity. Similar assistance should be extended to Malaysia if requested. The United States should be prepared to respond to future Chinese coercive acts including using U.S. naval forces to deter China's continuing use of "white hulled" paramilitary vessels. Other responses, such as imposing economic sanctions on Chinese energy companies should they drill in contested waters, are also conceivable but should not be specified in advance. The United States should state clearly and publicly that a declaration of an ADIZ by Beijing over the South China Sea would be destabilizing and would not be recognized by Washington. To further reduce the risk of an accident between U.S. and Chinese forces, the two militaries should implement their joint commitment to conclude an agreement on air-to-air encounters by the end of the year.
    Contingency Planning Memorandum by Bonnie S. Glaser April 7, 2015 Center for Preventive Action
  • South China Sea
    South China Sea Tensions
    As the United States pivots to Asia, disputes over territories in the South China Sea have escalated tensions and threatened regional stability.
    by Beina Xu May 14, 2014