Internet Governance After Busan: What's Next?

Thursday, November 20, 2014
Daniel Sepulveda

Deputy Assistant Secretary and U.S. Coordinator for International Communications and Information Policy, U.S. Department of State 

Lawrence Strickling

Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information, U.S. Department of Commerce 

Christopher Painter

Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues, U.S. Department of State 

Nuala O’Connor

President and Chief Executive Officer, Center for Democracy & Technology 

Closing Speakers

Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies, Director, Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program, David Rockefeller Studies Program, Council on Foreign Relations

Christopher Painter, coordinator of the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues at the U.S. Department of State; Daniel Sepulveda, deputy assistant secretary and U.S. coordinator for international communications and information policy at the U.S. Department of State; and Lawrence Strickling, assistant secretary for communications and information at the U.S. Department of Commerce; join Nuala O'Connor, president and chief executive officer at the Center for Democracy & Technology, to discuss the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) conference in Busan, South Korea, and what comes next. The panelists reflect on the consensus reached in Busan, the transition of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions away from the United States to the global community, and creating successful multistakeholder processes.

This meeting is part of the Internet Governance After Busan Symposium, made possible by Google, Inc., with additional support from Intel.

O'CONNOR: If everyone could take their seats, we're ready to begin. Thank you so much. I could get my mommy voice out and then you'll all really be scared. Good afternoon and welcome to our third panel. I'm Nuala O'Connor, I'm the President and CEO of the Center for Democracy and Technology, a digital civil liberties organization here in Washington D.C. and around the world. I want to actually commend the last questioner: you can come talk to me later. The digital life and the digital self is one of our passionate areas at CDT in addition to Internet governance, and free expression and privacy and all of your online civil liberties. I am delighted to be here today with three esteemed colleagues from government service. I guess I'm the token non-Obama administration official, having served in another administration which shall remain nameless at this time.

To my immediate right, Danny Sepulveda, the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Economic and Business Affairs at the Department of State. We are delighted you are here. I'm going to dispense with biographies, since you all have them in your packages, and we want to save time for your actual comments. To his immediate right, Larry Strickland, our esteemed Assistant Secretary for Communications at NTIA, at the Department of Commerce, my old stomping grounds. And Chris Painter, the Coordinator of the Office for Cyber Issues at the U.S. Department of State. We are so lucky to have all three of you here on the panel today.

A few additional remarks from the council. Please remember that this session is on the record, and please stay seated after this session for the closing remarks for today's event. We are delighted to have you, and we are excited to talk about Busan. Danny, your — you and your team deserve so much credit. It sounds like it was a smashing success. Would you tell the audience a little bit about what led up to the event, what you were expecting, what you were hoping for, what your goals were and how you achieved them.

SEPULVEDA: Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity, and I appreciate the opportunity to sit here with my colleagues and — and share some of our thoughts about where we stand and where we're headed on — on these issues of international Internet governance. So, there was a panel earlier today, in which my colleagues from Europe, Brazil, and — and Ghana talked about what their perceptions were of — of what happened in Busan, and it's always very interesting to me to hear other people's perception of the same event that — that you attend. But, generally, we're all in agreement that it was a successful event, and that consensus was achieved through, essentially, good relationships and the ability to identify what it is that you're trying to achieve, what you can agree on, what you can't agree on, and where else you can address issues that are not addressable in that particular circumstance.

So, right — I mean, while we were there, the three weeks felt very long. In retrospect, it feels like it went by in a blur. The — the first week was dedicated to high level policy statements, where myself and — and — and other ministers and ambassadors gave their general views on the ITU, what it should it be doing, and where it should be going in the next four years. There were also elections during that time.

And the last two weeks were dedicated to the negotiation of differences of opinions on the scope of the work, and how the work would proceed going forward for the — the next four years. And the way that that works out is actually a — a very interesting process. The resolutions are broken out into working groups, and my colleague Jeferson led the — the working group on cyber security. Our colleague from Italy led the working group on Internet issues generally. But there many, many, many working groups, and my job was to sort of sit as the coach at the top of that pyramid, and let the team run on these issues. So, Fiona Alexander, from NTIA, ran the Internet discussions. Our colleague, Micaela, from DHS, ran the — the discussions on cyber security. And everyone was spread out.

We had the blessing of being the United States of having the resources to have multiple people, and multiple rooms running multiple negotiations. Our — our U.N. staff and offices were also very, very helpful in all of these processes. And we were able to work through — the way that it works out is each working group gets a resolution and anyone who has a proposal gets to have that proposal put on a board, and — and present their proposal, and then people discuss it, negotiate out whether or not it's something that is acceptable. You manipulate language until it is, or you reject ideas. And then you move forward on the basis of consensus. The card that everybody has left to play is that if, at the end of the day, they are unwilling to move off of their proposal, they can call for a vote.

And our goal is to ensure that we were able to reach consensus agreement, and not limit the ITU to its mandate, but to define its mandate and ensure that that mandate is a positive one that focuses on connecting people to networks, connecting networks to each other, and leaving how people use those networks and what they use it for to other institutions to worry about from a governance perspective. So, at the end of the day, our goal is to maximize the economies of scale available to the firms that participate on this network, as well as the speakers that want to reach audiences, as — and — and maximize the amount of freedom they have to do so in productive ways as they see fit on those networks.

Again, our colleagues in the first panel did an excellent job of — of — of giving their perspectives, and I think that the — the sort of universal sense of — of success is — is appreciated and I think that what I would say in terms of was — if there was a formula to that success, the formula was two years of relationship building where I — I think, you know, Jeferson and I worked together on multiple, different negotiated outcomes during the three weeks that we were there and that was possible because we'd been getting to know each other over two years. I don't think if — if we had just met at this particular conference we would have been able to achieve those kinds of — of consensus agreements, and I think that that's true throughout — throughout the team.

I mean, Fiona's been doing this for many years, my — my deputy, Julie Zoller has been doing this for many years. And one of the things that I'm happiest about is the degree to which the United States came out in — in greater standing within the union. So, for example, we ran for the ITU council, which is the governing body between plenipotentiaries and got twenty-two more states to support us than did four years ago. My deputy, Julie Zoller, was voted to be the vice chair of the ITU council next year, and the chairman the following year. The sort of things that were unthinkable two or three years ago, given the — the tension within the organization. And we did agree to do some — some very significant and important work relative to expanding access to the networks, relative to concentrating on creating legal regulatory and policy environments that encourage investment in — in networks, and encourage investment in ensuring that people have access to those networks. But, I can get into the more specifics as we get into the Q&A.

O'CONNOR: But one just follow up question. It is true, it was a huge success for your team, and it sounds like great steps forward in achieving good relationship building. You've called it the Busan consensus. I'm concerned, is there really consensus? And what do you think there's consensus around? Do you think there's multistakeholder support? Do you think that there's a real consensus around how this should look going forward?

SEPULVEDA: I think the consensus is on — on three things. One, that the ITU's a critical institution. Two, that the ITU cannot do everything, and it has to do those things for which it has responsibility well. And, three, is that we have a responsibility to work together, and to hear each other out and to have an honest dialogue without demagoguing each other's positions and trying to understand not just what the proposal is, but what the underlying concern is and what the multiple mechanisms there are for addressing those concerns.

So, if you take, for example, the question of cyber security. From our perspective, from the United States' perspective, cyber security is about the protection of networks. Not about the protection of people's personal identifiable information, and it's not about how what — in terms of as it relates to attacks on other individuals, whether that be criminal attacks or state on state attacks, none — none of those things are the remit of the ITU. At the end of the day, what the ITU can do is share is best practices and information-sharing on how networks can protect themselves, telecommunications networks, and the owners and operators of telecommunications networks.

Those other questions are being discussed in other venues, including the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, UNESCO, the General Assembly in general — generally within regional organizations and institutions, within private sector organizations and institutions. And so, ensuring — what I think the Busan consensus was about was remaining a union, focusing on what the union does well, and needs to do to ensure expanded connectivity around the world, and then creating a space in which you can continue to discuss and debate issues that may not fall within the union's remit, but having the time and space in which to identify where you can go with those concerns.

O'CONNOR: Very positive outcome, or at least version of the outcome.


O'CONNOR: Larry. Larry is such an esteemed telecom attorney. This — the country is grateful for your service, and we are so delighted you are where you are. And not to make you feel even more important, but the world is watching. We are watching the IANA transition, we are watching all the important work you're doing at NTIA. Tell us what Busan means for you, and what do you project going forward? And tell us about NETmundial, and the other initiatives, and what do you think's going to happen there?

STRICKLING: Well, we should save something ...


STRICKLING: ... for Q&A, but let me hit some of the highlights, and — and maybe that'll spark a good discussion when we get to the Q&A. Well, I mean, 2014 has been a very important year for Internet — international Internet governance. And, no question, the hallmark event of the year was the Busan plenipotentiary, the ITU, and, again, Danny, you know, was — was quite humble in talking about the team effort that it took to get through the — and get the result we got, but — but Danny deserves so much of the credit for the leadership that he showed in terms of leading that delegation. Yes, he relied on other people to be in the front lines, but that delegation were, you know, his — his views, and his reflective ideas about how to proceed on this. And, so, Danny, you deserve a tremendous amount of credit for that.

But it's not the only thing going on, even though, I think, again, it was the most important event of the year. But for this year we also saw the NETmundial conference, in Brazil, in April, which in its own right was — was path-breaking opportunity to have a — a country, Brazil, in the developing world bring together people from all around the world to talk in a true multistakeholder environment, where governments and civil society and industry all talked as equals in this conference for two days, the output of which was an important set of principles and a road map to how do we address issues of international importance that perhaps don't have a home today for their deliberation and discussion and resolution.

And, so that was a very important event back in April. And, certainly, again, the government of Brazil deserves a tremendous amount of credit for organizing that event and running it in true multistakeholder fashion. And, again, Brazil has a long history of multistakeholder policy making in the Internet space internally, and it was quite appropriate that they were the country that stepped up to host this conference in April.

Also, this past year, we, of course, had the announcement from NTIA in March that we were prepared to complete the privatization, the transition of the IANA functions away from the U.S. government to the global Internet community. And, that, of course, has sparked a tremendous amount of discussion and debate this year, and it will be a very large topic on the agenda for 2015. Where that stands at this point is that the community has responded, I think, quite well to the call to organize and to look at what should come, if anything, in the post-contract environment once the contract between ICANN and the U.S. expires.

The community is determined that there are two sets of issues that they want to address, want to deal with. The first one being how to approach the technical IANA functions. There are four key functions involved, and look at what is the role the U.S. plays and how should those functions be performed in an accountable and transparent way post the expiration of the contract. The working group that's been assembled on that, the coordination group, has been meeting regularly since the late summer. They will be receiving proposals from the community I think in the December, January time frame, and they hope to be able to come up with a consensus proposal on those issues. I — I saw Jamie Hedlund, from ICANN was quoted a couple of days ago as saying the expectation was that work might be completed as early as March. But, that's only one of the sets of issues that are being discussed.

The other is — is an almost metaphysical discussion about the accountability of ICANN. There has always been a sense, and it's been a source of comfort to some, and a source of irritation to others, that the presence of the United States having a contract with ICANN provided a certain stability, and a certain comfort that ICANN would never ever, ever get totally rogue, and totally go off the reservation. Again, many people took comfort in that. Many others, including a lot of foreign governments, were irritated by that. And that relationship, if it's going to go away, the question is, what, if anything, needs to be done to make sure that ICANN remains accountable and becomes more accountable to its stakeholders when you don't have that backstop of the United States, however you perceive that backstop to be.

So, that work effort has been slower to come together. There's — it will be a cross-community working group that's been organized now. They, I believe, have completed a charter for the work of that group, and they will be getting organized and getting underway shortly. And so that'll be an important effort that we'll be watching closely, and seeing how well that group is able to confront these issues, and even to define the issues that are involved with the respect to the — the expiration of the American contract and then determine what measures, if any, would be appropriate to strengthen the accountability and transparency of ICANN going forwards.

So, we'll be watching that very closely, and we are trying not to steer this process any particular direction, but as ideas come forward, you know, we have tried to indicate where we think ideas have promise. Or, more importantly, we've tried to point out situations where ideas may be introducing new uncertainties into the process that the community really needs to think carefully through before they proceed too far down a particular path. We can get into some of the specifics on that on Q&A.

I think the last thing you asked about was — was the NETmundial initiative. This is a yet to be determined effort. It — what we know at this point is that it's being initially brought together by Brazil, by the — by ICANN, and by the World Economic Forum, and they are seeking to put together a coordination council to provide greater definition and more of an agenda in terms of how that group might actually evolve and emerge as — as a productive addition to the overall international Internet governance landscape. One thing that, if — to the extent people have looked at any of the materials surrounding it — it does intend to duplicate any work that's currently going on in this space, though it's not going to take up and duplicate what the IGF does, which was of great concern to a lot of people. It's not going to duplicate or conflict with what ICANN or the IETF or other organizations do.

So, we know what it's not going to do. What we don't know yet is what it is going to do. It talks about the idea of creating capacity, and infrastructure to allow a distributed Internet governance ecosystem to continue to grow and evolve. So, the coordination council's going to have an important task to try provide some definition about that, and more importantly, figure out how to engage the entire multi-stakeholder community to provide that definition as this organization gets off the ground. So, I'll maybe pause there. I'm sure we've left a lot of things out that we should come back and talk about on Q&A, but we'll wait for that.

O'CONNOR: And just a follow up for you, Larry, and, again thank you so much, and thank you for mentioning the word multistakeholder. I was timing us to see how long it took us on this panel. We were at almost twenty minutes before someone said the word multistakeholder. Very concerned at CTDC, obviously, that any transition really encourage and — and convene the voices of the individual, and of all parties, including civil society, and we thank you very much for all the processes you have run at NTIA that reflect that that value already.

Following up on IANA. What if we're not ready? What happens then?

STRICKLING: If the community isn't ready, yes, there's no harm done. The contract, while it has an expiration date at the end of September, can be extended for up to four years. So, if the community needs more time, there'll be no problem giving it more time.

O'CONNOR: And what are the values you're looking for in the new structure?

STRICKLING: Well, we've been quite clear that a) we don't want to be too prescriptive in defining what the outcome is, but, at the same time, we've provided four very clear principles that we felt any proposal had to satisfy. One was it needed to be multistakeholder in that it had to reflect the values of multistakeholder, and had to be generated through a multistakeholder process. We also said that it had to protect the security and stability and resiliency of the Internet. Third, it had to meet the needs of the customers of the IANA functions. And, fourth, it had to preserve a free and open Internet. So, frankly, there's been no real push back anywhere in the community — in the community to those principles because they are so well accepted in the ICANN community and in the global Internet community that that has not been a source of controversy that — that those are the — the frame within which we've asked the community to develop a proposal.

O'CONNOR: Thank you so much. Chris, turning to you, and, again, thank you for your years of service. You and I have been doing this a long time. And Busan is an important moment, but only one moment in time. Where are we going next?

PAINTER: So, you know, just to echo some of the things Larry said and Danny said, too. You shouldn't underestimate what a good achievement we — we got out of Busan and that, you know, Danny really spearheaded there. And I think that, if you remember just a few months ago, and just even right before the meeting, there was a lot of angst about what could happen. What the ITU might try to do. Whether it would try to exert control over Internet governance in the technical sense, whether it would try to take to over issues of cybercrime and international security. That didn't happen. But it was an important data point, just like the NETmundial conference, I think, was a very, very important data point that helped set up, really, success I think of the ITU to some example, because it got the global south involved in — in — in really affirming some of these key principles. And I think Brazil was really leading the effort there, and that was very helpful. And — and certainly the IANA transition also helped condition some success there.

But going forward, the fact that we — we reached this result in the ITU doesn't mean the debate on all these issues is over. I mean, this going to be, these are going to be continuing issues and even I think intensified over the next couple of years. You know, there — there are so many cyber meetings, cyber summits, there's so many cyber summits it's like the cyber Alps right now. You just see them everywhere ...


PAINTER: ... and it's — it's like every ten minutes someone is meeting on cyber. And some of them are very helpful, and some of them perhaps not. But it does show a level of attention that we haven't had, Nuala and I know from many years, that — that this used to be the province often of people who thought about technical issues, now it's really reached the issue of foreign policy, you know, foreign policy priority, human rights policy priority, economic policy priority, and national security policy priority. And we're seeing that reflected in what's coming up. So, you know, for the ITU, I think staying engaged as we do, and that's great that Julie has this position because I think we have to make sure that that's a productive organization and doing good things.

But we're also going to see all of the issues conflate in ways that are sometimes not very helpful. So, when you talk about Internet governance, it's not really just Internet governance anymore. People use Internet governance in vastly different ways. Sometimes they mean it in the technical running of the Internet, we're talking about ICANN, IETF and other institutions. Sometimes, they mean it to cover the full swathe of policy areas for the Internet, everything from — from those issues through to governance issues, through to policy issues around security versus policy issues around privacy, and all too often states use different aspects of those to — to argue different philosophies.

For instance, Danny referred to this, there are countries who use the term information security rather than cybersecurity and that's a very deliberate term because they are trying to actually control the flow of information. They're worried about destabilizing speech. When we're talking about cybersecurity, we're worried about actually protecting our networks.

And, so, there are some big philosophical differences in the world, and there is also, I think, a vast group of countries in the middle that are on the fence. A lot of them in the developing world, and we need to work with those countries going forward, and Danny's done great work in this area, and Larry, too, and others in our government in trying to make sure that we reach out to those countries and convince them why this vision, this open, interoperable and secure vision that we laid out in the international strategy for cyberspace a couple of years ago, which does deal with all these issues from governance to freedom, to Internet freedom, to, you know, security — hard security issues, is achieved and why this is in their interests.

So, where I see this coming up, you know, we — we certainly will see this coming up, as it does every year, in the U.N., in various parts of the U.N. So, you'll have the first, second and third committee. Third committee will deal with privacy issues, second committee will deal with the, you know, ICT4 development resolution, and also extending the IGF, which is critically important to us and to everyone, really, I think. And then you'll see it coming up in the first committee in terms of international security and what's going on there. Coming up we have the conference that is the continuation of the London process. It started in London, then was in Budapest, then was in Seoul last year, and will be in — in The Hague in the Netherlands in April. And I think the focus of that conference will be, largely around, I think, capacity building, and how we can bring capacity building to countries who really need it, which, again, gets them into the conversation, and also shows them that this way, this open, interoperable and secure way which includes other stakeholders, not just the government, it includes the private sector, it includes, importantly, civil society is the way to go. And capacity building is a key part of that. And, so I think that will be a focus there.

We have what's called a U.N. group of governmental experts. Danny mentioned this briefly, or mentioned the U.N. processes, but within that, that is the group that's been looking at international security issues. Issues around how you apply international law in cyberspace. How you can come up with maybe peacetime norms, where you do things or forbear from doing things that you in cyberspace that will make the entire environment more stable, and we've been doing a lot of work there.

But these other issues, these economic and social issues, do creep into that. You know, there's not a lot of clarity sometimes from some countries from a — they go to these different forums. And, then, of course, one of the things that happened at the ITU is, as Danny said, we were able to say what was really in the ITU's mandate, and really wheelhouse. What they could really do and do well. But, there are processes coming up like the WSIS+10 review, which will be, you know, going on to a meeting in December of 2015, and some multistakeholder preparations before that, which, really, is going to be looking at everything. I mean, it's focused on development to be sure, but it's going to be looking at all these issues, just like the original WSIS did. So, I think that — that's going to continue.

And then we — we then have — next year Brazil will be hosting the Internet Governance Forum. We've done, I think, as a community a great job with strengthening that forum over the last year, making it not a decisional forum, because that would completely change the character of it, but coming up with things within that forum where we are — we are having workshops on specific issues, where you have continuity from one meeting to the next, where it's valuable for people, including high level government officials and other stakeholders, to participate. And I think that momentum needs to be continued so that people understand the value of this — this forum, and not — and not one, as Larry said, that's conflicting with things like this WEF initiative.

The only thing I'd say about the WEF initiative is I agree with Larry it's not really clear what the goal is right now, or it's based on the President Ilves report that talked about distributed systems for coming up with solutions, and part of that's just being a router, and finding what solutions are out there for things where countries say there is no solution to cybercrime, and you can point to six different places and say, well, there actually is, but you don't know it. So, there could be some real advantages there, but, you know, as we said in Geneva when they had the initial meeting, it has to be inclusive. It has to include other stakeholders. It can't just be a top down process, it has to be very inclusive.

So, you — you do have a range of different things, even in the next few months, and there'll be more things coming up because, what I've also seen, is the countries that are not that fond of an open Internet, who have — are worried about stability issues, who are worried about drawing sovereign boundaries around their cyberspace have become far more active in the international community. It's not just us going out and talking to the rest of the world. They are being very active too in trying to persuade that part of the world of their vision, their vision is the correct one.

So, I think, again, NETmundial was a key data point that helped draw some of those other folks into the conversation in a very productive and positive way. We need to look for other opportunities to do that. I think capacity building is one of those. But this is not something where we can simply say, OK, game over now. There's — there's going to be real, even — even intensified, debate on this I think. And so that's something I think all three of us look forward to. It's something which I think is challenging, but I think we can, not just us as the United States but really the — the rest of the community who understands the value of this, the value of this technology as both an engine of economic growth and social growth, that we can really prevail with those arguments. But we need to — we really need to galvanize ourselves. Not just again government, but the private sector, civil society and — and enlist big tent governments from around the world who, I think, in the end this is really going to be beneficial to them.

O'CONNOR: Thank you so much for those comments. We at CDT very much agree with that, and we are committed, obviously, to the multistakeholder process. And so my question, frankly for the whole panel, and then we'll open it up to the audience, is how do we make sure this is really a representative multistakeholder process? I think having working in the technology community, there's a lot of skepticism, even in our own country, in Silicon Valley, in Seattle and elsewhere, about the relevance and the importance of these intergovernmental dialogues. How do we make sure the right people are at the table? And — and, Chris, thank you for your — your comments there. They're exactly right. There are still threats, despite our rosy expression of — of post-Busan reality, there are real threats from other parts of the world to a fragmented Internet. Thoughts about the multistakeholder process and how to get the right people at the table.

SEPULVEDA: In the first instance it becomes by being open yourself, right? So, our delegation to Busan was 130 people, half of whom were from government, half of whom were from broadly the private sector, including civil society. So, having that input is critically important, not only to where we position ourselves, but to the knowledge base with which we argue. And, by that same token, encouraging that kind of interactivity between policy makers, decisions makers in other countries, with their own stakeholder communities has been critically important to shifting the dialogue and — and ensuring that it's — it's an open and broader conversation. I know that Brazil ran a very open process as well. India, actually, this year brought a very diverse group of people to — to the Busan conversation.

But, depending on the issue and the space, the degree of multistakeholder participation will be different. Depending on the decision making in the space, the — the decisions will be different and who makes them in the hierarchy of decision making will be different. Why does this matter? What — why does it matter to the — to my mom or an average, everyday American. In the first instance, it matters in the degree to which they can communicate with their children, and, you know, in my mom's case with her family back in Chile. And the degree to which we are a connected society, and can freely associate and be active participants in our citizenship, but not just domestically, but — but globally.

Why does it matter for companies as large as Microsoft or as small as a startup that has no idea who the ITU is? It's because of that fracturing of the market. That if we got into a situation in which you had to ask for permission or the Internet fundamentally operated differently, under different protocols and under different rules in markets around the world you would destroy the economies of scale that enable an idea to be born global today, or a service to be born global today. That injecting that kind of friction into commerce would have negative repercussions not just for the firms that want to produce in that marketplace, but for the users abroad.

So, when a country thinks about doing data localization, and trying to force the production of data centers within a country, or trying to force the production of even equipment of a cell phone or a tablet within that country, if you're going to sell it in that country, all they're doing is raising prices for the users. And at the end of the day you're destroying the utility of the service for the end user. For your people. And having that conversation of the Internet and global communications as a platform for social and economic development that is not an end in itself, but a utility for the greater empowerment of human beings everywhere.

Though, the thing that we would talk about in — that came out of the World Summit on the Information Society back in 2003, 2005, was the idea that we were going to create a people centered information society. Not a government centered information society, not a corporate centered information society; a people centered information society. And if we retain that idea, that what we are here to do is serve the end user, whether that end user is a creator of services, or a user of services, then that will guide sound public policy both domestically and internationally.

O'CONNOR: You're focused a lot of services, but not as much on free speech. And other ...

SEPULVEDA: Well, you use a service by which to exercise your speech, right?

PAINTER: So, I actually think one of the best arguments for free speech, because we, as you know, the State Department has been a champion, in particular our — our democracy and human rights people on Internet freedom, and it's a core part of our — our value structure. It's a core part of the international strategy. But we want to advance that, and also advance the economic argument because, I think, states, particularly when they're worried about stability, will see the economic argument as one that's beneficial. And I'd say on the multistakeholder system, you know, it is, you know, it is as Danny said, not the exact same composition for every issue you're dealing with, right?

So, certainly for Internet, working of the Internet, how the technical Internet functions that is really a pure, multistakeholder system, where if governments controlling it we'd have a vastly different and unusable system than we have now. But, if you're talking about, for instance, passing cybercrime legislation, that's what governments do. Now, to be sure, they should be talking to the private sector, and civil society as they pass that legislation, they should be working with the private sector as they enforce those laws. But, you know, governments do have a unique role. I sometimes hear governments saying, well, when you talk about multistakeholder governments have no role. No. That's not true. Governments have a critical role depending on the subject. International security they have a larger role. But when we're talking about some of the other issues, it's — it's joint.

And so it's not just the governments and governments alone sitting in a back room negotiating things, they really need others there. And, then, finally, I'd say that one of the things we do, just as Danny did in Busan, is we model. When we talk about multistakeholder we walk the walk, too. So, not just in terms of what Larry did with the IANA contract, which I think was a critical signal that we — we actually put our money where our mouth is, but when we do capacity building, we've done a lot of regional capacity building in Africa and other parts of the world, we don't just have governments come and talk to folks to the other country. We bring in civil society, private sector, we have them do the same thing and that's very helpful. So, they understand this is not just governments and governments alone that are dealing with this.

STRICKLING: I'll just add and this will punctuate what both Danny and Chris have said, but I think setting the example is really, first and foremost, something we have to keep in mind and focus on. So, in addition to the action taken to announce the transition to the expiration of the IANA contract, you know, at the Department of Commerce we have been very focused on demonstrating how the multistakeholder process can lead to quicker, more flexible, more adaptable solutions to the kinds of problems that people are facing on the Internet today. So, for example, domestically we've managed to process, to develop multistakeholder codes of conduct for privacy, consumer privacy on the Internet. In some cases people think it's slow going, but if you compare it to the alternative, which would be years of regulatory proceedings or legislative debates, the conclusion of which might lead to a solution to a problem that no longer exists five years later, I think our processes are actually working quite well. We're taking the same idea and applying it now with respect to notice and takedown in a collaboration with the Patent and Trademark Office. Again, to engage the community on coming up with best practices, again, in a multistakeholder environment to improve the process of notice and take down. Cybersecurity, we're working with NIST in ways to find multistakeholder processes to encourage greater adoption of their cybersecurity frameworks. So, you start embedding this into what you're doing, day to day, and I think people then, first, they experience it, they get a firsthand sense of the benefit of these processes when they're run well, and we start getting the outcomes that demonstrate the types of — of greater flexibility, greater resiliency that you can have by running processes to create these kinds of outcomes. So — so I would put that at the head of the list.

PAINTER: You get by in that way, too. So, the NIST framework is a good example that  — NIST went out and talked to all the — the participants, both internationally and domestically, the private sector and others to build this. They didn't do it on their own. And then when we — we did the Incident Response Plan, so Cyber Incident Response Plan, back a number of years ago, from the White House, DHS took the lead on that, and instead of just the government trying to do it, they brought in all the industry and other stakeholders. It was a very messy process, and multistakeholder processes often are. But what happened is you ended up with something where people who participated had buy in, and that made it more stronger.

O'CONNOR: We totally agree, and we're so grateful for your commitment to multistakeholder, and we also agree that economic empowerment for the individual and for the institution is a valid and — and important agenda item. But the Internet as it was evolved and — and created — is a disruptor, and the economic argument has not always won the day, even in friendly places like Europe. If you look at the lawsuits levied against my old employer, Amazon, and others, it is not always a — a warm welcome for a U.S.-based Internet company, or an — an outside of the jurisdiction Internet company.

How do we — and I do agree with the rising tide lifting all boats argument, and that ultimately it is for the greater good — but how do we overcome those geographic boundaries, that national kind of desire to keep jobs and data, and create non-tariff trade barriers? Do you think trade is the next — we have talked much about trade negotiations, but is that the next hurdle for the Internet community?

SEPULVEDA: Well, I started in this administration working at USTR, and Mr. Froman, our current USTR is doing an immense amount of work both within TTIP and TPP to ensure that there are provisions allowing for the free flow of data and non-discriminatory treatment of — of practitioners. But, I — going back to — to the underlying question, I think we have to continue thinking about what the Internet is, not as the applications that ride over it, but as a global communications system that includes the Internet of things, the web and all the different services that are available to people over it.

So, ensuring that there's a single global communications infrastructure, and ensuring that people can use that platform to the highest degree possible of exercise of freedom for innovation and the access to other people for freedom of association, freedom of exchange of ideas is really the underlying — the underlying question, the underlying principle. And there's going to be degrees of differences of freedom in different parts of the world, obviously, because people in those governments will enforce their rules on people in different ways.

PAINTER: And, ultimately, I think that they find that that's unworkable. I mean, for instance, I think Brazil's a good example where there was a data localization requirement, and a draft of the bill, the Marco Civil bill, and it didn't — it didn't end up being up in the bill, partly because it's not good for the Brazilian economy. I think you have — I was in Bonn recently for a Munich security conference event, and they talked somewhat about the Schengen cloud, this idea of having a special cloud for the, you know, for parts of, of all of Europe. And, a lot of the CEOs were there, they said, look, we're multinational companies. That doesn't work for us. You know, it's just not practical.

So, I think part of it is — is understanding that you shouldn't fear the Internet, but you should embrace it and find ways that you can actually make it help your business model, and, perhaps, countries have not done that enough, and innovated enough. But I think that's something that should happen, will happen. I think people will see that that's really the great enabler, and that's where I think a lot of the, you know, the work needs to be done in the developing world. Because I think they want to realize the benefit of this, and — and if we can help them do that, that'd be great.

O'CONNOR: So, now it's your turn, and the hands are up.

QUESTION: Teresita Schaffer from Brookings and McClarty Associates. Going back a little bit earlier in this discussion, Ambassador Sepulveda talked about the — what was agreed at Busan and it was a three part agreement, which started with the ITU can't do everything, but it's critical. Is there a similar consensus on what it is that the ITU needs to do, and what it is that it shouldn't be doing, or is this a continuing argument. And what are the alternative forums that you see as being useful for dealing with things that shouldn't be part of the ITU?

O'CONNOR: Thank you for that. Dan?

SEPULVEDA: I appreciate the question. Yes, there was consensus in Busan on not injecting the ITU into content law enforcement or issues of — of war, or issues of state on state aggression. Outside of the — outside of those questions, what the ITU does well is it convenes law makers and policy makers around the world around questions of connectivity. Telecommunications connectivity. Whether that be voluntary, interoperable standards between telecommunications networks, or how we're going to globally allocate spectrum, so we have economies of scale for worldwide mobile communications, or what you need to do to ensure there's competition and investment in the wired infrastructure within your given country. Those are all very specific and important things. Managing the digital transition, so that you have a new — you have more space in the airwaves for mobile broadband in the parts of the world where the cost per person is only going to reach a level sufficient so that people can afford it if it's on a mobile platform. Those are incredibly important and honorable areas of work.

Now, there are whole other questions. So, how do you know where a cybersecurity attack comes from, and how do you prosecute that attack? That is — that is not a question for the ITU. The ITU's not a law enforcement agency. There are gatherings of law enforcement officials around the world. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime does that work. There are gatherings of human rights experts around the world. The Human Rights Commission does that work. There are gatherings of cultural experts around the world that try to determine what is culturally appropriate given the particular country and — and society that you live in. UNESCO does that work.

PAINTER: And I'd say there — there's, you know, it's not just U.N. institutions, there are lots of regional institutions. There's always this — this idea that you should have one ring to rule them all. Like, one place where everything comes, and that's not true in any other area, any other policy area that exists. So, there's — OAS does good work, APEC does work, the EU has work. There's other regional, and even international organizations. So, you can have a conversation. You can have solutions in the many of these different areas, cybercrime's a good example, with the Budapest Convention and with, you know, the work that INTERPOL and others are doing. So, there's a lot of different ways to — to solve these issues.

You know, this also dovetails with something I've often heard is we need a treaty for the Internet, and I always ask a treaty about what and by whom is actually going to sign this thing, and it's often the deal with somebody's security issues, but it doesn't really make sense in terms of how you would actually do it. So, I think, you know, this is something where we — we want, and you know, we want to make sure that the date happens in appropriate forms, that there's some cross connection between forms, too, because one of the proposals that we saw was this idea of make the Internet fully attributable, that you can make sure — that you can find out where everything is coming from, and this is a proposal that someone made.

And I — I'd say that, you know, being an ex-prosecutor that sounds good in that sense, not so good in terms of the way the Internet works, or Internet freedom, or people expressing their views. And so you have to strike that right balance and just having one — everything in one place doesn't do that as well, because there are lots of different stakeholders, even within governments. There are ministries of interior, there are justice ministries, there are people who do human rights law and they're not all in the same place.

SEPULVEDA: I will say this, though, one of the things that we did differently in Busan, I think that we tried to do differently in Busan was not reject the conversation. When people raised an issue, the given issue that was — that was questioned which — which was why in the traditional telecommunications network am I able to track and trace a call to — from whom it was sent and to whom it was sent everywhere. And I can't do that on an IPM. Now, the — the answer to that question is incredibly complex and there are both technical and — and efficiency reasons, and mechanism by which there — there are potential solutions to that challenge from a law enforcement perspective. Our point was to hash that out, see what the underlying concern was, and then talk about why the ITU was not the particular place, or whether ITU standards were not the best mechanism by which to achieve that end, right?

So, what I think we have to do at the ITU, and in really any given institution is let people speak freely. Have an honest and open debate, and an exchange of ideas and work out those things that you can agree upon, and then move forward on those things you can agree upon. But identify and understand concerns so you can address them in other places, and then do. Do address them. Go to the people who have those concerns, bring the — bring the necessary expertise from industry and other parts of government to help address those concerns to the degree that's possible. And to help understand what the costs and benefits are of any given proposal.


QUESTION: Hi, I'm Bob Boorstin, I'm now with Albright, Stonebridge. I used to be with Google. Much as in our first panel this morning, one of the key words that is China was not mentioned until the question period. I think one of the acronyms that has been missing from this discussion is NSA. If I'm not mistaken, it hasn't been said yet.

And it's interesting to have three U.S. government officials on the stage not talk about its impact on what went on in Busan and in particularly on NETmundial and other things that are coming forward, because as far as I understand it, the Brazilians in large part launched the NETmundial because they were so pissed off about the NSA. Now, that's a simplification, obviously, but it was a major part of that. So, could I have reflections on how the NSA is playing into the current discussions of Internet governance?


O'CONNOR: Took the words right out of my mouth, Bob. Thank you.

PAINTER: So, I — I can start. I mean, look, there has been, you know, certainly some sensitivity about that. That did, I think, have an effect in terms of the conversation and people thinking, you know, looking at the privacy issue, and trying to put the privacy issue and the governance issue, and the security all together, conflating the ways where I think the conversation often wasn't very precise or helpful. And I think that we need to, and we have, and President Obama has led a, you know, a real searching look at our intelligence practices, how we do them. He's said publicly we shouldn't do something just because we can. He's announced a series of reforms. He's been working with the Hill to try to work on some of those reforms. They're not just reforms limited to the U.S. And the fact that we're having this debate in the U.S. is a lot different than most other countries in the world, quite frankly. And some countries would never have this debate for the rest of their — their lives.

But, so, we've had these really strong debates about this and he's also talked about the rights of citizens outside the U.S. He's talked about applying the — some of the protections under the Privacy Act of 1974. He's talked about — Eric Holder talked about having, in the case of law enforcement data, giving redress to foreign citizens. So, there's been — there's been a lot of movement, and that's been important.

And that's an important debate, and a debate we should have. But when you conflate that debate all the time with the governance debate, what happens is, in my view, is that often those countries who are on the other side of this debate, who want a much more state-controlled Internet — and I've heard this said, I've heard, you know, for instance, Russia at one point said well, the surveillance issue is why we need state control of the Internet, which just makes no sense. But — but — but if, to the extent that we, especially those countries who understand this vision, you know, and there are many of them around the world, in Europe and Australia, and Japan and others increasingly in the developing world, that we don't understand the long-term game, the long-term goals that we have, which is really to have an unfragmented, open Internet that has security, and that we balance those things right, we're going to be lost. If we allow that — this debate to fragment us, I think that's going to be a real problem. So — so, it's not that it hasn't had an effect, but we need to make sure we're debating those issues, at the same time moving forward on these larger issues that I think are going to have real effect in terms of global economy and society.

STRICKLING: I just on the specific context of the IANA transition, I can't — I don't think the issue really is — has emerged as an important issue. That may largely be because what we're doing is ending a transition that started back in 1998, so that there's — there's nothing new here in the sense of what it is that needs to be done here. And the U.S. role by now is — is so minimal that every once in a while, well, one time, I remember seeing an article where somebody internationally tried to make the claim that the NSA couldn't have done what it did but for the fact that the United States controlled ICANN, which is absolute silliness. But, that's about the only linkage I've seen to it in the entire debate since last March.

SEPULVEDA: As it relates specifically to Busan and the ITU, at the end of the day, the ITU's not a national security agency. It's not a national security organization. It has no expertise in the field, and it has to remit in the field. It is a specialized agency of the United Nations created to ensure that human beings can connect to each other over wire and air. That — that's what it does.

So, as it relates how people feel about the disclosures that have been made, yes, there are a lot of emotions and everyone has their personal opinion on the subject matter and that makes conversation somewhat difficult at times, regardless of what you're discussing. But we were able to reach consensus in Busan that regardless of your feelings on that question, that question was not going to be decided and a remedy to it if you feel there needs to be one, was not going to be imposed by the ITU. That was one of our key outcome goals. And it was achieved because everyone agreed that that was the correct answer to that particular question. For that particular space.

O'CONNOR: All of that is so well said, and it's so true that the ITU is not the right place to have the dialogue around the NSA. And that the IANA transition — as I know since I read the contract when I worked at Commerce back in 2000, and we were ready to transition then — that this is not news and they're not the same. But — but Bob is right to raise the question. It is the number one thing that folks around the world, who work on Internet issues generally are — are concerned about, and ask us about, and it has done — are you arguing that it has not the damage that — that we see in our dialogues with civil society and other governments, and the questions and the concerns that folks raise. Chris, you spoke so well and you said the president has said this, and has talked about this, and there is discussion. What has been done?

PAINTER: Well ...

O'CONNOR: ... it's been a year and a half since ...

PAINTER: ... I mean, part of it is the president's done some things by executive order, part of it needs legislation. Legislation takes time. And I'm — I'm not going to try to predict when legislation will happen on anything, but that is an effort that is actually ongoing. And, look, I — I — I would say that, you know, we do have to have this debate. We do have to take it head on. I, you know, I've been to Germany several times, and talked to — to folks there in different forms. I've been at the Stockholm Internet Forum where this came up. I mean, these are legitimate questions that we should — we should engage in. That makes absolute sense. My concern is that that drives all the other discussions, and — and some — we don't see clearly what those goals are.

And I'd say that, you know, even in these data localization issues, you know, largely that's often driven by commercial interests, too, not just these interests. And you have to look at what makes sense. And, you know, the debate about how you — how you deal with intelligence gathering, which every country does, and what kind of oversight you have is important. Secretary Kerry said in a speech he delivered at the Freedom Online Coalition you need four things. You need transparency, you need rule of law, proper purpose, transparency and oversight. And those are all things that, you know, you could argue about how we do it in our system, but we have in our system and are a strength in our system. That is not just a debate for the U.S., that's a debate for the entire world, and I want to see more of that. And we are debating these things in the U.N. Third Committee, and the U.N. Human Rights Council. And we should, but, again, I think we need to make sure we're not having that drive the entire debate because the, really, the, you know, what's on the line is too big for us to — to allow that to happen.

O'CONNOR: That we would agree that it is a global issue. Question over here in the corner.

QUESTION: It's Jeferson Nacif from Anatel Brazil. Well, first a compliment, and a comment to Danny Sepulveda. Danny and his team performed very well there in the plenipotentiary. And thanks to his leadership, we could reach a very good consensus in the conference. And two comments, the first regarding the transition of IANA. I had the opportunities to put to participate in the — the Vancouver EITF meeting last year, one year — one year ago. And I was surprised that when I told him that we need communicating more — more communications between the technical community and the political community. And then when I go to ITU, and I — I say the same, that we need more communication between this political community and the technical community, people sometimes get surprised with me. But I actually, this is very important and this is something that we — we really need in the — the new IANA, or in the new ICANN in this accountability process, accountability review process that has been turned in the ICANN because it seems, and this is my point of view, is that if we don't have consultative process very well done, it may be better to keep in the old process, in the old ICANN, not a new ICANN. If ICANN is not really accountable to — to many players, and in my perspective to government as well, it would be better to keep the IANA and the ICANN in the old — the old agreement with the United States government.

But the other thing is regarding that — that the dissent of the discussion for me seems that we need more egalitarian solution of the positive outcomes of the Internet. Or at least creating a new enabling environment, where all can cope with it, and develop its capacity. And so, it's the perception of some that United States now have so many powers. You have private companies, the most important private companies dealing with Internet. You have cybersecurity resources. You have so many power in terms of Internet governance that it seems too many that you control the whole Internet. So, my question would be how can you try to balance this power so that countries can — can have and participate in these — the benefits of — of the Internet? Thank you.

O'CONNOR: Several questions. Big questions.

SEPULVEDA: Can I take the second question first, then I'll — I'll turn it over to — to Larry for ICANN. In terms of the underlying question of how do you assure egalitarian distribution of benefits of the deployment of the global network, I think that is sort of the underlying challenge that the developing world is posing to — to the United States and to Europe, which is how — how we are being included in this as something more than simply consumers of a service? How are we being — we being included as producers of services and as participants in a market rather than as recipients of — of — of market services?

And my answer to that would be that what we're working to do is to retain as level and open a playing field as possible so that countries and innovators, wherever they come from, can participate in that market on a level playing field, which is where the idea of a born global service comes from. And, as — a significant function of our success, the United States, Europe and others, is the origins of the network and firstcomer advantage. But — but the Internet isn't that old. And over time as you get a spreading beyond the buildings of people that are connected today, but to Africa and to Latin America and to Southeast Asia, you're going to see the rise of services and a delivery of — of benefits that are specific to those regions, that work well there and are — are captured within that geography.

So, the — the future of mobile banking, the current institutions of mobile banking you could argue, are being felt most beneficially in parts of Africa relative to other parts of the world, because it's not a new way to do something you've always done, but a new way to do something you've never done that has great returns for you as an individual. And, again, I go back to the idea that we can't look, or we're asking countries around the world not to look at ICT services in goods and products as an end in and of themselves.

So, if you look at what Diego Molano has been doing in Colombia, by eliminating taxation on tablets and — and cell phone devices, and by competitively reverse auctioning the — the delivery of services to rural populations and encouraging the use of — of the network, he's not trying to make Colombia a mass producer of tablets. What he's trying to make Colombia is a mass user of tablets, so that every kid, in every school is using a tablet to expand his educational capabilities and enrich him or herself. Ultimately, the point is that it's a — it's a platform for development, not an end goal of development. And that you can use the services that are — many of which are free, that our companies are deploying around the world in order to enrich yourselves. And in many ways — many times people are using cell phone connectivity in parts of the developing world in ways no one would have thought possible that are creating great returns for them individually.

But, again, what we would like to see, and what we're trying to see in, like, companies like Intel, Cisco and others are running academies around the world to increase your homegrown engineering capacity, your homegrown innovation capacity. And then there's a lot of things that nations around the world have to do to reduce the costs of investment, and reduce the costs of doing business in any given place, to ensure that you get the kinds of — the kinds of investments and the kinds of jobs that you want to see deployed in your countries.

STRICKLING: So, on — on your ICANN comment, I think the test of this, whether we got a successful transition or not, will largely depend on the process that's used to deliver and develop the transition plan in the sense that we've said we want it open, we want it transparent, we want it inclusive. We want everybody to bring their ideas to the discussion, and the debate, and to have the community really talk them through. I see here in the United States there have been commentators who are starting to write — whereas last year, or earlier this year they were saying it shouldn't be allowed to go forward — now that it's the — the articles are changing to more of, well, it shouldn't be allowed to go forward unless, and then you'll see the list of — of five or six things that the person, this individual wants to see in a transition plan. And to those people or anybody thinking like that I'm saying, well, go participate in the process.

If your ideas have the power you think they have, take them into the process. Convince people in the community that this is the way it ought to proceed. And I have — would have that message for any individual, any company, any government; they ought to be participating in it so we get the benefit of everybody's thinking in this process. And put it through the crucible that is the multistakeholder process out of which will emerge the strongest ideas. But they'll emerge only if we have an open and transparent, and inclusive process that attracts people to participate in it.

If we can get that, then I think we'll get a good outcome. Because when the plan comes out, and is presented publicly, at whatever point that occurs, there will be a lot of peoples wanting to say, well, how does the plan deal with this situation? The — how does it deal with another possible set of facts? The so-called stress testing that we've heard referred to from the beginning. And we — we agree with that idea, of having the plan go through that kind of evaluation review, but it ought to be happening as the plan's being put together. People ought to have thought through the contingencies, the hypotheticals that they might be worried about and make sure the plan as it get designed has answers to those sorts of contingencies that might emerge. But, again, it'll — it'll happen. We'll get the best plan if we get everybody participating, and everybody bringing their best thinking, and engaging in the dialogue that needs to happen to allow the best ideas to rise to the top.

O'CONNOR: Running short on time, and there are several more questions. One right there in the middle.

QUESTION: Thanks. Peter Dengate Thrush again. I wonder if I could just make a comment and then finish with a question. And the comment really just reflects some of the views that have been expressed about the multistakeholder model. And I think because of ICANN, which is quite a visible, public exponent of the multistakeholder model, where governments only have an advisory voice, it's often thought that the multistakeholder model is opposed, or antithetical to government. So, I just want to congratulate Chris for picking that point up. Sure, in relation to the allocation of domain names and I.P. addresses, governments have an advisory role only, but the multistakeholder model embraces all stakeholders in their proper capacities. So, if we can get the message out that the multistakeholder model is not antithetical to government, it just embraces government in its particular role that would be a very powerful development.

And the other thing is why it works. It's not a — people don't embrace the multistakeholder model as a statement of some kind of faith, it's — it's not Marxism versus capitalism or some other faith, it's — it's simply as Larry says, because it works. And the exposition you just gave, Larry, the — the crucible of ideas and the way to fight it out is why we do it. And the other aspect to bring out of that is the 'multi' means that the actual range of stakeholders changes around every issue. It's not some institutional thing called the multistakeholder model. It's the concept of bringing to every issue the range of stakeholders that can actually contribute to that particular issue.

So, if we can get these ideas out, as you guys are doing so eloquently today, I think we're going to see this move forward really positively. Can I finish with a question? Which is the WSIS+10 is coming up. That's housed by the ITU, as is the IGF. We've been talking today a lot about the ITU. How do you — what's — what's the position that you see advocating — what's the U.S. position going forward from your various perspectives into the WSIS+10?

PAINTER: Well, it's — it's not housed by the ITU. I mean, the ITU is one of the key contributors to it, but it's, you know, it's housed by the General Assembly, essentially, and there is this high-level meeting coming up. And there is the CSTD group that's doing the evaluation of the progress in each of the action lines. And, so, I think, you know, one of the key things we want to see come out of it, and — and Larry and Danny have thoughts on this, too, I'm sure, is that development agenda, which would be important I think there. I think we need to take stock of the various action lines, but we don't have to create new action lines. That was something we said before, that we have the right action lines. We're making progress on those action lines. Where we are, where are the gaps, I think that's appropriate. I think, you know, it is a — the final meeting is just governments, but the preparatory process involves all the other stakeholders, and we need to make sure all those other stakeholders are engaged in that process. Because, again, I don't think it's going to be limited to any particular issue. This is going to deal with a full suite of issues.

STRICKLING: By the way, you say governments only have an advisory role. There's absolutely nothing in the ICANN structure that prevents individual governments from participating as full stakeholders in any policy development process in the GNSO or any other part of ICANN. But, in addition, governments acting collectively through the Government Advisory Committee have a very precise role that they can play to provide advice to the board, which, again, is stronger advice than any other constituency organization of ICANN in terms of how the board has to respond to that advice. So — so, I just wanted to correct the — if people get the impression that governments don't have the ability to shape events at ICANN. In fact, they have multiple opportunities.

O'CONNOR: So, we have one and a half minutes left. You've got your thirty seconds. If we're sitting here a year from now, where will we be? What will we have achieved? I'll start with Chris.

PAINTER: So, as I said, there's a lot of challenges, but a lot of opportunities coming over in the next year. I — I think we will ultimately be in a good place. I think we are making progress in looking at each of these different policy areas. International security, we've made a lot of progress recently, and cybercrime I think we're making more progress. On governance issues, and the IANA transition there's more progress on — on spreading the idea of Internet freedom through the Freedom Online Coalition, there's a lot of good things going on. But what it requires is not just the engagement of — of the folks up here on this panel, but the — but really the engagement of all of you, and a lot of other folks around the world, making sure that we keep our eyes on the prize, essentially. And so I think, you know, I'm even, as a former prosecutor, I'm — I'm an optimistic person by nature. I see the challenges, but I think we can make some good progress going forward. And I think that this — this idea of why this technology and this approach is actually going to be economically and socially empowering — will prevail.

STRICKLING: I'm not going to make any predictions. Sorry.


O'CONNOR: And you got off with that — this panel without talking about net neutrality, so he's very grateful. You ...


O'CONNOR: ... owe me big time for that.


O'CONNOR: Anyway.

SEPULVEDA: Well, a year and a half from now, you said?

O'CONNOR: A year.

SEPULVEDA: A year from now. For me — for my office's goals we are going to target very specifically working on the good work that we've been able to do with Brazil, with my colleague, Jeferson, and others, to ensure that the — the next IGF is a success and to ensure that we are building on common values. Not just with Brazil, but with India, and with South Africa, and with other functional, open democracies around the world. We also are going to target in, and try to work with, countries that have a different point of view on issues of the control of content, and try to work with them to find ways to work more cooperatively with the companies that create the platforms that enable the distribution of information. So, Turkey would be a key example of that. And then, you know, making sure that — we continue to do the work at the ITU that — that enables it to do what it should be doing well, which is encouraging the deployment of the network around the world, particularly in the developing world, and increasing the number of people who have access to it, so that they can use it as they see fit.

O'CONNOR: Wonderful. Wonderful way to end. Thank the panels. Thank you all for joining us.


SEGAL: I was going to use this time to give you my history of Internet governance before Busan, but instead I'll just express my gratitude and appreciation to everyone. First, let me thank all of the panelists for giving of their time and their intellectual energy, and — and travelling. Let me thank again Google and Intel, and Ben Blink, and Audrey Plonk in particular for their help and support with the program.

I want to really call out Emily McLeod, and Leila Mahnad from the CFR's meeting programs for all of their help in really getting this going. Everyone's already decided that we're going to be here a year from now. And, so, as we move forward, all of these issues that we've been discussing — openness versus control, content, data localization — these are all issues that the digital program is taking up. My colleague, Karen Kornbluh, in D.C. and New York, is holding meetings on competitiveness and access, and digital trade. I'm holding meetings on cybersecurity and cyber conflict. We have a new blog called, Netpolitics, that I'll hope you'll all visit. And I hope you'll reach out to both of us on your ideas about where we should go over the next year, so when we have the next symposium we reflect all those views.

So, thanks again for all coming, and I hope you stay for — for lunch and networking and talking. Thanks again.


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