Democratic Republic of Congo

A case of Ebola, the deadly hemorrhagic fever with terrifying symptoms, has been found in the second-largest city in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The city, Bunia, has a population of almost one million. The disease has already been identified in Butembo and Beni, the former with a population slightly larger than Bunia, the latter slightly smaller. The disease is now urban and rural in eastern Congo. The director of the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Dr. Robert Redfield Jr., recently returned from the region. According to him, the disease is not under control and could last for another year. He expressed concern that stocks of Ebola vaccine could become depleted, which many observers conclude has kept the epidemic from becoming worse. Merck is developing the vaccine, which at this stage is not licensed and cannot be sold. It has donated over 133,000 doses and more than 87,000 have received it.  According to the World Health Organization (WHO), this Ebola outbreak is second only to the one in West Africa from 2014 to 2016, which killed some 11,000. As of March 13, WHO estimates that there have been 932 cases and 587 deaths in the affected parts of eastern Congo since the outbreak began in August 2018. Concern is that the disease could spread to eastern Congo’s neighbors, including Rwanda, Uganda, and South Sudan. National borders are porous with little regulation of the movement of people from one country to another in the region. Dr. Redfield says that his agency is prepared to do more, but its personnel cannot go into the epicenter of the disease because of a breakdown in security. (The U.S. Department of State determines where and when it is safe enough for federal employees to work outside the United States.) Eastern Congo has long been a war zone, with various militia groups active. A consequence has been intense suspicion among local people of outsiders. In February, there were two attacks on treatment centers that forced Doctors Without Borders (MSF) to close its facilities. It is not clear who the attackers are, but MSF and WHO officials have expressed concern about local community hostility to outsiders. Further complicating treatment, the disease is relatively new in the area and carries considerable stigma; protocols for containing the disease interfere with some traditional burial practices, for example. Centers for the treatment of routine diseases may also facilitate the spread of the disease because its victims are not necessarily segregated from other patients, again because of lack of familiarity with the disease. Some thirty percent of the victims have been children, and one hypothesis is that they were infected by the disease when they were taken to clinics for the treatment of routine childhood diseases. 

Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.

Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.

Herman J. Cohen is the former assistant secretary of state for African affairs (1989–1993), the former U.S. ambassador to the Gambia and Senegal (1977–80), and was a member of the U.S. Foreign Service for thirty-eight years. This originally appeared on Ambassador Cohen’s blog. He is responding with a different perspective to a blog post on the recent DRC elections by Michelle Gavin, current CFR senior fellow and former U.S. ambassador to Botswana and the SADC (2011–14), which appeared on February 6. It is reposted here with Ambassador Cohen’s permission.  In the daily Africa in Transition blog on February 6, 2019, Ambassador Michelle Gavin, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Program, harshly criticized the United States government’s policy toward the December 2018 presidential election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The title of the article summarizes Ambassador Gavin’s point of view quite succinctly: “The Truth About United States’ Complicity in DRC’s Fraudulent Election.” The word “complicity” in my view, is both unfair and unjustified. Here is why: Historic perspective Starting in early 2015, DRC President Joseph Kabila expressed an interest in amending his nation’s constitution to eliminate the two-term limit on the head of state. His proposal stimulated major street demonstrations by ordinary Congolese people. As a result, he stopped talking about changing the constitution. Nevertheless, Kabila continued to maneuver to remain in power. The presidential election scheduled for November 2016 received no funding, effectively cancelling it. The DRC Constitutional Court ruled that in the absence of an election, the President remains in power until an election can be organized.  In response to general discontent, Kabila held a number of “consultations” coordinated by the Conference of Catholic Bishops (CENCO) during 2017 and early 2018. The consultations were constructive. Nevertheless, they basically served to delay elections and maintain Kabila in power. The growing instability caused by Kabila’s refusal to consider relinquishing power caused the international community to intervene. Most importantly, U.S. United Nations Ambassador Nikki Haley visited Kabila in September 2017, and persuaded him to pledge to organize an election prior to the end of 2018, and to pledge that he himself would not be a candidate. Kabila’s decision constituted a successful diplomatic action by the U.S. government. Kabila kept his pledge to Ambassador Haley, but he did it in such a way as to try to maintain himself in power through a surrogate. For the 2018 presidential election, Kabila named Ramazani Shadary as his “heir”. During the election campaign, Shedari was one of three principal candidates. The other two were opposition candidates Martin Fayulu and Felix Tshisekedi. In view of the history of presidential elections in the DRC, dating back to 2006, most observers expected the vote count to be manipulated fraudulently so as to give the victory to Kabila’s surrogate Shadary. But to everyone’s surprise, the authentic election count gave so few votes to Shadary, that Kabila could not possibly get away with declaring him the winner.  All of the voting stations had witnesses and observers. The largest number of witnesses were from the UDPS party that supported Tshisekedi. The largest number of observers were from the Catholic Church. The Church reported that the candidate with the most votes was Fayulu. The UDPS reported that candidate Tshisekedi was the winner. Other sources reported to have seen the vote count of the official electoral commission (CENI) that had Fayulu as the winner. Not being in a position politically to declare Shadary the winner, Kabila had to choose between Fayulu and Tshisekedi. He chose Tshisekedi because Fayulu was financed by his arch enemy Moise Katumbi. To Kabila, Tshisekedi was clearly the lesser of the two evils. The International Community Responds In the first twenty-four hours after the election, with so many conflicting claims as to the real winner, the African Union, the Southern Africa Development Community, and the European Union requested that the DRC Government not announce the winner, and instead initiate a recount. The DRC ignored these requests, and the Constitutional Council went ahead and declared Felix Tshisekedi the new head of state. The U.S. did not comment until after the Constitutional Court declared Tshisekedi to be the elected President. The official announcement congratulated the Congolese people for their peaceful election, and expressed the determination to work with the Tshisekedi government for the development of the DRC. Ambassador Gavin’s criticism of the U.S. decision misses the main point. If Washington had denounced the election, and declared that Tshisekedi’s victory was fraudulent, U.S.-DRC relations would have arrived at a dead end. What is really important, is that Kabila is no longer in power, and that his corrupt, predatory system is on the way out. The Congolese people have been waiting for this for more than a decade, and their wish is finally fulfilled. Now, there is much potential for the U.S. and the DRC to cooperate on many aspects of development, private investment and security.  The U.S. decision was correct. Ambassador Gavin’s severe condemnation of that decision emphasizes useless idealism at the expense of pragmatic progress in the right direction. I am surprised that she is insisting on the perfect at the expense of the good. That does a great disservice to diplomacy.

When John Bolton rolled out the Trump administration’s Africa strategy late last year, many observers noted the absence of language around strengthening democratic accountability and strong governance, or supporting those defending human rights on the continent. In the weeks that followed, the world got a clearer sense of what those omissions might mean—nowhere more so than in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). On January 24, Felix Tshisekedi was sworn-in as the DRC’s new president. U.S. Ambassador Michael Hammer heralded the moment as the “first-ever peaceful, democratic transfer of power” in the country. It may have been peaceful, but it was democratic only in the way that a movie set’s facades are actual buildings. They look right at a glance, but once you peer inside, there is nothing there. All available evidence indicated that Tshisekedi did not win the election. Nor were there rules or laws in Congo that could somehow explain the backroom deal that determined the announced electoral outcome. The election was stolen, pure and simple. The Congolese people who bravely came out to vote were treated like unwitting extras in a drama staged by elites. Despite having suggested it would isolate and pressure those undermining democracy in Congo just days before, the Trump administration decided to join other states in accepting the sham outcome in an effort to stave off a potentially violent stalemate in Congo. The wisdom of that choice is debatable. Congo’s instability is largely a function of deeply flawed and unaccountable governance, so the idea that an unaccountable leader and dubiously legitimate parliament will improve security over time sounds a lot like wishful thinking. Proponents of this idea prefer to call it prudence. But prudence is one thing; praising the democratic nature of Tshisekedi’s ascendance is another. The people of Congo have good historical reasons to be skeptical of the United States. At a minimum, officials should choose their words with care. The United States’ interest in democratic legitimacy may be highly selective right now as it clearly matters a great deal more to this administration in Venezuela than in the DRC. But outright misrepresentations do us no favors. There are plenty of forces around the world working to devalue the meaning of ideas like democracy, or even truth. The United States ought not to join them.

Test your knowledge of deforestation, from its role in climate change to efforts to combat it.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s complicated and long-delayed elections ended with a surprise twist. Most of those riveted by the middle-of-the-night announcement of results had two likely outcomes in mind. Perhaps the less-than-independent electoral commission would announce that incumbent President Joseph Kabila’s handpicked successor had won—an outcome that would be fraudulent given his lack of popularity—but not surprising in a repressive and corrupt system. Or perhaps a new day would dawn for Congo, and the real winner—reported by many to be opposition coalition leader Martin Fayulu, who had a clear lead in pre-election polls—would be allowed to assume power.  Instead, another longtime opposition leader, Felix Tshisekedi, was declared victorious. Rumors abounded about a deal cut between Kabila and Tshisekedi before the announcement—one that would ensure protection for Kabila and his inner circle and access to power for Tshisekedi.  However, the fallout remains unclear. Fayulu is contesting the results, but the courts in Congo are as biased as the electoral commission. Regional powers are calling for a recount—a sound idea given the dubious parliamentary results that were announced alongside the presidential surprise—but simultaneously confusing is to propose a government of national unity.  One cautiously optimistic school of thought about the current state of affairs rightly acknowledges that this is an important change from the norm. The Congolese people, by voting in such numbers for opposition options, made it impossible to pretend that Kabila’s preferred candidate had won, disrupting plans for business as usual. They forced the regime to accommodate their desires—at least to a degree.  Another, more perplexing approach is embodied by the Southern African Development Community to call for a government of national unity. Ostensibly the notion that problematic and contested elections should end in unity governments is rooted in fears of instability. However, for Congo to overcome the violence and deprivation that have plagued it for decades, it needs a whole new model of governance. A unity government in which every major political player gets a slice of power does not move the country forward; it keeps it spinning its wheels in place. It sweeps the fact that the election’s most credible observers claim there was a clear winner under a rug of dubious cooperation and even more questionable utility. Something important is missing from these analyses—accountability. At the end of the day, elections are about more than expressing the preferences of the electorate. They are about establishing the lines of accountability that give legitimacy to leaders. Right now, it certainly appears that Tshisekedi owes his victory to Kabila and the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy. That loss of connective tissue to the citizens of the country distorts accountability in ways unlikely to deliver the relief from predatory governance that the Congolese people crave. Likewise, a government of national unity solution has nothing to do with accountability to voters and everything to do with elites accommodating one another. Without accountability, there is little reason to anticipate better days for the long-suffering people of Congo.

David Pilling has written a review of what he sees as some of the most important African events of 2018 for the Financial Times, a highly influential paper with respect to Western perspectives of Africa, published in London. He recalls the popular challenge now underway against Omar al-Bashir’s rule in Sudan; the deaths of Kofi Annan, the first African secretary General of UN, and Winnie Mandela, a flawed leader of the South African liberation movement; the highly positive emergence of the reform-minded Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian prime minister; and the international attention to Congolese surgeon Denis Mukwege, who won a Nobel Peace prize for his work with rape victims. He notes a continent-wide growth rate of 2.7 percent that was highly uneven: disappointing in Nigeria and South Africa, while among the highest in the world in Ghana, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Senegal and Tanzania.  His “five things that shook Africa in 2018,” and my comments: The African Continental Free Trade Area: I agree with Pilling’s characterization of it as a “step in the right direction.” Over time, and in concert with other factors such as infrastructure development, it has the potential for transforming African trade and therefore development. It is to be hoped that the big hold-out, Nigeria, will eventually sign-on. South Africa, the other hold-out, already has. Abiymania: Prime Minister Ahmed’s political reforms in Ethiopia are remarkable so far. I wholeheartedly endorse the enthusiasm for Ahmed and the new possibilities he has created domestically and internationally, such as the rapprochement with Eritrea. Zimbabwe’s flawed election: I do not believe that it was realistic to expect much change given the ZANU-PF’s continuing grip on power. Mugabe’s departure was just that, and little else. Bobi Wine: The Ugandan rapper is challenging the hold of autocrat Yoweri Museveni. While encouraging, it remains to be seen how much staying power he has at the moment. It is definitely something to keep an eye on. The China debt scare: I believe that it is much exaggerated, and I generally agree with Pilling’s point that, irrespective of the actual seriousness of African debt to China, it has certainly drummed up a lot of interest in Africa, and, for better or worse, was a central theme in the Trump administration's rhetoric around the new Africa strategy, if not its substance. Instead of Zimbabwe’s flawed elections, the rise of Bobi Wine, and the China debt scare on Pilling’s list, I would add: The change of leadership in South Africa: Removing Jacob Zuma and replacing him with Cyril Ramaphosa, all done according to party procedure and the rule of law, is no small feat. President Ramaphosa’s turn-around of governance in South Africa, especially his efforts to dismantle the corruption networks associated with former president Jacob Zuma, is encouraging. Though there is much to be done, Ramaphosa has deftly managed a divided ANC. Boko Haram’s resurgence: It poses a serious challenge to President Muhammadu Buhari’s reelection and could further destabilize the Giant of Africa, threatening the stability of its neighbors and the lives of millions of those displaced by the violence. Ebola’s resurgence in eastern Congo: Ebola appears no longer to be episodic but is now becoming endemic. By itself, it poses a major challenge to public health, if not of the same magnitude as HIV/AIDS. The real issue is that the outbreak, now present in some urban areas, is occurring in a highly-populated conflict zone near international borders during election season.  But, Pilling’s bottom line is right: “the continent took baby steps towards a brighter future.”  For what it is worth.

This week: Germany's political establishment is hit by data leak; Iran bans Instagram; internet shutdown in the DRC; the U.S. Congress opens federal data sets to AI companies. 

A long-awaited election in the Democratic Republic of Congo offers hope for the country’s first democratic transition, but a contested result could incite turmoil.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, and Egypt top the list of countries most likely to experience a new mass killing in 2018 or 2019, according to a new forecast. 

Test your knowledge of the DRC, from its independence from Belgium to its still-simmering conflict in the east.

Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.

The current outbreak of Ebola in eastern Congo's North Kivu province is taking place in a war zone, with rival militias and rebel groups inhibiting health workers responding the crisis. This is the tenth Ebola outbreak in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since the disease was first discovered in the country in 1976, and it has the potential to become the deadliest. There are currently at least 339 confirmed cases, with the epicenter in the city of Beni. Robert Redfield, director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, has raised the possibility that Ebola will become entrenched if health workers’ efforts continue to be disrupted.  The high population density of the region presents another challenge to health workers. In the past, Ebola outbreaks have been confined to isolated, rural areas, where they could be contained until they burned out. Now, the disease outbreak is in the second-most densely populated area of DRC. Even more worrisome for the World Health Organization and Congolese Ministry of Health is the threat that the disease will spread to population centers in the south and west of the country and become exponentially more difficult to manage. Compounding these problems is the highly porous border between DRC and neighboring Uganda, where much of the traffic is all but unregulated. Ugandan officials are expressing concern that the disease will cross the border, and they are taking emergency measures to screen travelers and vaccinate health workers with an experimental vaccine.  This most recent episode recalls the deadly Ebola outbreak that ravaged West Africa in 2014 and 2015. The current situation could be even more devastating if the disease spills over into neighboring urban centers and across international borders. There are still encouraging signs amidst all of this. The World Health Organization has declared that more than 30,000 people have been treated with the Ebola vaccine. While still experimental, the vaccine has proven itself effective in mitigating the spread of the disease. The Uganda health ministry has 2,100 vaccine doses available for health workers. Presuming that the vaccine continues to prove effective, production of the vaccine will need to be scaled-up quickly.