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How to Topple Maduro
In Foreign Affairs magazine, I assess U.S. policy on Venezuela and argue that the only way to achieve U.S. goals is the collapse of the Maduro regime.
The GCC: "Carefully Considered Reform" or Reactionary Politics?
Leaders of the Gulf Arab States pose for a photo before the opening session of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Riyadh May 10, 2011. (Ho New/Courtesy Reuters)
Little-noticed news from the Gulf: the Gulf Cooperation Council may now expand to include Jordan and Morocco. The GCC consists of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar. Expansion to include Jordan and Morocco would transform its role from that of a regional group to a more ambitious association of monarchs who have several common interests.
The first is, of course, survival in a turbulent Middle East where worrying terms like “democracy” and “free elections” are being heard. The kings, amirs, sheiks, and sultans have a common interest in ensuring that Arab royalty stays on the throne. They are also all Sunnis, and share a dim view both of Iran and of what might be termed “the rise of Shia power” whether in Iraq, Bahrain, or where Shia constitute a significant minority group—as is the case in Saudi Arabia.
What is more, the article in the Abu Dhabi newspaper to which I linked above states:
“A larger coalition of Arab monarchies could also help to fill a power vacuum that has emerged in the region with the fall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt and the current instability in Syria. The GCC’s recent leading role in the region is in contrast to the Arab League, the most high-profile regional organisation, which has shown signs of internal division and recently postponed a summit scheduled in Baghdad, apparently over differences on Bahrain.” A larger GCC, not bound to the Gulf, may indeed come to have a larger role.
But that reference to Bahrain points to a potential problem. For Jordan and Morocco, there may be an additional reward to joining the GCC: they receive aid from the oil producers in the Gulf, and may believe that they will get more if all these nations draw more closely together. But at what price? There are many rumors that the Saudis have counseled (i.e., pressured) the kings of Morocco and Jordan to abandon their announced reform plans, and stop any moves toward constitutional monarchy where the king would cede some powers to elected officials. The Saudi invasion of Bahrain is sometimes explained as an effort to prevent the Shia majority there from gaining political power, or to prevent an increase in Iranian influence, but this pressure on Jordan and Morocco—which are both Sunni and far from Iran—suggests there may be more here: a general desire to halt the rise of democracy in Arab lands.
The Arab world is experiencing a revolutionary moment, and this may lead monarchs to reject every proposal for reform. Henry Kissinger described the problem is his classic 1954 work about Europe after Napoleon, A World Restored: “ The conservative in a revolutionary period is always somewhat of an anomaly….What is the meaning of authority? What is the nature of freedom? Henceforth stability and reform, liberty and authority, come to appear as antithetical; the contest becomes doctrinal and the problem of change takes the form of an attack on the existing order, instead of a dispute over specific issues.” Arab kings must realize that reformers are not their enemies, and that true conservatives are also reformers. Kissinger continues: “To be a conservative, wrote Metternich, required neither return to a previous period, nor reaction, but carefully considered reform. True conservatism implied an active policy.”
An enlarged and well financed GCC can provide real leadership to the Arab world. The members are all countries with good relations with the United States, including in most cases close intelligence and military ties. The trick will be to prevent the GCC from becoming a reactionaries club, trying to avoid “carefully considered reform” and instead to preserve royal roles that make constitutional monarchy and democracy impossible. The legitimizing principle of government in the twenty-first century is popular sovereignty. The GCC monarchs can adjust to that, as many European monarchs did—or in the end disappear as did many other European kings and princes, ending up living in exile in rented mansions with plenty of time to contemplate what went wrong.
Can Anyone Explain Our Syria Policy?
Protesters gather during a demonstration after Friday Prayer in the Syrian port city of Banias May 6, 2011. (Ho New/Courtesy Reuters)
As the days go by and the Assad regime kills more peaceful demonstrators, U.S. policy becomes less and less possible to comprehend, much less defend.
The latest news makes the situation there even clearer and more horrifying: “At least 10,000 protesters have been detained in the past several days in a mass arrest campaign aimed at quelling a seven-week uprising in Syria against the government of President Bashar al-Assad, activists said, as fresh shelling of a residential neighborhood was reported on Wednesday from Homs, the country’s third largest city. The shelling, most intense between 5 a.m. and 8 a.m., appeared to signal a further escalation in the crackdown.”
U.S. policy in the face of these horrors has been weak. Last Friday Secretary Clinton was still saying Assad might be a reformer. The president has yet to say one word about Syria himself. A statement was issued a couple of weeks ago, but he has not yet said anything on camera to denounce the regime’s violence or support the demonstrators. Our new sanctions do not name Assad. The Syrian ambassador remains here in Washington and ours remains in Damascus—even after a member of the embassy staff was detained by Syrian police, hooded, and beaten. The net effect is to make Syrians and Lebanese who are struggling for freedom wonder why the United States is still supporting Assad.
Good question. Here are some possibilities.
Theory One: Sheer incompetence.
In this take, the administration doesn’t want Assad to stay in power but its Middle East hands are overwhelmed by events in the region and very slow to react. Perhaps this reflects a deep seated view in the State Department that we must and can do business with Assad. That view certainly spread to Capitol Hill, where in the last few years then-Speaker Pelosi and Senator John Kerry were among its supporters. In the administration’s defense, U.S. policy toward Syria has been unproductive for a long time, under several presidents. In the Bush administration, Syria was for some years isolated successfully; we even persuaded EU foreign ministers to stay away. But it’s evident that there were neither sufficient carrots to get Assad to change nor sufficient sticks to force him to do so or to bring him down. In those years Syria was jihadi central: every jihadi who wanted to travel to Iraq to kill Americans went through Damascus International Airport, and we did nothing in response. So failed policies toward Syria are nothing new.
Theory Two: The Vogue View.
Perhaps current policy is explained by the remnants, the detritus, of the older “Bashar is a young reformer” view. Assad was seen as someone who wanted change, was modern and had lived in London, spoke good English, and –above all!-- had a young and glamorous wife. Secretary Clinton cannot seem to shake this sentiment. (Vogue Magazine has removed the puff piece on Assad’s wife from its internet site, and one can only wish it were as easy to erase from Western minds the underlying nonsense about Assad being a reformer.)
Theory Three: Can’t Admit Mistakes.
Here, the administration knows the policy approach it had adopted and defended is dead, but is unwilling to admit it-- not yet anyway. It is unwilling, for example, to admit that sending an ambassador to Damascus was a mistake. This defensiveness is eroding far too slowly but if this theory is right it will not prevent a better policy, sooner or later. The problem is that the regime will have killed a lot more Syrians by then and may have crushed the protest movement.
Theory Four: The Engagement is Still On.
Under this theory, the administration is adhering to its initial policy of engagement with Syria (as with Iran). This would explain its apparent blindness to the remarkable strategic gains for the United States if Iran loses its only Arab ally, its border with Israel (through Hamas), and its Mediterranean port (in northern Syria). Perhaps the administration is still praying for Israel-Syria peace talks, especially now that peace talks with the new Hamas/Fatah coalition are obviously impossible. This would help explain the more general misunderstanding of how important it is that those Arab regimes that resist change with guns must lose, and lose fast.
Theory Five: Defeatism.
Perhaps the administration has concluded that Assad simply will not lose, but will survive under any realistic set of circumstances. The Sunni elites and the army have not deserted the regime and will not, they may think, so he’ll be there and there is no point in making relations with him worse or in prolonging the violence. This, if true, would be a remarkably defeatist policy and I would argue a dishonorable one. It will have a broad impact in the region, especially on how those fighting for democracy—and those fighting against it—view the United States.
Theory Six: The Brotherhood is Coming
It may be that the administration agrees with those who say any successor regime in Damascus will be worse, as it will come under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood or some other form of extremism. No evidence is ever offered for this conclusion, though it is a mantra I have heard for years. The Brotherhood is very weak in Syria—far weaker than in Egypt, where the Administration called for Mubarak’s departure. Assad’s jails are full of political prisoners who could man a new government, and in the protest movement itself there is no evidence of extremist influences--yet. And here is the fatal flaw of this argument: surely if Assad wins and wreaks vengeance with a further reign of terror, extremists will gain influence. This whole experience would have led many Syrians to conclude that peaceful protest led by moderates is a bad bet, and the only real way forward is through terror and bloodshed.
Theory Seven: We Are Helpless.
This is the theory that we have no real influence in Syria and there isn’t anything we can do anyway. But there are things we can do. We can act to make Syria a pariah state, as it now even more clearly deserves. We should seek a joint agreement with the EU and Canada that none of our foreign ministers will visit there nor will theirs be received in any Western capital. We should impose harsher sanctions, targeting more regime officials and starting at the top with Assad. We should put top regime officials and cronies on no-fly lists and bottle them up in Syria, and start denying landing rights to Syrian Arab Airlines. We should go after regime corruption, which is vast. We should supply more money for the opposition in Syria and in exile, if they want it and can make use of it. We should push again and again at the UN Human Rights Council and in other international bodies to keep Syria on the defensive and to show our moral and political support for the democracy movement.
It isn’t possible for someone outside the White House to know which of these theories explaining its behavior are valid, and to what extent. But it is possible to see that whatever the basis for U.S. policy, it is failing and must be abandoned in favor of a far more assertive opposition to the vicious Assad regime and a far more energetic defense of the Syrians now struggling, and dying, to end a regime that has brought decades of repression, violence and terror.
Egypt: Corruption and the Presidency
Much has been written about the effort to find bank accounts and other property belonging to the Mubarak family and to others who were powerful figures in the Mubarak regime. Whether that effort has crossed over from a fair inquiry into persecution of some wealthy businessmen is a subject for another day. Certainly the people of Egypt have a right to recover any moneys stolen from them through corruption during the Mubarak years, and to prosecute wrongdoers.
But however important it is to punish wrongdoing by those now gone from power, is it not more important to keep from power others who may have been corrupt? Is it not more important to prevent future corruption?
With this in mind, Egyptians should now demand to understand the financial affairs of any candidate for the presidency and of his family. Do any of the men who will present themselves for that office have foreign bank accounts and properties? If so, where and what are they? What is the value? If it is many millions, what was the source of those funds?
All presidential candidates should be forced to divulge their wealth, just as they are in the United States and many other countries. One benefit is that if that wealth increases while they are in office in the future, Egyptians can rightly demand to know how that happened and whether corrupt payments were involved. Another benefit is that candidates will be forced to make a (presumably sworn) statement upon whose accuracy their political futures will depend. If someone declares a small amount and is then shown to have a huge Swiss account or gorgeous London town house, he will pay the political price and face legal sanctions.
Perhaps all of the candidates will prove to have lived as ascetics. Perhaps all will be able to show the legitimate source of all the funds and properties they and their families own. And perhaps not; indeed adoption of this requirement may even make some people think twice about entering the race. But given the history of public corruption and the outrage it has stirred in Egypt, thinking about the wealth of the next president and not only the last should be a key part of the transition to democracy.
Syria: Clinton Fails Again
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivers remarks on March 22, 2011. (Jim Young/Courtesy Reuters)
On March 27, Secretary of State Clinton made what seemed an astonishing gaffe by calling the Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad a “reformer” in an interview on Face The Nation. That statement was widely attacked so two days later she appeared to withdraw it, claiming “I referenced opinions of others. That was not speaking either for myself or for the Administration.”
But that apology turns out to have been meaningless, for now she has done it again. In an interview on May 6, she was asked about events in the region. Here is part of the exchange:
SECRETARY CLINTON: There are deep concerns about what is going on inside Syria, and we are pushing hard for the Government of Syria to live up to its own stated commitment to reforms. So I think it’s – it is fair to say --
QUESTION: But the Syria case is particularly poignant, the (inaudible).
SECRETARY CLINTON: It is poignant.
QUESTION: At this point, this is a country where they have killed most people in the street.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I don’t have that comparison, but what I do know is that they have an opportunity still to bring about a reform agenda. Nobody believed Qadhafi would do that. People do believe there is a possible path forward with Syria. So we’re going to continue joining with all of our allies to keep pressing very hard on that.
This is astonishing. By last week Assad had killed roughly one thousand peaceful demonstators, though the numbers are hard to verify because he has also kicked journalists out of Syria and closed down many internet and telephone connections. The “reformer” is using his army to murder Syrians seeking freedom and human rights. If this “reformer” line is the interpretation she is getting in cables from the U.S. ambassador in Damascus, that’s yet another reason he should be recalled. If he is taking a tougher line, one has to wonder why she isn’t listening and where she is getting this absurd view.
When I speak to Lebanese and Syrian human rights activists and journalists, they tell me they and their colleagues believe the United States wants Assad to remain in power. For weeks I had been protesting that this was wrong, a misimpression, a misunderstanding. Now I am not so sure, not after Clinton repeated this nonsense about Assad and reform.
The Obama Administration has a moral obligation now to state its position--America’s position--clearly. With another weekend of murders in Syria, with more use of the Syrian Army to kill unarmed protesters, Secretary Clinton should be calling for his departure rather than continuing her foolish and embarrassing statements about reform in Syria. Enough is enough.
The End of the "Peace Process"
Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal (R) talks with President Mahmoud Abbas (L) during their meeting in Cairo May 4, 2011. (Ho New/Courtesy Reuters)
The agreement between Fatah and Hamas marks the end of a long period of cooperation and negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians.
It’s worth reviewing the recent history briefly. In 2003, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon endorsed the two-state solution and said Palestinians should govern themselves. At a summit meeting in Aqaba, Sharon and Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (whom Yasser Arafat was forced to appoint) exchanged words of peace and Abbas explicitly renounced violence as a tool of Palestinian politics. In late 2003 and with more detail in early 2004, Sharon announced that he would pull Israeli settlers and troops out of Gaza and withdraw symbolically from four small settlements in the West Bank, and after a long political battle did so in the summer of 2005.
In November 2004 Arafat died and Abbas was chosen as his successor in a free election in January 2005. Negotiations over a final settlement started up again after the Annapolis Conference in November 2007, though they ended when Operation Cast Lead began in late 2008 and have never recommenced. Despite the Hamas coup in Gaza in 2007, Israeli-PA cooperation on the ground improved from 2006 right through to 2011, allowing for a significant progress in economic conditions in the West Bank and for considerable security cooperation against terrorist groups including Hamas. Under American training, PA security forces improved greatly in the last several years, just one piece of the institutional progress that has taken place since Salam Fayyad became prime minister in 2007.
In choosing to enter a coalition with Hamas, Abbas is abandoning all the advances made to date and abandoning his own former approach. Cooperation with Israel to improve life in the West Bank and security cooperation against terrorism have now been jettisoned in favor of the appearance of unity. All of Abbas’s past statements about Hamas as his enemy, Fatah’s enemy, and the PA’s enemy have been put aside in an embrace of Khaled Meshal, the Hamas leader. Under the agreement, elections will be held for the PA presidency and parliament, and for the PLO bodies, in one year, and security forces are to be put under one umbrella.
Why now? Why Hamas entered this coalition is easy to explain. Its invaluable support from Syria is as shaky as the Assad regime itself, and its usual opposition to PA elections is softened by the prospect of winning them. Moreover, Hamas has long sought to enter and dominate the PLO but was kept out of it. Abbas’s willingness to let Hamas in is a considerable victory for Hamas.
But why did Abbas do it? Public opinion polls suggest that Palestinians want national unity and reconciliation, so Abbas is playing to the voters. (Whether those voters will be able to distinguish real reconciliation from a façade put up by Hamas and Fatah leaders who hate each other is a different matter.) And Abbas is calling for a September UN vote recognizing an independent Palestinian state, which would be harder to win if the PA manifestly ruled over half the territory only, with Gaza wholly independent. Abbas may also have felt that with polls showing that Hamas is quite unpopular in Gaza and weaker than in 2006, Fatah should be able to win the PA and PLO elections.
As to the meaning of all this for the “peace process,” well…..there is no more “peace process.” Abbas has given up on it, just as he has given up on President Obama. He recently commented to Newsweek that “It was Obama who suggested a full settlement freeze. I said OK, I accept. We both went up the tree. After that, he came down with a ladder and he removed the ladder and said to me, jump. Three times he did it.” Abbas is turning instead to internal politics, and his message to us is “Go away and leave me alone. I am finished with peace negotiations for now.” Of course, as he has promised not to run again in next year’s presidential elections, he himself is presumably finished with them forever. He wants his legacy to be some semblance (no matter how false) of national unity, rather than a difficult and controversial peace agreement with Israel that requires him to make compromises—and be accused of treason by Hamas for each one. In this sense he is casting himself as a transitional leader between Arafat and whatever comes next, a man too weak to lead his people across to the promised land of real national independence.
It remains to be seen how the United States and the EU will react to the new situation. When Hamas won the 2006 elections, the U.S. and EU (with Russian support, briefly) adopted what became known as the Quartet Principles: “It is the view of the Quartet that all members of a future Palestinian Government must be committed to non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations…”
Trying to get around the Principles in 2006 and again now, the Palestinian formula is that there will be a non-party technocratic government. That way, they can say Hamas is not actually participating in the PA government—not yet anyway. It is a hollow formula, and not only because it merely delays the problem of Hamas’s role until elections are held. Will “all members” of the new government now truly endorse an absolute end to violence and terror, not simply tactically but morally and permanently?
In his 2003 Aqaba speech, Abbas said “we repeat our renunciation, a renunciation of terror against the Israelis wherever they might be. Such methods are inconsistent with our religious and moral traditions and are dangerous obstacles to the achievement of an independent, sovereign state we seek. These methods also conflict with the kinds of state we wish to build, based on human rights and the rule of law.” Excellent words. Will every new appointee swear to them, even though Hamas obviously rejects them? After all, it is only a month since Hamas fired an anti-tank missile at an Israeli school bus. And this week, senior Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar told al-Jazeera Hamas would never recognize Israel and “the rule of Poles and Ethiopians in their land.” But don’t worry about that, said Fatah Central Committee member Nabil Shaath: “many others agree with us that the old rules of the quartet were not logical, and are not workable.”
Back in 2006 and 2007, it seemed to me the EU would abandon the Quartet Principles if Hamas gave them the slightest pretext—but the Hamas guys did not come through for the eager European diplomats. They wouldn’t move one inch toward the Quartet. Perhaps they will in 2011, in which case Israel will find top-level Hamas representatives being wined and dined in all the capitals of Europe. If not, the EU will likely oppose the PA effort at the UN in September, led by the Germans. For obvious historical reasons and because it is led by a principled person, Germany has already taken a tougher line. When this week President Sarkozy said "If the peace process is still dead in September, France will face up to its responsibilities on the central question of recognition of a Palestinian state," Chancellor Merkel rejected an appeal from Abbas and said "We do not think that unilateral steps are helpful."
If the EU does not support the Palestinians in New York come September, the Palestinian effort will likely succeed in winning a majority but fail nevertheless. Because if the new entity does not have EU and U.S. recognition, the Palestinian effort to replace negotiations with Israel by unity between Fatah and Hamas and by unilateral diplomatic moves will have led into a cul de sac. Who cares how Zimbabwe and Venezuela and the Arab League vote, if the United States, the EU, and nations such as Canada and Australia vote against the Palestinian effort or (for those who are afraid to do so) even abstain on it?
What should Netanyahu say when he speaks to a joint session of Congress in a couple of weeks? That Israel wants peace and remains committed to the two-state solution; that it realizes the State of Israel will have to give up some settlements in the Land of Israel, if peace is obtainable; that the refugee problem must indeed be solved, but the solution must be found in Palestine, not in Israel; that the fundamental problem is security, and the continuing refusal by the Palestinians to accept Israel as a Jewish State; that there can be no return to the 1949 armistice lines; and that anyone who seeks peace must regard the entry of Hamas into the PLO and into the Palestinian Authority as a grim development.
And what of Washington? Due to the deal with Hamas, any hope Israel’s enemies, or its “friends” in Europe, had that President Obama would push Netanyahu into serious concessions when they meet in late May is now gone. I was one of those who, over the past few months, were urging Netanyahu to consider far-reaching steps toward the Palestinians, but that was back in the old days when the PA and Fatah were enemies of Hamas. Such steps are impossible now in both American and Israeli politics. The president would be wise to adopt a new policy now: the goal should be to try to avoid Israeli-Palestinian violence, let the Palestinians vote next year, and then see where we stand. If the president has a second term and the conditions are good he can return to this subject then; for the remainder of his first term it needs to be parked. It is fair for him to ask Netanyahu to avoid provocative actions, such as starting new settlements in the West Bank or announcing large new housing projects in Jerusalem (new projects will be started there, but Israel should seek less rather than more publicity for them).
And the president should tell the Palestinian Authority leadership that we will give it aid to the extent that its officials are committed to the Quartet Principles and continue to fight terror. Secretary Clinton said on Wednesday that “we are waiting to see the details. We obviously are aware of the announcement in Cairo yesterday. There are many steps that have yet to be undertaken in order to implement the agreement. And we are going to be carefully assessing what this actually means, because there are a number of different potential meanings to it, both on paper and in practice. We’ve made it very clear that we cannot support any government that consists of Hamas unless and until Hamas adopts the Quartet principles. And the Quartet principles have been well known to everyone for a number of years. So we’re going to wait and make our assessment as we actually see what unfolds from this moment on.”
This is not reassuring. The PA will not have “a government that consists of Hamas,” but a non-party technocratic government meant precisely to get around the Quartet Principles. The United States needs to be far clearer: we cannot and will not support any government where Hamas has a real influence and the security forces stop fighting terror. We must certainly not fund such a government, and indeed once Fayyad leaves we should be very wary of the financial practices of the PA. For years Fayyad has resisted Fatah Party efforts—often led by President Abbas—to put corrupt officials into the Finance and other ministries, and this is one reason Fatah leaders dislike him and want him out.
But the critical test will be security work. According to descriptions of the agreement, “Among the first tasks to be tackled is the establishment of a higher security council tasked with examining ways to integrate Hamas and Fatah’s rival security forces and create a ‘professional’ security service. The accord also calls for…the release of a number prisoners held by the rival movements in jails in the West Bank and Gaza.” This suggests an integration of the American-trained security forces with Hamas terrorist forces known as the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, an end to fighting terror, and the release from prisons of terrorists from Hamas and other groups. If this transpires, it would mean the PA/Fatah leaders are choosing the armed struggle over peace with Israel, and would mean that Hamas will henceforth be the leading Palestinian faction.
Perhaps not; perhaps the West Bank security forces will continue their work, given their long years of war against Hamas. Perhaps this agreement like its predecessor will soon break down, for the Hamas and Fatah leaders have been enemies for decades. Yuval Diskin, who is about to step down as the head of Israel’s Shin Bet security service and who knows as much about Hamas and Fatah as anyone, said this week “I think the chance of a real reconciliation between the sides over the next two or three years is slim. The signing of the agreement creates a facade of unity, but it is unclear how they will implement the agreement on the ground.” In that sense Secretary Clinton was right to say we need to see what unfolds. But we need to be absolutely clear on the standards we will apply. We do no favor to any Palestinian who really seeks peace, democracy, and independence if we pull our punches when a murderous terrorist group maneuvers to gain power in—and then take power over—all the Palestinian territories.
