Heads of State and Government

This morning, I had the privilege of testifying before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at a hearing titled “Venezuela: Options for U.S. Policy.” Also joining me before the committee were David Smilde, Senior Fellow, Washington Office on Latin America, and Mark Feierstein, Senior Associate, Americas Program Center for Strategic and International Studies. You can read my written testimony, the written testimonies of my fellow witnesses, and watch a recording of the hearing on the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations website.  

The separation of powers has spawned a great deal of debate over the roles of the president and Congress in foreign affairs, as well as over the limits on their respective authorities, explains this Backgrounder.

[Note: This post was updated to reflect additional strikes in Yemen on March 2, March 3, and March 6.] As a candidate, President Donald Trump was deeply misleading about the sorts of military operations that he would support. He claimed to have opposed the 2003 Iraq War when he actually backed it, and to have opposed the 2011 Libya intervention when he actually strongly endorsed it, including with U.S. ground troops. Yet, Trump and his loyalists consistently implied that he would be less supportive of costly and bloody foreign wars, especially when compared to President Obama, and by extension, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. This might be true, but nonetheless the White House is considering deploying even more U.S. troops to Syria, loosening the rules of engagement for airstrikes, and increasing the amount of lethal assistance provided to Syrian rebel groups. By at least one measure at this point in his presidency, Trump has been more interventionist than Obama: in authorizing drone strikes and special operations raids in non-battlefield settings (namely, in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia). During President Obama’s two terms in office, he approved 542 such targeted strikes in 2,920 days—one every 5.4 days. From his inauguration through today, President Trump had approved at least 36 drone strikes or raids in 45 days—one every 1.25 days. These include three drone strikes in Yemen on January 20, 21, and 22; the January 28 Navy SEAL raid in Yemen; one reported strike in Pakistan on March 1; more than thirty strikes in Yemen on March 2 and 3; and at least one more on March 6. Thus, people who believed that Trump would be less interventionist than Obama are wrong, at least so far and at least when it comes to drone strikes. These dramatically increased lethal strikes demonstrate that U.S. leaders’ counterterrorism mindset and policies are bipartisan and transcend presidential administrations. As I have noted, U.S. counterterrorism ideology is virulent and extremist, characterized by tough-sounding clichés and wholly implausible objectives. There has never been any serious indication among elected politicians or appointed national security officials of any strategic learning or policy adjustments. We are now on our third post-9/11 administration pursuing many of the same policies that have failed to meaningfully reduce the number of jihadist extremist fighters, or their attractiveness among potential recruits or self-directed terrorists. The Global War on Terrorism remains broadly unquestioned within Washington, no matter who is in the White House.

Nelson Mandela’s South Africa was one of the founders of the International Criminal Court (ICC). As an early signer of the Treaty of Rome the widespread view within the ruling African National Congress (ANC) was that the ICC was a means of holding accountable dictators and other heads of state for criminal behavior. The ANC government even incorporated the Treaty of Rome into South African law. Hence, violation of the Treaty of Rome is also a violation of South African law. Since its establishment, the ICC shoe has pinched the toes of a number of dubious heads of state, notably Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta. At the request of the then-Kenyan government, the ICC investigated crimes committed at the time of the 2007 Kenyan elections and subsequently indicted Uhuru Kenyatta, by then president of Kenya, and his vice president William Ruto. However, Kenyatta’s Kenyan government refused to cooperate with the ICC and prosecutors accused it of intimidating witnesses, who withdrew their testimony. The cases collapsed, and Kenyatta launched a campaign for African states to withdraw from the ICC. He and others accuse the ICC of bias against African states, and many claim that the ICC’s jurisdiction should not extend to heads of state or governments. There is also resentment that certain Western countries, notably the United States, support the ICC but have declined to sign the Treaty of Rome and therefore are not under its jurisdiction. There is anger in some quarters that the ICC could not indict members of the George W. Bush administration for perceived crimes during the war in Iraq. South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma, too, has fallen afoul of the ICC. Under the Treaty of Rome, if a person indicted by the ICC falls into the hands of a signatory state that state is obliged to hand him over to the court. Sudan’s chief of state Omar al-Bashir has been so indicted by the ICC for crimes committed in Darfur. Al-Bashir visited Pretoria in 2015 for an African Union heads of state summit. Zuma not only failed to detain Bashir, he facilitated the latter’s hasty departure from the country when South African courts were moving toward ordering Bashir’s arrest, following suits filed by South African civil organizations. Subsequently, the Zuma government has joined the quit ICC bandwagon by notifying the United Nations of South Africa’s intention to withdraw. At its January summit, the African Union heads of state voted in favor of a non-binding resolution calling for its members to withdraw from the ICC. However, on February 22, the South African High Court ruled in favor of the opposition Democratic Alliance suit that the government’s announced departure was “unconstitutional and invalid.” Because the Treaty of Rome is incorporated into South African law, only parliament could change it so that South Africa could leave ICC jurisdiction. In response to the ruling, the Zuma administration has reiterated its intention to leave the ICC and is considering its options. Zuma’s ANC has a majority of over sixty percent in parliament. The BBC concludes that at the end of the day, parliament is likely to approve withdrawal; but such a projection is premature-still. The ANC is badly fractured with pro and anti-Zuma factions. The party is scheduled to elect a new leader in December 2017. Many South Africans, including some in the ANC, see the ICC as part of the Mandela legacy of “non-racial” democracy and the rule of law. Shedding ICC jurisdiction, by contrast, is associated with Zuma, who is discredited among some for alleged corruption. Hence, it is by no means certain that parliament would do Zuma’s bidding on this issue anytime soon.

This post was coauthored with Sungtae (Jacky) Park, research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. South Korea is in turmoil, with President Park Geun-hye having been suspended from office by the South Korean national assembly after being implicated as an accomplice in the criminal investigation of her close friend, Choi Soon-sil. Consequently, the South Korean conservatives have lost popularity among the public, and the center-left Minjoo Party’s Moon Jae-in has emerged as the front-runner in South Korea’s looming presidential election, which must be held within sixty days if Park’s impeachment is upheld at the South Korean constitutional court. This situation has led many Korea-watchers to be concerned about how Seoul might reorient its foreign policy, with the South Korean progressives poised to retake the Blue House. Unlike the conservatives, the progressives tend to be more skeptical of the planned deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on the Korean Peninsula, critical of the December 2015 comfort woman agreement with Japan, and have indicated desires to reengage in diplomacy with North Korea. But sometimes it is more useful to step back and examine the forest, rather than focusing on the trees. A careful evaluation of South Korea’s national interests, constraints, variables affecting its foreign policy, and strategic options, in a recent Council on Foreign Relations discussion paper, The Korean Pivot: Seoul’s Strategic Choices and Rising Rivalries in Northeast Asia, authored by Scott Snyder, Darcie Draudt, and Sungtae (Jacky) Park, reveals that South Korea’s future choices are constrained by many broader structural forces outside of Seoul’s control. To begin with, South Korea is dealing with an increasingly precarious regional environment. The reliability of the U.S.-Korea alliance has been thrown into question. Moreover, North Korea’s nuclear and missile development continues, and the country may be capable of mounting a nuclear warhead on its medium-range Nodong missiles to threaten Japan and South Korea. South Korea also faces the risk of being caught in conflicts involving the United States, China, and Japan, while South Korea’s trade-dependent economy means the country’s economic prospects rely on international market forces, limiting its own ability to manage economic affairs. These external variables will matter more in shaping Seoul’s strategic choices than policy positions taken by a newly-elected South Korean president, who must navigate these treacherous issues with limited margin for error. Given that Northeast Asia’s security environment is deteriorating, Seoul will no doubt continue to seek a strong alliance with Washington and is unlikely to pursue a foreign policy of neutrality, independence, or alignment with China. At the same time, South Korea will likely pursue a combination of hedging, regionalism, and networking to mitigate regional tensions and to avoid entrapment in great power conflicts, although Seoul could choose to balance against China at a later stage. Effective hedging would require South Korea to not only pursue friendly relations with China, but also make a clear assessment of issues critical to the maintenance of the U.S.-ROK alliance, those that affect U.S.-ROK relations but may not be critical, and decisions that can be deferred. Moreover, South Korea needs to pursue serious economic reforms to maintain its status as a middle power and improve relations with Japan. For its part, Washington should avoid overreacting to every South Korean move that seems to be “tilting toward Beijing”; South Korea is not about to become a Chinese tributary state. Moreover, a loosening of the alliance would undercut Seoul’s leverage with Beijing and is not in South Korea’s interest. South Korea is also unlikely to unilaterally call for the removal of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula under current conditions. The United States should recognize that a positive Sino-South Korean relationship, if it can be achieved, will contribute to stability in Northeast Asia by mitigating Chinese concerns that the U.S.-ROK alliance might be directed against China. South Korea ultimately shares with the United States an interest in the freedom of navigation and in maintaining the liberal world order. Given that the Korean Peninsula is geographically closer to China than to the United States or Japan, South Korea would be the first to suffer if the Chinese modify the regional order in their favor. In such a case, South Korea would naturally increase U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation and take a tougher stance against Chinese revisionism. Until then, Washington can afford to be patient. The United States should also support South Korea’s attempts at network diplomacy and the creation of regional security mechanisms. Seoul’s pursuit of such initiatives will not fundamentally alter the overall regional dynamics, but such initiatives could be tension-mitigating mechanisms that help to delay and manage crises. As a country sensitive to both U.S. and Chinese interests, South Korea could be in a good position to push regional mechanisms and network diplomacy with U.S. backing. Washington has yet to enthusiastically endorse Seoul’s initiatives such as the erstwhile Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), but Northeast Asian stability could benefit from better U.S.-ROK coordination on regionalism and networking. Despite the rising uncertainty that South Korea has to deal with, in the face of both its own domestic political crisis and the election of Donald Trump, the North Korean threat is becoming ever more dangerous and is a common challenge for both the United States and South Korea. Both countries also have to deal with an increasingly complex regional environment in Northeast Asia. Given the costs and stakes involved, no American president can afford to step away from the Korean Peninsula, and South Korea’s next president will inherit the same problems and constraints that the Park administration has faced in its efforts to solve what she termed the “Asian Paradox.” For more information on the themes discussed above, please download the CFR discussion paper, The Korean Pivot: Seoul’s Strategic Choices and Rising Rivalries in Northeast Asia.

Two months following the passage by the ROK National Assembly of a motion of impeachment against Park Geun-hye, power remains in the hands of Acting President Hwang Kyo-ahn, South Korean conservatives are split between the pro-Park New Liberty Korea Party and the newly-established anti-Park Bareun (Righteous) Party, and a series of investigations has expanded the dimensions of South Korea’s political scandal and threatened to ensnare top Korean corporate leaders.1 South Korea’s most experienced leader in international affairs, former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, ended his flirtation with presidential politics by concluding that he should remain out of the race, seemingly turning a looming presidential election into a fight among progressives.2 Hwang has succeeded, thus far, in fulfilling his caretaker role, insofar as he has kept current policies in place and maintained government momentum despite the looming threat of politicization and reversal of Park Geun-hye’s major foreign policy decisions. But while South Korea stands still and awaits new political leadership, regional tensions are increasing and potential cleavages in the Northeast Asian security environment are becoming more apparent. True, the crisis has been a test of the impressive responsiveness of South Korean democratic institutions to public demands for transparent and clean government, but this display comes against the backdrop of a global turn toward nationalism and backlash against globalization. Both of these trends pose serious risks for a vulnerable and trade-dependent South Korea’s economic well-being and national security. South Korea runs the risk of repeating the historical precedent of allowing factionalism in domestic politics to paralyze an effective political response to rising external geopolitical risks and dangers. South Korea’s transitional government, its ongoing political vacuum, and its looming domestic power transition are affecting South Korean geopolitical risks in the following ways. Efforts to Influence the Transition to a Trump Administration North Korea’s resumption of missile tests on February 12, 2017, with a test of a solid-fueled land-based ballistic missile following a four-month hiatus, has renewed pressure on the Trump administration to prioritize a counterstrategy to defeat North Korea’s development capabilities to threaten the United States and its allies.3 Following tweets in early January asserting that North Korea achieving the ability to hit most parts of the United States “won’t happen” and holding China responsible for reigning in North Korea, the Trump administration has ordered a North Korea policy review, sent Defense Secretary James Mattis on a reassurance tour to South Korea and Japan in late January, and had Trump himself pledge to “stand behind” Japanese allies in a joint press conference with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held in response to North Korea’s missile launch.4 Otherwise, the Trump administration has held its rhetorical fire, presumably pending the administration’s review of policy toward North Korea and development of a coherent strategy for responding to the North. The fact that North Korea’s first missile test under the Trump administration occurred while Trump and Abe were having dinner together in Florida, provided an opportunity for Trump to emphasize the importance of a coordinated response among allies. However, his failure to acknowledge that the missile test was an important alliance coordination issue between the United States and South Korea can be attributed, to some degree, to South Korea’s political vacuum. In contrast to Abe’s flurry of diplomatic activity, including four visits to the United States within the past half year, South Korea’s political leadership has remained in the penalty box pending the final judgment of the Constitutional Court over whether to uphold the validity of the National Assembly’s impeachment of Park.5 Even the visit of National Security Advisor Kim Kwan-jin, to the United States has been a subject of debate within South Korean politics. Since his office is physically located at the Blue House complex, some viewed his visit for early talks with the Trump administration during the transition period to be a violation of the National Assembly’s impeachment motion, with a Minjoo party member noting that his act was “definitely an act exceeding an authority.”6 Given that the Trump administration was still in its transition phase, it was inevitable that the only people in place to represent it were at the National Security Council. Sending Kim, who represents the South Korean counterpart of the US National Security Council, was a bow to the reality of the Trump transition and an effort to maintain coordination between governments as closely as possible despite the vacuum in Seoul and the transition in Washington. Political Relations With Near Neighbors A second cost of South Korea’s political vacuum has come in the form of a broken relationship between South Korea and Japan. This development has occurred because South Korea’s political vacuum made it possible for South Korean NGOs to challenge the December 2015 “comfort woman” agreement by placing a statue outside the Japanese consulate in Busan (in addition to the one outside the embassy in Seoul that Park had pledged to try to remove in that deal) at a time when there is no politically empowered central government leader able to assert national prerogatives as a priority over local sentiments. Instead, the local authorities initially removed the statue, but then relented and replaced it in response to public sentiment.7 In response, the government of Japan recalled its ambassador to Tokyo.8 Meanwhile, Japanese government ministers including the minister of defense paid their respects personally at the Yasukuni Shrine.9 A major unspoken premise underlying the “comfort woman” agreement has been challenged by these developments: that both South Korea and Japan would need to bring domestic political forces under control in order to preserve a normal relationship between the two governments—a task that is easier said than done in a democratic political system. There is no prospect that the issue can be successfully resolved in the midst of an impending presidential campaign, i.e., it will be difficult to resolve the current tensions until South Korea chooses its president, who will have to figure out how to repair the relationship with Japan as one of his early presidential tasks. At the same time, China’s challenge to South Korea’s domestic politics continues to grow through its economic retaliation to South Korea’s agreement to deploy THAAD on South Korean territory. China has quietly imposed non-tariff barriers on pop culture and cosmetics from South Korea, subjected businesses affiliated with the Lotte Group to intense audits in retaliation against Lotte’s decision to sell a golf course to the ROK government in connection with the THAAD deployment, and reduced the flow of Chinese tourists to South Korea.10 In addition, China has privately sent envoys to warn South Korea of the consequences of its decision while publicly hosting opposition national assemblymen who saw opportunities for a photo op with China’s foreign minister.11 However, despite continued criticism of the Park administration for a lack of transparency in the announcement of the THAAD deployment, Chinese political pressure seems more likely to push South Korea’s political leaders toward acceptance of the deployment. Impact on South Korea’s Economic Growth Park’s scandal removed the momentum for the South Korean government to secure a raft of reforms to structures that are widely perceived as obstacles to South Korean economic growth. For instance, high-levels of youth unemployment and high rates of temporary labor are directly connected to a rigid labor market, which protects permanent workers regardless of their productivity or contributions.12 The momentum for these sorts of structural reforms has completely dissipated as the National Assembly focuses solely on investigations of scandals and short-term political maneuvering in anticipation of the next presidential election. Park’s “creative economy” initiatives, which emphasized establishment of innovation hubs and promoted creation of new start-ups as a means to generate new jobs and strengthen South Korean competitiveness, are surely thwarted by the overall political malaise that has struck South Korea.13 Moreover, the main remaining sources of growth in exports, exceptionally important for growth in the South Korean economy, are tied to international competitiveness and are dominated by the chaebol. But the heads of the largest chaebol have been entrapped in Park’s scandal. Almost every large conglomerate has been entrapped by Choi Soon-sil’s rent-seeking, either through direct extortion related to fundraising for her sports foundations or as part of efforts to shake down companies by locking in exclusive PR contracts. Samsung CEO Lee Jae-yong has been detained. Samsung and other major chaebol have pulled out of the Federation of Korean Industries and political arousal over income inequality is likely to produce a president with a mandate to challenge chaebol privilege within South Korean society in one form or another, raising uncertainty about economic policies under the next administration.14 Response to North Korean Crisis Hwang Kyo-ahn has spent a good deal of time organizing responses to North Korean developments, including the resumption of missile testing and the assassination of Kim Jong-nam. Fortunately, there has not yet been a North Korean provocation that would require a real political decision from the caretaker leader. Given that South Korea’s political vacuum provides a windfall to the North, Pyongyang has shown reluctance to do much that would distract from South Korea’s political malaise. However, a North Korean provocation against the South would also provide the gravest and most difficult challenge to an acting South Korean leadership with no political mandate to respond. Perhaps, the wide degree of uncertainty regarding possible South Korean responses is actually the surest deterrent against North Korea’s usual propensity for risk-taking, given the evident vulnerabilities and paranoia surrounding Kim Jong-un’s own efforts to consolidate his power. Although North Korean intervention at a time of South Korean vulnerability might be tempting, Pyongyang’s efforts to influence South Korean politics have repeatedly proven to be counterproductive. It would be better for Pyongyang to assess the situation after it sorts itself out and then determines a course of action. Conclusion The costs and consequences of South Korea’s political vacuum have mounted as the crisis has ballooned and South Korea has continued on autopilot without a clear sense of political direction. Only a new mandate from the South Korean people and the energy of a new administration empowered to implement the political will of the people will enable South Korea to overcome its current problems. The longer the situation is prolonged, the greater the costs of inaction, and the harder it will be for a new leadership to regain lost momentum resulting from South Korea’s current political drift. This post originally appeared on Asan Forum.

The Nigerian media continues to be transfixed by the question of President Buhari’s health, with rumor and innuendo flying, including the “fake news” of his death. Buhari went to London on January 19, for ten days of rest and medical tests. However, he has since extended his stay twice, and at present there is no set date for his return. Buhari’s press people insist that he is healthy. And, his Febuary 13, telephone meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump should have dispelled rumors of his death. Senate President Bukola Saraki and two other political figures visited him in London on February 15. Following the visit, Saraki released a tweet stating that the president was in good health. Subsequently, on February 21, the president sent a message to the Nigerian people saying that there was no cause for alarm. Photographs of the president (there has been no film footage) from London indicate that he has lost weight but is still capable of standing and mobility. However, the Nigerian press complains that the people around Buhari stone-wall them, just as deceased Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua’s family and close political operatives did when he was dying in 2010. Contributing to the air of suspicion is the frequency with which African chiefs of state die in foreign hospitals. Robyn Dixon notes that Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi died in a Belgian hospital in 2012, Guinea Bissau President Bacai Sanha died in a Paris hospital, also in 2012, Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa died in a Paris hospital in 2008, his successor Michael Sata died in a British hospital in 2010, and Gabonese President Omar Bongo died in a Spanish hospital in 2009. President Mugabe of Zimbabwe makes annual trips to a hospital in Singapore, where he spends a substantial amount of time; it would be no surprise should he die there. Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua did die in Abuja, but only after a lengthy stay in a Saudi Arabian hospital where he was almost entirely isolated from contact with Nigerian political figures and media. He apparently died in a self-contained medical unit at Aso Villa (the presidential residence) that flew back with him from Saudi Arabia. In virtually every case where an African chief of state or head of government has died abroad, his inner circle has insisted that he was healthy—until he was pronounced dead. Predictably, there has been criticism in Nigeria over President Buhari’s desire to seek medical treatment in London, especially after the construction of a medical facility at the Villa that, according to Robyn Dixon, cost $16 million, “more than the total capital budget for Nigeria’s sixteen federal teaching hospitals.” Nevertheless, by Western standards, medical care in sub-Saharan Africa is typically abysmal, with the exception of South Africa. Hence, rich Africans routinely seek medical attention in London, Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt, and Johannesburg. In addition, in some cases and under certain circumstances, presidential suspicion, if not paranoia, about the circumstances in which they work makes a foreign venue attractive when they are weak or incapacitated. Meanwhile, Buhari spokesman Femi Adesina said on Nigerian television, “The fact that the president is receiving visitors, the fact that he has spoken with the American president, and the fact that he asked us to tell the world that he’s fine, I think that’s just enough.”

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 18 to February 24, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1488216332504’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); February 18: Cattle rustlers killed "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) in Chafe, Zamfara. February 19: Sectarian violence led to nine deaths in in Jema’a, Kaduna February 19: Boko Haram killed four in Askira/Uba, Borno. February 20: Sectarian violence led to seventeen deaths in Kaura, Kaduna. February 22: Two Germans were kidnapped in Kagarko, Kaduna. February 22: Suspected Boko Haram terrorists killed fifteen Nigerien soldiers in Tilwa, Niger. February 22: Boko Haram killed seven soldiers in Maiduguri, Borno, but the army retaliated, killing "scores" (estimated at forty) Boko Haram militants. February 22: A suicide bomber killed himself and one other in Amchide, Cameroon. Boko Haram is suspected.

View article in Spanish, originally published in El Financiero. Mexico’s presidential elections for decades have been a one shot deal. Whomever wins the most votes—paltry as that count may be—goes on to live in Los Pinos. And paltry they increasingly are -- in the last two elections these numbers dipped well below 40 percent; in 2018 many believe the winner could garner less than a third of the ballots. This has significant negative ramifications for legitimacy, accountability, and governability. But there is a solution – a second electoral round. Most of Latin American and indeed most countries around that world that elect presidents, as opposed to prime ministers, have a second round. A few weeks or so after the first election voters return to the ballot box to choose between the two highest vote getters. This process ensures the new president an electoral mandate, as by definition over half of the voters chose the winner in the second round. This is vital for leaders, such as Argentina’s president Mauricio Macri, who want to make big changes to the status quo.   Second rounds also tend to eliminate extreme or fringe candidates, exposing the very real electoral ceiling on their vote share beyond the fervently loyal. This is the immediate reason many in Mexico champion the reform, as they believe it will stop a 2018 AMLO victory. A two round system lends itself to political bargaining– with the two top contenders assiduously courting the runners up and their votes. This at times makes strange bedfellows – for instance recently in Peru, when the left and right of the political spectrum galvanized around former banker turned politician Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK) to defeat the initial front runner, Keiko Fujimori. Runoffs of course have their limits. While the president has a more robust mandate, they often face a divided congress, which can lead to gridlock. And because two people can win in the first round, it encourages more candidates to run, leading to a proliferation of political parties and the problems therein. But Mexico’s other electoral rules—namely the combination of single member districts, where just one person wins a senate or congressional race, and the plurinominales, where party leaders’ choose who makes the longer proportional representation list —will head off a more Brazilian fate (at least in terms of the number of political parties).  What a second round will help Mexico deal with is the longer term political fracturing already under way. This is due both to changing social mores and the rise of independent candidates. Mexican voters no longer identify as they once did with the traditional parties. As recently as the turn of the 21st century, nearly 3 out of 4 voters identified with one of the main political parties: PRI, PAN, or PRD. Today, just half of the electorate declares any allegiance to an identifiable party. The young and educated in particular don’t commit, shifting with candidates or splitting their tickets between parties. With the new generations of voters increasingly unmoored from the lifelong identifications of the past, politicians have growing incentives to differentiate themselves from the party masses. Add to this the new legal framework for independent candidates. While the recent reforms allowing these mavericks are a win for representation, it further fragments the political scene. Looking toward the 2018 presidential race, Mexico could see five or more options on the ballot, particularly if a few of those vying for a traditional party nomination make good on their threats to go it alone if not chosen. And even if their appeal remains quixotically in the single digits, the inherent dispersion among so many choices will weaken the election’s winner by granting him or her just a fraction of the popular vote. President Peña Nieto has come out against instituting a second round in Mexico’s electoral system, saying that the majorities such rules create are “fictitious.” Yet fictions can serve a purpose -- building trust among politicians and with society, and forming a programmatic basis for political coalitions. Peña’s opposition likely results from other reasons. The president may believe the PRI’s famous “hard vote” is still enough to win the 2018 contest. If the PAN fractures or if El Bronco or other independents jump in, then with even less than 30 percent of the vote the PRI candidate could in fact squeak by—though at the cost of legitimacy and governability. But perhaps the president’s real worry is as he looks around the table, the most likely second round coalition—between the PAN and PRD—would exclude him and his chosen successor. And that is something a PRI president can’t abide.  Yet if these short term partisan preferences win out, Mexico will lose. True, a second round won’t solve all of the nation’s ills. But it will help shift away from an imperial presidency to one where power comes from an electoral mandate. This would give the next president the citizen’s backing to deal firmly with a potentially erratic northern neighbor. And most importantly, it could galvanize Mexico’s political system to finally implement the desperately needed changes to improve security, better education, and increase long term investment, making its economy competitive for the twenty-first century in ways that will benefit society more broadly.

Rosettenville, a suburb of Johannesburg, was the site of the February 11-12 burning of buildings alleged to have been used by “prostitutes and drug dealers.” These “prostitutes and drug dealers” have been  popularly identified as “Nigerians.” In the aftermath of the fires, the mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, bitterly criticized the South African government for failing to secure South Africa’s borders. (Mashaba is a prominent leader of the Democratic Alliance, the official opposition to the African National Congress government of Jacob Zuma.) Though many of its residents are poor, Rosettenville is far from being a “township slum.” Over time, waves of immigrants have settled there before moving on. Initial migrants to Rosettenville included eastern and southern Europeans who were followed by Portuguese settlers from Europe and former colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Most recently, immigration into this suburb has been from African countries north of the Zambezi River. This includes Nigerians. As elsewhere in urban South Africa, residents complain to outsiders about crime and the inadequacies of law enforcement. In general, crime is a major preoccupation and focus of government criticism by South Africans across all racial lines. Much like other countries on the continent, the police are national rather than local, and there is significant demand for private security services (particularly in wealthy Johannesburg suburbs). South African immigration and refugee law and policy is among the most generous in the world. For example, while their cases are being reviewed, asylum seekers are permitted to work and move across   the country freely. Adjudication of asylum cases can take years, but, once approved, refugees have most of the rights of South African citizens. The extrajudicial killings of up to 116 Nigerian nationals over the past two years is indicative of the rise in xenophobia in South Africa. This has been fueled in large part, by popular rhetoric labeling illegal immigrants and refugees as criminals. The unrest is damaging to South Africa’s reputation across the continent, especially as the Nigerian government has expressed growing concern over the dangers faced by its nationals in South Africa.

Last week while in Mexico I had the chance to talk to Alejandro Domínguez, Reporter for Milenio TV about U.S.-Mexico relations under the Trump administration. You can watch the conversation here.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 11 to February 17, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1487692129595’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); February 12: Nigerian soldiers killed five at a meeting of the Indigenous People of Biafra in Oshimilli North, Delta. February 13: Boko Haram killed one in Chibok, Borno. February 14: Seven were kidnapped in Lagos State, Lagos. February 14: Nigerian soldiers killed six civilians in Agatu, Benue. February 15: Boko Haram attacked an NAF helicopter; but the soldiers retaliated, killing scores (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Agatu, Benue. February 15: A Catholic priest was kidnapped in Ukanafun, Akwa Ibom. February 16: Boko Haram suicide bombers attacked Maiduguri, Borno. Three suicide bombers detonated, killing themselves, but six others were killed by Nigerian soldiers. Two civilians were also killed. February 16: A landmine killed four Cameroonian soldiers in Tsanaga, Cameroon. Boko Haram was suspected.

Since 1994, South Africa’s constitutional institutions have strengthened, as has the independence of the judiciary, which now regularly rules against an increasingly discredited Zuma administration. The political parties are becoming more competitive, even as the country regularly holds credible elections. Corruption, especially in the inner circle of President Jacob Zuma and among his allies in the African National Congress (ANC), has probably increased, but it is challenged by the country’s free press and vociferous civil society. However, the parliamentary escapades of the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) threatens the strength of South Africa’s parliament, one of the country’s most important institutions. Led by Julius Malema, once head of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), the EFF has challenged the way that South Africa’s parliament functions. Malema and the EFF, still small but now the third largest party in parliament, view President Zuma as disqualified to serve as the country’s chief of state in the aftermath of court rulings related to presidential corruption. Indeed, EFF and Malema’s hatred of Zuma and his close associates appears almost visceral. (After a dispute, Zuma expelled Malema from the ANC.) Accordingly, the EFF has conducted demonstrations, some akin to riots, on the floor of parliament over the past two years. The Zuma administration’s response has been to tighten security in the parliamentary precincts to such an extent that the opposition parties complain about intimidation. But, it cannot control the behavior of EFF members of parliament on the floor. President Zuma delivered his annual State of the Nation Address to parliament on February 9. Once again the EFF disrupted the proceedings, the speaker, Baleka Mbete, could not control it and eventually she called in the security services to eject the protesting EFF members, who resisted. The South African parliament broke into a brawl. At that point, the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) withdrew in protest of the methods the security services were using. In the end, Zuma delivered his address—usually one of the most important on the parliamentary calendar—to those who remained, almost all of whom were members of the ANC. Some South Africans approve of EFF disruptions when the focus is on the highly unpopular President Zuma. But, that focus can change in ways that are unpredictable. We should anticipate that there will be more and more disruptive episodes on the floor of parliament, at least until the ANC party leadership contest in December, which may lead to Zuma’s departure. In the meantime, Speaker Mbete’s seemingly ineptness has seriously damaged her candidacy to succeed Zuma and become the first female leader of the ANC and likely chief of state. The progressive breakdown of parliamentary decorum may have lasting consequences. Once the downward spiral starts, it is hard to stop. Further, continued and possibly accelerating disruption of parliament carries the risk of undermining the legitimacy of the institution among people at large. Indeed, we Americans have seen a progressive decline in popular respect for the Congress as it has become more blatantly partisan and seemingly deadlocked while issues of importance go unaddressed.

Africa featured not at all in the U.S. presidential campaign, and the Trump administration has been silent about the continent since the inauguration. Hence, for American friends of Africa it was encouraging that President Trump spoke with the presidents of Africa’s two largest economies on February 13. However, there has been no White House explanation as to why the president chose the chiefs of state of those two particular countries: arguably, the United States has a closer security relationship with Kenya. As of February 14, the White House has released few details about the conversations, while there have been only brief reports from Nigerian and South African sources. This is not unusual: details of communications among heads of state are rarely made public. Both conversations must have been short. According to the White House schedule, the President talked to Nigeria’s Muhammadu Buhari at 9:45 a.m. and to South Africa’s Jacob Zuma at 10:30 a.m. Most of the remainder of President Trump’s day was involved with the visit of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. The February 13 focus on Africa telephone calls appears to follow a White House pattern of geographical consolidation. Over the weekend and earlier in the week President Trump or Vice President Pence talked to the heads of state of Colombia and Brazil. According to South African sources, the presidents talked about strengthening the ‘already strong’ diplomatic relationship, and President Zuma referred to the six-hundred U.S. companies at present operating in South Africa. (Few outside observers would characterize the bilateral relationship as ‘already strong.’) If Nigerian reports are accurate, the conversation between presidents Trump and Buhari was much more significant. According to a Nigerian presidential spokesman, “President Trump assured the Nigerian president of U.S. willingness to cut a new deal in helping Nigeria in terms of military weapons to combat terrorism.” The Obama administration and parts of the U.S. Congress had been reluctant to sell certain types of military equipment that the Nigerians wished to buy. It remains to be seen how the necessary generalities of the two presidents’ conversation translates into a policy change.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 4 to February 10, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1487003086513’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); February 5: Sectarian violence led to nine deaths in Abakaliki, Ebonyi. February 6: Gunmen kidnapped six traders in Okene, Kogi. February 6: Suspected Boko Haram terrorists killed two in Damaturu, Yobe. February 7: Nigerian troops killed one would-be suicide bomber and arrested another in Maiduguri, Borno. February 7: Pirates kidnapped eight off the coast of Brass, Bayelsa. February 8: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Uhunmwonde, Edo. February 9: Nigerian troops killed thirty Boko Haram insurgents and lost seven of their own in Dikwa, Borno. Boko Haram also kidnapped one of the soldiers. February 9: Boko Haram killed one and abducted one boy in Chibok, Borno. February 10: Gunmen attacked a police station in Okehi, Kogi, killing two policemen and two others. February 10: Boko Haram killed eight Nigerian soldiers in Mafa, Borno.