Somalia

It is hard to imagine a more devastating tragedy for a child in the developing world than to be crippled for life by polio. Given the success of the international vaccination effort, it is also increasingly unnecessary. However in 2012 Nigeria recorded 122 new cases of polio. Nigeria had been one of only three countries where the disease was still endemic (the other two were Afghanistan and Pakistan). But now Nigeria is joined by another African country – Somalia. Eunice Kilonzo in The East African reports 191 polio infections in Somalia. The media is also reporting small outbreaks elsewhere in east Africa, often associated with Somali refugee movements. Somalia appears to have the largest known reservoir of unvaccinated children in any specific geographic area worldwide. It has been estimated that there are up to a million Somali children who were never vaccinated between 2008 and 2012. I previously blogged on some of the reasons behind the persistence of polio in Nigeria and its reappearance in Somalia. Since those blogs were posted, polio appears to have spread in Somalia, but there are signs of progress for northern Nigerian polio eradication. Both northern Nigeria and Somalia are venues of a deep distrust of the West, and particularly the United States. Arguments are made that wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the embargo against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq that deprived Iraqi children of access to certain pharmaceuticals, and the recent sanctions against Iran prove that the United States is at war with Islam. Radicals argue that polio vaccination is somehow "western" and therefore un-Islamic. Boko Haram, the jihadist insurrection in northern Nigeria, feeds on popular suspicion of the polio vaccination campaign. It claimed responsibility for the murder of ten polio vaccinators in February 2013. In Somalia, al-Shabaab, another jihadist terrorist movement, has urged the boycott of the vaccination. A Japanese-funded polio vaccination campaign over the summer was “derailed and watered down” by al-Shabaab’s hostile propaganda, according to the media. In Africa, polio appears to be a companion of jihadist insurrection, terrorism, and refugee movements. So long as they persist, the international community’s polio eradication campaign will be challenged.

Alex Vines, director of Area Studies and International Law, and head of the Africa Program at Chatham House, a London based think-tank, has written a thoughtful article for CNN. He looks at U.S. counterterrorism operations in Africa, including questions about their legality under international law and their impact (often unintended) on weak African states. I agree with his point that U.S. military engagements can–and have–caused greater instability in some African venues, rather than countering successfully terrorism and other forms of instability. Vines tees-off his analysis with discussion of the October 5-6 U.S. military operations in Libya and Somalia. Vines recalls on-again, off-again American involvement since 1993 in Somalia, and makes a convincing argument (at least to me) that the effect was to promote radicalization in that country. Turning to contemporary terrorism, He reiterates the crucial point that “jihadi” terrorism is far from homogeneous–Boko Haram in Nigeria is very different from al-Shabaab in Somalia. But, such groups do well in weak states that are poorly governed. That reality implies that institution building, promotion of good governance, and more jobs is the way to address terrorism, rather than the quick fix of military action. But, that prescription requires sustained attention, now sorely lacking in paralyzed Washington. Also salutary is Vines’ reminder that “counterterrorism policies live on the edge of international law.” They can have consequences that are directly contrary to U.S. long-term interests.

This is a guest post by Jim Sanders, a career, now retired, West Africa watcher for various federal agencies. The views expressed below are his personal views and do not reflect those of his former employers. Somalia is clawing its way out of twenty years of war-torn chaos. Some are proposing initiatives that use innovative technology to assist in state building and recovery, but they face a struggle against Somalia’s warlord-dominated past. Many former warlords remain in power at various levels of government and civil society. This dynamic of warlord versus technology is therefore becoming a lively discussion. In the June 2013 issue of Wired Magazine, Adam Rogers’s article "Life After Warfare: How a Digital Map Could Revive A Devastated Mogadishu," examines urban planner Mitchell Sipus’s effort to digitally map Mogadishu. With no birth certificates, no business registrations, and no tax collection system, Sipus hopes to encode businesses, infrastructure, and people. By creating a database for businesses and projects, Sipus’s "map could be a means to measure problems and redistribute resources." The project "isn’t just about reinforcing city government;" it is also "about creating new markets…people have to have jobs, livelihoods." Sipus believes that the mapping project could provide a foundation for this effort. But there are problems. Sipus notes that "many of the local-level politicians were warlords two years ago. It’s the same people. What are they going to do if suddenly they have a map that outlines tribal distributions in the city or what markets are more successful?" Such a map could "make the city go back" to conflict as much as it could nudge it toward development and governance. Katrina Manson’s piece, "Welcome to Mogadishu," in the June 1-2, 2013, weekend edition of the Financial Times, deals with a similar issue. In effect, she picks up where Sipus leaves off, taking the dilemma of modernizing and democratizing warlords deeper. Manson quotes writer Nuruddin Farah as saying that "Somalis do every possible lawless activity that will get them an extra penny...you cheat institutions but you keep your trust with persons and individuals." In reference to this moral code, Manson argues, "that’s one reason why personal bonds shape politics." And so while issues of federalism and constitutionalism, staples of conventional theories of democracy, are often discussed (especially perhaps by Somalia’s foreign friends); the driving dynamics in the country do not seem to have changed much in decades. As Manson notes, "al-Shabaab is only the latest reason the country isn’t working..." With a substantial number of warlords now in parliament, yet another patronage state with a thin veneer of democracy seems to be forming. It is as yet unclear whether technologies such as digital maps of Mogadishu will aid or hinder the reconstruction of the city, and nation.

This is a guest post by Hamish Stewart, a co-founding Director of the Centre for African Development and Security. The world is optimistic about Africa’s future, but to unlock its economic potential concerted efforts must be made to engage with its most fragile states. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States is a country-led peace and statebuilding framework agreement aimed at stabilizing and developing the world’s most fragile states. The agreement is sponsored by the g7+ grouping of fragile states and accepted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. It provides a mechanism or approach for fragile states themselves in order to build political support for those countries transitioning from conflict and to maintain stability where regional tension threatens renewed conflict.  The New Deal is a long-term framework. In addition to security, its goals include access to justice at the domestic level, as well as job creation in the continent’s burgeoning private sector. Many fragile states are resource-rich. While they have the potential for growth, transparent resource management is essential if they are to curb corruption and control illicit money flows that retard economic and social development. That, too, is a goal of the New Deal. The return of conflict in Mali and the recent unrest in central Mozambique underline the fragility of even successful transitions to peace. And no low-income or fragile state has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal. The New Deal for Fragile States represents a new, long term approach. Its potential is illustrated by the positive developments in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the decade following civil wars. Somalia’s newly elected government has announced that it will conduct all future development cooperation through the New Deal. The New Deal is, among other things, a follow-on to the Millennium Development Goals and involves a new conversation. On April 18, the International Dialogue on Peace Building and State Building convened a stakeholder meeting in Washington, DC to promote The New Deal as a framework for development and peace building.

Lori-Anne Theroux-Benoni, writing for the Institute for Security Studies from their office in Dakar, has written succinct analysis of the different approaches to peacekeeping employed in Africa. She contrasts the seeming inactivity of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) when M23 rebels overran Goma in November 2012, with the dynamism of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISO) moving against al-Shabaab. She notes that UN operations have traditionally been contingent on the consent of the parties involved, impartiality, and the non-use of force, except in defense of the mandate and in self-defense. The UN has been adjusting these principles to reflect intra-state conflicts where civilians may be deliberately targeted, but there is still work to be done. The African Union’s Constitutive Act, by contrast, authorizes forceful intervention in a member state in the event of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or at the request of the state government. The AU calls its operations “peace support,” not “peace keeping,” as the UN does. Hence with respect to northern Mali, Theroux-Benoni suggests that the initial “peace support” efforts should be undertaken by the African International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) with robust UN-organized financial and logistical support. A UN peacekeeping force would take over only when conditions were ripe. So, she argues credibly that the UN and AU mandates should be seen as complementary, and that both have a role to play in Mali. However, both the UN and the AU would require significant financial and logistical support from UN member states, which has so far been slow to finance the UN’s humanitarian appeal for the region.

Karen Kaya specializes in Middle Eastern affairs with a particular focus on Turkey and is a National Security Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Jason Warner is a Ph.D. student in African Studies and Government at Harvard University. Turkey and Somalia are the geopolitical realm’s newest couple, and things are getting serious. Turkey has unleashed a charm offensive in Africa, and Somalia specifically. After the last members of the al-Shebab terrorist group were chased out of Mogadishu in August 2011, Ankara flooded the city with some five hundred development and aid workers. Turkish prime minister Erdoğan was the first non-African leader to enter the city limits of Mogadishu since the country collapsed in 1991; Turkish Airlines was also the first major carrier to fly into Mogadishu in twenty years. Since then Turkey has given some U.S. $51 million to Somalia.  These overtures have stirred up serious emotions in the country. What forms do this love affair take? More than any other country, Turkey has taken on a deeply influential role in bringing Somalia’s situation to international attention. In May 2012 Turkey hosted a United Nations conference on Somalia’s transition process, after which Erdoğan explained: “We have really struggled to make Somalia’s voice heard.” Turkey has been assiduous in its efforts in opening schools, improving public sanitation, repairing roads, and renovating the country’s dilapidated airport. "They are the sponsor we have been looking for the last twenty years. They are the Holy Grail for Somalia.” A Somali national said. Turkey’s innovation is its on-the-ground engagement. Most countries operating in Somalia have headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. Turkey is in the thick of Mogadishu. This smashed the wall that made Mogadishu a no-go zone. It was the best gift for the Somali people. Turkey’s friendship overtures also extend beyond Somalia into the rest of Africa. Their embassies and consulates have increased from twelve in 2009 to an anticipated thirty-four by the end of 2012. Turkey is also trying to leverage its 99 percent Muslim identity to show how it is uniquely positioned to be a regional and global leader. Somalia analyst Abdihakim Aynte notes that Erdoğan’s 2011 Somalia visit reinforced this theory. Not everyone is impressed with Turkey’s leader-via-Islam strategy, however. Some in Turkey believe aid to Mogadishu is intended to woo Muslim voters to the moderately Islamist AKP party. Somalia’s al-Shebab openly ridiculed Turkey as “a stooge of the West.” Paralleling developmental assistance, Turkey agreed to train peacekeeping troops in 2010. In February 2012, Turkey was also poised to contribute capacity-building as well as material resources. This is a paradigm shift from previous, security-centric, approaches. What will the implications of the Turkey and Somalia love affair be? To Africa: while Somalia is reaping the rewards of international visibility and domestic security, other countries will also likely benefit from education and infrastructure development, and most importantly, increased trade relations. To Somalia: Turkey’s entrance appears to be a godsend. There is finally a genuinely devoted partner who is effective in catalyzing both peace and development. Further, Turkey’s Muslim identity undermines anti-imperial, jihadi rhetoric that historically underwrote al-Shebab’s terror logic. To Turkey: Africa provides allies for international forums. It also represents a source of natural resources, and a new market for diversified trade and reduced dependency on Europe. To the U.S.: Turkey’s presence in Africa will likely be more beneficial than undercutting. Though at odds on certain points, Washington and Ankara hold broadly similar goals for antiterrorist initiatives, conflict resolution, and economic development on the continent. Today, Turkey and Somalia are cozying up in the honeymoon period; whether their relationship will stand the test of time is yet to be seen.

This is a guest post by Nic Cheeseman. A version of this article originally appeared on the blog Democracy in Africa. Nic Cheeseman is a university lecturer in African politics and the Hugh Price Fellow of Jesus College at University of Oxford. The old plan to rebuild Somalia was based a fairly top-down model in which the idea was to first establish the framework of government (a Transitional Federal Government and a new constitution) and then to ensure its implementation. The plan faced a number of obvious problems. It is very difficult to establish a legitimate government by imposing a political structure from the top down, especially if a number of key actors are not included in the discussions over what the political system should look like. In the absence of widespread legitimacy, establishing the authority of the Transitional Federal Govermment (TFG) was always going to rely on force -- but, to borrow the words of Cameron himself, the engagement of the international community has been too ’sporadic and half-hearted’ for this to be a realistic proposition. So what is the new plan? Well, first of all it seems to be the end of the road for the TFG, which will now be replaced by a ’caretaker authority’ which will face exactly the same difficulty in establishing central control as its predecessor . But although it may sound like the new plan is basically the same as the old plan, it is actually very different. This can be seen in the language of the final communique of the conference which does not feature the words constitution, elections, or democracy once. Instead, there is a new focus on what are called ’local areas of stability’. Apparently there has been an agreement to ’increase support to build legitimate and peaceful authorities’ and to then use these authorities as the basis to ’promote local and regional cohesion’. In other words, the new plan to rebuild Somalia is to create a set of functioning local governments that will then be integrated back into a viable centralized state. It is understandable that diplomats, having failed with top down strategies for so long, have decided to ’go local’. But there are a number of major problems with the plan. First, it is unclear exactly which ’legitimate and peaceful authorities’ the communique refers to. In many parts of the country warlords and militias wield greater power than any civilian authority. Organic processes of state formation have been successful in Somaliland and Puntland, which presumably was part of the inspiration for the new approach, but the conditions in these areas were very different to places such as Mogadishu and Kismaayo. Doing deals with ’local authorities’ in these areas is likely to involve supporting some pretty unsavoury characters. Second, building federalism from the ’outside in’ (building a state out of a series of pre-existing units, rather than deciding to divide up an existing centralized state to create a devolved system of government) is a very tricky business. There are not many examples of this process occurring in the modern era and in most cases it results in relatively weak central governments. This is because pre-existing authority structures are likely to want to limit the strength of the central government in order to preserve their own power (think of the United States of America and the European Union). This is even more problematic if the ’local authorities’ are unaccountable and sustain themselves through corrupt or criminal activities. Finally, there is a question about how ’local’ the new localism really is. Without becoming too conspiratorial, it appears that the new plan will involve regional actors and the international community working to support local actors to establish political stability and to deliver services. Exactly what this means is not entirely clear at the time of writing. But it seems to imply that regional countries engaged in Somalia will direct their forces (already in the country currently fighting Al-Shabaab) to empower alternative local leaders to establish effective control in their sphere of influence. If this were to come to pass we might see Ethiopia forming partnerships with leaders along its border, and Kenya forming partnerships in its sphere of activity in South-Western Somalia. Such a plan may well prove an attractive proposition for Kenya and Ethiopia: it would enable them to create ’buffer zones’ to insulate their countries against Al-Shabaab and would improve their chances of benefitting from the natural resources that many suspect lie beneath Somali soil in the future. But would also create a potentially explosive situation by enmeshing regional players within domestic Somali battles, and in a worst case scenario could result in a set of new proxy wars as regional rivals jockey for control of territory and resources against the backdrop of a political vacuum. In other words, it would risk transforming Somalia into the Democratic Republic of Congo. This is where Professor Anderson’s talk (mp3) comes in. Kenya invaded Somalia to wage war against Al-Shabaab in October 2011, claiming that it was acting in self-defence following the kidnapping of tourists close to the Somali border. But most experts agree that there is little evidence that Al-Shabaab planned the kidnappings. Which raises the question of why Kenya was quite so keen to get involved in such a risky and expensive battle. Of course, the government were motivated by genuine concerns over sovereignty and the military has been keen to take firmer action to deal with the ‘Somali problem’ for years. But is it also possible that the Kenyan government got wind of the shift from a ‘top-down’ to a ‘bottom-up’ approach? And if so, might the Kenyans calculated that by sending troops into Somalia, portraying themselves as an active ally of the American government in the war of terror, and demarcating a Kenyan sphere of influence within Somali territory, they would be in a far better position to benefit from the new plan to rebuild Somalia?