Comparing the Size and Capabilities of the Russian and Ukrainian Militaries

In Brief

Comparing the Size and Capabilities of the Russian and Ukrainian Militaries

Russia holds a sizable advantage over Ukraine on troop numbers and weaponry yet the two sides have fought to a standstill. Russia this spring has ramped up attacks on civilian targets while resisting U.S. ceasefire calls.

Where does the battlefield stand?

By the spring of 2025, the conflict had reached a relative stalemate. The current front line runs over six hundred miles from the Kherson region in southern Ukraine to the Luhansk region, part of the Donbas, in the east. Russia controls roughly 20 percent of Ukraine and continues to make incremental gains. Recent analysis indicates that Russia has accelerated its territorial advances, capturing an average of 5.5 square miles per day this month—more than double the rate in April, according to a Ukrainian war monitoring organization. Reports indicate that Russia has concentrated almost half of its attacks this year in the area around Pokrovsk, a logistical and supply hub for Ukraine’s military in the east. Russia also continues to inflict heavy damage on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and major population centers with long-range missile and drone strikes. However, Ukrainian forces have proven remarkably resilient.

Since the February 2022 invasion, Ukrainian forces have regained over 50 percent of the territory seized by Russia, notably preventing the capture of Kyiv and forcing the withdrawal of Russian forces from northern Ukraine during the early stages of the war. Russia launched a series of new offensives that gained ground in 2024, but Ukraine’s military managed to slow Russia’s rate of advance in recent months.

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Despite Russia and Ukraine’s various successes, neither side has managed a significant territorial breakthrough in recent months. As a result, the fighting has devolved into a war of attrition.

What losses have Russia and Ukraine’s militaries suffered?

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Russia maintains the military advantage it held prior to the invasion in February 2022, though both militaries have incurred heavy losses over the course of the war. Around 750,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded in the war thus far, according to a March 2025 U.S. intelligence report. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said a month earlier that Ukraine’s forces had suffered more than 425,000 casualties during the conflict. Still, Russia is estimated to have a total of 1.1 million active-duty soldiers, roughly 600,000 of which are deployed in or near Ukraine. In contrast, Ukraine has roughly 880,000 active-duty personnel, Zelenskyy said earlier this year, though other estimates vary.

The high casualty rates have strained both militaries. To an extent, the Ukrainian military has been able to adapt its tactics to accommodate the manpower shortage, using high-tech military drones, for example, to slow Russian advances and inflict high casualties. Ukraine reports having built 2.2 million drones last year and aims to produce 4.5 million this year. Ukraine is also building ground-based and sea-based drones, which were used last summer to drive the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of Crimea and open up the Black Sea to Ukrainian commerce. In a surprise attack on June 1, Ukraine’s intelligence service conducted a coordinated drone operation that successfully struck five Russian air bases, destroying roughly forty military aircraft, according to Zelenskyy. Drones are now inflicting an estimated 70 percent of the casualties on both sides. Russia, for its part, has turned to other recruitment tactics to boost its manpower, such as relying on foreign fighters. In November, for example, about ten thousand North Korean troops deployed to help the Russians counter Ukraine’s successful offensive in the Kursk region of Russia.

Both have also suffered significant equipment losses. Russia reportedly lost a total of fourteen thousand tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers and has turned to refurbishing Soviet-era armor and artillery to equip its expanding number of units. In the first half of 2024, delays in U.S. military and financial assistance left Ukraine with an acute ammunition shortage. At the time, Russia was reportedly firing at least five times as many artillery rounds as Ukraine. With continued support from foreign governments and heavy investment in its defense production sector, Ukraine has been able to overcome its equipment deficit and now boasts a defense industrial base that has grown more than tenfold since the start of the war. However, Ukraine’s defense industrial base remains far smaller than that of Russia, which continues to expand its already sizable defense production, albeit at high cost. For example, Russia recently reached their goal to ramp up their drone production to over one-hundred drones per day, contributing to the surge of drone attacks on Ukrainian cities in recent months.

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How much do Russia and Ukraine spend on their militaries?

Ukraine’s military expenditure has increased sharply since 2022, and it was the eighth largest military spender in the world in 2023. Nevertheless, Russia continues to outspend Ukraine. Between 2023 and 2024, Russia’s military spending increased by 40 percent, surpassing Europe’s combined military expenditure over the same period. Both countries intend to continue this upward trajectory. Draft budget documents indicated Russia’s plan to increase its national defense budget to nearly $145 billion, 6.3 percent of its total gross domestic product (GDP), in 2025, while Ukraine’s approved state budget allocated roughly $53.7 billion, or 26 percent of its GDP, for defense and security.

How has foreign assistance affected Russia’s and Ukraine’s military capabilities?

Ukraine’s military relies heavily on support from its Western allies. The United States has led the majority of the effort to arm and equip Ukraine, providing them with advanced weapons, intelligence, training, and billions of dollars of other financial and military assistance. President Donald Trump temporarily paused U.S. support for Ukraine in March before resuming it, but the U.S. aid pipeline is running dry, and Trump has given no indication that he will support more U.S. aid for Kyiv. Though the United States has committed more security assistance than any other country, Europe as a whole accounts for roughly 60 percent of all financial and military aid to Ukraine. Indeed, with the future of U.S. assistance to Ukraine uncertain under the Trump administration, European countries such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have stepped up their pledged support. For example, Germany announced it would provide thirty missiles to use on Patriot missile systems, while the Netherlands indicated its plans to supply a Hawkeye air defense system, an early warning mechanism. However, most experts argue that the current level of support is only enough to continue the current stalemate; it is not sufficient for a Ukrainian victory.

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Foreign assistance to Russia is much harder to verify, but evidence suggests that Russia is also reliant on foreign support, notably from China, Iran, and North Korea. China continues to provide indirect aid, helping Russia circumvent Western sanctions by buying Russian oil and gas and supplying Russia with many of the crucial components needed to build weapons systems. Last year, the European External Action Service reported that China was providing lethal aid to Russia for the first time in the form of military drones. General Christopher Cavoli, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, also blamed China for the faster-than-anticipated reconstitution of the Russian military. Similarly, Iran has provided Russia with lethal drones and ballistic missiles and has enhanced its energy cooperation with Russia. North Korea has provided millions of rounds of artillery, as well as a number of outdated offensive systems. Perhaps most notably, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un has also sent roughly fourteen thousand troops to fight alongside Russian soldiers.

What effect could a ceasefire have on Russia and Ukraine’s military capabilities?

In the event of a complete ceasefire, such as the thirty-day ceasefire proposed by U.S. President Donald Trump, both sides could use such a pause to reorganize and replenish their depleted forces and equipment. Some experts argue that given Russia’s continued battlefield momentum, as well as manpower and air power advantages, a pause in hostilities would primarily benefit Ukraine. However, a pause raises several potential issues for Ukraine’s military. It would jeopardize recent gains made around the eastern cities of Pokrovsk and Toretsk if it allows Russia’s military to regroup and launch new offensive operations. Others have also raised questions about Ukraine’s ability to maintain its current levels of mobilization and the West’s resolve to continue providing the same amount of aid in the absence of fighting.  

Russian service members ride military buggies during combat training at a firing range, in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict, in Krasnodar region, Russia December 12, 2024.
Russian service members ride buggies during combat training in Krasnodar region, Russia, December 12, 2024. Sergey Pivovarov/Reuters

Russia would likely be able to reconstitute its forces at a more rapid pace than Ukraine. Russia’s aggressive recruitment efforts have enabled it to continue growing its forces despite heavy casualties, though recent analysis suggests the Kremlin is also increasingly concerned with retaining its forces during a ceasefire. That has led other experts to argue that with Russia’s current upper hand, a ceasefire would allow Moscow to maximize its current gains and resume the war with greater strength. However, Russia could also face certain challenges, including the economy’s ability to maintain its war-time production levels. Ultimately, the side that will benefit most will be determined by the conditions of any ceasefire agreement.

It remains doubtful that an agreement can be reached and upheld. While President Zelenskyy has agreed to a complete thirty-day ceasefire, Putin has refused, drawing rare criticism from Trump for his unwillingness to stop the war. Over the past several months, Russia and Ukraine have agreed to several partial or temporary ceasefires, all of which were reportedly violated. In March, both sides agreed to two limited, thirty-day ceasefire agreements: one to halt attacks on energy infrastructure, and another to stop engagements in the Black Sea. In late April, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared an ‘Easter Truce’ to last thirty hours, but both sides quickly reported violations. The same occurred after Putin announced a three-day ceasefire to coincide with Moscow’s commemoration of the defeat of Nazi Germany on May 9. Negotiations remain ongoing to achieve a complete, longer-lasting cessation of hostilities, but little progress has been made. So long as Putin continues to believe that Russia holds the military advantage, it is unlikely that he will move off of his maximalist position and negotiate in good faith.

Will Merrow and Michael Bricknell created the graphics for this In Brief.

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Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week. In the Middle East, Israel and Iran are engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. CFR’s experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict on CFR.org. While the situation evolves, including the potential for direct U.S. involvement, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region which could have far-reaching consequences: the diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) technology to leading Gulf powers. The defining feature of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters ranging from European security to trade. His approach to AI policy is no exception. Less than six months into his second term, Trump is set to fundamentally rewrite the United States’ international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come. In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump administration planned to abandon the Biden administration’s safety-centric approach to AI governance in favor of a laissez-faire regulatory regime. “The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,” Vance said. “It will be won by building—from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.” And as Trump’s AI czar David Sacks put it, “Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That’s not a winning formula for technology development. We’ve got to let the private sector cook.” The accelerationist thrust of Vance and Sacks’s remarks is manifesting on a global scale. Last month, during Trump’s tour of the Middle East, the United States announced a series of deals to permit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially over one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models. These imports were made possible by the Trump administration’s decision to scrap a Biden administration executive order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside the United States and China to date. The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: training data, algorithms (the governing logic of AI models like ChatGPT), advanced chips like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)—and massive, power-hungry data centers filled with advanced chips.  Today, the United States maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors—a field in which U.S. tech giants like Nvidia and AMD, remain far ahead of their global competitors. To weaponize this chokepoint, the first Trump administration and the Biden administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.  The semiconductor export control regime culminated in the final days of the Biden administration with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule—a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors. The rule sorted the world into three camps. Tier 1 countries, including core U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas tier 3 countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls. The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the tier 2 bucket, which included some 150 countries including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many tier 2 states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to the United States, were furious.  The rule wasn’t just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how the United States could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties. Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states’ access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.  However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivize tier 2 countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure. Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem. This hypothesis is about to be tested in real time. In May, the Trump administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers. This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially also in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China. The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and the United States leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants. We are now playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology—and an effort to box out Chinese technology—is of paramount importance. Perhaps maintaining and expanding the United States’ global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete the United States—but it also introduces the risk of U.S. chips falling into the wrong hands via transhipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.  Such risks are not illusory: there is already ample evidence of Chinese firms using shell entities to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia. And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE’s G-42, until the U.S. government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024. In the United States, the ability to build new data centers is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid. What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations. The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology—American or Chinese—and on what terms? In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now. The question remains whether the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to the United States and what impact it will have on the global balance of power.  We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected].

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