Oil and Petroleum Products

  • Trade
    Are Trade Wars Bad for U.S. Energy Dominance?
    Years ago, Wanda Jablonski, the famous energy journalist and newsletter publisher, gave me an important piece of professional advice. Be careful how many conflicts you take on at one time.  Wanda’s admonition was intended to instruct me about how to be effective within the complex oil politics of the Middle East. But lately, I have been reminded of her wise counsel as I read the news. The Trump administration should heed her words in deliberating on the vast array of trade and oil sanctions issues that need to be considered by the White House. While it is true that chances are any individual policy that could affect oil and gas trade can be accommodated easily by markets, it could be a different calculation to impose multiple policies all at once. Oil markets are watching closely all of the various energy related trade and sanctions policies on the table. Right now, any tightening of oil sanctions against Iran are viewed as the most impactful upside market risk, with the U.S.-China trade war swinging sentiment in the opposite direction.    U.S. oil and gas exports are on the rise and that has been good for the United States geopolitically. U.S. energy exports help promote American influence while at the same time reducing the U.S. trade deficit. So far this year, U.S. energy exports have exceeded expectations and that is paving the way for some beneficial outcomes. Besides serving as a bulwark against Russian manipulation and Mideast supply disruptions, greater availability of U.S. oil and gas could make it easier to convince European countries they can afford to agree to renewed sanctions on Iran. They also up the pressure on Russia’s oligarchs by potentially shrinking the pie they have to split. One could even argue that rising U.S. shale production is playing a role in convincing Saudi Arabia’s new leaders to institute needed social and economic reforms by creating uncertainty about long run oil prices. In another example, high U.S. oil refinery exports are replacing lost Venezuelan refined products. This could pave the way for United States regional diplomacy, should it make greater efforts, to gain more support within the Organization of American States (OAS) to isolate the Maduro government, which is no longer in a position to provide finance or free oil to Caribbean and Central American countries. Right now, OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro has expressed support for a case against Venezuela’s leader Nicolas Maduro for “crimes against humanity” before the international criminal court in the Hague. Perhaps in time, as the lingering effect of Venezuela’s defunct Petrocaribe oil aid program fades however, OAS could be able to reach a majority decision to declare foul on Venezuela’s actions to dismantle its democracy and thereby strengthen diplomatic pressure on Caracas.  The United States should add stronger diplomatic effort in this direction, before it resorts to unilateral oil sanctions on Venezuela. Banning sales of U.S. tight oil to Venezuela should be used as a last resort measure only. That’s because the whole concept of U.S. energy “dominance” is based on the diplomatic gain that comes from the U.S. reputation as a pivotal free market oil and gas supplier that would never cut off another nation. Albeit Venezuela could be considered a situation that is sui generis given the humanitarian suffering of the Venezuelan people, but some international backing from OAS or the United Nations would give the United States better standing with other buyers for imposing restrictions on U.S. tight oil exports to Caracas. The United States is well positioned to leverage that fact that U.S. exports of refined products are supplying Latin America and the Caribbean in the face of the decimation of the Venezuelan refining industry, which was rumored last month to be about to indefinitely shutter three of the country’s four largest refinery complexes.      In addition to mooting sanctions against Venezuela, the United States is due in May to decide whether to take steps that would effectively re-impose oil sanctions against Iran. During his visit to Washington, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman lobbied the Trump administration to reopen the Iranian nuclear deal and pressure Iran for better terms that would ensure Iran never obtains nuclear weapons, rather than the announced terms which reduces the number of Iran’s centrifuges and limit the level of uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent, far below weapons grade, for 15 years. Under the deal, Iran is tasked to remove the core of its heavy-water reactor at Arak, capable of producing spent fuel that can yield plutonium. The Saudi crown prince told the New York Times that “Delaying it and watching them getting that bomb, that means you are waiting for the bullet to reach your head.” Last month, European leaders were sounding out the possibility that fresh sanctions be imposed on Iran aimed to moderate the country’s ballistic missile program and its role in regional conflicts in a manner they hope would maintain the Iran nuclear deal. Saudi Arabia is likely to oppose that approach and the Saudi diplomatic strategy regarding Iran could press the kingdom to offer to replace Iranian oil that would be lost to buyers during any re-imposition of oil sanctions against Iran. Iran has had increased difficulty marketing its oil in recent weeks, offering additional discounts to sway buyers who are worried about the effects of future sanctions policy. European companies are considering contingency plans, and Japan reportedly curtailed its oil imports from Iran in March.  Any U.S. moves on Iran will have to be taken in the context of the desire to take similar moves against Venezuela, which like Iran exports heavy crude oil (in contrast with rising U.S. production, which is of a different lighter quality). The U.S. strategic petroleum reserve has some heavy crude oil stored in its caverns. Worst comes to worst, a loan to a particular U.S. refiner hard hit by sanctions could be made.  The U.S.-China trade negotiations are yet another backdrop to U.S. energy issues to consider. As a recent Citi brief to clients notes on the latter, it is “clear that energy specific trade with China continues to improve in the U.S. favor.” The bank’s rough estimate is that the U.S.-China net oil export balance rose from +$2.8 billion in 2016 to +$8.2 billion last year and could reach $11 billion in 2018 if January trends can be sustained. This trade has implications for the direction of the U.S.-China trade balance that will need to be kept in mind by the Trump trade team.  But the complexities go beyond oil, U.S. exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) are also finding a profitable opportunity window in the global market based on higher than anticipated demand from China, South Korea, and Taiwan, aided by economic growth and new policies aimed to reduce coal use and fight air pollution across Asia.  As it accelerated its policies to promote coal-to-gas switching, China’s LNG imports rose almost 50 percent in 2017 and have continued to be strong this winter, including purchases of six cargoes via the U.S. LNG export terminal at Sabine Pass. South Korea surpassed Mexico as the largest buyer of U.S. LNG in the first quarter of 2018, and a boost in the long run appetite from South Korea for LNG is expected, given President Moon Jae-in’s pledge to curb use of coal and nuclear in favor of cleaner, cheaper renewables and natural gas.  In other words, growing U.S. LNG exports intersect with several ongoing trade negotiations, namely with China, Mexico, and South Korea. S&P Global Platts is forecasting U.S. LNG exports to increase by 8.1 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) by 2020 and another 4.9 bcf/d by 2025, a factor that needs to be considered in trade negotiations. Sales to Mexico are particularly important for the Permian Basin, where excess natural gas is already being flared at high levels.    China’s threat to impose a 25 percent additional tariff on U.S. propane (which is an important component of the liquefied petroleum gas or LPG used in Asia as a residential heating and cooking fuel and as a feedstock to China’s growing petrochemical industry) won’t affect U.S. propane producers all that much. That’s because the largely fungible commodity will be sold elsewhere, with rising supply from Iran and Australia likely to replace the U.S. LPG in China, along with other Middle East supplies. As that shift takes place, U.S. sellers will shift to non-Chinese buyers.  The bottom line is that markets will likely still rebalance in the wake of turmoil created in the coming weeks from any disruptive new trade and sanctions policies, leaving it a little less clear whether prices are facing headwinds or tailwinds. For U.S. energy dominance, it could also be a mixed bag, with commercial availability of U.S. oil and gas only part of the equation. As the upcoming events could show, even fully free market oriented production can face a geopolitical context in a world in disarray.    
  • Saudi Arabia
    Thirty Years of U.S. Arms Sales to Middle East Endogenous to Unstable Oil Prices, Research Shows
    As the White House hosts Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman today, policy makers need to be reminded that any new arms sales across the Middle East could become part of a repeating pernicious cycle that could lay the seeds to the next big oil crisis. That’s an important conclusion of my new economics and policy paper published today with co-author Rice economics professor Mahmoud El-Gamal in the academic journal Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy (EEEP). Bin Salman kicked off the preliminary public relations for his current trip with an important and serious interview aired on the American TV news magazine 60 Minutes, in which he noted “Saudi Arabia doesn’t want to own a nuclear bomb. But without a doubt, if Iran develops a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” While Saudi Arabia and the United States share a common view that Iran is a destabilizing force the region, the United States has been resistant to Saudi lobbying that standards for a U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal should not ban enrichment of uranium. Westinghouse and a consortium of U.S. companies are discussing a bid for the multi-billion tender to build civilian nuclear reactors in the kingdom in competition with China. Coincidentally, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) tweeted today that the United States needs to “modernize our nuclear weapons arsenal, continue to address the environmental legacy that the Cold War programs, further advance domestic energy production, better protect our energy infrastructure, and accelerate our exascale computing capacity,” noting that nuclear deterrence is a core part of the DOE mission.” In our EEEP article, we argue that geopolitical events that are often considered exogenous to the debt-driven financial boom and bust global economic cycle are part of an endogenous and self-perpetuating meta-cycle, linked by high petrodollar recycling during periods of high oil prices that typically accompany high economic growth periods, like the one seen in the early 2010s. Petrodollar recycling takes many forms, including rising military spending and buildups. El-Gamal offers a theoretical model that explains why an oil exporting country could be “incentivized” to time its military activism during periods of oil price slumps, with the coincident effect of boosting national revenues, thus converting military capital into civilian capital. A significant part of Arab countries’ military equipment (and Russia’s) used in recent conflicts was accumulated during oil boom years following the Iraqi invasion (2003-2007) and during the Arab Spring uprising (2011-2013). Last year escalations in conflict across the Middle East from Yemen to Northern Iraq helped raise the price of oil on the heels of the major down cycle of 2014-2015. The paper using discrete wavelet analysis of oil production at the country level to demonstrate that military conflicts that destroy production installations or disrupt oil transportation networks are the “most significant antecedents of sustained long term disruptions in oil supply.” The paper recommends that “rather than increase arms sales as rentier states seek to externalize their problems, major economies such as the United States, China, Japan and Europe multilaterally and through international agencies should encourage the acceleration of economic reforms such as those proposed by the Saudi Crown Prince. Forty years of military buildups have failed to bring peace and economic prosperity to the Middle East. While it is unlikely that the Middle East oil exporters will intentionally escalate regional proxy wars in a manner that leads to the destruction of oil facilities, the nature of war can be irrational and unpredictable, hence explaining the return of the geopolitical risk premium to the price of oil. The hedge fund community, which trades in oil, has so far appeared relatively unconvinced by announcement of economic reforms in Saudi Arabia. It has also been skeptical of the success of the Iranian nuclear deal. Meanwhile, the oil industries of Syria and Yemen have been decimated by recent geopolitical conflicts. A similar fate befell Iraq and Iran during their eight-year war, our research shows. In light of this self-perpetuating cycle, industrialized governments would benefit from revisiting coordination mechanisms for use of strategic stocks, including discussions with Saudi officials currently visiting for how the United States could respond (in conjunction with Saudi Arabia?) to further deterioration of Venezuela’s oil industry. The United States imported just over 500,000 barrels per day (b/d) of Saudi crude oil last fall, the lowest level since May 1987 and down from 1.5 million b/d a decade ago. The kingdom is now the fourth supplier after Canada, Mexico and Iraq. The drop reflects more than rising U.S. production since Saudi Arabia and Venezuela supply a heavier grade of crude oil used by coker units that economically upgrade poorer quality crudes into light products like naphtha and gasoil. Rising tight oil production is a lighter grade of crude oil less desirable for coker units of the U.S. gulf coast. In years past, the U.S.-Saudi security partnership has included coordination of responses to sudden changes in global oil supply, including strategies that involved targeting Russia when lower oil prices were needed to send a firm message of geopolitical deterrence. The question is with the current Saudi-Russian oil bromance and the United States itself now an oil exporter, is this critical element to the U.S.-Saudi relationship still viable?
  • Saudi Arabia
    IPO Politics and the Saudi U.S. Visit
    This post is co-written by Jareer Elass, an energy analyst who has covered the Gulf and OPEC for 25 years. He is a regular contributor to the Arab Weekly. This week, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman begins his two-and-a-half week-long visit to the United States—including a March 20 White House meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. Top of the Saudi agenda will be to further cement close political ties between the three-year-old regime of Saudi King Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud and the Trump administration. That could be harder than it looks if President Trump brings up a request for Saudi Arabian financial support in Syria. Russia has also been publicly out hat in hand to the EU on Syria while behind the scenes trying to shake down Saudi money for Syria as part of its oil collaboration with Riyadh. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to support any peace process on Syria that sustains strong Iranian influence. Beyond the geopolitical, the crown prince is focused on the Saudi economy and wants to bring American business to Saudi Arabia. Regardless of how these complex topics play out, there’s no doubt that the young Saudi leader will have to be in public relations mode. Crown Prince Mohammed has already kicked off his trip with a long interview aired on the American TV news magazine 60 Minutes, in which he controversially indicated Saudi Arabia’s willingness to enter the nuclear arms race alongside chief rival Iran. The subject will be a tricky one: while Saudi Arabia and the United States share a common view that Iran is a destabilizing force in the region, the U.S. has been resistant to Saudi lobbying that standards for a U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal should allow either reprocessing spent fuel or enrichment of uranium. Washington Post columnist David Ignatius’s suggestion that Saudi Arabia try to cozy up to the United States by suspending its oil deal with the Russians to punish Russian leader Vladimir Putin for a recent string of unacceptable actions is also fraught with peril. That's because Putin could similarly be thinking that falling oil prices would hurt Saudi Arabia’s stability more than his own. The kingdom is vulnerable on the oil price front both due to domestic economic pressures and to lofty oil price levels needed to support the Aramco IPO valuation process. Analysts calculate that a sustained oil price around $70 a barrel is needed for the kingdom to hit valuation targets for the IPO consistent with the $2 trillion valuation used in announcing the plan. Raising the stakes, the Saudi crown prince’s visit to the United States follows a similar tour recently led by the Saudi foreign minister that failed to convince potential American investors that the current and future political climate in the kingdom is not a risky one. The tepid response from U.S. institutional investors during the road show makes the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) increasingly unlikely to be favored as a final choice for the foreign bourse to be selected by the Saudi regime for the Aramco IPO. It has also made the timing of the listing murkier, thereby lengthening the time line for how long Saudi Arabia could need its cooperative oil arrangement with Russia to last. The Saudi case for the durability of its own political stability was shaken by reports in the New York Times last week of the Saudi government using “coercion” to wrangle billions of dollars’ worth of assets from targeted prominent Saudis, including members of the royal family. The report made clear that the campaign of intimidation against individuals who have been singled out for their alleged corruption is continuing, raising questions about the Saudi government’s end game. There have been several constants in what the Saudi government has said over the last two years about its intent to sell a stake in Saudi Aramco. When the IPO was first announced, it was said to involve a sale of up to 5 percent of the state firm, with a listing on the Saudi stock exchange as well as on one or more foreign bourses. According to the crown prince, Saudi Aramco’s valuation could be appraised at more than $2 trillion, with the Saudi government collecting as much as $100 billion from the limited sale. The Saudi regime has grappled with choosing an appropriate foreign listing from the outset amid concerns about the leading exchanges under contention—the NYSE and the London Stock Exchange (LSE)—and the fact that the stated valuation of 5 percent of Saudi Aramco could be hard to achieve. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has estimated that an average $70 a barrel is what the kingdom would need to balance its 2018 budget, though it has endorsed the kingdom’s decision to delay achieving a balanced budget until 2023 in an effort to avoid economic damage as Riyadh slows its pace on implementing fiscal reforms. Industry experts have been skeptical of the official projected valuation of the state oil firm, and indeed, by some accounts, the math doesn’t appear to work in Saudi Arabia’s favor, unless oil prices rise significantly and other criteria are met. Moreover, the kingdom’s new $70 a barrel price goal, which seems linked to the Saudi IPO conundrum, has divided members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), some of whom have been saying too high a rise in oil prices could be deleterious to OPEC’s future. Iran has publicly stated its preference for prices at around $60 a barrel because it believes that $70 could backfire on the group, prompting U.S. shale companies to bump up their output and a long run weakening of demand for oil, resulting in an uncontrolled collapse in future oil prices. The crown prince’s London visit has fueled rising speculation in recent months that the IPO would be delayed beyond 2018. Oil Minister Khalid Al-Falih in a March 8 interview referred to a 2018 deadline for conducting the IPO as an “artificial deadline”, noting that the “anchor market will be the Tadawul exchange” but emphasized that the kingdom has the necessary fiscal and regulatory framework in place for Saudi Aramco to be listed this year. Falih has also suggested that his government saw major issues associated with choosing the NYSE for a foreign listing of Saudi Aramco shares, saying that “…litigation and liability are a big concern in the U.S. Quite frankly, Saudi Aramco is too big and too important for the Kingdom to be subjected to that kind of risk” While Falih pointed to New York City’s decision earlier this year to sue five major oil firms over the “existential threat of climate change” as a concern, the Saudi government is equally worried about the ability of families of 9/11 victims to sue the Saudi government under the “Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism” Act that was passed by the U.S. Congress in September 2016. During his London trip, the Saudi oil minister praised the LSE, saying that, “The London stock exchange is one of the best in the world, it is well-regulated and we respect it.” But, floating Saudi Aramco shares on the LSE is not without controversy. The U.K.’s chief financial regulatory body came under fire in the spring of 2017 when it recommended easing LSE rules to allow state-owned companies like Saudi Aramco to qualify for premium listing without being subject to the strictest corporate governance rules. The Hong Kong exchange could be a convenient compromise for the Saudi government in its pick for a foreign bourse on which to list Saudi Aramco shares. And then there is also talk of the Saudi government forgoing an IPO entirely and favoring a private sale to strategic investors, or a combination of a listing on the Tadawul and a private sale. This would be beneficial if the Saudi regime believed it was going to fall far short of the $2 trillion valuation and of course, it would free the kingdom from having to be overly transparent about its finances and operations as required by some foreign exchanges. But U.S. officials have argued that a private placement with Chinese firms would not provide many of the structural benefits that come from undertaking a public listing. It would be surprising if the Saudi government failed to float Saudi Aramco shares on the Tadawul, given how the public expects to participate in the IPO and the desire for Riyadh to help build the Saudi exchange into the premier bourse in the region. But, one of the biggest concerns about a Saudi Aramco listing on the Saudi exchange is the lack of liquidity due to the Tadawul’s size. The Saudi exchange is small compared to major foreign bourses—with a market capitalization of around $470 billion and 171 listed companies, a stark contrast to the scale of the NYSE, which has a capitalization of $21 trillion and more than 2,000 listed companies. Tadawul officials have been preparing for the listing and have even recommended the Saudi exchange be the sole bourse for the Saudi Aramco sale. But, there is real concern that the Tadawul will not be able to absorb up to 5 percent of Saudi Aramco shares on offer, and that a large sale could cause much volatility on the domestic exchange, with the potential for investors to shed other company stocks rapidly to raise funds as they buy up Saudi Aramco shares. In fact, according to a recent report from the Energy Intelligence Group, the Saudi regime is reportedly calling on members of the royal family and wealthy Saudi businessmen to commit to injecting new funds into the Tadawul and to purchasing Saudi Aramco shares in a drive to prevent a destabilization of the domestic stock market when the IPO is launched on the local exchange. The Saudi Aramco IPO is the linchpin of the crown prince’s ambitious economic revamping program known as Saudi Vision 2030. Proceeds from the sale are to be directed to the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund, which in turn will make investments designed to move the kingdom away from being an oil-driven economy. Though the Saudi regime has made progress on some economic reforms, the Saudi Vision 2030’s agenda to fundamentally transform the kingdom’s economy greatly depends upon the success of the limited sale of Saudi Aramco. That has injected a certain level of inflexibility into the kingdom’s oil policy that makes any talk of Saudi oil cooperation with the United States against Russia a lower probability course of action than it was in the past.
  • Energy and Climate Policy
    Why Fuel Economy Standards Matter to U.S. Energy Dominance
    During last week’s international energy industry gathering in Houston, CERA Week, U.S. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry introduced a new buzzword for the Trump administration’s energy policy: “energy realism.” 
  • Nigeria
    An $80 Million Yacht, a $50 Million Apartment, and Nigeria’s Former Oil Minister
    Laundering money by purchasing real estate in foreign countries is an old song. The wealthiest parts of London and New York are filled with expensive houses and apartments, respectively, that are apparently unoccupied by their foreign owners most of the time. Mayfair and Belgravia in London and midtown Manhattan are especially popular. In Manhattan, One57, located at 157 West 57th Street, is one of the most notorious of the supertalls, apartment houses more than one thousand feet high. It includes the most expensive apartment ever sold in New York, at a price of $100.5 million in 2014. New York law makes it easy for purchasers of expensive real estate to be anonymous, making properties in the city attractive to foreigners living in unstable countries who wish to protect or launder their assets. Kolawole Akanni Aluko, a former executive director of Atlantic Energy, was the owner of a 6,240-square foot apartment on the 79th floor of One57 that he reportedly purchased for just over $50 million. The formal owner, apparently, was a shell company that he controlled. As collateral for a mortgage, Aluko used his $80 million yacht, which he reportedly rented to rapper Jay-Z and singer Beyoncé at a rate of $900,000 per week. Subsequently, he defaulted on a mortgage of $35.3 million to a Luxembourg bank. In foreclosure, the apartment was sold at auction in 2017 for $36 million, a decline of 29 percent in the purchase price. Aluko and others are under investigation in Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the United States for, among other things, bribing the Nigerian oil minister at the time, Diezani Alison-Madueke, for lucrative government contracts. Alison-Madueke is also under investigation. Aluko has reportedly disappeared on his yacht and is thought to be somewhere in the Caribbean. For its part, the U.S. Department of Justice has filed a civil complaint seeking the forfeiture and recovery of $144 million in assets related to the alleged bribery of Alison-Madueke by Aluko and others. Oil and gas are the property of the Nigerian state. They are exploited through joint ventures and agreements between the state and oil companies. Oil production is normally about two million barrels per day. Yet more than half of Nigeria’s population lives in poverty. Popular resentment at corruption of the magnitude alleged with respect to Aluko was an important factor in the presidential victory of Muhammadu Buhari in 2015, and drives his anti-corruption campaign. For more insight into One57, see this article by the New York Times that chronicles a reporter’s over-night stay.   
  • Energy and Climate Policy
    OPEC’s Venezuela Dilemma and U.S. Energy Policy
    As senior officials from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) gather in Houston for the international industry gathering CERA Week, they will be listening carefully to speeches by the CEOs of the largest U.S. independent oil companies about the prospects for the rise in U.S. production in 2018 and 2019. Likely, they won’t like what they hear. U.S. industry leaders are saying U.S. shale production could add another one million barrels per day (b/d) or more on top of already substantial increases, if oil prices remain stable. Best C-suite guesses from Texas are that a sustained $50 to $60 oil price could result in a fifteen million b/d mark for U.S. production in the 2020s, up from ten million b/d currently. U.S. shale’s capacity to surprise to the upside is likely to leave OPEC producers with some soul searching to do as they consider their strategy for the second half of the year and beyond. OPEC has received some unexpected help to make space for rising Iraqi and U.S. oil exports from the sudden collapse of Venezuela’s oil industry where workers, faint from lack of food, are abandoning their posts to emigrate or worse to sell stolen pipes and wires to make ends meet for their families. Energy Intelligence Group is reporting this week that Venezuela’s oil production has fallen to 1.4 million b/d last month, down from 1.8 million b/d just last autumn. But ironically, a further collapse of Venezuela’s oil industry could make OPEC’s deliberations harder, not easier, if it ruptures the conviction of the current output reduction sharing coalition. If too many Venezuelan oil workers abandon their posts at once out of desperation, the country’s fate could more closely mirror Iran in 1979 when a crippling oil worker’s strike brought Iranian oil exports to zero and rendered the Shah’s rule untenable. The U.S. also continues to mull additional sanctions against Venezuela, including oil trade related restrictions, to pressure Caracas to restore democratic processes inside its borders. Trading with state owned PDVSA is becoming more difficult but Venezuela has been using U.S. tight oil as a diluent for its heavy oil. Historically, during many past oil disruptions, OPEC’s Arab members like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have increased exports to prevent oil prices from skyrocketing. Kuwait especially is likely to argue that will be necessary to keep oil prices from going too high since it is keenly aware that the high prices of the early 2010s were exactly what stimulated the very U.S. shale oil investment and energy efficiency technologies that are plaguing the long run outlook for OPEC oil today. Studies on how digitization of mobility can eliminate oil use has led many organizations, including some large oil companies, to speculate that oil demand could peak sometime after 2030. The argument that the OPEC cuts need to be abandoned sooner rather than later could also sit well with Russia’s oil oligarchs who have been unhappy to see continued cooperation with OPEC that has left some one to two million b/d of potential Russian projects on hold. But Saudi Arabia could worry that a premature relaxing of the “super” OPEC coalition agreement could bring prices lower than the $70 it is targeting to keep its domestic spending on track and to position state oil firm Saudi Aramco for a successful five percent initial public offering (IPO) sale. It has been seeking a long lasting condominium with Russia to prevent a return to destabilizing competition for market share. Expanding U.S. exports have eaten away at Mideast sales to Asia. Russia is also looking to sell more oil and gas eastwards. All this leaves OPEC (and its partnership with Russia) in a quandary. Traditionally, OPEC’s Gulf cooperation council members, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have made extra investments to carry spare capacity to respond to sudden supply shocks and/or to punish usurpers who could challenge OPEC for market share. But in the age of U.S. oil abundance, OPEC’s Gulf members are questioning whether this approach continues to make sense. In a world where peak oil demand is being mooted, will “the shareholder” (eg ruling royal governments) order national oil companies to spend billions of dollars to develop new spare capacity, even if it could not be needed? But if producers fail to make those investments and oil prices ratchet up to extremely lofty levels, can that propel a faster acceleration to low carbon electric cars, shared mobility services, and oil saving devices, hurting those very same oil producers even more harshly in the long run? China is clearly positioning itself to take advantage of such an eventuality with a multi-trillion dollar industrial export policy for renewables and clean tech of its own making. The overall uncertain situation has led to some incoherent commentary by OPEC leaders. On the one hand, some leaders talk about the global oil field three percent decline rate in near hysterical terms as potentially leading to an epic supply crisis in the coming years. They cite this risk as a reason to keep oil prices high. On the other hand, even as they sound that alarm, they are not willing to bet with their own pocketbooks on making major investments to plug that supposed hole. The alternative option for OPEC to restart the price war seems equally toothless, especially if those flooding the market do not appear to be able to survive the sustained revenue drop to make it an effective threat. Citi projects that even with expected declines in production in certain non-OPEC producing countries, continued increases from Brazil, Canada, Africa, and global natural gas liquids will overwhelm losses elsewhere, even without a higher than expected contribution from U.S. shale, assuming geopolitical events don’t create an unexpected cutoff of a major producer. It is in this context of confusion that the United States needs to consider the dangers of altering a suite of energy policies that are working. The United States is well positioned to supply individual U.S. refiners with heavy crude from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), should it find that new sanctions or internal strife means those refiners have to abandon Venezuelan heavy oil imports. In other words, the SPR is not superfluous. Corporate efficiency standards for U.S. cars help constrain U.S. domestic oil use, freeing up U.S. refined products and crude oil for export and enhancing the role of U.S. energy production to constrain OPEC and Russian market power. Free trade agreements with Canada and Mexico are ensuring a strong nearby pipeline market for rising U.S. surpluses of natural gas. U.S. assistance for its clean tech industry prevents China from monopolizing benefits that can come to an economy when higher oil prices prompt countries to shift more quickly to energy saving technologies and renewable energy. The Trump administration needs to slow down in busting with tradition when it comes to energy. Some of the tried and true policies of the past are contributing to this administration’s mantra of energy dominance. They need to focus on the old saying “If it ain’t broken, don’t fix it.”
  • China
    China’s Coming Challenge to the U.S. Petro-Economy
    U.S. oil production is set to surpass its all-time record monthly high (first set in 1970), and U.S. liquefied natural gas exports are roaring ahead, with 800 billion cubic feet already shipped since 2016. The U.S. Energy Information Administration is expecting the United States to become a net exporter of natural gas soon. This all bodes well for the Donald J. Trump administration’s aspiration for America to “dominate” global oil and gas markets and will improve the U.S. trade balance. The geographical diversity of the shale revolution across the United States now also partly shields the U.S. economy from the net ill-effects of sudden oil price rises. This stands in contrast to China, which has become the world’s largest oil importer. But could there be too much of a good thing? Rising U.S. oil and gas production is weakening Russia’s ability to use energy as a lever in international discourse and has diminished Iran’s ability to use its oil and gas sector as a diplomatic lure. Energy abundance provides many strategic and economic advantages. But lawmakers and the White House should think twice before focusing too intently on the current U.S. petro-economy. Petro-economies can become overly vulnerable to cyclical changes in commodity prices or worse in the case of Venezuela and Russia. Ask any Alaskan who is studying the possibility of a state budget crisis, petro-linkages are a double-edged sword. The United States needs to stay the course on advancing its digital economy, even if that means reducing demand for oil. Here’s why: China has recognized the strategic detriment of being too oil dependent when the United States is not and it is making a major energy pivot that could position itself to challenge U.S. energy dominance and even U.S. strategic pre-eminence. U.S. policy makers need to recognize this risk and take steps to mitigate it. As I explain in my latest article in Foreign Affairs, it is in the vital U.S. interest to remain in the Paris accord. China is banking on clean energy technologies as major industrial exports that will compete with U.S. and Russian oil and gas and make China the renewable energy and electric vehicle superpower of a future energy world. According to the International Energy Agency, the Chinese public and private sectors will invest more than $6 trillion in low carbon power generation and other clean energy technologies by 2040. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that Beijing has spent as much as $47 billion so far supporting domestic solar panel manufacturing, an effort that allowed China to dominate the panel export market and cratered costs. Chinese investment in battery technology is likely to have a similar effect on battery prices. Later this year, Goldman Sachs is bringing a $2 billion initial public offering to market for Chinese firm CATL that analysts are saying will quickly make the company the dominant battery manufacturer in the world. China is also betting big on electric vehicles, with BYD now the largest producer of electric vehicles in the world and another half dozen Chinese firms in the top twenty. Over a hundred Chinese companies currently make electric cars and buses. What’s more, China is hoping to bring all of its clean energy products to market as part of its $1.4 trillion Belt and Road Initiative, an infrastructure program designed to expand Beijing’s influence throughout Asia. To accomplish this, China is also working to dominate the financing of clean tech and renewable energy, opening the world’s largest carbon market and encouraging its major banks, including the People’s Bank of China, to promote and underwrite green bonds. China’s goal is not just to reduce its own dependence on foreign oil and gas. It hopes to use its clean energy exports to challenge the United States’ leading role in many regional alliances and trading relationships as well as to fashion an international order more to its interests. Its clean energy pivot is providing a platform for Beijing to court countries in Europe, Central Asia, and Asia with offers of cheap finance, advanced energy and transportation infrastructure, and solutions to pollution and energy insecurity. That raises the question of how the United States will sustain its energy dominance if it abdicates its role in multinational settings that will determine global rulemaking for energy exports and greenhouse gas emissions. Presumably, China intends to fashion a global energy architecture that will favor its interests. At some point down the road, that will not be defending coal use. It will be to sell its clean energy technologies free of tariffs (and possibly aided by subsidies) while European, Chinese, and other nation’s fees on carbon emissions hamper U.S. oil and gas exports. It could also make Chinese, rather than U.S., standards for green finance, energy product labeling, and advanced vehicles the global standard. The take away from this Chinese challenge is that the United States needs to find creative ways to meet its Paris climate accord commitments and continue to develop a substantive technology innovation and climate change policy approach. Washington should consider additional policies to promote private sector investment in clean energy, including allowing renewable energy investors to form master limited partnerships in the same way as their oil and gas compatriots. Washington should also consider new uses for natural gas and bio-methane that can help meet the U.S. emission reduction pledge and stay the course on automobile efficiency standards that contribute to our shrinking oil import bill. During the Cold War, the United States rose to the task of reasserting itself in science when it realized the dire consequences of losing the space race. Meeting the challenge of China’s pivot to clean energy will be no different. The United States needs to work diligently inside and outside the Paris accord framework to fashion trade rules and carbon market systems that will accommodate U.S. oil and gas exports now and lay the groundwork to promote clean energy technologies in the future. A version of this article first appeared as a “Gray Matters” column in the Houston Chronicle.
  • United States
    Mapping Capital Flows Into the U.S. Over the Last Thirty Years
    Up until 2014, the growth in central bank dollar reserves closely mapped to the increase in U.S. net external debt. The past few years have been different: for the first time in a long time, yield-starved private investors in Europe and Japan, not emerging market reserve managers, financed the United States' external deficit. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria’s Formal Economy Looking Up
    Nigeria is recovering from the recession of 2016, when GDP growth fell as oil production dropped due to unrest in the oil patch and the persistently low international oil prices. However, international oil prices have now gone up. In an interview with Bloomberg on January 24, Godwin Emefiele, governor of the central bank of Nigeria, struck an optimistic tone. Emefiele commented, “Things are looking up. Nobody ever thought the price of crude would hit $70 in such a short period of time.” He said that interest rates could be cut during the first half of 2018 as inflation eases. In December 2017, inflation was 15.4 percent, a 20-month low, though still above a target band of 6 to 9 percent.  Oil is central to Nigeria’s formal economy. It generates 90 percent of the country’s export earnings and about 70 percent of total government revenue. Yet it is only about 12 percent of GDP. (For a variety of reasons, economic statistics are indicative rather than definitive, as Morten Jerven has shown.) The budget framework for 2018-2020 presented to parliament is based on a price of $47 per barrel and the production of 2.3 million barrels per day. Economic growth is projected to be 3.5 percent in 2018, 4.5 percent in 2029, and 7 percent in 2020. If international oil prices hold at their present level or increase, and if production levels can be maintained, the economic growth projections are credible. Hostages to fortune are international oil prices, which are largely determined by forces over which Nigeria has little control. While Nigeria ostensibly has more control over security in the oil patch, there is an ongoing, low-level insurgency that has been in effect for years. Nigeria is also entering the 2019 electoral cycle, which is likely to lead to heightened political tensions.
  • Venezuela
    How Much Worse Can it Get for Venezuela’s State Oil Firm PDVSA?
    Venezuela’s latest attempt to raise capital by issuing a cryptocurrency, the petro, linked allegedly to its Orinoco oil reserves is problematical on so many levels, it is hard to know how to comment on it beyond pointing out the U.S. government has already said that trading in the new market could risk exposure to U.S. sanctions. Stopping the cryptocurrency could wind up being the easiest item for the Donald J. Trump administration to address in the steps that Caracas is taking to obviate Venezuela’s state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A’s (PDVSA) creditors. PDVSA is engaging in all kinds of no cash deal making to bypass oil cargo seizures. But the company could face even more difficulty this year as Venezuela’s financial woes have bitten into its capacity to keep its oil fields running. Citibank estimates that Venezuela’s oil production capacity could sink to one million (barrels per day) b/d over the course of 2018, down from 2.8 million b/d in 2015, as its access to credit worsens, sending even more of its facilities into disrepair. International service companies are limiting activities in the country as they take write downs on hundreds of millions of dollars in unpaid fees. Venezuela’s oil fields have a natural decline rate of 25% that requires constant attention to maintain capacity. Finding a soft landing out of the crisis for PDVSA’s U.S. subsidiary Citgo Petroleum could become increasingly complex for the United States as it seeks to manage Venezuela’s deteriorating situation. Washington has placed sanctions on critical members of the Venezuelan government but has been reluctant to take action that could spill over to Citgo’s ability to operate. Citgo operates three of America’s largest oil refineries for a total capacity of 750,000 b/d, including an important regional facility near Chicago. Citgo supplied fifteen billion gallons of gasoline in the United States in 2015. So far, Citgo has been shielded from creditors by its corporate structure. But recently, impatient creditors of state oil company PDVSA are starting to use more aggressive tactics, with one such group trying to seize an oil cargo ship in an attempt to get paid. To avoid such circumstances, PDVSA, which for all intents and purposes can no longer attain bank letters of credit, is “time swapping” ownership of some of the undesignated crude oil cargoes it can muster for export for exchange of later delivery of badly needed fuel and feedstock. The arrangements are designed to discourage creditors from trying to grab oil in international locations because, in effect, the oil is already owned by other parties before it sets sail from Venezuela. Last year, Venezuela shipped about 450,000 b/d to China as part of a repayment of $60 billion in Chinese loans. That is less than half of the oil volume originally anticipated in the payback schedule. In fact, one of the largest lenders, China Development Bank, has been receiving barely enough oil and refined oil products from Venezuela to cover the interest payments on its loans, according to Energy Intelligence Group. China and Russia are still receiving repayments via oil shipments, with some small percentage of the value of the cargoes allegedly getting back to Caracas. Other buyers such as Indian refiners are still seen picking up cargoes on a F.O.B. basis (free on board) that gives immediate ownership on pickup. The question is whether the status quo will prevail or whether Citgo’s operations will be affected as financial problems escalate. The fate of PDVSA’s bonds, which are also in a state of “quasi-default,” are particularly tricky because many diverse parties are laying claim in a manner that could foreclose on Citgo shares. A deal that pledged company stock to bondholders is creating an opening to hasten foreclosure. In another deal, Goldman Sachs purchased $2.8 billion worth of PDVSA bonds at thirty cents on the dollar back in 2017. The thesis behind the Goldman purchase, and most every other credit line extended to PDVSA is that the state firm has valuable assets, some of which are abroad, and giant reserves of oil. Governments come and go but eventually, so the thinking goes, that oil can be turned back into cash. The Venezuela case could test that kind of thesis, with implications for other oil producers trying to go to global markets to turn their oil reserves into cash. The disruption of Venezuela’s oil exports from international trading has been gradual, perhaps somewhat muting its effect to date. The breakdown of the country’s refining system has created openings for U.S. refiners to export increasing volumes of gasoline and diesel to Latin America and elsewhere. To some extent, the drop in its crude oil exports has facilitated the ongoing collaboration between the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and important non-OPEC producers to steady oil prices at higher levels. Higher oil prices are a bit of a help to the Venezuelan regime but with most of its oil having to be sold in barter format, convertible foreign exchange will be increasingly hard to come by, especially if oil field production problems leave it with fewer available barrels to trade. As the financial situation for PDVSA worsens, the oil market effects could widen, especially if it leads to the collapse of Citgo Petroleum. U.S. policy makers should think about whether it’s advisable to develop a contingency plan now for the latter outcome. The Trump administration could consider being pro-active, perhaps offering a crude for products swap open tender for the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) with other U.S. refiners now to create at least a small government buffer stock of refined product that could be directed to Illinois or other affected markets in the spring, should Citgo’s operations get unexpectedly interrupted by financial problems or legal proceedings. Such a plan could ameliorate the effect on U.S. consumers from any sudden event related to Venezuela and give Washington more flexibility to respond to the ongoing crisis inside Venezuela. Should nothing go wrong in the coming weeks, the contingency planning could still be a win-win. The refined product stocks could offer the same protections ahead of next summer’s hurricane season and serve as a test case for how to modernize the SPR to include refined products at no government cash outlay.
  • Iran
    Oil and the Iran Protests
    It doesn’t take much these days to remind oil traders that Middle East geopolitical risk can raise oil prices. Unrest in Iranian cities is the latest case in point. News and video records of major protests in Iran pushed Brent prices to $67 a barrel before analysts started pointing out that the risk to oil supply from the protesters themselves was low. That analysis could be too sanguine. The protests in Iran underscore a rising risk across the Persian Gulf: disgruntled populations are willing to sabotage oil facilities to make themselves heard. Iran has been the site of such attacks of late, especially in the oil rich Khuzestan province known for its Arab separatist movement. In a sign that Iran likely takes the potential for sabotage seriously, an Arab separatist leader who was known to advocate for attacks on oil facilities in Iran was gunned down in Europe recently. Late last year, Bahrain accused Iran of being behind a terrorist attack on a pipeline that brings oil from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain. Saudi Aramco has also boosted security at its offshore oil facilities on its maritime border with Iran. Those fields, including the Marjan oil field that is shared across the border with Iran, are slated for expansion by Aramco. Iran is also increasing production on its side of the field, called Foroozan. Khuzestan province is also home to fields that are important to Iran’s ability to increase its domestic oil production utilizing Chinese investment. Saudi Arabia has accused Iran of being involved in recent missile attacks from Yemen that targeted Riyadh airport and the royal palace. The accuracy of the thesis that Iranian protests won’t spread to oil workers the way they did in late 1978 will depend in large measure on whether Iranian government repression of discontent can be successful in putting down insurgency, as it was in 2009. It is important to remember that the sequence of events that led to the fall of the Shah of Iran took months to unfold. Protests were unrelenting at the end of 1978 and oil workers were eventually motivated by the chaos to deny the military access to fuel to prevent them from killing even more Iranian citizens. As conflict escalated on the streets, oil workers walked off the job, eventually bringing Iranian oil exports to zero. The Iranian government is well aware of this risk. In 2010, in the aftermath of internal instability in 2009, it increased the presence of the revolutionary guard in the oil sector to prevent a repeat of 1979. Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also never seemed to embrace the notion—put forward by reformists—that Iran’s economy would benefit from integration with the global economy. Rather, Khamenei has advocated vociferously that Iran needs to stay the course on an economy of “resistance” where indigenous economic capacities are part of the battlefield and individuals sacrifice personal consumer needs in favor of the commanding heights of the state. That view seems to lend credence to commentary that Iran’s hardliners themselves started the protests initially to weaken reformers by highlighting the failure of the nuclear deal to bring about tangible economic benefits. If reports of protest slogans are correct, the population could be tiring of the hardliner view that it is a higher calling to remain cut off from the global economy to fund the security of Shiite compatriots via wars in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. Rather, like citizens in many places around the world, especially countries with oil, some Iranians are asking why they should make such sacrifices for a government that lacks accountability and is excessively corrupt. Oil markets will be watching carefully to see if the Donald J. Trump administration uses Iran’s repression of its own people as a reason to refuse to issue the waiver to keep the United States from violating the terms of the nuclear deal or if the U.S. president—once again—refuses to recertify Iran’s compliance with the deal, kicking the issue back to a reluctant Congress. Markets will be looking for any signs that U.S. action will make it more difficult for Iran to sell its oil or to raise new oil and gas investments in the Iranian industry. But as tempting as that grandstanding could be, the United States should probably take no hasty actions on this one until it can give the Iranian people a chance to be fully heard. If reports are accurate, Khamenei’s long standing concept that his fellow citizens should continue to sacrifice in a resistance economy to keep the upper hand in regional conflicts could be losing ground. The United States should do nothing to hinder that momentum. Acting out in ways that reconfirm the long standing hardliner story line that the United States will always be an enemy to Iran would be a mistake at this time. Rather, the United States should take a breath and with uncharacteristic patience, do nothing regarding sanctions until it can see if the chips fall in a more favorable place.
  • United States
    Could a U.S.-Russia Oil Showdown be Coming?
    About a year ago, a seasoned U.S. oil leader with deep political connections explained to me that U.S. shale would be out of the woods by 2018. His thesis was straightforward: he thought the U.S. economy would see improved growth under President Trump, pulling up global gross domestic product—and with it, oil demand. That growth would mean Saudi Arabia would be closer to maxed out on its capability to produce oil, no longer a significant threat to U.S. shale. Under this world view, American producers would be able wrest more market share in the future without fear of toppling prices, hence the Trump administration’s optimistic view of U.S. energy “dominance.” At the time, it seemed like a rosy prognostication. I pointed out how easily Russia, armed with a cheap ruble and flexible tax policy, could also increase its own oil output. But 2018 is now around the corner and that conversation now seems somewhat more prophetic. It raises the question: What would it mean for Saudi Arabia and U.S. shale producers if Russia does an about-face and makes a production push. It’s something to watch. Because, while Saudi Arabia might not be technically maxed out, global demand is on the rise and Saudi ability to flood the market to punish challengers is, at least for the moment, greatly reduced. Not only is the kingdom boxed in to supporting higher prices because of domestic economic pressures and its planned initial public offering (IPO) of state oil giant Saudi Aramco, it is also facing long term oil field problems that will not be cheap or easy to fix. Already this year, an unexpected corrosion problem at a significant pipeline at the large Manifa field reduced Saudi spare capacity. Saudi Aramco’s hefty new capital budget reportedly targets increases at three offshore fields by 2022 to replace declining capacity elsewhere but past efforts to expand sustainable production capacity have been a painstaking process, stretching over more than a decade at a cost of tens of billions of dollars. The next tranche will be even more challenging. Regardless of its handicap versus the United States and Russia at adding new producing areas in its oil fields, Saudi Arabia is not yet abdicating its leadership role. It took a pro-active stance towards recent deliberations to extend OPEC-non-OPEC production cuts into 2018. Saudi’s steadfast commitment to the deal was not initially reciprocated by Russia, which was more tentative in public statements leading up to the November OPEC meeting. The cat and mouse process led one seasoned journalist to note Russian President Vladimir Putin has “crowned himself king of OPEC.” The sequence of events prompted questioning whether Russia has finally achieved what four decades of sponsored military proxies failed to do—surreptitiously gaining sway over Saudi oil policy. For its part, Russia’s stated concern about a production cut extension was linked in part to the advantage higher oil prices are giving to U.S. shale producers. Russian oil companies complained to Moscow about their excess of 1.2 million barrels a day (b/d) of new oil field projects they’d like to green light. A Citibank report, “From Russia with Love – A Crude Romance,” suggests that not only do Russia’s largest companies have 300,000 b/d in idled current capacity, they are sitting on some 23 fields that could add substantial new production in the next five years, including 14 fields on state firm Rosneft’s books aggregating 770,000 b/d. Russia also has untapped shale potential. Any Russian increases will come head to head with rising U.S. oil production, which the U.S. Energy Information Administration said last week could hit 10 million b/d in 2018, up 780,000 b/d. Analysts at Cornerstone Macro are similarly bullish on U.S. supply, especially should prices be above $60 a barrel. They project U.S. tight oil production could rise by 960,000 b/d next year (ex-natural gas liquids) and an additional 770,000 b/d in 2019, if prices hold around $60, bringing total U.S. crude oil production above 11 million b/d over the next two years. Increases would be even larger in a $65 oil price environment, Cornerstone Macro suggests. Longer term, the upward potential for U.S. production could be substantially higher than that, with some estimates as high as 20 million b/d. The storyline that lack of access to new funds would force capital discipline and thereby lower production gains, (e.g. focus on profits, not growth), looks increasingly questionable given that oil and gas exploration and production companies have raised more than $60 billion in bond sales so far this year, levels typical of pre-price drop conditions. Unlike past, higher risk efforts, this year’s borrowing is supported by hedging activities. Right now, production disruptions in Venezuela, the U.K., and Iraq are supporting prices in addition to a war premium fueled by raging proxy wars across the Mideast. Traders, shale investors, and even reportedly Saudi Arabia, are betting that continued problems in Caracas, among other locales, will make ample room for U.S. rising production. Longer term, there are more producers in line to increase exports, including Iran, Iraq, Brazil, and Canada, to name a few. But the real geopolitical showdown for market share will likely come down to Russia and the United States: who can bring on new oil fastest? A looming U.S.-Russia oil and gas rivalry has deep geopolitical implications. It works against improvement in bilateral relations and is a delicate security matter for trading partners of both countries. The possible conflict over market share is existential to Russian power. Washington’s energy dominance tack, which recently included an announced gas export deal for Alaska during the Trump visit to Beijing, sounds as threatening to Russian ears as NATO expansion did a decade or more ago. Not only does Russia rely heavily on its energy exports for its statist budget and as a diplomatic lever, but the commanding heights of Putin’s inner circle and his grip on power is intimately inter-linked with Russia’s oil and gas elite. Russian influence and economic health has suffered in the past from orchestrated alliances between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar that targeted Russia’s energy earnings. The threat of rising U.S. oil and gas exports could be one factor encouraging increasingly risky Russian adventurism since doing nothing about it could neutralize a major tool of Russian foreign policy. For now, Russia seems content to collaborate with Saudi Arabia on oil market stability which ironically also suits the current U.S. administration, whose America first jobs message is tied heavily to the economic engine of the shale revolution. But that delicate oil truce rests on the back of Venezuela and its woes, which is making space for everyone. At some later date, if Saudi stability seems vulnerable to continuing proxy wars in the Middle East, Putin may be tempted to see if he can tip the scales further in Russia’s favor, making additional space for his long term export surge and rendering his giant reserves all the more important. This article first appeared as a “Gray Matters” column in the Houston Chronicle.
  • Saudi Arabia
    Oil and a More Muscular Saudi Arabia
    Saudi oil policy is undergoing a significant, yet subtle shift that is likely to have broader, strategic implications. The shift comes in the wake of a perfect storm of complicated existential threats facing Riyadh that have forced its government to accommodate new realities. In effect, for the time being, Saudi Arabia appears to have lost its flexibility on oil price policy and therefore will increasingly have to respond to geopolitical challenges in ways that don’t involve actively using export policy to lower the price of oil. A significant oil price drop now would be inconvenient to Saudi Arabia’s ambitious economic reforms, as well as threaten the success of controversial social reforms. This oil revenue conundrum could drive an already muscular Saudi foreign policy while at the same time, weakening the kingdom’s interest in the inner political dealings of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The threat to flood the oil market with its spare oil production capacity has for decades been a critical Saudi lever to muster oil production discipline and burden sharing within OPEC. OPEC, together with Russia, for now seem willing to consider a rollover of ongoing production cuts based on current improvements in oil prices but typically OPEC output cut discipline weakens over time. It remains unclear how the kingdom would be forced to respond if oil production increases from Iraq and other members to the agreement, not to mention the United States, start to eat at lofty oil prices come next spring. In the past, escalation in regional conflicts with Iran might have been met with policies designed to hurt Tehran via lower oil prices. But the Saudi response to the intercepted missile lobbed by Yemen-based Houthi rebels targeting the airport near the Saudi capital of Riyadh has been more strategic in nature. Riyadh quickly made it clear that the response it had in mind was more direct and militarily oriented, by announcing that the coalition would close access to all land, air, and sea ports to Yemen. The official Saudi Press Agency’s frankly worded statement on the matter noted that “Iran’s role and its direct command of its Houthi proxy in this matter constitutes a clear act of aggression that targets neighboring countries, and threatens peace and security in the region. Therefore, the coalition’s command considers this a blatant act of military aggression by the Iranian regime, and could rise to be considered as an act of war against the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” Ironically, the more robust the kingdom’s military responses over time, the more likely that oil revenues will support the Saudi economy at home. The backdrop to the new Saudi oil price stance begins at home. In a series of recent interviews in late October, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman made clear Saudi Arabia’s commitment to launch an initial public offering (IPO) of 5% of state oil monopoly Saudi Aramco next year and emphasized Saudi Arabia’s continued commitment to stabilize oil markets. Analysts calculate that the kingdom needs an oil price of roughly $60 a barrel for the Aramco IPO to meet acceptable revenues from the share sale. Events inside Saudi Arabia, including the recent arrest of at least eleven senior princes, former and current ministers, and dozens of top businessmen, sent oil prices higher Monday, raising the possibility that OPEC could even set its sights on $70 a barrel. It also created the prospects that any hole in the Saudi budget can be plugged by money seized from those arrested–fortunes estimated to tally in the hundreds of billions to trillions of dollars. A new anti-corruption commission has been empowered to “returns funds to the state treasury” and “register property and assets in the name of the state property.” The Saudi news comes in the wake of oil markets that have become more sensitive to geopolitical events in recent weeks, ever since a referendum on Kurdish independence temporarily disrupted oil exports from the Kirkuk oil field. The threat of a Venezuelan financial default is also weighing on markets. But it is also assumed by analysts and traders alike that an oil price drop would be inconvenient to Saudi Arabia’s ambitious economic reforms, including the Aramco IPO, leaving some speculators to believe they can go long in the oil futures market with impunity. This backdrop is in addition to the U.S. context where the U.S. President has made his commitment to the American domestic energy industry straightforwardly clear, implying yet another compelling incentive for Saudi Arabia to keep oil prices stable. President Donald Trump recently weighed in on the Saudi IPO on Twitter, saying it was important to the United States to float the shares on the New York Stock Exchange. Still, the longer term problem of price versus volume has been a durable, longstanding challenge for Saudi oil strategists over the years. Typically, Saudi declarations that the oil rich kingdom will support oil prices with its own production cuts invites other countries to free ride with extra production of their own. Russia has been a particularly notable free rider off OPEC cuts over the years, for example, promising cuts that tend to dematerialize over time in favor of export boosts. Conversely, Saudi attempts to expand or even protect its market share most often come at the expense of global oil prices. The late Saudi King Fahd removed his famous oil minister Sheikh Zaki Ahmed Yamani when the minister faced a similar delicate dilemma of achieving both a price and volume target. In the mid-1980s, the minister was instructed by the king to change course and end an extended oil price war that had been designed to get Saudi Arabia’s market share back. On some level, today's situation is reminiscent of that historical period. The Saudi IPO could create similar problems since investors will look for assurances that a steady volume of oil sales will reap predictable revenues that are also tied to the level of oil prices. That tension is in addition to other kinds of risks related to political stability in the kingdom and uncertainty about the long term demand for oil. Higher oil prices will invite a rebound in U.S. production at a time when Iraqi and Russian industry might also be poised to expand. That ultimately might be a longer term problem for Saudi Arabia, but one that doesn’t appear to be on the geopolitical radar today.
  • Energy and Climate Policy
    Rebuttal: Oil Subsidies—More Material for Climate Change Than You Might Think
    This post is authored by Peter Erickson, a staff scientist at the Stockholm Environment Institute and a co-author of a new paper in Nature Energy that studies how much of U.S. oil reserves are economical to extract as a result of government subsidies that benefit the oil industry. This post is a response to a previous post, by Varun Sivaram, arguing that federal tax breaks for the oil industry do not, in fact, cause a globally significant increase in greenhouse gas emissions, citing a recent CFR paper authored by Dr. Gilbert Metcalf at Tufts University. Dr. Sivaram’s short response to Mr. Erickson’s rebuttal is included at the bottom of the post. As Congress moves towards tax reform, there is one industry that hasn’t yet come up: oil. While subsidies for renewable energy are often in the cross-hairs of tax discussions, the billions in federal tax subsidies for the oil industry rarely are; indeed, some subsidies are nearing their 100th birthday. And yet, removing oil subsidies would be good not only for taxpayers, but for the climate as well. The lack of attention on petroleum subsidies is not for lack of analysis. Congress’ own Joint Committee on Taxation values the subsidies at more than $2 billion annually.  (Other researchers have put the total much higher.) Just in the last year, two major studies have assessed in detail how these subsidies affect investment returns in the US oil industry. The two analyses—one published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the other in Nature Energy (which I coauthored)—both show the majority of subsidy value goes directly to profits, not to new investment.   That inefficiency—both studies argue—is reason enough for Congress to end the subsidies to the oil industry. But oil subsidies also have another strike against them: oil is a major contributor to climate change. The burning of gasoline, diesel, and other petroleum products is responsible for one-third of global CO2 emissions. That climate impact is one of the reasons the Obama Administration had committed, with other nations in the G7, to end these subsidies by 2025. Both the CFR and Nature Energy analyses arrive at a similar figure as to the net climate impact. As CFR fellow Varun Sivaram notes in a previous post on this blog comparing the two studies, the CFR study finds that subsidy removal would reduce global oil consumption by about half a percent. Our analysis for the Nature Energy study also finds a reduction in global oil consumption of about half a percent. (You won’t find this result in our paper, but it is what our oil market model, described in the online Supplementary Information, implies.) The most critical place where the studies—or rather, authors—differ is how they put this amount of oil in context. (Our study also addresses many more subsidies, and in much more detail, than the CFR study, but that is not the point I wish to address here.) Sivaram refers to the half-percent decrease in global oil consumption as “measly…washed out by the ordinary volatility of oil prices and resulting changes in consumption…the nearly-undetectable change in global oil consumption means that the climate effects of U.S. tax breaks are negligible.” I would argue that this assertion confuses the effect of subsidies on oil consumption with our ability to measure the change. But before I get into it further, let me first describe how much oil and CO2 we are talking about. By the CFR paper’s estimates, removal of US oil subsidies would lead to a drop in global oil consumption of 300,000 to 500,000 barrels per day (corresponding to 0.3% to 0.5% of the global oil market). The sequential effects in their model are shown in the chart below, which I made based on their results. It shows their lower-end case, in which global oil consumption drops by 300,000 barrels per day (bpd). (This case is described in their paper as using EIA’s reference case oil price forecast and an upward-sloping OPEC supply curve.)  In their model, a drop of over 600,000 bpd in US supply from subsidy removal is partially replaced by other sources of U.S., OPEC, and other rest-of-world supply, yielding a net reduction in global consumption of roughly half as much (300,000 bpd, shown in the right column). (This ratio itself is also interesting and important. For each barrel of oil not developed because of subsidies, this case shows a drop in global oil consumption of 0.45 barrels. The CFR study’s other three cases show a drop of 0.51, 0.63, and 0.82 barrels of global consumption for each US barrel left undeveloped.) Each barrel of oil yields, conservatively, about 400 kg of CO2 once burned, per IPCC figures. So, the range of impacts on oil consumption in the CFR study (again, reductions of 300-500k bpd or 110 million to 200 million bbl annually) implies a drop in global CO2 emissions of about 40-70 million tons of CO annually. (The actual emissions decrease from subsidy removal could well be greater, because this estimate doesn’t count other gases released in the course of extracting a barrel of oil, such as methane or other CO2 from energy used on-site). From a policy perspective, 40 to 70 million tons of CO2 is not a trivial (measly) amount. Rather, it is comparable in scale to other U.S. government efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. For example, President Obama’s Climate Action Plan contained a host of high-profile measures that, individually, would have reduced annual (domestic) greenhouse gas emissions by 5 million tons (limits on methane from oil and gas extraction on federal land), 60 million tons (efficiency standards for big trucks), and 200 million tons (efficiency standards for cars). The CFR authors don’t quantify their findings in CO2 terms, however, and Sivaram refers to oil market volatility as a way to discount CFR’s findings on reduced oil consumption, concluding that the effects are “undetectable” and “negligible.” The argument is essentially that because other changes in the oil market are bigger, and can mask the independent effect of subsidy removal, that subsidy removal has no effect on climate change. This line of argument conflates causality, scale and likelihood of impact (which in this case are either all known, or can be estimated) with ability to monitor, detect and attribute changes (which is rarely possible in any case, even for more traditional policies focused on oil consumption). By this logic, almost any climate policy could also be discounted as immaterial, because it is rare to be able to directly observe with confidence both the intended result of a policy and the counterfactual – what would have happened otherwise.  Rather, I would argue that if we are to meet the challenge of global climate change, we’ll need these 40 to 70 million tons of avoided CO2, and many more, even if there is uncertainty about exactly how big the impact will be. Concluding an action represents a small fraction of the climate problem is less a statement about that action than it is about the massive scale of the climate challenge. Indeed, as the Obama White House Council on Environmental Quality stated, such a comparison is “not an appropriate method for characterizing the potential impacts associated with a proposed action… because…[it] does not reveal anything beyond the nature of the climate change challenge itself.” So, I argue that subsidy removal is indeed material for the climate, even by the CFR report’s own math. And as Sivaram also notes, the CO2 emission reductions would multiply as other countries also phase out their subsidies. Lastly, I need to disagree with Sivaram’s statement that our study is “written in a misleading way”. He asserts this because in the Nature Energy article we focus on the entire CO2 emissions from each barrel, rather than apply an oil market economic model as described above that counts only the net, or incremental, global CO2. But the incremental analysis method above is not the only way to describe CO2 emissions. Indeed, comparing the possible CO2 emissions from a particular source to the global remaining carbon budget is a simple and established way to gauge magnitudes, and nicely complements the incremental analysis enabled by oil market models.   As another noted subsidy expert—Ron Steenblik of the OECD—commented separately in Nature Energy, our analytical approach provides an important advance because it enables “researchers to look at the combined effect of many individual subsidies flowing to specific projects and to use project-specific data to gauge eligibility and uptake.” Similar assessments of other countries, and other fossil fuels, would provide an important window on the distortionary impacts of these subsidies and their perverse impacts on global efforts to contain climate change. Sivaram Response to Erickson Rebuttal First of all, I am grateful to Peter Erickson for responding in this way to a blog post I wrote that was critical of his conclusions. His response was graceful and sophisticated—I think I largely agree with it, and he’s pointed out some holes in my post that I want to acknowledge. However, I do still stand by my headline, “No, Tax Breaks for U.S. Oil and Gas Companies Probably Don’t Materially Affect Climate Change.” In fact, I think the Erickson rebuttal above reinforces just that point. Tackling the overall thesis first: in his rebuttal, Erickson is willing to accept that a reasonable estimate for the carbon impact of U.S. tax breaks for oil and gas companies is 40–70 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually (there may be other greenhouse gas emissions, such as methane, that increase the climate impact). Erickson even compares the magnitude of this negative climate impact with the positive impact of President Obama’s efficiency standards for big trucks. I am absolutely willing to accept that removing U.S. tax breaks for oil companies would be about as big a deal, in terms of direct emissions reduction, as setting domestic efficiency standards for big trucks. Importantly, this direct impact is trivial on a global scale, which is the point that I made in my original post, reinforcing Dr. Metcalf’s conclusion in his CFR paper. I am, however, sympathetic to Erickson’s argument that the world needs a rollback of tax breaks, efficiency standards for big trucks, and a whole suite of other policies in the United States and other major economies to combat climate change. And there is certainly symbolic value to the United States rolling back its oil industry tax breaks, possibly making it easier to persuade other countries to follow suit. I also want to concede that Erickson very rightly called me out on unclearly discussing the relationship between oil price volatility and the effect on oil prices of removing tax breaks. We definitely know which direction removing subsidies would move prices (up) and global consumption (down). I should have been clearer that my comparison of the frequent swings in oil prices to the tiny price impact of removing subsidies was merely to provide a sense of magnitude, NOT to imply that measurement error washes out our ability to forecast the magnitude of tax reform’s price impact, ceteris paribus. Finally, Erickson took issue to my characterization of his paper as “misleading.” Indeed, I never meant to imply that he and his co-authors intended to mislead anybody. I still, however, stand by what I meant: that the paper might lead a casual reader to take away an erroneous conclusion by relegating the global oil market model to an appendix and only citing the increase in U.S. emissions in the main body. In my opinion, readers need to know that industry tax breaks have a very small effect on global greenhouse gas emissions, but there are other very important reasons to remove them. And yes, the United States absolutely should remove its tax breaks, as should other countries remove their fossil fuel subsidies. On that count, Erickson and I are in complete agreement.
  • Energy and Climate Policy
    No, Tax Breaks for U.S. Oil and Gas Companies Probably Don’t Materially Affect Climate Change
    Last week, the journal Nature Energy published an article from scholars at the Stockholm Environment Institute arguing that the tax breaks given to oil companies by the U.S. government could lead to carbon emissions that eat up 1 percent of the world’s remaining “carbon budget.” (The carbon budget is scientists’ best guess of how much more carbon dioxide the world can emit while still having a chance of limiting global warming to 2°C.) This is an enormous figure—few other national policies reach that level of climate impact. So, if true, this analysis provides a powerful argument in favor of ending preferential tax treatment for U.S. oil and gas firms (see Vox’s piece for an accessible discussion). But that conclusion flies in the face of the conclusion reached by a paper published here at the Council on Foreign Relations by energy economist Gilbert Metcalf. His paper concluded that tax breaks for oil companies modestly increase U.S. oil production, but, more importantly, global prices for and consumption of oil barely budge as a result, minimally affecting the climate. (The paper came to a similar conclusion about the climate impacts of tax breaks for U.S. natural gas production.) I was closely involved in the review and editing process for that paper, and I can attest that Professor Metcalf’s methodology was rigorously stress-tested. So who’s right? In a nutshell, I stand by the CFR paper’s conclusion that federal tax breaks for oil and gas companies aren’t a major contributor to climate change. The biggest reason is that both the Nature Energy and CFR papers are in agreement that the tax breaks barely alter global oil prices, which implies insignificant changes in global consumption of, and emissions from, oil. In fact, the Nature Energy authors do not dispute this, and they only explicitly say that tax breaks cause emissions from burning U.S. oil to increase. But their omission that those tax breaks likely cause emissions from burning other countries’ oil to decrease can easily mislead a casual reader to assume that they mean global emissions will increase as much as emissions from burning U.S. oil will.  The two papers also have some other quantitative disagreements, and the Nature Energy paper might have more up-to-date industry data than the CFR paper. Nevertheless, I don’t think those other disagreements justify overturning the CFR paper’s overall conclusion about the limited climate effects of the tax breaks. Finally, the two papers do agree on one thing: the tax breaks should go. The Nature Energy paper contends that ending the tax breaks would bring “substantial climate benefits.” Although the CFR paper concludes that emissions “would not change substantially,” the two papers agree that tax reform has symbolic value that would strengthen U.S. climate leadership; U.S. taxpayers would also benefit from a few billion dollars annually of recouped government revenue from oil companies. Back to Basics The two papers are in agreement that there are three major tax breaks that oil companies get from the federal government that promote more U.S. oil production. The first allows firms to immediately expense “intangible drilling costs” (IDCs), which account for the majority of drilling costs, rather than deducting them from their taxable income over several years. The second tax break, percentage depletion, allows some oil companies to deduct a fixed percentage of their taxable income as costs rather than deducting the value of their reserves as they are depleted. And the third tax break allows oil companies to write off a percentage of their income through the domestic manufacturing deduction. Together, these three tax breaks amount to around $4 billion in foregone government revenue annually. (The Nature Energy paper considers several other tax breaks but concludes that these three are the important ones.) Both papers then set out to quantify how much more oil U.S. firms produce as a result of the tax breaks. In general, the two papers go about this in a similar way. The Nature Energy paper uses real industry data on U.S. shale oil fields to calculate which fields are profitable to produce oil from with the tax breaks but aren’t worth drilling without those breaks. And the CFR paper uses a new theoretical tool along with empirical statistics to find the percentage of wells that tax breaks make profitable to drill. But the two papers differ in their bottom-line conclusions. The Nature Energy paper rings the alarm bells by concluding that the total amount of oil in the fields that tax breaks turn from unprofitable to profitable is between 13 and 37 percent of the total amount of profitable oil (depending on where oil prices are between $75 and $50 per barrel; higher prices mean that less oil becomes economic to produce as a result of tax breaks—see figure 1). As a result, the authors conclude, if all of the oil in the fields turned profitable by tax breaks were produced by 2050 (and burned), the world would emit 6–7 gigatons of carbon dioxide, roughly 1 percent of the remaining carbon budget. Figure 1: Nature Energy paper summary figure: “The impact of subsidies is highly sensitive to oil price. These charts shows how much oil is economic at price levels between US$30 and US$100 per barrel according to whether it is already producing; discovered and economic without subsidies; discovered and economic only because of subsidies (‘subsidy-dependent’); or not yet discovered. a, Results at the base, 10% discount rate. b, Results at an alternative discount rate of 15%. The subsidy-dependence of the not-yet-discovered fields was not assessed, as these quantities are speculative, based on Rystad Energy’s assessment. Still, should they prove as subsidy-dependent as the fields we do assess, the impact of subsidies at higher prices would be larger than we currently estimate.” The CFR paper finds that 9 percent of the wells that oil companies drill each year are induced by tax breaks. But most of the additional oil that the U.S. produces will be offset by reduced production elsewhere in the world. After using a simple model of global oil supply and demand, the paper concludes that increased U.S. production translates only to at most a 1 percent decrease in global oil prices, and a measly half a percent increase in global consumption of oil (see table 2, which projects the oil market impacts of taking away tax breaks). Such a small uptick is washed out by the ordinary volatility of oil prices and resulting changes in consumption. So the CFR paper concludes that the nearly-undetectable change in global oil consumption means that the climate effects of U.S. tax breaks are negligible. Table 2: CFR paper summary table: Table 2 presents the modeled equilibrium values of global oil price, supply, and demand in 2030. The first column lays out four ways that the global market could develop: two future oil price possibilities considered by the Energy Information Agency (EIA), and within each of those cases, the two scenarios for OPEC to be price-responsive or exhibit cartel behavior to maintain its market share. Within each of these four alternatives for how global markets might behave, the second column presents two options for domestic policy: the United States can maintain existing tax preferences (baseline), or it can repeal the three major preferences. The tax reform is assumed to shift the domestic oil supply curve by 5 percent. The remaining columns in table 2 report the equilibrium Brent oil price—the benchmark for most of the world’s oil—in 2012 dollars; supply, in million barrels of oil per day (mbd) from the United States, OPEC, and the rest of the world (ROW); and global demand. Table 2 shows that the long-run effects of U.S. tax reform are minimal under a wide range of input assumptions for how the future oil market behaves. The highlighted figures demonstrate that global prices and demand change by up to 1 percent, and U.S. production changes by less than 5 percent, regardless of the assumptions of future oil prices and how OPEC will respond. Although these changes are greater than those projected by previous studies, they are still small. An oil price increase of up to 1 percent would be over three hundred times smaller than price spikes in the 1970s and ten times smaller than the average annual increase in oil prices from 2009 to 2014. It would raise domestic gasoline prices by at most two pennies per gallon at the pump." I don’t think the Nature Energy paper makes any explicit errors, but I do think it’s written in a misleading way. The paper has a supplementary section in which it also runs a simple global oil supply and demand model, which produces a similarly small price change (a 2 percent increase) in response to U.S. tax breaks as the CFR paper reports. What the Nature Energy paper is really concluding is that tax breaks to U.S. oil companies increase the slice of the global emissions pie that is attributable to U.S. oil being burned, but they don’t commensurately increase the size of that pie. Remaining Quibbles Between the Papers Still, there is some legitimate disagreement between the papers even before running a global supply-and-demand model, suggesting that the CFR paper’s estimate of oil market impacts might have been understated. The Nature Energy paper finds that tax breaks convert 13–37 percent of reserves from uneconomic to economic to extract. It uses actual data on the size and extraction cost of reserves in different shale oil plays to make this conclusion, and the article implies that U.S. production could actually increase by 13–37 percent in the long run as a result of the tax breaks. By contrast, the CFR paper’s estimate of the long-run increase in U.S. supply is much smaller—less than 5 percent. As explained above, the CFR paper first finds that tax breaks account for 9 percent of domestic drilling. Then, the paper further diminishes its estimate of the impact of tax breaks. The difference between drilling rate and long-run supply arises because the CFR paper uses industry data to conclude that the fields that the tax breaks turn from uneconomic to economic to drill are smaller than the average field. Therefore, even though the tax breaks account for 9 percent of the new wells, those smaller wells produce less than 5 percent of U.S. oil supply. The CFR paper does use industry data—including a constant estimate of the elasticity of drilling with respect to price and a regression of well initial production against profitability—but my read is that the Nature Energy paper’s dataset might be more up-to-date. (There are a few other disagreements in assumptions, such as whether the hurdle rate for new investments is 10 or 15 percent and whether the future oil price will be closer to $50 or $75 per barrel. The Nature Energy paper, however, is careful to run a sensitivity analysis and copy the CFR paper’s assumptions to enable comparison.) As a result, the CFR paper’s estimate of the increase in U.S. supply as a result of tax breaks—less than 5 percent—might be a bit of a lowball. In some sense we are comparing apples and oranges by comparing the CFR paper’s estimate of annual U.S. production attributable to tax breaks to the Nature Energy paper’s estimate of total reserves converted from uneconomic to economic. But there is some reason to believe that the effect of tax breaks might be to induce greater than 5 percent of U.S. oil production. Even if that is true, however, it is unlikely that tax breaks materially affect global consumption of oil, mediated through price changes, because the United States accounts for less than 15 percent of global production. Therefore, the conclusion of the CFR paper—that tax breaks to the oil and gas industry are immaterial to climate change in terms of directly induced emissions—probably stands. That doesn’t mean the tax breaks are a good idea. In fact, both papers argue forcefully that the tax breaks should be abolished, at the very least because the United States in doing so can demonstrate leadership in the G20 and other forums where it urges other countries to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies. The effects of those subsidies, on a global scale rather than a national scale, are in fact material to climate change. The world would be better off if they were sharply curtailed.