Russia

Thirty-five years ago, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski famously declared that the doctrine of détente “lies buried in the sands of Ogaden.” By exporting revolution to the Horn of Africa, he implied, Moscow had abandoned norms of peaceful coexistence, as well as prospects for the SALT treaty. One wonders if a more recent would-be doctrine, the “responsibility to protect” (R2P), is destined to suffer a similar fate. Two years ago, the UN Security Council seemed to vindicate this new norm, by authorizing “all necessary means” to protect Libyan civilians against strongman Muammar al-Qaddafi. Today, R2P clings to life support in Syria, as the civilian body count there mounts to appalling levels. Many commentators, including this one, welcomed the Security Council’s authorization of intervention in Libya as the first legitimated use of armed force under R2P. UNSC Resolution 1973, as well as historic support from the Arab League, provided legitimacy to a NATO-led intervention that reversed Qaddafi’s depredations and, ultimately, provided cover for Libyan rebels to remove him from power. At the time, the intervention seemed to tick all the boxes: the situation was grave, the interveners’ cause was just, and their response was proportional. After a lengthy air campaign, in which no NATO troops lost their lives, Qaddafi had been toppled from power. At the time, it was easy to overlook the fact that this Western interpretation was not widely shared—and that the Libyan case had unique features that were unlikely to be easily replicated in other settings. These features included a dictator despised in the Arab world, a country of minimal strategic importance, a small national population, and topography conducive to an aerial campaign. Diplomatic fallout began quickly. Russia and China, which had abstained from the resolution, soon objected that the NATO-led coalition had transformed the UN mandate into a license for “regime change.” Such a claim was either naïve or cynical, since all involved in Security Council deliberations should have been well aware of the expansive implications of authorizing “all necessary means,” as well as the unlikelihood that Qaddafi himself would agree to a negotiated agreement with rebel forces. Nevertheless, the complaint resonated in many corners of the globe. The African Union (AU) also emerged as a primary critic, depicting the intervention as yet another ill-advised imperialist venture on the continent. This reflected less knee-jerk opposition to R2P—after all, the AU’s constitutive act declares “non-indifference” to the internal affairs of other countries, and its Peace and Security Council has endorsed the principle of intervention in cases of genocide and mass atrocities—than pique at being sidelined diplomatically. By brushing aside AU efforts at diplomatic mediation, the Western powers reinforced African insistence that future interventions on the continent be endorsed by the African Union. The chaotic aftermath of the Libyan intervention also left a sour taste in the mouths of many UN member states. Indeed, independent militias continue to run rampant in parts of Libya two years after the intervention.  Moreover, the collapse of Libyan domestic security permitted a wave of weaponry to wash over neighboring countries—contributing to instability in the Sahel. In Mali, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and extremist Tuareg groups exploited this flow of material to launch their bloody insurgency, at one point controlling nearly half of the country. Even before the civil war in Syria, then, the implementation of R2P in Libya had generated buyer’s remorse among many governments that had endorsed it at the 2005 UN World Summit. In an effort to rescue the concept, Brazil proposed that UN member states embrace the related concept of “responsibility while protecting” (RWP) in November 2011. Under this framework, the UN Security Council would undertake military intervention only as a last resort, after weighing the balance of likely consequences, and ensure that any force used was proportionate to the gravity of the situation. It would also oblige the Security Council to adopt a formal monitoring and review mechanism where states would discuss and debate the implementation of any ongoing R2P action. The proposed RWP scheme is not without problems: the “last resort” requirement is at odds with the reality that early, preventive action is often the best way to head off atrocities. The Permanent Five (P5) may also balk at committing to an ongoing monitoring mechanism for R2P-mandated missions. Nevertheless, the Brazilian proposal offers a potential bridge to bring skeptical governments back to the R2P fold. As such, it merits careful U.S. consideration rather than dismissal. It is the bloody situation in Syria, however, that has fostered disillusionment with (though not yet the demise of) R2P. The most obvious lesson to be drawn is that the implementation of R2P will inevitably be selective. If one or more of the P5—in this case Russia—sees a significant national interest in protecting the offending government, the UNSC will be blocked. Interventionist powers will then face the unpalatable choice of doing nothing or (as the United States did in Kosovo with NATO) pursuing a surrogate form of multilateral legitimacy for coercive action. Second, the Syrian case demonstrates the difficulty of applying R2P when the conflict in question has evolved from a government making war on unarmed civilians into a full-blown civil war in which both regime and rebel forces commit atrocities. When opposing sides are wearing neither white nor black hats but varying shades of grey, the threshold criteria for R2P intervention—and the means by which it should be implemented—become even cloudier than normal. Third, the situation in Syria underscores the difficulty of reconciling humanitarian ideals with geopolitical concerns. The Obama administration, from the President on down, has often denied this distinction, on the grounds that mass atrocities create dangerous spillover consequences for entire regions (with the Great Lakes region of Africa a case in point), as well as fomenting forces of (and providing havens for) extremism. Perhaps. But the strategic, economic, and human consequences of a U.S.-led military intervention in Syria are hard to predict. The costs—for regional instability, budgetary overstretch, and U.S. lives—could be gargantuan. And they need to be weighed against the likelihood (and benefits) of “success”—something the administration has yet to define. This cost-benefit analysis must also include an honest assessment of the expenses associated with “the responsibility to rebuild” the post-intervention society (something the Bush administration notoriously neglected to do in Iraq). It would be premature to describe Syria as the death knell of R2P. But it is clear that much of the idealism surrounding the UN’s unanimous endorsement of the norm eight years ago has dissipated, buried in the Libyan Desert and the blood-soaked hills of Syria.

According to the press, Brazil is negotiating an agreement with Mozambique to finance the construction of the Moamba Major dam to provide drinking water for Maputo. It is expected to cost U.S. $500 million. The Bank of Brazil has funded an environmental impact study for the project. With a population approaching two million and growing rapidly, Maputo needs an assured water supply. A successful agreement between Brazil and Mozambique means that construction on the dam could start as early as 2014. The Moamba Major dam highlights Brazil’s expanded engagement in Africa. Chatham House, in November 2012, published a highly useful briefing paper on Brazil’s growing African role. It highlights Brazil’s African economic interest. Its trade with the continent increased from U.S. $4.2 billion to U.S. $27.6 billion over the past decade. Africa is potentially an important export market for Brazilian manufactured goods. But, the Chatham House briefer highlights that Brazil sees African engagement as more than economics. It is a key to Brazil’s recognition as a major power, and close south-south relations focused on Africa could help build international support for a permanent UN Security Council seat for Brazil. Brazil seeks a partnership for development with an important political dimension rather than solely an economic relationship. Brazil is one of the BRICS countries, along with Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Brazil’s expanding role in Africa is overshadowed in the international media by China and India’s larger role. (So, too, is South Africa’s role.) But, Brazil’s approach to Africa appears to be the more broadly based, with important political and developmental aspects, as well as economic. And there are important cultural ties between Brazil and the Lusophone Africa states such as Angola and Mozambique. Brazil also has the diaspora’s largest population of African origin. Thus far, the Brazilians appear to have avoided the cultural and other mistakes of the Chinese. The Brazilian relationship with Africa may prove deeper and longer lasting than that of its higher-profile rivals among the BRICS.

This week yet another ratcheting up of tensions between Japanese and Chinese forces in the East China Sea drew our attention. Alongside the incremental escalation of danger inherent in these interactions is the dueling narratives about what is actually happening on the ground—or, more accurately, on the water and in the air. The confusing stories coming out of Northeast Asian capitals only complicate an already worrisome  situation, one that could easily result in a local commander behaving badly or miscalculating. The latest iteration is the intriguing Chinese response to the most recent incident. The Japanese government protested a Chinese Jiangwei-II class naval frigate’s use of radar to actively target Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyer Yudachi. The incident occurred on January 30 in waters 100–200 kilometers (62–124 miles) northwest of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. A similar incident apparently occurred on January 19 when a MSDF helicopter was the object of a firing radar lock by a Chinese Jiangkai-I class frigate, according to the Japanese Ministry of Defense. At first, Beijing authorities did not acknowledge the incident, but noted the report in the Japanese media of the incident. Silence then ensued, leading many to speculate that the ship’s commander had not had authorization from Beijing for his actions. On February 8, China’s Ministry of Defense issued a statement saying that fire control radar was not used in either incident and that Japan has “repeatedly spread false accusations which distorted facts and defamed Chinese military’s normal combat readiness training.” A spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also reported the results of the Defense Ministry’s investigation, stated that the incident never happened, and accused Japan of “completely making something out of nothing.” Adding to this effort to claim nothing happened are the Russians, who apparently sent two SU-27 jets into Japanese airspace to the northwest of Hokkaido. When the Russian Defense Ministry denied the event, saying its military aircraft flew in “strict accordance with international rules governing airspace,” the Japanese government offered to hand over the data to prove it. Why exactly the Russians would want to exacerbate an already tense situation between Japan and China is unclear. Japan has little incentive to make up an incident since Japan’s prime minister has personally argued for better relations with Moscow. Exchanging data over these types of incidents would be wise for all concerned, but particularly for Japan and China. If Tokyo and Beijing want to contain the escalatory dynamics between their forces in the East China Sea, then this would be the right moment to begin to work on processes for better managing an already dangerous situation. Noteworthy is the Chinese acknowledgement that this kind of radar targeting is a "dangerous act," and one that the Beijing government would recognize as unacceptable. The finger pointing over who is raising the stakes, Japan or China, can blur lines of communication within governments as easily as between them. Local commanders must understand who is in charge in Beijing and in Tokyo. Sharing data between central government authorities on incidents such as these would build confidence in each country’s desire to avoid serious incidents between their two militaries. Equally important, it would help Japanese and Chinese governments be fully confident that each is in full control of their militaries.

The new year is a time of hope. As 2013 dawns, optimists yearn for a period of sustained global economic growth after five years of recession, turbulence, and sluggish recovery. Achieving this scenario will require close policy coordination among governments of the world’s major economies. This places a heavy burden on the Russian Federation, which on December 1 assumed the rotating chairmanship of the Group of Twenty (G20). It has become fashionable to dismiss the G20 as irrelevant at best or a failure at worst. Neither critique is fair. During the depths of the global financial crisis, the G20 proved its value by helping to set the global agenda, shape new international rules and norms, and address practical challenges of macroeconomic policy coordination. As an uneven recovery began to take hold and national interests came to the fore, however, the group’s momentum stalled. The question now is whether the G20 can serve not only as a short-term crisis manager but also as a longer-term steering group for the global economy—and other global challenges. The Kremlin does not lack for outside advice about how to manage its tenure. At the invitation of Russian officials, the Council of Councils (CoC)—a global network of think tanks convened by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)—recently offered the Russian Government eleven separate memos suggesting priorities for its chairmanship, which will culminate in September at the G20 summit in St. Petersburg. My own contribution recommends several steps for success. Given space constraints, I’ll focus here on the three most important. Moscow should persuade its partners to: - Embrace a G20 mandate encompassing both crisis management and long-term challenges. The G20 provided an indispensable forum to respond to the 2008 global financial crisis. The body must remain prepared to coordinate multilateral responses to future crises, including convening emergency meetings outside the regular summit schedule to grapple with extraordinary crises. At the same time, the Russian chair should encourage the G20 to confront and resolve longer-term structural issues. Several long-term priorities come to mind. First, the G20 must continue to press surplus and deficit countries to rectify longstanding global imbalances. While China’s undervalued exchange rate has already appreciated gradually, easing some frictions,  significant international imbalances persist, imperiling global recovery. Second, the G20 must press for the evolution of the new Financial Stability Board into a fully-fledged international organization, with adequate staff, resources and authority to monitor and enforce the new financial regulatory standards it is promulgating. Third, the G20 must engage the global trade agenda. In a shaky recovery, holding the line against protectionism is insufficient. With the death of Doha, the era of comprehensive trade deals may be over. But the G20 can spearhead negotiation of more limited sectoral and plurilateral agreements, to which interested parties can adhere. - Strengthen the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) to permit candid evaluation of G20 efforts. When it comes to summit meetings, nothing breeds cynicism like perceived failure of states to live up to their past pledges. Russia can help dispel such skepticism by pressing fellow G20 members to give real teeth to the MAP. Currently, each G20 member agrees, on a purely voluntary basis, to share economic information and policy targets with one another and the staff of the IMF, which then ascertains whether national policy choices are consistent with the Pittsburgh Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth. At Los Cabos, the G20 strengthened this peer review process by establishing a new Accountability Assessment Framework, accompanied by a public, annual report. While the MAP provides a useful global forum for the negotiation and sharing of national commitments, it remains a weak instrument for policy coordination. To strengthen the MAP, Moscow should push its G20 partners to support reforms outlined in a recent report by the Canadian think tank CIGI: create a transparent, online database permitting analysts to review international commitments; adopt a more rigorous peer review process; create a more robust analytical capability (notionally within the IMF) to assess the global impact of national policies; and establish an enhanced negotiating forum where G20 members can engage in bargaining over respective national commitments. - Craft a broader agenda and create a foreign ministers’ track. Among the biggest debates about the G20’s future is whether it should hew closely to its initial macroeconomic and financial focus, or expand its vision to address a wider array of global challenges. G20 finance ministries, which have dominated the summit process to date, are nearly unanimous in resisting any “mission creep”, fearing that a sprawling list of tasks would dilute its coherence and effectiveness. Over time, however, leaders themselves are likely to find the G20 an irresistible setting to tackle other pressing items on the global agenda. Already, successive hosts have broadened the G20’s substantive agenda, adding items like a new approach to development in Seoul and a commitment to “green growth” in Los Cabos. The quandary for Russia is to manage the G20’s expanding agenda so that it does not jeopardize the body’s crisis management capacity, overwhelm the annual summit process, or jeopardize the informality that makes such leaders-level gatherings attractive. The G20 can reduce these risks by taking three related steps. First, it should create a permanent foreign ministers’ track to complement the finance ministers’ track. Here, Russia can build on the “informal” meeting of G20 foreign ministers hosted by Mexico in February 2012. Potential agenda items would include climate change, development cooperation, nuclear non-proliferation, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and efforts to combat transnational crime. Second,  it should sharpen the agenda of G20 finance ministers (and central bank governors), so that they can focus more narrowly on their core missions of promoting global growth, improving financial regulation, and advancing governance reforms within international financial institutions. Third, the G20 should raise the bar for including new items on the actual G20 summit agenda. An issues should be raised to the leaders’ level only rarely—notably when it requires a high-level decision and when no existing global institution has already been seized of the problem

Transparency International has just issued its Corruption Perceptions Index 2012. The scale ranges from one hundred (“highly clean”) to zero (“highly corrupt.”) One hundred-sixty-seven countries were surveyed this year. The African countries with the highest scores were those that usually do best on such scales: they are small (Botswana, sixty-five; Cape Verde, sixty; Mauritius, fifty-seven.) Among the larger states, Ghana (forty-five) and South Africa (forty-three) did the best, as they usually do in that category. At the bottom were Chad (nineteen), Sudan (thirteen), and Somalia (eight.) Among larger African states, Ethiopia’s score was thirty-three, Kenya’s was twenty-seven, Nigeria’s twenty-seven, and Congo-Kinshasa’s was twenty-one. World-wide, two-thirds of all countries scored less than fifty out of a one hundred. It is no surprise that the highest scores were Denmark (ninety), Finland (ninety), and New Zealand (ninety). All three are small, highly developed and generally have the best social statistics in the world. The lowest scores are also no surprise: Afghanistan (eight), North Korea (eight) and Somalia (eight). But in the broad, middle range, those that scored fifty or below included Estonia (sixty-four), Puerto Rico (sixty-three), China (thirty-nine), and India (thirty-six.) Russia’s score was twenty-eight. China and India, of course, have the largest populations in the world, and their combined populations make up more than half of humanity. The third largest country in the world by population is the United States. Its score was seventy-three; the United Kingdom was seventy-four, Germany, seventy-nine, and France seventy-one. Canada was eighty-four. The survey measures perceptions of corruption, not actual levels of corruption. With a few exceptions, most of the world’s population perceives corruption in their own country to be a major issue. That is certainly true in Africa where, for example, in South Africa and Nigeria the media constantly bewails official corruption and sees it as a barrier to sustainable economic development.