LGBTQ+

Although LGBTQ+ people in every region of the world face marginalization and repression, their human rights have steadily advanced. The Biden administration has an opportunity to further promote LGBTQ+ rights by asserting them as a foreign policy priority.

Deployed around the world, the armed forces are a pillar of U.S. power and influence abroad. But many civilians are unfamiliar with their composition. How much does the military resemble U.S. society?

Governments worldwide have imposed lockdowns to contain the coronavirus, but those same restrictions have increased the risks associated with domestic violence, especially for women, children, and LGBTQ+ individuals.

Neil Edwards is the volunteer intern for CFR's Africa Program in Washington, DC. He is a master's candidate at the School of International Service at American University and a returned Peace Corps Rwanda volunteer. On November 11, police in Uganda arrested 125 members of the LGBT community. The Kampala police assert that the Ram Bar, which is frequented by the LGBT community, is a hot spot for smoking opium and shisha. Although reports suggest that only a few were smoking, those arrested were charged with violating the Tobacco Control Act, which outlaws smoking with a shisha water pipe, among other things. They face imprisonment for up to six months. Those arrested deny the charges, claiming that they were distributing condoms and anti-retroviral drugs to prevent the spread of HIV. The raid is the second of this month—part of a renewed crackdown on the LGBT community. In February 2014, Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, signed into law the Anti-Homosexuality Act. Under the law, those convicted of “homosexual acts” faced seven years to life in prison. The law also included provisions that extradite Ugandan nationals living outside of the country and extradite them back to Uganda to receive sentencing. The law elicited international outrage and governments withheld aid to Uganda. In part due to this international pressure, in August 2014, the Constitutional Court of Uganda ruled the act invalid on procedural grounds.   Even without the draconian legislation, homosexuality is still illegal in Uganda under the penal code established by the British during colonial rule. According to that law, “whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment…for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall be liable to fine.” The current penal code, established in 1990, punishes intercourse with “any person against the order of nature.”    In 2007, the Ugandan LGBT community was estimated to be 500,000 people, about 1.6 percent of the population. More recent data are difficult to gather because many Ugandans are scared to identify as a member of the LGBT community. Members face frequent harassment, sometimes violent and often by state officials. This makes it difficult for them to make use of government services, find employment, and access healthcare. In politically repressive and authoritarian Uganda, citizens face limitations to their freedom of speech, making it difficult to educate the LGBT community about health, let alone host a gay pride parade.  Reports indicate that there have been recent increased levels of violence and discrimination against the LGBT community. Human Rights Watch reported that sixteen detainees were forced to undergo anal examinations following a raid in October. Police have also searched the houses of suspected members of the LGBT community, confiscating condoms, lubricant, and anti-retroviral medicine, and charged them with “carnal knowledge against the order of nature.”  Weeks before this latest crackdown, MPs introduced new legislation similar to the 2014 Anti-Homosexuality Act. In this newer version, the death penalty was reintroduced (it had been scrapped from earlier versions) and extended to those supporting the LGBT community. International pressure is again needed to protect the legal and social rights of the LGBT community and stop this bill from becoming law.   

Update: Pete Buttigieg announced on March 1, 2020, that he was ending his campaign. Fact can be more interesting than fiction. In 2000, a high school senior won the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library’s annual Profiles in Courage essay contest by extolling the virtues of the country’s only independent member of Congress, Bernie Sanders of Vermont. To the student, the self-described socialist was an “inspiring example” of a political leader willing to “eschew political and personal comfort and convenience because they believe they can make a difference.” Nineteen years later, Peter Buttigieg found himself standing next to now-Senator Sanders in a Democratic presidential debate. But the South Bend mayor wasn’t there to praise his high school idol but to upstage him. When asked whether voters should take age into account when deciding whom to support given the forty-year gap between the two men, Buttigieg graciously allowed that “I don’t care how old you are. I care about your vision.” He then added, “I do think it matters that we have a new generation of leaders stepping up around the world.” If Buttigieg wins next November, he will be the youngest person ever to become president, and at thirty-nine years and one day the first thirty-something to take the oath of office. The Basics Name: Peter Paul Montgomery Buttigieg Date of Birth: January 19, 1982 Place of Birth: South Bend, Indiana Religion: Episcopalian Political Party: Democratic Party Marital Status: Married (Chasten Glezman) Children: None Alma Mater: Harvard (BA), Pembroke College of the University of Oxford (MA) Career: Naval intelligence officer in the Navy Reserve (2009-2014), Mayor of South Bend (2012-present) Campaign Website: https://www.peteforamerica.com/ Twitter Handle: @PeteButtigieg Buttigieg’s Announcement Buttigieg officially kicked off his campaign in South Bend, Indiana, on April 15. He did so in what was once a Studebaker car factory and now a tech hub. That was a fitting setting for a speech that plugged the potential for America’s economic revival. Buttigieg said that he is offering “something totally different” than those who use “resentment and nostalgia” to reach communities like South Bend and sell “an impossible promise of returning to a bygone era that was never as great as advertised.” Buttigieg calls for forward thinking and innovation to replace the “politics of the past.” He didn’t suggest what a Buttigieg foreign policy doctrine might look like. Buttigieg’s Story   Buttigieg is the son of two University of Notre Dame professors. His father, an immigrant from Malta who died this past January, was a literary critic. His mother is a linguist. Buttigieg inherited their academic abilities. He was his high-school valedictorian, went to Harvard, and then was named a Rhodes Scholar. Oh, and he speaks eight languages. (He taught himself Norwegian so he could read a favorite writer without having to rely on an English translation.) After graduating from Oxford, Buttigieg worked as a consultant for McKinsey and Company from 2007 to 2010. He joined the U.S. Navy Reserves in 2009, served until 2017, and reached the rank of lieutenant. He was summoned to active duty in 2014 and spent six months in Afghanistan. He worked on efforts to disrupt Taliban and al-Qaeda financial support networks in the country. Buttigieg took an unpaid leave from his day job, being the mayor of South Bend, to serve on active duty. He was first elected to that post in 2011. He was just twenty-nine at the time and the youngest mayor of any city with at least 100,000 people. He was re-elected in 2015. To put the size of Buttigieg’s constituency in perspective, he won roughly 19,500 votes in his two elections combined, or less than one quarter of the seats in Notre Dame Stadium. In comparison, Bill De Blasio won more than 725,000 votes when he won re-election as New York’s mayor in 2017. In May 2015, Buttigieg wrote an essay for the South Bend Tribune announcing that he is gay. He says he decided to come out because he wanted “to have a personal life” and because Mike Pence, who was Indiana’s governor at the time, had signed a bill to give businesses the ability to discriminate against gays and lesbians based on religious grounds. In 2018, Buttigieg married Chasten Glezman.  Buttigieg’s Message Buttigieg stresses three core principles: freedom, security, and democracy. He argues that there is more to freedom than “freedom from” government; there is also “freedom from” corporations and “freedom to” live one’s full life. When he discusses security he stresses cybersecurity and what he considers the “great security issue of our time,” climate change. And he wants to reinvigorate America’s democracy by tackling electoral reform, voting rights, money in politics, and gerrymandering. But Buttigieg’s talk about freedom, security, and democracy comes with a second message: he is young and “it’s time for a new generation of American leadership.” While he said at the July Democratic presidential debate that he doesn’t care how old the candidates are, he deftly finds ways to make the case that his generation didn’t create the problems that America faces but it is the one that can fix them. He is calling for “a fresh start for America” and says he will carry out generational change. He says he is driven “by the awareness that we face not just another presidential election, but a transition between one era and another, a fact of which the current presidency is as much as symptom as a cause. I believe that the next three or four years will determine the next thirty or forty for our country and our world.” Buttigieg’s Foreign Policy Views Back in June, Buttigieg gave a major foreign policy speech at Indiana University. He took pains near the start of the nearly hour-long address to lower expectations by insisting, “I do not aspire to deliver a full Buttigieg Doctrine today.” The mayor was good to his word. The well-crafted, occasionally inspirational speech hit mostly broad themes and generally avoided specific policy questions, such as how he would respond to the threat he says China poses or whether he would seek to revive the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The thrust of the speech was to make the case for revitalizing American global leadership and the liberal international order, though he didn’t use that phrase. He instead put it this way: “My central purpose is to argue that the world today needs America more than ever—but only if America can be at her best.” If Buttigieg didn’t provide an exact accounting of how America can be at its best or what sacrifices Americans need to make that happen, he did mention a few specifics. He said he would fight to “repeal and replace” the 2001 congressional authorization of the war in Afghanistan that successive presidents, both Democratic and Republican, have used to justify U.S. military counterterrorism operations around the world. (He didn’t say, however, what he would replace it with.) He also vowed to recommit the United States to the Iran nuclear deal, saying that “whatever is imperfections, this was perhaps as close to a true ‘art of the deal’ as it gets.” He likewise vowed to rejoin the Paris climate agreement, noting that he was one of more than four hundred U.S. mayors who had committed their cities to honor the agreement’s goals. Buttigieg has addressed some foreign policy specifics outside of his Indiana University speech. Like pretty much all of his Democratic rivals, he has argued “that there has to be an end to endless war.” Unlike many of his Democratic rivals, however, he hasn’t committed to removing all U.S. troops from Afghanistan before the end of his first term. He says that “the hard part is figuring out whether we can get out well, or whether we’re going to get out poorly.” Buttigieg thinks it is unrealistic to expect quick denuclearization in North Korea. He favors instead “striking an initial freeze agreement that would have North Korea cease production of fissile material and end nuclear and missile testing, all verified by international inspectors, in exchange for targeted sanctions relief, which could be reversed if the North Koreans did not uphold their end of the bargain.” He hasn’t said what his alternative would be if Pyongyang isn’t interested in what he has to offer. Buttigieg looks to be seeking middle ground on trade. He opposes rejoining TPP, arguing like most of his Democratic rivals that it “lacks critical trade provisions on labor, environment, and the digital economy, and does not align closely enough with the needs and interests of American workers.” On the other hand, he says it is a “fool’s errand to think that you’re gonna be able to get China to change the fundamentals of their economic model by poking them in the eye with some tariffs.” And he acknowledges that trade can create “good jobs, they pay well” and that it gets blamed for too many of America’s economic woes: “I mean, NAFTA happened a while ago. And a lot of the jobs that were lost then, it would be very hard to bring back no matter what because of automation.” Buttigieg’s solution is to “insist on policies that ensure that working families in cities like mine can play a more appealing role in the story of globalization than the role of victim.” What those policies are remains to be seen. Given Buttigieg’s relative youth and modest government resume, the question of whether he is ready to be commander in chief has come up. He has a ready-made answer: he has “more military experience than anybody who has arrived in that office on day one since George H.W. Bush.” He adds that the fact he was called to active duty in Afghanistan gives him a unique perspective on foreign policy. “It was one thing to learn about foreign policy when I was a student at Oxford, it’s another thing to learn about foreign policy when sent to a war zone on the orders of a president. You understand at a very deep and personal way what is at stake.” Reporters who press Buttigieg on whether a Midwest mayor is prepared to handle international questions should expect pushback. When The View put that question to him, he responded: “I felt pretty involved in international questions when I was deployed to Afghanistan.” More on Buttigieg Buttigieg recently published his first book, Shortest Way Home: One Mayor's Challenge and a Model for America's Future. The Washington Post noticed Buttigieg back in 2014 when it called him “the most interesting mayor you’ve never heard of.” The Washington Post Magazine profiled Buttigieg back in January, describing him as “a combination Boy Scout and lovable dork” and labeling him “the longest of 2020 presidential long shots.” Buttigieg’s appearance at a CNN Town Hall in March helped propel him from unknown small city mayor to the upper half of the Democratic field. New York Magazine followed Buttigieg as he campaigned in April and concluded that even by the standard of presidential candidates he “is still unusually controlled. Even his modulations are the same from speech to speech and interview to interview. In most of them, he uses the phrase “theory of the case,” meaning his belief that defeating Trump—and Trumpism—is a job for someone who understands the folks who put him in office well enough to convince them that there’s another way.”  Buttigieg sat down with Vox back in May to discuss everything from his qualifications to be president to his economic plans to his belief that America should “play a special role” in world politics. Politico Magazine analyzed Buttigieg’s transformation from “a virtual unknown with a puzzling last name and a lane to the presidency that most pundits considered notional at best” to top tier candidate. Politico attributes the rise to Buttigieg’s ability to position himself “as both a groundbreaker and traditionalist, a norm-breaker and rule-follower: He’s an openly gay candidate who proclaims the virtues of marriage; the mayor of a midsized Midwestern city and an Afghanistan combat veteran and practicing Episcopalian who is observant enough that he gave up alcohol for Lent.” The New Yorker explored what it sees as the paradox of the Buttigieg candidacy: “He has placed himself in a performative role, without the benefit of a performative personality.” That is, he comes across “as more prosaic political character—he has a habit of giving answers in numbered sequence, and he uses phrases like ‘pathway to peace.’” The Atlantic thinks that Buttigieg looks more to Harry Truman than to Barack Obama on foreign policy. (Buttigieg named one of his dogs “Truman.”) Last month the New York Times asked why Buttigieg waited until he was thirty-three to come out as gay and concluded that “he may have waited far longer than most young gay men today. But ever the overachiever, he made record time in setting a new bar. In less than four years he went from being single and closeted to being married and out as a gay candidate for president. Buttigieg answered eighteen questions for the New York Times. When he was asked where he would go on his first international trip as president, he answered that he had “probably better become president before finalizing that decision.” CFR asked Buttigieg twelve foreign policy questions. He believes “America’s greatest foreign policy accomplishment has been our leadership of global efforts to promote the values that animate our own and other great democracies, to the benefit of the security and freedom of our people.” He thinks that America’s greatest foreign policy mistake “has been the failure to use our leadership more vigorously in key areas of international change: to bend the benefits of globalization more equitably to improving the everyday lives of poor and middle-class citizens, especially women and minorities, in our own and other nations; to combat climate change and nuclear proliferation; and to stand strong against the recent surge of anti-democratic forces around the world.”  Corey Cooper, Elizabeth Lordi, and Aliya Medetbekova assisted with the preparation of this post.  

Violence attributed to online hate speech has increased worldwide. Societies confronting the trend must deal with questions of free speech and censorship on widely used tech platforms.

A growing body of research has made the case that counter-terrorism and CVE would benefit from a more nuanced gender lens. What remains under-studied—and generally absent from policy discussions—is whether the growing attentiveness to gender might also include a greater focus on masculinities.

South Africa has the most extensive legal protection of human rights of any country in Africa, and more than most other parts of the world. Those protections include gay rights. A recent episode provides an example of how the South African constitutional, judicial, and legal system works against discrimination and hate speech. It also demonstrates that there are boundaries to the use of religion as a defense against discriminatory language, even if the extent of such limits are still unknown.  Section nine of South Africa’s constitution guarantees equal rights to all South Africans and outlaws discrimination, including that based on ethnicity, gender, religion, as well as sexual preference. Pursuant to that provision, Parliament passed the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) in 2000. In turn, PEPUDA led to the creation of Equality Courts to adjudicate infringements of equality such as unfair discrimination and hate speech. In 2013, the South Africa Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), an independent agency with jurisdiction derived from the constitution that monitors human rights complaints, laid a complaint before an Equality Court. It alleged that a pastor in Cape Town named Oscar Bougardt engaged in hate speech against the LGBT community. The case was ultimately resolved through arbitration. Under its terms, the pastor signed an agreement in which he acknowledged, among other things, that his words were “likely to encourage hatred and cause emotional, psychological and physical harm to members of this [gay and lesbian] community.” He promised to refrain from making such statements in the future.  Nevertheless, he continued to do so. For example, in 2015 following the report that the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria had executed nine men and a boy for homosexuality, Bougardt commented online that, “we need ISIS to come to countries that are homosexual friendly. ISIS please come rid South Africa of the homosexual curse.” In response, the SAHRC asked the Equality Court to hold Bougardt in contempt of court for violating the 2013 agreement. While Bougardt did not deny the statements attributed to him, he did deny having invited ISIS to come to South Africa or that he was encouraging violence against gays and lesbians. Instead, he claimed that he was expressing his constitutionally protected religious views. In May 2018, the Equality Court found that Bougardt violated the agreement he had signed in 2013 and that he had failed to show how freedom of religion protected his comments. When the Court began to consider an appropriate punishment, Bougardt promised to refrain from online comments about gays and lesbians, to apologize to gays and lesbians, and to end his relationship with an American pastor, Steven Anderson, known for his homophobic preaching. The judge ultimately sentenced Bougardt to thirty days of imprisonment, along with five years of suspension. Despite the case against Bougardt, the South African courts have not addressed the broader question of whether religious views can be a defense against charges of discrimination against LGBT persons. However, this Equality Court judgement sets a precedent, increasing the likelihood that such a claim will fail. 

At a UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) conference in Abuja, Abika Dabiri-Erewa—the senior special assistant to Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari on diaspora and foreign affairs—warned that Germany will likely deport between twenty-five and thirty thousand Nigerian asylum seekers. She said many claims for asylum were spurious: “some who are from the East and West are saying they are running away from Boko Haram while others say they are gays and were having challenges expressing themselves in Nigeria.” She said the Nigerian foreign ministry is working with German authorities “to see how the entire process [of deportation] can be made easier.” She did not indicate when deportations would begin. The announcement from Dabiri-Erewa comes on the heels of a meeting between a German envoy and Minister of Foreign Affairs Geoffrey Onyeama last month to discuss Nigerian migrants in Germany. Resettling Nigerians deported from Europe will be challenging for Nigerian authorities, hence the call for Nigerians not to participate in “irregular” migration. However, rather than convincing would-be migrants to stay put, European efforts to reduce migrant flows are simply forcing them elsewhere. At the same conference, another Nigerian official lamented that Nigerians are now migrating to “unpopular” countries like Morocco, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Mali.  Nigeria’s large population, tradition of migration, and stagnant economy suggest significant emigration will continue. But a successful asylum applicant must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, social class, and other legally defined criteria. It will therefore be difficult for most Nigerians to obtain asylum in European countries. Even so, Dabiri-Erewa’s suggestion that “gays” are unqualified to seek asylum in Europe is ironic; Nigeria’s deep-seated homophobia can expose gay Nigerians to persecution that may in fact qualify them for asylum.  

Last week I hosted a CFR roundtable with Juan E. Mendez, the United Nations special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment, to discuss his new report on gendered aspects of torture. The groundbreaking report, released earlier this year, addresses gendered aspects of torture and other ill-treatment of persons in detention. It stresses the need to apply gender analysis to torture and cruel treatment to reveal abuses that would otherwise be invisible or normalized. During our discussion, Mendez noted that, when thinking about prisoners and torture, people often think about men—nearly ninety percent of prisoners globally are men—and the experiences of women and girls are downplayed. But torture and other abusive treatment does not only occur in detention or in formal government custody.  It can occur on the battlefield, in health facilities, and at home. The special rapporteur spoke about how domestic violence by private actors may also violate the main treaty on torture—the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment—where the state fails to punish perpetrators and protect victims, and creates “conditions under which women may be subjected to systematic physical and mental suffering, despite their apparent freedom to resist.” While the Torture Convention requires state involvement in the abusive conduct, the state can be held accountable for its failure to act. Mendez also notes that in some countries women and girls, as well as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons, face particular risks of harsh punishment or targeting for actions that are considered “moral crimes.” In one case that prompted international attention, a young Nigerian woman, Amina Lawal, was sentenced to death by stoning after she became pregnant by a man whom she said had promised to marry her—he failed to, and left her to raise the child alone without any support. When women, but not men, are sentenced to be stoned for such “crimes,” allowing for discriminatory application of harsh penalties (as in Lawal’s case, until the ruling was overturned by a higher court), it is not only grossly unfair, it can constitute torture or cruel treatment. Under the Torture Convention, severe pain or suffering that is imposed to discriminate against someone (or to intimidate, coerce, punish, or extract information or a confession) constitutes torture (or cruel treatment, if it is less severe). In his report, Mendez notes that “offences that are aimed at or that solely and disproportionately affect women, girls and persons on the basis of their perceived or actual sexual orientation or gender identity,” may contribute to the perpetuation of gender-based violence that can amount to torture or cruel treatment. The report also points out that states that fail to criminalize or enforce laws banning "cultural" practices such as honor killings or female genital mutilation and cutting (FGM/C), for example, are contributing to gender-based violence that may violate the Torture Convention.  I recently hosted a roundtable with Time magazine Person of Influence honoree, Jaha Dukureh, who spoke about her success in pressing the Gambian government to ban FGM/C, a harsh practice used to control the sexuality of women and girls. State enforcement of that legal ban will be critical. In his report, Mendez urges that “States must finally implement their heightened obligation to prevent and combat gender-based violence and discrimination perpetrated by both state and private actors against women, girls, and persons who transgress sexual and gender norms.”

Below is a guest post by Daniel Chardell, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program. Last week, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) wrapped up its twenty-seventh session in Geneva. It is no secret that the Council is flawed. And yet, over the course of the previous five years, the UNHRC has transformed from a feeble body devoid of standards and integrity into a vibrant—albeit imperfect—forum for the defense of human rights. Success stories in the news are rare these days. But the United States should take pride in how it brought about this evolution. More importantly, the case reveals that sustained multilateral engagement can yield dividends, given sufficient commitment, resources, and creative diplomacy. The UNHRC was established in 2006 to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights, which had served as the UN’s premier human rights body since 1946. The Commission was notoriously impotent, farcical even. Countries with egregious human rights records, from Libya to Sudan, managed to become Commission members, affording them a platform to deflect criticism, obstruct meaningful action against flagrant atrocities, and, to the chagrin of the United States, disproportionately bash Israel. The Commission’s work often pitted the West against non-Western countries, which tended to vote in blocs along the lines of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). By the time it was shuttered in 2006, the Commission was discredited and disgraced. The refashioned Human Rights Council came into being in March 2006 as part of Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s campaign to overhaul the UN human rights regime. Annan assured skeptical U.S. officials that the new human rights body would not resort to “business as usual.” But President George W. Bush and his top advisors had misgivings. Convinced that the Council’s mandate set inadequate standards for membership, the United States—alongside only Israel, the Marshall Islands, and Palau—opposed the creation of the new human rights body. The Bush administration’s concerns were not entirely unwarranted. The Human Rights Council quickly assumed some of its predecessor’s worst qualities: rights abusers secured membership; members voted in lockstep with the OIC and NAM blocs, precluding country-specific resolutions; and Israel became the target of a recurring, standalone agenda item, making it the only country perpetually singled out for such intense scrutiny. For observers in Washington, the Council’s institutionalized bias against Israel was the last straw. The Bush administration’s doubts, it seemed, had been vindicated. Fast forward to February 2009. After hardly one month on the job, President Barack Obama declared a “new era of engagement” with the world, signifying a departure from his predecessor’s penchant for unilateralism. The following month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the administration would seek membership at the UNHRC. The policy reversal flabbergasted the Council’s harshest U.S. critics. “This is like getting on board the Titanic after it’s hit the iceberg,” warned John R. Bolton, Bush’s ambassador to the UN at the time of the Council’s founding. The Heritage Foundation’s Brett D. Schaefer and Steven Groves confidently predicted that “the performance of the council with the U.S. as a member will be virtually indistinguishable from its performance absent U.S. membership.” By 2012, however, something startling happened: the Council began acting like the responsible human rights watchdog it was set up to be. Robust U.S. engagement was the decisive factor. The United States actively built cross-regional coalitions that were requisite to breaking up voting blocs and, later, pushing through country-specific resolutions on Iran, Libya, and Yemen, among others. And, beginning in 2011, the Council’s action on Syria proved that the UNHRC could unite in the face of grave human rights abuses. Between 2011 and 2012, the Council convened four emergency sessions devoted exclusively to the human rights situation in Syria. With the support of non-Western countries, including some Arab states, a U.S.-led coalition established a commission of inquiry and, subsequently, a special rapporteur to investigate Bashar al-Assad’s human rights abuses. All the while, the UN Security Council remained deadlocked. “The persistent engagement on Syria by the UNHRC,” writes Suzanne Nossel, “was the United Nations’ principal vehicle for isolating the Syrian regime and expressing the condemnation of an expanding circle of regional neighbors.” In other words, where the Security Council failed, the Human Rights Council succeeded—not least because the United States chose to act within the bounds of the UN system and rally global support by diplomatic means. At the same time, however, UNHRC sessions were occasionally reminiscent of the Commission era, with the United States and its traditional Western allies at odds with the OIC and NAM on Israel, Palestine, and economic, social, and cultural rights. The Council’s latest session was no exception. To be sure, the twenty-seventh session gave the Obama administration plenty to celebrate. Most importantly, the UNHRC adopted the second-ever resolution against human rights abuses on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. “Expressing grave concern”—in diplomatic parlance, a fairly robust turn of phrase—“at acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, committed against individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity,” the resolution calls on Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, the new UN high commissioner for human rights, to update a 2011 report on the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons. Zeid will present his report at the Council’s twenty-ninth session in the summer of 2015. One could reasonably argue that the LGBT resolution is “toothless,” or that the motion is merely symbolic. However, the significance of this resolution—and the resistance it faced in the Council—cannot be overstated. Reaching consensus in a global forum is inherently challenging, let alone on an issue as sensitive as sexual orientation. It was far from certain that last week’s LGBT resolution would pass. A host of countries—namely, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Russia—mounted fierce opposition and attempted (in vain) to strip the text of all meaning. Nonetheless, the resolution garnered support from every continent. It was sponsored by Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay. Several non-Western states—such as Cuba, the Philippines, South Africa, Venezuela, and Vietnam—cast their votes in the affirmative. And a number of states—including Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), India, Kazakhstan, Namibia, and Sierra Leone—that might have condemned the resolution displayed tacit support by agreeing to abstain. To be sure, securing such broad support required that the sponsors water down the text. But such is the nature of multilateral cooperation and norm-building: progress is achieved incrementally. The twenty-seventh session saw a number of other positive developments, including a resolution calling on states to enable civil society organizations to operate freely and safely. As increasingly oppressive governments in Egypt, Russia, and elsewhere clamp down on freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, the resolution underscores that civil society—comprising political activists, human rights groups, the media, and a host of others—is vital to the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Additionally, the Council adopted country-specific resolutions on Syria, Yemen, the Central African Republic, the DRC, and Sudan, all of which are witnessing mass human rights abuses and unprecedented humanitarian crises. With the Security Council paralyzed by Russian and Chinese obstruction, the UNHRC remains the most prominent global platform that can credibly investigate and condemn the ongoing atrocities committed in Syria. Of course, the session was not without shortcomings. On the heels of the U.S. Supreme Court decision on Argentina’s sovereign debt restructuring, for example, the Council considered a resolution dubiously claiming that “vulture funds” hinder the capacity of states to fulfill their human rights obligations. On this, the U.S. delegation’s position was clear: “The state’s responsibility for promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is not contingent on its sovereign debt situation.” Nevertheless, the resolution received the overwhelming support of non-Western members, reflecting the deep-seated divide between the West and “the rest” on matters of economic, social, and cultural rights. And although no resolutions on Israel were tabled at this session, the hot-button issue is always simmering just beneath the surface. As many U.S. officials have long argued, the Council’s disproportionate focus on Israel remains the single greatest threat to the human rights body’s legitimacy. The United States has pushed—and doubtless will continue pushing—for the removal of the UNHRC’s Israel-specific agenda item. That said, in the absence of peace and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, such efforts will come to no avail. This is not to suggest that Israel’s alleged human rights abuses deserve no scrutiny, but rather that its record should be considered alongside those of all other countries. More than two years ago, my colleague Stewart M. Patrick wrote that the UNHRC was, despite its improved record, “deeply imperfect.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, that remains true today. Deeply imperfect though it may be, however, the Council is not a lost cause. To the contrary, we should expect the Human Rights Council to remain imperfect. That is precisely why it demands U.S. leadership. The U.S. government’s recent successes at the Council are a testament to the importance of creative diplomacy, long-term commitment, and compromise with countries with which the United States rarely sees eye to eye. Indeed, it is time to recognize what Obama administration officials have claimed for years: the Human Rights Council is at its best when the United States is an active participant, not a detached critic.

Erwin Li is an intern for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In just its sixth year, Shanghai Pride has emerged as a major celebratory event for China’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. The weeklong festival features art exhibits, panel discussions, and even a marathon-picnic—all of whose locations span across many of the city’s most popular areas. But there’s more to the celebration than just fun. Shanghai Pride aims to promote awareness about China’s sexual minorities by openly addressing the unique social and cultural challenges that they face. For example, this year’s film festival displayed works on transgender identity and homophobic violence, while a panel discussion asked parents and relatives of LGBT children to share their stories of support and acceptance. In a society still dominated by traditional views on gender, Shanghai Pride thus offers a rare chance for solidarity, and an avenue towards greater social acceptance. Still, some LGBT activists have recently adopted a more confrontational approach, requesting that China’s government legally recognize the rights of China’s LGBT community. In May 2013, a nineteen-year-old LGBT activist Xiang Xiaohan (a pseudonym) led an unregistered hundred-person march in Changsha, Hunan, where participants called for an end to homophobia and discrimination on the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia. (Xiang was detained for twelve days, and Weibo searches for “Changsha” and “protest” were unsurprisingly blocked.) Earlier this year, Xiang became the first LGBT activist to file a lawsuit against the government; after Hunan’s local authorities refused to register his LGBT rights organization, Xiang claimed that their written reply had defamed the LGBT community in China. And while Xiang’s case was dismissed by a local court, it did gain attention when state-sponsored media outlet Xinhua reported on the situation. Xiang also indicated that he does not intend to give up, telling BBC that he “will continue to try to encourage the government to safeguard gay and lesbian rights through laws.” Does this more direct approach imply a growing trend in China’s LGBT movement? Only time will tell. Last month, a Beijing court agreed to hear a case involving a homosexual man suing a Chinese clinic for falsely advertising the efficacy of its “sexual reorientation therapies”—a procedure he claims caused him undue psychological harm. This case represents the first time legal channels have opened up for China’s sexual minorities. But legal options don’t equal protection, especially when court systems are still largely subject to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence. Under the policy of “don’t support, don’t ban, don’t promote,” Beijing has traditionally adopted a laissez faire approach to LGBT rights, choosing to ignore “private affairs” unless they affect “social stability.” This makes it difficult to predict both Party behavior and its effect on activism. There are real dangers to confronting the government about political change. Chinese leaders have long been averse to granting citizens the right to self-organize, and so even peaceful festivals like Shanghai Pride have been unable to obtain a permit for a city parade. These types of restrictions have only intensified under President Xi Jinping, as crackdowns on human rights lawyers, journalists, and foreign NGOs have all ensued. The recent arrest of nine LGBT activists—Xiang among them—is certainly proof that that there are no guarantees for the development of this civil society movement. Yet despite the political risks, this strain of confrontational activism will likely need to supplement its gentler, awareness-raising counterpart. After all, bold approaches to activism test and clarify lines in the sand while events like Shanghai Pride shape social attitudes to push those very boundaries. And as social acceptance for China’s LGBT population of roughly thirty million climbs, the CCP may feel compelled to acknowledge the needs of this community. The People’s Daily published a report last May titled “China’s LGBT Community Needs More Support” that described the prejudices against sexual minorities and the failure of conversion therapies, perhaps indicating a future space for activism. So while China’s LGBT movement may be young, Beijing should see the larger picture it represents: whether it’s through a festival or a protest, LGBT activists are presenting very real issues that won’t just disappear.

Lauren Bohn talks about the importance of food with Syrian refugees in Beirut for Bon Appetit. Maya Sioufi discusses how Cinephilia is investing in the future of Arab cinema. Farah Wael examines gay rights in Lebanon for Index on Censorship.

Nigerians across religious, ethnic, and regional divisions are strongly supportive of the anti-gay measure recently signed into law by President Goodluck Jonathan. The legislation criminalizes virtually all aspects of gay life, not just gay marriage. There has been support from spokesmen for the Christian Association of Nigeria (the principal Christian umbrella group), the Roman Catholic Church, the Methodist Church, the sultan of Sokoto (the premier Muslim traditional ruler), and Jama’atu Nasril Islam, perhaps the most important Islamic group with a national membership, as well as an outpouring of support from much of the population. Some Nigerians appear to be rediscovering a sense of nationalism. As one said to CAJ News Africa, “for the first time in life, I am so happy to be a Nigerian!” Others expressed pride that Christians, Muslims, and adherents to traditional religion are united in their opposition to homosexuality. President Jonathan is benefitting from a popularity boost. As Premium Times wrote on January 13, “for many Nigerians, accustomed to attacking Mr. Jonathan over his failure to address many of the nation’s ills and its stinking corruption, the bill’s signing, largely a popular decision, came as one of the commendable steps taken by his administration.” In the face of criticism of Secretary of State John Kerry and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, some Nigerians are using the anti-gay legislation as a push back against alleged “western cultural imperialism” As a Roman Catholic spokesman said, opposition from the American government should be no surprise because “…the West which had done everything to sell their cultures to Africa will stop at nothing to want to impose such beliefs on the African continent which is always going to the West for financial aids and loans.” Indeed, many Nigerians see the anti-gay legislation as a reaffirmation of core African–and Nigerian–values. Nigeria is challenged by an Islamist insurrection in the north, ethnic and religious conflict in the Middle Belt, the prospect of renewed insurgency in the Delta, poverty, and corruption. The ruling party is fragmenting. In absolute numbers, Nigeria has the second largest number of HIV/AIDS victims in the world. (The new legislation will set-back efforts to fight the disease.) And the country faces national elections in 2015 in which it is widely expected that President Jonathan will seek re-election. Under such circumstances, Nigeria is not the only country in history where politicians have sought to rally national unity by attacking a despised minority. But, we outsiders should guard against excessive cynicism in ascribing the anti-gay legislation to the search for short-term political advantage. Homosexuality and a gay lifestyle is seen by many Nigerians as a challenge and threat to core African values. And resentment of alleged Western cultural imperialism is deep seated. The Vanguard, a large daily with a national readership, on January 15 summed up the widespread Nigerian view: “Nigerians yesterday reacted angrily to U.S. criticisms of the country over the anti-same sex bill signed into law by President Goodluck Jonathan Monday, saying that Nigeria will not become the modern day Sodom and Gomorrah in the name of human rights."