China in the Taiwan Strait: January 2025

January saw the PRC’s first combat patrol of the year around Taiwan and the presidential office of Taiwan’s first-ever tabletop wargame. Taiwan accused Chinese-owned cargo ships of deliberately damaging undersea telecom cables in the waters surrounding the island, Taipei cracked down on spies and PRC ID-holders, and Donald Trump’s inauguration brought new challenges for the Washington-Beijing-Taipei relationship.
January 30, 2025 5:04 pm (EST)

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Rehearsals and drills: It was a turbulent start to 2025, with the PRC’s first combat patrol of the year around Taiwan taking place on January 2. The combat patrol involved twenty-two military aircraft—eighteen of which crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait during the exercise.
On January 8, Taiwan’s navy carried out its own three-day military drill. The exercise simulated a defensive operation against a major People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy incursion attacking from the southwest. The drill allowed Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) to test the threat-detection capabilities of its unmanned aerial vehicles and radar systems and the capabilities of its corvette warships, Kuang Hua VI–class missile boats, and a new rescue-and-salvage ship, the Da Wu.
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Also this month, Taiwan’s presidential office completed its first official tabletop war game exercise simulating a PRC invasion of the island. The three-hour exercise was chaired by Vice President Hsiao Bi-Kim, Presidential Office Chief Pan Men-an, and National Security Advisor Joseph Wu. Participants simulated Taiwan’s response to a major military attack by China, supported by Iran, North Korea, and Russia, accompanied by high-intensity gray-zone coercion tactics including the PLA’s potential severance of undersea cables, leading to a blackout across Taiwan. The exercise was intended to hone Taiwan’s whole-of-society resilience and improve coordinated threat responses across agencies and levels of government. On the same day, President Lai Ching-te oversaw the second meeting of Taiwan’s Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee.
Violations of Taiwan’s de facto air defense identification zone (ADIZ) continued at a steady pace, with 235 aircraft and maritime vessels entering the ADIZ since January 1. Of those, 131 aircraft crossed the median line between China and Taiwan in the strait. Total incursions this month were on par with the last several months of 2024, but were high compared to January 2024, which saw seventy-two total. Per-month ADIZ violations shot over 280 around Lai’s May 2024 inauguration and have been high ever since.
According to the annual Preventive Priorities Survey published by the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. foreign policy experts believe a security crisis in the Taiwan Strait is moderately likely in 2025, but would greatly harm U.S. interests were it to materialize.
Defense technology: On January 16, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced a new order of American surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Taiwan purchased the SAMs for $312.9 million through the U.S. Foreign Military Sale process via the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, the private organization that unofficially handles Taiwan’s consular affairs in the United States and officially purchases U.S. weapons for the defense of Taiwan. The SAMs will be deployed near Taipei and New Taipei. They serve to boost Taiwan’s capacity to defend its capital from missile attacks and will fill a gap in Taiwan’s overall defense capabilities by providing better medium-range missile defense. The MND also announced the purchase of two new mobile radar systems for threat detection.
Not to be outdone, news broke this month that the PRC is building three to five new barges for military use, most likely designed to facilitate amphibious landings. The barges are likely capable of docking in shallow coastal waters and feature roughly 120-meter-long bridges that extend from the bow, which allow the barges to offload military vehicles onto roads, potentially bypassing narrow beaches. That capability would allow PLA military equipment and personnel to avoid certain coastal defenses during an invasion contingency. Roll-on, roll-off ferries (which have transported tanks and other military equipment during past PLA exercises) can also dock on large barges, supplying them with vehicles and equipment.
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Cognitive warfare: Taiwan’s National Security Bureau reported that average daily cyberattacks against Taiwan’s government networks doubled to 2.4 million in 2024, with most traceable to the PRC. In addition, 2024 saw a 60 percent increase in disinformation on Taiwanese social media. Cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns are part of China’s gray-zone coercion efforts to destabilize Taiwan’s society and government. Taiwanese officials commonly refer to such efforts as cognitive warfare; the PRC has repeatedly denied involvement in cyberattacks against its adversaries.
A January 17 article by Kathrin Hill of the Financial Times indicated the popularity of TikTok and similar Chinese social media apps among Taiwanese youth is influencing the island’s politics. Opposition to Taiwanese independence, self-identification as Chinese rather than Taiwanese, dissatisfaction with the efficacy of Taiwanese politics, and other beliefs associated with pro-Chinese political leanings are more common among young people and Chinese app users than other groups. Some elements within the ruling Democratic People’s Party support banning TikTok or increasing barriers to its function in Taiwan, while others worry that restricting its usage would further decrease youths’ trust in the government.
The tech scandal that shook the world this month kicked off when a Chinese start-up released an artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot, DeepSeek, which the company claims it built with a smaller-than-usual number of advanced computer chips. Stock prices for those companies that design or manufacture such chips took a dive, with the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company taking a 10 percent hit on January 27; the stock has since partially rebounded. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry comprises approximately 15 percent of the island’s GDP. If that weren’t enough to concern Taipei, it quickly became evident to DeepSeek users that the chatbot is inclined toward pro-PRC political stances: a study done by NBC revealed that the service provided evasive answers or answers in line with Beijing’s political leanings in every test case. For example, when asked by journalists whether Taiwan is a country, DeepSeek responded that it is not a country and “has always been an inalienable part of China’s territory since ancient times.” It is not yet clear how Taipei plans to respond to the new AI platform.
Dragging their anchors: It was not smooth sailing in the Taiwan Strait this month, as Taiwan intercepted two separate civilian cargo ships suspected of damaging or attempting to destroy undersea cables. On January 3, Taiwanese authorities were informed that a Chungwa Telecom–owned undersea cable had been damaged. In connection with the damage, the coast guard intercepted a freighter—the Shunxin-39—off the island’s northern coast. The ship, which flies a Cameroonian flag and is owned by a Hong Kong company (which, in turn, is owned by a Chinese national), refused to return to shore for investigation. It proceeded en route to Busan, South Korea; Taiwan has requested the Koreans’ help investigating the freighter. Taiwan alleges that the ship’s crew comprised Chinese nationals and authorities suspect PRC involvement in the incident. The ship’s owner has denied his vessel damaged the telecom cable in the first place. China’s office of Taiwan affairs dismissed the accusations as well, with a spokesman calling undersea cable damage a “common maritime accident.” The affected cable was part of a network that links Taiwan to the American West Coast. Repairs are expected to be completed by the end of January.
Days later, the Taiwanese Coast Guard drove another cargo ship, the Bao Shun, out of Taiwanese waters. The freighter, which carries a Mongolian flag, navigated in and out of Taiwan’s territorial waters for five days, taking a sometimes-erratic course in the waters directly over the undersea cable network damaged by the Shunxin-39. The Bao Shun reportedly came dangerously close to Taiwanese Coast Guard vessels and to the island’s coast itself during that time. Among the parties closely monitoring this story: Finland and the Baltic states, which have accused Russia of directing civilian oil tankers to sabotage undersea cables similarly in the Baltic Sea and surrounding waters in a similar manner over the past year. The most common method to cause deliberate damage to an undersea cable is for a ship to drag its anchor along the sea floor.
Taiwan’s MND announced on January 15 that it is stepping up surveillance of all ships that travel over undersea cable networks in the island’s surrounding waterways, and on January 26, Taiwan blacklisted fifty-two Chinese-owned tankers that carry Cameroonian, Mongolian, Sierra Leonean, Tanzanian, and Togolese flags. Taiwan identified the Shunxin-39 incident as part of a trend of aging, dilapidated ships reregistering in the countries with the lowest barriers to entry and later sailing over undersea cables in the waters surrounding Chinese and Russian adversaries. Over the past two years, these “shadow vessels” or “ghost ships” have increasingly been found operating in Asian and European waterways, sometimes nearby damaged undersea cables, without proper lighting and signaling. Some U.S. and European intelligence agencies have connected the cable damage in Europe to accidents rather than sabotage, though the Baltic governments disagree and consider Russian cable damage a potential security threat; Taiwanese officials continue to consider the possibility that cable damage is part of a deliberate Chinese campaign to interfere in the island’s affairs.
Papers, please: Officials have warned the Taiwanese public not to be tempted by PRC’s recent efforts to encourage Taiwanese people to apply for PRC citizenship or residency documentation, including residency cards, bank accounts, Chinese phone numbers, and PRC identification cards. The island’s Mainland Affairs Council has identified those efforts as part of Beijing’s larger United Front strategy to influence the Taiwanese population’s views about the PRC. In addition, the Ministry of Justice has reminded the public that possessing PRC identification and maintaining PRC citizenship is illegal for Taiwanese nationals. The ministry is seeking out Taiwanese individuals with such identification documents or passports; those in violation could have their housing licenses, voting rights, national healthcare, and other public benefits revoked. On January 23, the Mainland Affairs Council announced the cancellation of the Taiwanese ID cards and public benefits of three people who were found to also maintain PRC identification documents. The Ministry of the Interior also identified five local officials across Taiwan who maintain PRC citizenship; Taiwan has demanded the officials renounce their Chinese citizenship in accordance with the Nationality Act, which prohibits elected officials from being foreign nationals.
Diplomatic quagmire: While cross-strait relations remain tense, some progress has been made on one sticking point: China is preparing to allow mainland tour groups from certain provinces to travel to Taiwan; Taiwan emphasized that such tourism will only be possible following formal talks between Beijing and Taipei. In January, Taiwan reiterated its stance that it will not return to cross-strait negotiations on its political status under the framework of the 1992 consensus and will only participate in talks without any preconditions.
The triangular relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei continued with similarly high intensity. Taiwan sent a delegation to President Donald Trump’s inauguration in Washington, DC, with the speaker of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan Han Kuo-yu watching the ceremony from the overflow room in the Capitol Building’s visitor center. Chinese Vice President Han Zheng represented Beijing at the inauguration; Zheng was seated inside the Capitol rotunda for the swearing-in.
Three days before the U.S. presidential inauguration, Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke over the phone. On the call, Xi reasserted China’s position that the “Taiwan question” concerns Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs quickly rebutted China’s claim to Taiwan and reiterated the island’s independence. Following his confirmation, Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke on the phone with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Rubio expressed serious concern over the PRC’s coercive actions against Taiwan.
On the international front, even worse news for Taipei: a Lowy Institute report by Benjamin Hescovitch reveals that 62 percent of UN member states (119) largely support the PRC’s position regarding Taiwan’s status, including the so-called One-China Principle, which states that Taiwan is a part of the PRC (a figure that includes the 46 percent of states that support Beijing’s efforts toward “reunification” between Taiwan and mainland China).
Spies: January saw a major Taiwanese crackdown on PRC-directed espionage. On January 8, the Taiwan high prosecutor’s office indicted seven retired military officers for allegedly receiving money from Chinese agents in exchange for classified military information and pro-PRC activity. The defendants stand charged with breaking anti-infiltration and national security laws. A few days later, an additional retired officer was indicted: Retired Lieutenant General Kao An-kuo is facing suspicion that he assisted the PLA with invasion planning and enticed other military personnel to do so; he faces a minimum of ten years in prison.
On January 12, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau released a full analysis of espionage activities involving the PRC. 2024 broke records for spying-related criminal cases in Taiwan, with sixty-four prosecutions. Most of those suspected and convicted of espionage in Taiwan are either retired or active-duty military; a Mainland Affairs Council spokesman told reporters that 85 percent of national security–related indictments involve people affiliated with Taiwan’s military or police forces. According to the report, China sometimes recruits agents through underground finance networks and civic and religious groups and has coerced Taiwanese contacts into expressing pro-PRC positions through blackmail or gambling debt, as well as paying spies in cash.
Other persons of interest: The New Taipei prosecutor indicted a Chinese man from Zhejiang Province on January 20 for breaking immigration laws and the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area when he rode an inflatable raft onto Linkou Beach, Taiwan, in September 2024. The man told authorities he came to Taiwan to “pursue freedom.” On January 24, Taiwan’s Supreme Court upheld the eight-month prison sentence of a retired PLA general for violating immigration laws. The man, Ruan Fangyong, fled mainland China for Taiwan in June 2024 and surrendered to Taiwanese authorities, claiming that he had escaped to the island for “democracy.”
Meanwhile, the Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) confirmed that PRC public security has been holding a nineteen-year-old Taiwanese man, thought missing for ten months, in detention for fraud since at least December 2, 2024. The incident has set off a dispute between Beijing and Taipei, as Taiwan was not properly informed of the man’s arrest. According to the SEF, China has not been in compliance with the 2009 Cross-Strait Agreement on Mutual Judicial Assistance since April 2024. The agreement requires each government to inform the other promptly if it detains one of the other’s nationals.