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CFR experts examine the science and foreign policy surrounding climate change, energy, and nuclear security.

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Employees work on the production line of solar panels at a workshop of Jiangsu DMEGC New Energy Co., Ltd. on July 22, 2025 in Suqian, Jiangsu Province of China.
Employees work on the production line of solar panels at a workshop of Jiangsu DMEGC New Energy Co., Ltd. on July 22, 2025 in Suqian, Jiangsu Province of China. Xu Changliang/VCG/Getty Images

Trump’s UN Speech Cannot Steer the Global Climate Effort

Despite the president’s remarks criticizing global efforts to address climate change, other countries will pursue a clean energy transition or—like China—use the U.S. retreat to their advantage.

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Fossil Fuels
A New Study on Oil Taxes
Dan Ahn and I have a new energy brief out that takes a fresh look at oil taxes. From the introduction: "Policymakers are confronting difficult choices [regarding tax hikes and spending cuts].... In this context, it might be possible to reconsider oil taxes not only as an unwelcome burden, but as an alternative to something worse. We have modeled the potential consequences of substituting taxes on oil consumption for either higher non-oil taxes or reduced government spending, both as part of a larger deficit reduction package. [We show that] doing so can improve economic performance while reducing oil consumption if done right." The paper goes on to quantitatively explore the growth, employment, and oil consumption impacts of different ways of modifying deficit reduction packages using oil taxes. The paper is the first to look at oil taxes in the context of broader deficit packages; it’s also novel in that it looks at how oil taxes might perform in a weak economy. In a Bloomberg View op-ed today, we explain some of the basic results, and provide some simple intuitive explanation for the paper’s conclusions that goes beyond what’s in the paper itself. Take a look.
Fossil Fuels
President Obama: The World’s Best Oil Market Manager?
Okay, so the title of this post is tongue-in-cheek: the U.S. president has far less power to influence gasoline prices than campaign-season banter would lead you to believe. But I figure if a sitting president can take the blame for high and volatile oil prices, maybe the White House should take a little pride in the fact that, by some measures, oil prices reflect the lowest volatility in years. (There’s a bit more to the story, though.) Figure 1 shows the annualized 30-day historical volatility of spot WTI prices since 1984, the first full year after the benchmark launched based on that crude stream. Since the start of 2013, volatility by this metric hasn’t been so low on average since 1995. Were it to drop below 15 percent and stay there consistently, it would be the first time since 1992. Figure 1. Annualized 30-day historical volatility of spot WTI prices (1984 – present) Source: Bloomberg Note implied volatility as well. The so-called “Oil VIX,” a barometer of market expectations of 30-day volatility of crude prices, dropped to 21.67 percent on January 22, the lowest reading since the index began tracking the market in 2007. The index is an oil-specific version of the VIX, a measure of equity market volatility, derived from volatility skew from a range of option strike prices on the United States Oil Fund. Figure 2. CBOE Oil ETF VIX Index (2007 - present) Source: Bloomberg Looking at historical volatility only in percentage terms, though, can mask the magnitude of the changes in absolute prices and thereby gloss over the potentially harmful macroeconomic effects of large price swings. If you were to look only at Figure 1, you couldn’t tell that the oscillation in flat price has been of an order of magnitude higher between 2010 – 2012 than it was from 1996 - 1998. These absolute changes are not always quantitatively discernible when viewed in relative terms, but they matter to net effects on the macroeconomy. Figure 3. WTI spot prices (1983 – present) Source: Bloomberg One way to see how noisy today’s oil prices are in absolute terms is to multiply prices by volatility. Figure 4 shows WTI spot prices since 1984 times the same rolling 30-day volatility depicted in Figure 1. The result is striking: the market’s gotten a whole lot rowdier when it comes to the magnitude of the price swings in dollar terms, even if volatility by other measures has fallen. Figure 4. Annualized 30-day historical volatility of spot WTI prices * spot WTI prices (1984 - present) Source: Bloomberg
Fossil Fuels
Thinking Carefully About Tight Oil
A piece in Slate by Ray Pierrehumbert arguing that tight oil abundance is a myth is making the rounds. The essay makes some fair warnings against irrational exuberance when it comes to hundred year supplies, claims of endless energy independence, and complacency on climate change as a result of abundant natural gas. But the piece does at least as much to confuse as illuminate. Fortunately, that provides a good opportunity to look at a few important misunderstandings that frequently arise in discussions about U.S. oil. The Slate essay starts with an attack on a paper published last year by Leonardo Maugeri that had a distinctly cornucopian bent. Many, myself included, have argued that that paper was way over the top. But Pierrehumbert makes a big mistake when he claims that all of the other excitement – from the EIA, IEA, and others – have flowed from bandwagoning on the Maugeri report. Those of us who spend decent parts of our professional lives involved in this stuff know quite well that this isn’t what happened. For starters, the first prominent and enthusiastic projections weren’t from Maugeri; they were from Ed Morse at Citigroup. The EIA and IEA reports used bottom-up analyses that were independent of the Maugeri work. If people want to pick apart these studies, that’s fine, but cutting down one largely unrelated outlier won’t do the trick. The next big problem with the Slate essay – again one that many others make too – is that it appears to assume that tight oil will need to deliver all U.S. oil production. That allows it to claim things like this: “At the high end of the estimates, predicted production from Bakken and Eagle Ford together amounts to perhaps a two-year oil supply for the United States at 2011 consumption rates.... Even if it were to prove possible to achieve production rates comparable to those of Saudi Arabia, that would only mean that we would deplete the resource faster and bring on an oil crash sooner.” On top of this, while Pierrehumbert is right that some people are ignoring the fact that current tight oil prospects will peak and then decline, he errs in presenting this as a critique of mainstream estimates, like those by the IEA and EIA, despite the fact that those projections show precisely that same decline. The essay then launches in an oft-heard discussion about high decline rates and large capital costs. Geologists’ focus on this as an argument for why production will be low continues to baffle me. Do people think that the models used by government agencies and industry forecasters don’t incorporate this? Of course they do. They just find that, even when they include this, economic incentives still push things toward higher production, at least through the end of the decade. There is no law of nature that says it’s impossible to produce a lot of oil from a field whose wells are expensive and decline quickly. The Slate essay also manages to bring in one of my favorite bugaboos: energy return on investment (EROI). It is taking ever more energy, Pierrehumbert points out, to produce a barrel of oil. This is supposed to herald the disastrous coming of a day when we need to put more energy in than we get out. But not all energy is the same, and it can make very good sense to put in large amounts of energy in a relatively low-value form (e.g. gas) to get a smaller amount of high-value energy (e.g. oil) out. Once again, geology and physics are important, but economics need to be factored in. One last point: the Slate essay repeats the misleading juxtaposition of the amount oil in a massive resource (this time the Green River shale formation) with plausible emissions limits in a carbon-constrained world, in order to warn about the climate consequences of extracting the new fuels. But this suffers from the same problem that the “game over” claims for the tar sands have: it pays no attention to time scales. There is no plausible scenario in which we’ll spend the next thousand years with a totally decarbonized economy – except that we’ll burn everything in Colorado or Alberta or some other discrete carbon pool. The causal arrow runs the other way: these big pools of oil will be burned if we choose to cook ourselves; they will mostly remain in the ground if we don’t. It’s how much fossil fuels we use, not where they come from, that matters most to the planet.
  • Fossil Fuels
    Why Roll Yield Matters to Oil Benchmark Preferences
    In my last post I discussed how trading volumes show a migration into ICE Brent from NYMEX West Texas Intermediate (WTI), two of the world’s most watched crude oil benchmarks. The trend is part of Brent’s broader rise as the preeminent world price of oil. Here I’d like to show graphically part of the reason why some financial market participants are opting to trade the North Sea crude instead of its American cousin. It has to do with recent trends in the futures prices for both crudes. Figure 1 shows the forward curves—i.e., a series of sequential prices for future delivery— for NYMEX WTI and ICE Brent crude oil. Prices for Brent, in red, stretch out to 2019, whereas WTI, in green, go through 2021. I noted in my last post the remarkable divergence between front-month contracts for Brent and WTI, a significant shift from the historical norm of WTI’s slight premium. Note in Figure 1 the difference in the shape of the two curves for near-dated contracts. WTI contracts through August 2013 were in a state of contango, with prices rising into the future. For backwardated Brent, on the other hand, prices are progressively declining over the entire curve. Figure 1. Forward curves for NYMEX WTI and ICE Brent as of Jan. 24 Source: Bloomberg This difference in structure may seem arcane, but it has proven an important driver of the shift among some financial market participants into Brent contracts at the expense of WTI. Commodity index investors, for example, are interested in reaping roll yield, or the normalized difference between a nearby and a deferred futures contract, since they roll their exposure as futures contracts approach expiration. This type of yield is one of the primary sources of long-term returns for commodity index investors. As Figure 1 shows, though, the Brent curve offers a positive roll yield for contracts at the front of the curve—in contrast to WTI, where that yield would be negative, all else equal. That differential, which tilts the balances toward the North Sea benchmark insofar as the roll-related return potential, has been one factor pushing trading volumes in its direction. Figure 2 shows this differential in another way. It depicts the price spread between futures contracts for the two crudes one and six months in the future since 2000. The close correlation between the spreads for the two markers were tightly positive up until around 2010, when the glut of light-sweet crude in the U.S. midcontinent sent WTI into a prolonged state of contango, whereas Brent’s structure reflects relative physical tightness in the underlying North Sea streams. Figure 2. 1 - 6 month price spread for NYMEX WTI and ICE Brent (2000-2013) Source: Bloomberg Because the market expects Cushing’s supply woes to begin to be amerliorated later this year, the result of additional pipeline capacity draining excess crude inventories, WTI’s contangoed structure extends out only through September as of yesterday’s market close. After that delivery date, as Figure 1 suggests, the slopes the two curves come closer into alignment, minimizing Brent’s roll yield advantage over the American benchmark. As Figure 3 makes plain, though, near-dated contracts for the crudes are traded much more heavily than those further out along the forward curve. The differential in the term structure of the two crudes, though by market expectations impermanent, appears sufficient over the most heavily traded contract months to have helped incline some commodity traders toward Brent over WTI. Figure 3. NYMEX WTI 20-day average trading volume over the length of the curve as of Jan. 24 Source: Bloomberg
  • Heads of State and Government
    Unexpected Energy Headlines for Obama’s Second Term
    When you ask energy experts what headlines to watch for in President Obama’s second term, you’re likely to hear about issues that are hot right now: the possibility of new greenhouse gas regulations, growth of U.S. oil and gas, prospects for wind energy and distributed solar, LNG exports, and the like. All of these will almost certainly be in the news. But I’ll hazard another guess: odds are high that many of the biggest headlines and decisions will be about things that we aren’t even thinking about today. Look at the President’s first term. Some of the headlines were about predictable issues: the fate of cap-and-trade legislation; the outcome of the Copenhagen climate talks; the results of U.S. efforts to promote clean energy through the stimulus. One can also argue that while the specifics of other big climate headlines – Hurricane Sandy, Western wildfires, and so on – were unpredictable, the fact that there would be climate events like like that were not. But many of the biggest energy events and challenges of the last four years were pretty much unanticipated: the Deepwater Horizon oil spill; the U.S. oil and gas boom; the Keystone XL pipeline and LNG export fights; the Fukushima nuclear disaster; and the Arab Spring, with all of its implications for world oil markets. Look back through Dan Yergin’s timeline of (mostly) modern energy history and you’ll see that this isn’t a quirk of the last four years. The Bush administration didn’t expect $145 oil, Hurricane Katrina, skyrocketing natural gas prices, 9/11, or a protracted war in Iraq. The Clinton administration, entering office soon after the first Iraq war, probably did not expect eight years of energy market calm. Heck, the Buchanan administration was probably pretty surprised when Edwin Drake struck Pennsylvania oil. The unpredictability of the energy world shouldn’t just matter do crystal ball gazers. It should matter to businesspeople whose investments are exposed to the possibility of rapid and unexpected change. It should matter to government leaders who are evaluating policy options whose costs and benefits might change suddenly in the face of unanticipated events. And it should matter to anyone, analyst or advocate, who tries to influence them: there is a tendency to focus on tactical decisions, but when circumstances change, it’s leaders’ much broader strategic outlooks that shape how they respond.