Food and Water Security

Jack McCaslin is a research associate for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. An article from Fox News recently called attention to the killing of Christians in Nigeria by comparing it to the deadly Easter Sunday suicide bombings of churches and hotels in Sri Lanka. According to the article, the attacks “highlight the dangers that remain from asymmetric terrorism and violence against Christians in ethnically and religiously divided societies.” However, linking these tragedies to each other and to a perceived global trend of violence against Christians mischaracterizes the nature of the conflicts in Nigeria.  The appropriateness of a comparison between Sri Lanka and Nigeria is not clear. Their ethnic make-up, social statistics, and post-colonial experiences are vastly different. Not least, Christians and Muslims are a tiny minority in Sri Lanka, a predominately Buddhist country, while in Nigeria, Christians and Muslims each constitute about half of the population. Identifying the perpetrators of atrocities in both countries is difficult. Although the Islamic State has claimed responsibility, it is not clear what its role was in the Sri Lanka bombings or, for that matter, what its role is in northern Nigeria.  With respect to Nigeria, Fox cites the recent killing of eleven and the wounding of thirty in Gombe. A police officer got into an argument with a procession of children during Easter activities, which reportedly led him to drive into it. It is not clear what the police officer’s motives were; Boko Haram is active in Gombe but it seems that they were not involved. Boko Haram appears to be largely an indigenous movement, and there is little evidence of strategic or tactical cooperation between the Islamic State or al-Qaeda affiliates and Boko Haram, though they share a common belief system, are murderously hostile to Christians, and have exchanged various forms of communication, the significance of which remains unclear. The article also notes the killing of seventeen Christians and the wounding of eight in Nassarawa state early in April. No link is provided, but the Council on Foreign Relations’ Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) documented an attack in Numa Kochu, resulting in the death of a pregnant woman and several children. This seems to fit the description in the article. According to reports, Numa Kochu is a predominantly Christian community comprised of those of the Mada ethnic group. The victims’ funeral services were led by local leaders of the Christian Association of Nigeria, a prominent religious organization. As is often the case, the affiliation and motive of the perpetrators are not clear. They have been described as “gunmen” and “herdsmen” by various Nigerian media outlets, and reference is made to the farmer-herder conflict in Nassarawa, which has been intense and deadly. It is worth noting that in some statements made by community leaders and the security services, no reference is made to religion.  Christians are certainly murdered in Nigeria, and in some cases, they are murdered because they are Christian. But, despite Boko Haram’s murderous hostility to Christians, most of its victims have always been Muslim, not least because the insurgency takes place in a predominantly Muslim part of the country. (Boko Haram’s killing of such great numbers of Muslims, based on a wide definition of apostasy, is understood to be one of the reasons that the group split in 2016.) For what it is worth, data from the NST shows a decline in Boko Haram attacks on churches and an increase in attacks on mosques over time. Indeed, the smaller number of Christian deaths at the hands of Boko Haram likely reflects the fact that most of them have fled.  Today, most Christian deaths are occurring in the Middle Belt, where there are overlapping quarrels over land and water use, ethnicity, and religion—and where Christians are numerous. But when Christians or Muslims are killed in the Middle Belt, it is not clear exactly why. Is it because they are a farmer or a herder? Or because they are ethnically Fulani, many of whom are herders, or of a small ethnic group, who are often farmers? Or is it because they are Muslim, which most Fulani are, or Christian, which those of many small ethnic groups are? These questions are not easily answered. Ethnicity can often correspond to a particular religion, both of which can sometimes correspond to a distinct way of life. Or not. In Zamfara, where the violence is particularly bad, both herders and farmers are mostly Muslim and mostly Fulani. There is also an important criminal element involving bandits and cattle rustlers. Another way to think about it: violence may fall along ethnic and religious lines, but it is not necessarily driven by those distinctions.  Religious polarization is a real challenge in Nigeria, and it has likely increased. The government has been unable to destroy Boko Haram or end the local conflicts in the Middle Belt. Further, the economy remains in the doldrums, and the country now has the most people living in extreme poverty in the world. But linking Nigerian tragedies to the tragedy that occurred in Sri Lanka and a global trend of violence against Christians overlooks important nuances in Nigeria’s multiple ongoing conflicts. 

Asch Harwood is a research associate with the Council on Foreign Relations and the creator of the Nigeria Security Tracker. Previously at UNICEF and Reboot, he is the founder of Red Hook Media Lab.  Has sectarian violence in the Middle Belt increased significantly in 2018? If so, has it eclipsed the Boko Haram conflict? On December 20, 2018, we published year-to-date data. Below we publish data for the entire year of 2018.  Based on an analysis of Nigeria Security Tracker data, the short answer to the first question is yes, violence has almost doubled since 2017. The NST documented 2,037 deaths through all of 2018, compared to 1,041 sectarian-related deaths in all of 2017.*  The answer to the second is that violence is about even with Boko Haram, in terms of the number of conflict-related victims. Deaths related to the Boko Haram conflict for all of 2018 are 2,016.** (See an in-depth analysis of data related to Boko Haram here.) The NST identifies sectarian conflict as acts of violence that occur between distinct identity-based groups (or are framed as such in the Nigerian press). Examples typically include conflict that is described as occurring between “communities,” religious groups, or between named groups, such as “Fulani herders” and “Berom farmers.” (We exclude Boko Haram from our sectarian violence category.) Given our interest in patterns over time, this sectarian category can be useful. However, it does obscure the complex economic, social, historical, and political (often highly local) factors that fuel this type of conflict. The first graphic, “Sectarian Violence by State/Year,” shows number of deaths by state for each year since 2011. The second graph, “Sectarian Deaths by Year” shows year over year totals.  The escalation in violence through 2018 comes because of a relative "lull" in 2017. The worst overall year since 2011 is 2014, which parallels 2018.  var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082083611'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='920px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='1020px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='787px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='887px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   As illustrated in the two maps below, violence in 2018 has been concentrated in Benue, Plateau, Taraba, Nasarawa, Adamawa, and Kaduna. In 2014, it was concentrated in Kaduna, Nasarawa, Taraba, Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, and Katsina. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545089069262'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='920px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='1020px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='387px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='487px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The fourth graphic, “Sectarian Violence by State,” shows sectarian-related deaths by month. This graph includes all states in Nigeria. Use the drop-down menu to select specific states, and adjust the time frame by moving the slider. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082354981'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='720px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='950px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='787px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='887px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The fifth graphic, “Number of Sectarian Violent Incidents by Month,” aggregates the number of incidents (as opposed to number of deaths). There has been a notable escalation in the number of monthly incidents, starting in January 2018. This graph includes all states in Nigeria. Use the drop-down menu to select specific states, and adjust the time frame by moving the slider. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082382073'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='720px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='950px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='787px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='887px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The last graph is “Sectarian Deaths by LGA,” and shows number of deaths by local government area. Agatu in Benue, and Barkin Ladi in Plateau are clearly the most affected by sectarian violence. Move the slider to adjust the time frame. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082405603'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='720px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='950px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='487px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='687px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   *The numbers presented here do not match the numbers on the main NST dashboard. For readability sake, we filter out some of the smaller categories, such as conflict involving a “sectarian and other armed actor.”   **This number is a rough estimate. It includes deaths in which Boko Haram is the only perpetrator, clashes between the state and Boko Haram in which there are deaths on both sides, and in which the state is the only perpetrator.  This blog post has been updated with data for the entire calendar year 2018. 

Asch Harwood is a research associate with the Council on Foreign Relations and the creator of the Nigeria Security Tracker. Previously at UNICEF and Reboot, he is the founder of Red Hook Media Lab. Has sectarian violence in the Middle Belt increased significantly in 2018?  If so, has it eclipsed the Boko Haram conflict? Based on an analysis of Nigeria Security Tracker data, the short answer to the first question is yes, violence has almost doubled since 2017. The NST documented 2,037 deaths through all of 2018, compared to 1,041 sectarian-related deaths in all of 2017.*  The answer to the second is that violence is about even with Boko Haram, in terms of the number of conflict-related victims. Deaths related to the Boko Haram conflict for all of 2018 are 2,016.** (See an in-depth analysis of data related to Boko Haram here.) The NST identifies sectarian conflict as acts of violence that occur between distinct identity-based groups (or are framed as such in the Nigerian press). Examples typically include conflict that is described as occurring between “communities,” religious groups, or between named groups, such as “Fulani herders” and “Berom farmers.” (We exclude Boko Haram from our sectarian violence category.) Given our interest in patterns over time, this sectarian category can be useful. However, it does obscure the complex economic, social, historical, and political (often highly local) factors that fuel this type of conflict. The first graphic, “Sectarian Violence by State/Year,” shows number of deaths by state for each year since 2011. The second graph, “Sectarian Deaths by Year” shows year over year totals.  The escalation in violence through 2018 comes because of a relative "lull" in 2017. The worst overall year since 2011 is 2014, which parallels 2018.  var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082083611'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='920px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='1020px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='787px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='887px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   As illustrated in the two maps below, violence in 2018 has been concentrated in Benue, Plateau, Taraba, Nasarawa, Adamawa, and Kaduna. In 2014, it was concentrated in Kaduna, Nasarawa, Taraba, Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, and Katsina. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545089069262'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='920px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='1020px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='387px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='487px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The fourth graphic, “Sectarian Violence by State,” shows sectarian-related deaths by month. This graph includes all states in Nigeria. Use the drop-down menu to select specific states, and adjust the time frame by moving the slider. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082354981'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='720px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='950px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='787px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='887px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The fifth graphic, “Number of Sectarian Violent Incidents by Month,” aggregates the number of incidents (as opposed to number of deaths). There has been a notable escalation in the number of monthly incidents, starting in January 2018. This graph includes all states in Nigeria. Use the drop-down menu to select specific states, and adjust the time frame by moving the slider. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082382073'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='720px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='950px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='787px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='887px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The last graph is “Sectarian Deaths by LGA,” and shows number of deaths by local government area. Agatu in Benue, and Barkin Ladi in Plateau are clearly the most affected by sectarian violence. Move the slider to adjust the time frame. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082405603'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='720px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='950px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='487px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='687px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   *The numbers presented here do not match the numbers on the main NST dashboard. For readability sake, we filter out some of the smaller categories, such as conflict involving a “sectarian and other armed actor.”   **This number is a rough estimate. It includes deaths in which Boko Haram is the only perpetrator, clashes between the state and Boko Haram in which there are deaths on both sides, and in which the state is the only perpetrator. The blog post originally contained data through November 2018. It is now updated to include data for all of 2018.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has published a report, “Africa’s Unresolved Conflicts Key Driver of Food Insecurity.” The report includes a graphic with a map showing the overlap between food insecurity and conflict in Africa. The graphic would be an excellent teaching device. Among other things, the report shows that the majority of Africans experiencing high levels of food insecurity, 107 out of 143 million, live in countries experiencing or affected by conflict. Eleven out of the twelve countries in conflict are experiencing the highest level of food insecurity. A bar graph breaks down the number of people by the different levels of food insecurity they face and in what country. Nigeria, Sudan, and Cameroon, respectively, top the list. Based on the percentage of the population facing food insecurity, however, South Sudan is ranked first, followed by Cameroon and Burundi. In fact, almost 80 percent of South Sudan’s population faces some kind of food insecurity, and over 65 percent of Cameroon’s does. That there is a link between conflict in Africa, which is virtually all internal, and food insecurity is intuitively obvious. But the link is sometimes overlooked by commentators and policy makers. The Africa Center has done a service by showing explicitly the link in a user-friendly way.  The Africa Center for Strategic Studies is an institution that is part of the U.S. Department of Defense and is located at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. Its focus is on African security issues. It provides a forum for American and other military and civilian personnel to exchange ideas, research, and training. It also sends out a daily and highly useful survey of top media stories related to African security. It can be accessed here.  

With much of the world’s attention fixated on climate change, the Our Ocean conference is a great opportunity to address the health of the oceans and garner commitments to save it from the scourges of pollution, overfishing, and transnational crime. 

The absence of a U.S. response to China’s encroachment on Asia’s rivers points to a failure to comprehend the regional implications of increased competition for water resources.

Sub-Saharan Africa is urbanizing at the fastest rate in the world. Western commentators, notably McKinsey in its 2016 report “Lions on the Move II,” see rapid urbanization as increasing the continent’s p roductivity. McKinsey states, “urbanization has a strong correlation with the rate of real GDP growth,” and that “productivity in cities is more than double that in the countryside.” Other observers, however, question whether urban infrastructure—especially water and education—can meet the needs of an exploding population. The Financial Times recently published a balanced report on the pros and cons of rapid African urbanization. It focuses on Bamako, Mali, as an example of the continent-wide phenomenon. It cites a World Bank estimate that Bamako’s population today, at 3.5 million, is 10 times larger than it was at independence in 1960. A professor at the University of Bamako comments that that the city’s growth is a “catastrophe foretold,” that “Bamako is a time-bomb.” Among other shortcomings, the professor notes that the city lacks a land registry even as real estate booms. The exploding population growth translates into high land prices that encourage corruption. Peppered through the Financial Times piece are arresting statistical notes. For example, a World Bank economist observes that Africa is now 40 percent urban with a per capita GDP of $1,100. By the time Asia reached that level of urbanization, its per capita GDP was $3,500. Statistics about Africa are generally weak, but for frequent travelers to Africa, the explosion of the urban population is obvious. So, too, are the slums, the lack of schools, water shortages, and unpaved roads. Unemployed male youth are ubiquitous and do, indeed, constitute a potential time bomb with respect to political instability. Experience shows that urbanization cannot be reversed, as few residents are willing to return to the countryside unless compelled to do so, as occurred in Chairman Mao’s China or Pol Pot’s Cambodia. But no African state has comparable means of repression should it wish to reduce its urban population. African urbanization will continue and public authorities having few tools with which to manage it.   

A devastating drought that has placed severe restrictions on water usage in South Africa—particularly in the Western Cape province, its capital Cape Town, and the neighboring Northern Cape—has captured U.S. attention. There are several reasons for this, among them the fact that Americans are more familiar with South Africa than with other parts of Africa due to tourism as well as business and cultural links. The drought also is evidence of the deleterious effects of climate change. With regard to climate change, Cape Town is almost a dress rehearsal for what rapidly growing American cities in the Sun Belt, such as Los Angeles or Phoenix, could face in the future. In 2017, Western Cape Premier Helen Zille declared her province a disaster area because of the drought. In March, the ruling African National Congress’ minister for cooperative governance, Zweli Mkhize, declared a national state of emergency. However, with the arrival of winter rains, Mkhize decided not to renew the state of emergency when it expired on June 13. The weather is finally improving. In May, South Africa’s late autumn, more cold fronts than usual pushed across the Western Cape, bringing rain. The South African Weather Service expects “slightly above normal” rainfall this winter season. Water levels in dams around Cape Town are also improving. In early June they were at 32.1 percent of normal capacity, compared to 29.8 percent the week before and 20.9 percent a year earlier. The largest dam in Western Cape, Theewaterskloof, is at 21.5 percent of capacity. Weather experts caution that the welcome rain has not officially broken the long drought. According to the National Drought Coordinating Committee, however, the acute phase of the drought in Western, Eastern, and Northern Cape has ended. It suggested the region is now entering a “resilience building” phase, where officials will focus on adapting to water scarcity exacerbated by climate change. Like the Los Angeles and Phoenix metropolitan areas, Cape Town’s population has been growing steadily over the past decade and a half, adding over a million people from 2001 to 2016 to reach just over four million. The city is wealthy, with a per capita income close to $16,000, and there has been improvement in the quality of township housing, albeit from a low base. However, the city’s water use has increased as precipitation levels have decreased—this is the new reality to which Cape Town, and many other cities around the world, will need to build “resilience.”

A historic dry spell has severely affected Cape Town's water supply, and global climate patterns suggest that other cities may face the same fate.

Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia are close to armed conflict over a Nile dam project; so far the United States is ignoring them.

The very tight race between Uhuru Kenyatta and his Jubilee Party and Raila Odinga and the National Super Alliance (NASA) reflects growing food insecurity that, in turn, is the product of drought, which may also be related to climate change. Spring rainfall is down 75 percent from the its five-year average, bringing Kenya’s staple food crop, maize, down 70 percent from its five-year average, according to the UN Food and Agricultural Organization. In response to the drought, food prices are much higher than normal. According to local observers, the price of maize flour is up 50 percent, milk is up 12 percent, and sugar, 21 percent. Food agencies estimate that 2.6 million of 48  million Kenyans are now “food insecure,” with estimates that the number could increase by one million by August. In certain remote areas, food agencies are describing the situation as “one step away from famine.”  The incumbent Kenyatta administration has introduced price controls on maize flour and lifted tariffs on imported maize. The opposition, NASA, sees these steps as too little too late. It is also critical of alleged white-elephant prestige projects, general corruption, and government policies that benefit big farmers and millers, often with close ties to Jubilee. Election Day, August 8, will show the extent to which voter anger at high food prices is directed at the Kenyatta administration. As the incumbent, Kenyatta would normally be the favorite, not least because of the administration’s patronage networks. But that advantage could be undercut by the price of maize.  

This is a guest post by Michael Clyne. Michael is a risk management consultant specializing in Africa. You can follow him on Twitter at: @mikeclyne.  Pirate attacks have returned to the Gulf of Aden, disturbing Somali waters once a hotbed for piracy but which in recent years achieved a remarkable reversal. At least six commercial vessels have been hijacked or attacked in northern Somali waters since March. U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis warned of the new threat during a press conference last week in neighboring Djibouti, where the United States maintains its only semi-permanent military base on the continent. With relatively minor exceptions, the attacks are the region’s first in five years, a lull reached by a combination of international and private security efforts. But that lull eventually became a victim of its own success, with prevention fatiguing after attacks abated. Governments rolled back robust defense operations, eventually relegating them to monitoring and surveillance. Shipping companies followed suit, cutting costs on expensive security guards once hired to arm and defend their vessels. Secretary Mattis’s warning, however, wasn’t aimed at the navies or military policy which once protected Gulf of Aden shipping lanes. Instead, his remarks were in reference to private shipping companies who should pick up the tab, strengthen security, and reconsider arming their vessels. “We want to make sure the industry continues not to be lax,” said General Thomas Waldhauser (head of U.S. Africa Command), as he re-enforced Secretary Mattis’s position. Yet the drivers of piracy are decidedly international. General Waldhauser attributed the re-emergent attacks to the drought parching the Horn of Africa and famine looming over Somalia, just as the war-ravaged nation enters its “lean season.” Before famine, the modus operandi of Somali pirates had been hijackings-for-ransom, with crewmembers held hostage for months – even years – as their captors negotiated lucrative ransoms. However, without the luxury of time, some recent attacks have skipped drawn-out negotiations to loot cargo in a sign of Somalia’s desperation and resource crunch. This is all despite gradual gains in Somali governance and development, with historic February elections inaugurating a new federal government and attracting foreign capital. However, extremist group al-Shabaab still controls most of Somalia’s vast hinterland where it stands to exploit the famine and drive more unemployed youth toward the sea. President Trump has refocused on Somalia, expanding U.S. military authority to strike al-Shabaab, but traditional counterterrorism operations will do little to prevent piracy, whose networks remain generally distinct from al-Shabaab’s, and may even exacerbate the famine and violence piracy thrives in. Another international driver behind Somalia’s piracy is the overfishing and depletion of Somali waters. Last week’s New York Times exposé of China’s outsized impact on seafood resources focused on West Africa, where China's deep-sea vessels now catch most of their fish. But that’s because a global free-for-all already depleted Somalia’s waters, where corrupt governments continue selling off what’s left. Somalis arrested for piracy often say they are actually fishermen forced to enter shipping lanes from depleted coastal waters. That is rarely true – fishing doesn’t require the AK-47s suspects are caught with – but their excuses do reveal the international dilemma at the heart of piracy. General Waldhauser indicated that he is not ready to conclude that Somali piracy is trending back. But with famine and drought exacerbating its drivers amid a vacuum of deterrence, solutions could be as complex as the problem, requiring a return to international and private measures.