Iran’s President Signaled Interest in Engagement at the UN. Does It Matter?

Ray Takeyh is Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

In his first speech to the UN General Assembly, Pezeshkian signaled interest in engaging with other nations on Iran’s nuclear program. Did he mark anything new for Iranian policy in his UN address?

The speech had contradictory elements. It began with a stern denunciation of Israel and blamed the country for all that has gone wrong in the Middle East since October 7. The speech also indicated his desire to resume nuclear talks with the United States as a means of obtaining sanctions relief, which is not a new position for the regime.

But it’s worth noting the central audience for his speech was European leaders, especially the “EU-3” countries involved in negotiating the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Pezeshkian met with French President Emmanuel Macron on the sidelines of the UN debate. His new government is eager to improve ties with the European states and recognizes that lack of progress on the nuclear issue has been an obstacle to that. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who has ultimate decision-making power, also has spoken in favor of resuming the nuclear deal under the right conditions. (The office of presidency is subordinate to that of the Supreme Leader, who possesses the ultimate decision making power.)

How could Iran demonstrate seriousness about nuclear cooperation?

UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi said after meeting Iran’s foreign minister in New York that he saw a new willingness on Iran’s part for meaningful discussions on its nuclear program. Grossi has made many trips to Iran and at times even negotiated various work plans. None of those trips and plans have yielded the desired transparency about Iranian enrichment activities. It is possible that the new regime will offer the inspectors improved access to various facilities. But Iran is still enriching uranium to about 60 percent—which has no real civilian use—a level that raises concerns because the material can be quickly enriched to nuclear weapons grade. These issues can only be resolved as part of a new nuclear accord and not a bilateral breakthrough between the IAEA and Iran.

Is there still a threat of direct Iran-Israel conflict or is the ongoing fighting likely to remain mostly between its proxy Hezbollah and Israel?

At the United Nations meetings, Pezeshkian scorned Israel while saying Iran does not want to see a regionwide conflict, a stance the Islamic Republic has long maintained. Yet, it is dedicated to the so-called rings of fire strategy whereby its proxies—for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen—surround and harass its enemies. Any conflict in Lebanon has a risk of escalating to encompass Iran. Last spring, for instance, tensions sharply escalated, and Iran launched missiles and other projectiles at Israel for the first time, though they were intercepted by air defenses.

What are the prospects for ramped up diplomacy in calming Iran-Israel tensions?

It will be difficult for the Pezeshkian government to have any diplomatic outreach to Israel. His reported comment that if Israel lays down its arms, Iran will also do so, promoted criticism from the conservative press in Iran. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi even denied that the comment was made. The new government may have more diplomatic room with the United States, but likely not Israel.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.