The swift collapse of Syria’s regime brings a humiliating end to Russia’s and Iran’s sway and opens the door for greater Turkish influence. But the Islamist movement that seized power has yet to show its full intentions.
Dec 8, 2024
The swift collapse of Syria’s regime brings a humiliating end to Russia’s and Iran’s sway and opens the door for greater Turkish influence. But the Islamist movement that seized power has yet to show its full intentions.
Dec 8, 2024
  • Syria
    Europe’s Syria Prevarications
    The West’s overall approach to Syria since the uprising began in March 2011 has been a combination of empty sloganeering (“we strongly and unequivocally condemn this violence”), wishful thinking (“it is only a matter of time before Assad falls”), and hand wringing (“Syria is not Libya”).  Yet recently, there seems to have been a subtle, yet important shift that would augur a more active American and European role in managing the conflict.  The recent Friends of Syria meeting in Istanbul gave Secretary of State John Kerry an opportunity to signal an evolution of U.S. policy and the British and the French have publicly entertained  the idea of lifting the arms embargo on the rebellion. This all seems to be good news, yet it may be more apparent than real.  This is not to suggest that Washington will renege on the pledge that Kerry made in Turkey or that the Foreign Office and Quay d’Orsay are not serious about the prospects of supplying weapons to the Free Syrian Army, but this support is far from unequivocal. The rethinking in Europe about how best to assist the rebellion masks a continuing deep ambivalence about Syria’s civil war and the prospects for bringing it to an end.  Like American officials, Europeans tend to mouth all the right words about the “cost of doing nothing being too high” and that “Assad has to go,” but it is hard to be convinced that they believe what they are saying.  If you listen carefully and parse the Europeans’ comments about Syria, they actually contradict the more robust policy they are suggesting by lifting the embargo.  They say: 1)      There is no magic formula for resolving the conflict in Syria; 2)      While Assad has already lost, the opposition can only win at high cost; 3)      As a result of 1 and 2, plans must be made for a “political transition” central to which is “re-opening political space.” This strikes me as European prevaricating at its best.  In essence, they are calling for that mythical “Russian solution,” which would have Bashar and Asma living out their days in the company of other discredited dictators on the outskirts of Moscow while the rebels make a deal with regime loyalists who were not part of Assad’s inner circle. In the abstract there is, of course, a compelling logic to this plan.  If you want to mitigate the possibility that Syria rips itself apart in a post-Assad maelstrom of factional violence, you have to avoid the mistakes the United States made in Iraq with de-Baathification.  Fair enough, but both the regime and the rebellion have taken the Russian solution off the table and Moscow has little influence over Assad’s decision-making.  Who exactly from the opposition is willing to talk to whom within the regime?  It is clear that the fight has become existential for both sides, making compromise difficult even with the intervention of the most skilled diplomats. There is a sense that the Europeans know they are being unrealistic, leaving one to wonder why they are even peddling the idea.  Even though they emphasize the importance of a political solution when pressed, the Europeans freely admit that the prospects for a negotiated transition “may have been overtaken by events.”  Indeed, they have.  Many months ago.  Syrians are thus left to draw the conclusion that despite some movement in Washington, London, and Paris, they remain on their own.
  • Israel
    Regional Voices: Iran, Syria, Yemen, Israel, and Palestine
    “We don’t need an atomic bomb. ... And besides, it is not atomic bombs that threaten the world, but Western morals and culture declining in values.” –Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad “Look, I respect their prowess and their struggle…I respect their ideology, even if I strongly disagree with it, on one condition! They must remain one faction among many other factions of the revolution and one component of Syrian society which has many other components.” –Abu al-Hasan, an Aleppo activist speaking about Jubhat al-Nusra “The Americans say they hold our sons to rehabilitate them. They can return them to us and we could take care of them.” –a mother of a Yemeni detainee in Guantanamo “The march of hatred of the Israel-haters and followers of the path of the Mufti of Jerusalem… is added proof that any agreement with the Palestinians must also include within it Israeli Arabs.” –Yisrael Beytenu leader Avigdor Liberman criticizing Israeli Arab participation in the annual “Right of Return” march in Wadi Ara “How can you be patriotic if you’ve fled?” –Syrian president Bashar al-Assad on the Syrian opposition in a rare television interview “The problem is not Fayyad and never was Fayyad…The problem is the Israeli occupation and a lack of any kind of political or diplomatic horizon.” –Awaida Ahmed Awaida, chief executive of the Palestinian Stock Exchange “We don’t need imported charters or a new understanding of the nation’s religion…We won’t be doing our population, and our nation, any service if we pledge our allegiance to those who don’t know a thing about our reality.” – a statement by the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, referring to the alliance between Syria’s Nusra Front and the Qaeda branch
  • United States
    Prolonging the Conflict in Syria
    The debate in Washington about Syria has picked up a bit lately.  The Obama administration is stepping up its aid to the rebellion and the civil war will no doubt be on the President Obama’s agenda when he meets with a parade of regional leaders at the White House starting next week. Although many members of Congress—taking cues from their constituents who are weary of the Middle East—are resolutely opposed to American involvement in Syria, others have expressed frustration that the United States is not doing more to bring the crisis to an end.  Like all things related to Syria there is little agreement even among the people who would like to see a more robust policy on what form a more active approach to the conflict would take. The state of the debate essentially revolves around two options, which have been articulated before, but they contain some new twists: 1)    Arm the rebels with the kind of weapons that can tip the battlefield advantage and establish a no fly zone.  In the process of pouring guns into Syria and denying Assad the ability to use planes and helicopters Washington will place itself on the side of morality and demonstrate to the Iranians, who are providing men and materiel for the fight, that Washington is not going to hide behind the Turks, Qataris, and Saudis.  There are, this argument goes, consequences to inaction in Syria not least of which is the continuation of the war and a likely increase in Iranian regional adventurism. 2)    A diplomatic solution to the Syrian conflict is possible, but only if Washington “engages with the Iranians.”  The logic here is fairly straight forward—Tehran is continuing to support to the Assad regime because Iran has interests at stake in Syria and thus far the only way to protect these interests is by joining the fight.  If, however, a deal can be reached with Tehran where its position in Damascus would not be fatally compromised with Assad’s ouster, the war can be brought to an end sooner rather than later. The problem with both “solutions” is that they are likely to do the exact opposite of what they are intended.  There is no doubt that ramping up support for the rebels and eliminating the one clear advantage Assad has—airpower—can make a significant difference.  Yet almost everyone agrees that the fight will not be over when the Syrian president flees and/or is killed.  Tehran and the remaining supporters of the Assad regime will likely burn Syria down in order to deny their opponents a victory or at least, bleed the rebellion badly on its way to one.  What good will a no fly zone do then? Not much.  Then there is the thorny problem of what to do after Assad is gone.  The impulse will be to support the development of a democratic, prosperous Syria, but that is hard to do in a war zone (see, Iraq 2003-present).  Regardless of what Washington does, the Syrians, Iranians, Turks, Saudis, Qataris, and others like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant are going to fight it out in Syria for a long time. The diplomatic option is not the equivalent to the Leverettian “Grand Bargain” that never was, but it has similar problems.  Proponents of engagement always assume that the “engagee” shares the same interests or can be made to share interests through dogged diplomacy.  Yet Iranian and American interests conflict sharply in Syria.  Washington is unlikely to settle for a diplomatic solution in which a post-Assad Syria remains a place from which Iran can continue to support Hizballah and Hamas; and Tehran is not going to accept a deal where its ability to extend its influence in the region is sharply curtailed.  In addition, the engagers tend to forget that a deal with the Iranians is not going to sit well with the rebels, Turks, Saudis, and Qataris.  They will likely do everything possible to preclude or undermine such a deal, which would no doubt entail a lot more violence.  Some might argue that each of these actors can be bought off in some way that would improve the chances of an Iranian solution, but that is highly unlikely.  The rebellion wants to chase Iran out of Syria; the Saudis are deeply paranoid of all things Iran, especially an American dialogue with the Iranians; and Tehran’s gains from any agreement that protects its interests is a net loss for both Ankara and Doha. I once thought the use of American power in Syria could make a difference.  More than a year later, I have serious doubts about getting involved in someone else’s civil war. It seems that Syria is a problem that has no answer.
  • Israel
    Regional Voices: Egypt, Syria, Israel, and Palestine
    “Enough already of formations, committees and groups and whatever else…We want action not words and, let me say this, there are many names and committees but there is no action on the ground.” -Coptic pope Tawadros II’s reaction to Egypt president Mohammed Morsi’s handling of the attack against “What was taken by force can only be restored by force.” –Dr. Mustafa Barghouti, to the Palestinian National Security Conference “There are no objective sources of information on either side, neither with the regime nor the rebels…We need to get out of this Facebook phase, where all we do is whine and complain about the regime.” –Absi Smesem, 46, a veteran reporter and editor of Sham, a new weekly Syrian newspaper “We are the ones that suffer…Whatever I do on the local level, whatever the minister of tourism does, it has a ceiling. We will never get back what was without political stability or security.” –Ezzat Saad, the governor of Luxor on the plummeting rates of tourism in Egypt “We need them to return and rebuild their towns…We will start with the youth and young men and activists who are needed to run the towns, and then later the kids and families will return.” –Mohammed Qadah, a Dara’a representative of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces “This just shows to all those who thought the people on the ship were peace and human rights activists that they were hard-core Islamists supportive of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.” –an unnamed Israeli official on the news that a survivor of the Mavi Marmara plans to donate his compensation money to Hamas and Islamic Jihad “On the one hand it complicates the situation for Kerry, on the other hand it says something about the need to intensify American efforts… If things will be left to local and internal dynamics, things might get out of hand.” –Ghassan Khatib, vice president of Birzeit University on violent West Bank clashes following the death of a Palestinian prisoner in Israeli custody
  • Egypt
    Weekend Reading: Egypt’s Bassem Youssef, Politics of the Arabic Language, and Videos from Syria
    Al-Monitor outlines the investigation of Egypt’s beloved comedian, Bassem Youssef. Muftah discusses how nuances of the Arabic language reflect and affect the ever turbulent politics of the region. A new resource, Syria Video, which compiles war videos and other information related to Syria’s ongoing civil war.
  • Egypt
    Regional Voices: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Tunisia
    “Their lives are worthless when it comes to the interests of Egypt and Egyptians…I am a president after a revolution, meaning that we can sacrifice a few so the country can move forward. It is absolutely no problem.” –Egyptian president Mohammad Morsi responding to violent clashes between members of the opposition and the Muslim Brotherhood “Yesterday I was really surprised by the comment issued from the White House that it was not possible to increase the range of the Patriot missiles to protect the Syrian people…I’m scared that this will be a message to the Syrian regime telling it ’Do what you want’.” –Moaz Alkhatib, leader of the Syrian National Coalition, in an interview with Reuters “Sometimes…a girl contributes 100 percent to her own raping when she puts herself in these conditions.” –Adel Abdel Maqsoud Afifi, an Egyptian police general, lawmaker and ultraconservative Islamist “Homs is burning and no one cares.” –An unidentified Syrian activist “All those you attacked in your interview in Al-Akhbar are more honorable than you, even Antoine Lahd because while he only collaborated with Israel, you served as an agent for Abu Ammar [Yasser Arafat] – the late head of the Palestinian Authority – as well as for ousted [late] Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi and the Soviets and the U.S. and Syrian President Bashar Assad and Israel.” –Free Patriotic Movement representative Naji Hayek speaking about Progressive Social leader Walid Jumblatt “The majority want a compromise…It’s impossible to bring things back under control as they were.” –Roaa Salem discussing the views of fellow students at Damascus University on the Syrian civil war “I think they need a second revolution…We prefer not to choose from bourgeois political parties.” – Armazan Tulunay, a young revolutionary socialist at the World Social Forum at Manara University in Tunisa
  • Middle East and North Africa
    What To Do About Syria
    The continuing, and worsening, crisis in Syria leaves some analysts confused and their writing not very useful. The best guide to what is happening, and what the United States should do, is the writing of Fred Hof of the Atlantic Council. Hof was until last year a key figure in the making of American policy toward Syria, though we can see from his analyses that all too often his excellent advice was rejected by the Obama Administration. On March 18, Hof wrote a thoughtful article entitled "Syria: A Slippery Slope?" Here he addressed the view within the Obama administration that any further involvement is simply too risky. Here is Hof’s warning: Does the crisis in Syria present a slippery slope? It does indeed. Obama is no fool when he conjures up the image of an involuntary slalom down a precipitous slope with hungry gators waiting below. What he may not fully appreciate is that the headlong descent is already underway. Even if he had not put the credibility of his office and the United States on the line in August 2011 by calling on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step aside, he would still be obliged, eventually, to confront the reality that the nature of the struggle for Syria puts him on the slope whether he wants to be there or not. For all of his power and skill as commander-in-chief, Obama is already on the slope and careening downward....What is happening in Syria would be bad enough were it a big island in the Indian Ocean. Yet it is not....The implications of Syria’s state failure for a neighborhood containing allies and close friends of the United States are the reasons why the United States is already losing its footing on a steep hillside. Will the administration really be able to cite a prior engagement in East Asia as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel howl for help? Hof’s conclusion is stark: If it is possible that a regime now unable to defeat a disjointed, poorly armed, and inadequately equipped rebellion would be spurred to decisive victory by the loss of its air assets, its Scud missiles, and its ability to coordinate military operations, then perhaps there is reason to give credence to the most extreme and objectively incredible of the slippery slope arguments. What cannot be denied, however, is that the United States is on the slope and headed down. Holding the Syrian crisis at arm’s length is not an option; it will not break the fall. If hand rails are to work, they must be of American design and construction. We will not dictate or micromanage Syria’s end state. There is no guarantee of success in terms of rescuing Syria and building a decent relationship with it, one based on equality and mutual respect. But we will neither avoid the slope nor break our fall just because we would like to be somewhere else. In a more recent article entitled "The United States, Europe, and the Case of Syria," Hof notes how weak we have been in Syria--while Iran and Russia have been strong: There is nothing dishonorable or naive on the part of Europe and the United States in wishing to see a peaceful, negotiated transfer of power in Syria.  The problem is that two key parties—the Syrian regime and the Russian Federation—see no value in it.  Russia and the Assad regime are likely weighing the clear, on the ground determination of Iran and Hezbollah to produce a favorable military outcome against what they perceive to be uncertainty in the West.  Assad believes Iran will save him.  Russia thinks it can be on the winning side.  Both sense they can deal a real blow to the United States and its allies. The collective response of the United States and Europe to this reality is, at best, discordant and confused. Hof calls upon us to recognize a new government on Syria territory, and he does not sugar-coat what this means: [A] decision to support the formation and functioning of a new government on liberated Syrian territory would not be a rhetorical, empty gesture or checking a box to produce a symbolic deliverable for a ministerial-level meeting.  It would involve real work and real commitment.   A government must be able to govern.  It will need resources and on-the-ground technical assistance and advisory services.  It may well need help defending populations under its jurisdiction.  It should be recognized by Europe, the United States, and the Friends of the Syrian People as the legal government of Syria and credentialed as such at the United Nations.  All of these things will require of the United States and Europe a strategic paradigm shift.  This is not about strategic communications and messaging.  It is about facing reality in Syria and changing the calculation of the Assad regime. Both articles are worth reading in full, for Hof is doing what the Obama administration is still refusing to do: face reality. Today all the choices facing us bring considerable risk, due to two years of passivity that allowed the situation to become steadily worse. But allowing more time to pass will mean more jihadis gathering in Syria, more civilian deaths, more refugees, more regional instability, and more difficulties in ending the violence in post-Assad Syria. Waiting is not a strategy, nor is hoping that someone will assassinate Assad. The incremental steps the administration has taken, always many months too late, do little more than illuminate the errors of its previous refusal to act--to take the very same steps when they would have done more good. It is baffling to read that Secretary Kerry is eager and anxious to jump into the Israeli-Palestinian "peace process," and to hear the President say that "Secretary of State John Kerry intends to spend significant time, effort, and energy" on it, while Syria burns next door. To put it gently, if those are really the Secretary’s priorities they are incomprehensible.
  • Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament
    Probing for Chemical Attacks in Syria
    The success of a UN investigation into an alleged chemical weapons attack in Aleppo province last week will depend on a number of factors and could prove inconclusive, says CFR’s Gregory Koblentz.
  • Iran
    Weekend Reading: Controversy in Jordan, A New Year in Iran, and Religion in Syria
    The Jordanian perspective on Jordan’s current political situation and King Abdullah’s recent commentary in the Atlantic. Farhang Jahanpour gives his take on President Obama’s message to the leaders and people of Iran on their annual celebration of Nowruz, the Persian new year that dates back several thousand years. Syria Deeply interviews Syrian activists to understand better the secularist-Islamist dynamic among Syria’s rebels.
  • Jordan
    Weekend Reading: Tunisian Shake, Jordan’s Price Hike, and Syria’s Rebel Leadership
    Haifa Zaaiter argues that the "Harlem Shake" craze that has hit Tunisia may end up disarming the Salafists of their most potent weapon: denouncement of apostasy. The Impatient Bedouin reflects on the recent outburst of violence in Jordan’s parliament over the country’s decision to raise fuel prices last week. Mustafa Akyol recalls his interview this past Monday with Sheikh Mouaz al-Khatib, the President of the National Coalition for Opposition Forces and the Syrian Revolution.
  • Syria
    Syria’s Continuing Civil War
    The pitched battle for Syria’s future could eventually pull the country apart and precipitate a seismic sectarian shift in the region, says Mideast expert Mona Yacoubian.
  • Israel
    Regional Voices: Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Israel and Turkey
    “Friday has become a day of self-imposed imprisonment.” – Riham Ibrahim, Egyptian housewife “Presenting money and weapons to al Qaeda (in Syria) by Qatar and Turkey is a declaration of armed action against Iraq…The weapons will reach Iraqi chests for sure.” – Iraqi transport minister Hadi al-Amiri “Morsi’s decision to go for parliamentary elections amidst severe societal polarization and eroding state authority is a recipe for disaster.” –Mohammed ElBaradei, the leader of Egypt’s Constitution Party “I tell them that if our kebabs were 100 percent meat and our rice was Iranian, I’d have to triple my prices…And if they keep complaining, I just blame it on sanctions.” –Hesham, an Iranian restaurant owner about complaints from his customers “Even with all the discounts on offer, few people come and we have to close the shop early.” –Ahmed al-Sherif, owner of a clothing store near Cairo’s Tahrir Square “This is an Israeli interest…It’s not a favor to the Palestinians, it’s not a favor to the Arab world, and it’s not a favor to the president of the United States…There is no status quo…Stagnation and stalemate means deterioration; this is something we cannot afford.” –Tzipi Livni, speaking about the need for a Palestinian state upon agreeing to join Prime Minister Netanyahu’s next coalition government “It is the first time to feel we are living in a war condition…Today I saw what was happening in Baghdad in my city, Damascus. This is not the Damascus I know.” –30-year-old Anas, a Damascene whose home is right behind Assad’s Baath party headquarters “There could never be disagreement between the Armed Forces and the presidency, because the president and the Armed Forces are not two factions, they are one, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is extremely professional.” –Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi in an interview with state TV “Just like Zionism, anti-Semitism and fascism, it becomes unavoidable that Islamophobia must be regarded as a crime against humanity.” –Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaking at the “Fifth Alliance of Civilizations Forum” in Vienna’s Hofburg Palace
  • International Law
    “A Moment of Truth” for Syrian Refugees—and International Justice
    Yesterday Antonio Gutteres, the United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees, briefed the UN Security Council on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria. Gutteres’ remarks, delivered in closed session but subsequently published on UNHCR’s website, provide a chilling summary of the human cost of this grinding conflict. The crisis, in his words, presents a “moment of truth” to the international community. That is true in at least two senses. The world needs to take bolder steps to alleviate human suffering in Syria. And it needs to hold the perpetrators of atrocities accountable. The humanitarian crisis in Syria is dire. In April 2012, UNHCR had registered 33,000 Syrian refugees in neighboring countries. Today, ten months later, this number has swelled thirty-fold, to 963,000—and it continues to climb. “Since early January, over 40,000 people have fled Syria every week,” Gutteres observed yesterday. The number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon now exceeds four hundred thousand—nearly ten percent of that country’s population of 4.3 million. A similar number have found shelter in Jordan (population 6.2 million). On Monday alone, 4,585 Syrians entered that country. Many tens of thousands of more have fled to Turkey and Iraq. As the conflict deepens, the risk is growing that Syria’s Palestinian refugees, numbering half a million, may once again be forced to flee. Syria’s refugees, Gutteres notes, have “lost everything they once owned—businesses, homes, livelihoods.” Most are living in austere conditions in crude camps, suffering through one of the harshest winters in years. An entire generation of children has been traumatized, their lives uprooted and shattered. Meanwhile, host countries (with the exception of prosperous Turkey) are straining to provide social services to refugee populations, who are taxing modest budgets and infrastructure. They are also struggling to manage the potentially explosive societal and political consequences of this massive influx—as well as the possible spillover of violence across their borders. It is the situation inside Syria, however, that is “most tragic”. While precise figures are impossible to come by, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimate that more than 3 million, or over fifteen percent, of Syria’s remaining population is internally displaced. More than four million [PDF] Syrians are in need of vital food and other assistance from UN agencies to survive. Particularly alarming are growing reports of mass atrocities committed by Assad’s military and, to a lesser degree, insurgents. On February 18, a special commission appointed by the Human Rights Council released a 131-page report documenting of widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by both government and opposition forces. Based on 445 individual interviews, the report details multiple instances of summary executions, massacres, targeting of civilians, abuse against children, and sexual violence. Yesterday, Zainab Hawa Bangura, a Sierra Leonean who serves as the UN’s special representative on sexual violence in conflict, provided the Security Council with what Britain’s UN ambassador termed a “disturbing” account of “the widespread use of sexual violence by the regime.” While both sides have committed atrocities, the Human Rights Council report is a scathing indictment of the regime’s strategy of punishing civilians perceived as sympathetic to the opposition: Indiscriminate and widespread shelling, the regular bombardment of cities, mass killing, indiscriminate firing on civilian targets, firing on civilian gatherings and a protracted campaign of shelling and sniping on civilian areas have characterized the conduct of the government. Based on this growing body of evidence, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, has repeatedly urged that the Syrian situation be referred to the International Criminal Court. But the UN Security Council, the one body that could authorize such a referral (since Syria is not party to the Rome Statute), has failed to do so, due to opposition from Russia and China. “It’s incredible the Security Council doesn’t take a decision, because crimes are continuing, and the number of victims is increasing day to day,” says Carla del Ponte, former chief prosecutor for the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia and a member of the special Human Rights Council commission on Syria. “Justice must be done.” Meeting in Rome with Syrian opposition leaders, Secretary of State John Kerry promised to expand “non-lethal” U.S. aid to those fighting Assad’s regime. While a welcome development, the Obama administration should take two additional steps to reduce human suffering in Syria and bring perpetrators of mass atrocities there to justice. First, the United States should increase its relief assistance both for refugees outside Syria’s borders and for those internally displaced within the country. Doing the former means directing more funds to UNHCR and other international agencies on the front lines. Doing the latter will require the United States (and other donors) to shift away from their current policy of directing relief assistance through the government of Damascus. As Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch notes, that approach guarantees that little aid gets to rebel-held areas. The new approach would entail expanding cross-border assistance with or without the consent of the Assad regime, so that it gets to the populations in most desperate need. Second, the United States should push the Security Council to refer the crisis in Syria to the ICC. By the beginning of the year, more than fifty UN member states had already called for this step, and several more EU leaders endorsed it last week. To be sure, Russia and China will likely cast vetoes against any such resolution. Nonetheless, there would be symbolic value in forcing a vote, likely to enjoy overwhelming support of the UNSC’s other members. The typical counterargument—that such a referral would be counterproductive, since it would only lead the Damascus regime to dig in its heels—seem untenable. When it comes to digging in, Assad is already up to his neck.
  • Syria
    The Permanent Reprehensive
    As I wrote in this blog earlier today, the ambassador-- or "Permanent Representative," to use the correct UN language--of Syria was recently elected to a position in the UN Special Committee on Decolonization. And I noted that Syria’s official news agency happily reported this event. A more careful reading of the report by SANA, the official Syrian news agency, shows that someone in Damascus has either imperfect English--or perfect English and a terrific sense of humor. For the SANA report said that The Permanent Reprehensive of the Syrian Arab republic to the UN, Dr. Bashar al-Jaafari, was unanimously re-elected as Rapporteur of UN Special Committee on Decolonization. There are alas many other regimes whose ambassadors to the UN might equally well be called "the Permanent Reprehensive." It’s a glorious new title, and we should all thank SANA for supplying it. ---------- Update: A friend has pointed out to me that China has a Deputy Permanent Reprehensive.  
  • Middle East and North Africa
    American Humanitarian Aid in Syria: Too Little, Too Late, Too Much to Assad
    Today’s Washington Post reports that The Obama administration is moving toward a major policy shift on Syria that could provide rebels there with equipment such as body armor and armored vehicles, and possibly military training, and could send humanitarian assistance directly to Syria’s opposition political coalition. The United States will continue to refuse military aid to the rebels, but the policy change is viewed as a significant one and has been signaled in remarks by our new secretary of state during his trip this week. The rebellion against the Assad regime is now two years old. There are an estimated 70,000 dead and perhaps 4 million refugees and displaced persons. Large areas of the country are now in rebel hands or are contested between the rebels and the regime. In that context it is worth stopping to re-read one line quoted above: if the new policy is implemented the United States "could send humanitarian assistance directly to Syria’s opposition political coalition." This of course makes one wonder where we have been sending it. The Post answers the question: The Obama administration, citing legal restrictions on direct funding of the opposition, has funneled $385 million in humanitarian aid through international institutions and nongovernmental organizations, most of which operate under Syrian government supervision. There is no better measure of the failed policy toward Syria that has been followed these two years by the Obama administration. Nor need we look much further to understand why, as the Post also reports The opposition...has been strident in its criticism of the United States and others for refusing to provide it with the resources to organize a quasi-government and broaden its support inside Syria. In the midst of a gigantic rebellion against the Assad regime and immense humanitarian suffering inflicted by that regime, we have been providing aid to agencies that operate under the supervision of that regime. The disgraceful result is revealed in a January 29, 2013 statement by Medecins Sans Frontieres: International aid provided to Syria is not being distributed equally between government and opposition controlled areas. The areas under government control receive nearly all international aid, while opposition-held zones receive only a tiny share. It should be obvious that the ability to dispense food, medicine, and other crucial humanitarian goods is a source of power and influence. We have for two years complained of the composition of the opposition and the worrying strength of extremist elements--and have then failed even to provide the more moderate elements with humanitarian support that they could distribute to strengthen themselves. Meanwhile the extremist groups engage in "humanitarian relief efforts, such as paving new roads and clearing old ones, baking bread for the increasing number of needy Syrians, and supplying foodstuffs." That the provision of military aid, lethal or non-lethal, directly to the rebels should occasion long debate is understandable, though two years of dithering is unforgivable. But even if you think it to be forgivable, and indeed proper, to be considering two years in whether we should now direct our humanitarian aid away from government-controlled agencies and areas and toward rebel-controlled areas and rebel groups we favor is the greatest indictment of the administration’s Syria policy. Let us hope that the policy changes Secretary Kerry has been talking about are implemented immediately.