Syria

Thanassis Cambanis claims that Lebanon’s Hizballah and the clerical regime in Iran are now fully vested factions in Syria’s civil war. Hicham Mourad discusses the uneasy relationship between Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the leaders in Saudi Arabia. Angie Balata explores the history of rock music in Egypt.

Significant Developments Syria. Israel publicly warned Syrian president Bashar Assad to stop transferring advanced weapons to Hezbollah yesterday. In an unusual move, a senior Israeli official contacted the New York Times on Wednesday and was then quoted by the paper saying that “Israel is determined to continue to prevent the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah,” arguing that such a move would destabilize the region. The Israeli official warned further: “If Syrian president Assad reacts by attacking Israel, or tries to strike Israel through his terrorist proxies, he will risk forfeiting his regime, for Israel will retaliate.” Meanwhile, the United Nations General Assembly passed a nonbinding resolution yesterday condemning Syrian authorities and calling for a “political transition” to end the violence in Syria. The resolution passed by a vote of 107-12 with 59 abstentions, less than the 133 votes a similar resolution received last August. In introducing the debate, Vuk Jeremic, president of the General Assembly, raised the official UN death toll to more than eighty thousand people. Iran. European foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton met Iranian envoy and presidential candidate Saeed Jalili in Istanbul last night. Ashton called the dinner meeting “useful” but announced no plans for a new round of negotiations. Earlier in the day, a senior UN official announced that talks between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency had failed to break ground on resuming an investigation into “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. Meanwhile two big-name candidates registered as candidates for Iran’s presidential elections just before the deadline on Saturday: former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who is close to President Ahmadinejad. Turkey-Syria. The Turkish government blamed Syria earlier in the week for two car bomb explosions that killed at least forty-six people in Reyhanli, a border town in Turkey. It was one of the deadliest terror attacks on Turkish soil. Officials in Turkey announced that they had arrested nine people on Sunday; all the detainees were Turkish citizens and a number of them confessed to links to Syrian intelligence services. U.S. Foreign Policy Talking Syria. President Barack Obama met with Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the White House today to discuss Syria. In a joint press conference, Obama said that there is no “magic formula” for the situation in Syria. Earlier in the week, the president hosted British prime minister David Cameron who visited the White House to discuss Syria and the upcoming G8. Both leaders emphasized, in press conference remarks, the urgency of ending the fighting in Syria; Cameron noted that “Syria’s history is being written in the blood of her people, and it is happening on our watch.” Acknowledging the difficulty of finding a diplomatic solution, Obama said that “It’s going to be challenging, but it’s worth the effort.” Meanwhile, Secretary of State John Kerry sounded cautiously optimistic about plans for an international peace conference to bring together figures from the Syrian opposition and regime. At a press conference in Stockholm on Tuesday, Kerry said that “progress is being made” and the Syrian government had given names of officials who would attend to Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov. While We Were Looking Elsewhere Egypt. Gaza’s interior ministry announced a state of alert along its border with Egypt after unidentified gunmen abducted seven Egyptian security officers in the Sinai Peninsula early today. The seven security personnel were in taxis outside of the city of El Arish when masked gunmen ambushed them. Egyptian security officials said that they had been in contact with the kidnappers and that the abduction may have been related to anger over claims that an imprisoned militant had been tortured. Libya. Libyan officials claimed that a bomb blast in Benghazi that killed three people on Monday could have been an accident instead of a deliberate car bombing. Libyan interior minister Ashur Shwayel said that “all signs point to an accidental explosion.” The car was transporting explosives used to make anti-tank mines when it exploded outside of a hospital. Yemen. Three kidnapped Red Cross employees were released yesterday by Yemeni tribesmen in the southern province of Abyan. The three men were abducted on Monday. Two Egyptian technicians who had been abducted last week by the same tribe were also released. Iraq. Bombings in Baghdad and attacks in northern Iraq killed at least seventeen people today, in the latest surge of violence in the past several weeks. More than thirty-five people were killed yesterday as a result of bombings in Baghdad and Kirkuk that seemingly targeted Iraq’s Shiite population. Bahrain. A court in Bahrain sentenced six people to jail for insulting King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa on Twitter. The six were convicted for the “misuse of freedom of expression.” One of those convicted was Mahdi al-Basri, who did not send any tweets, but served as a lawyer for a community account that wrote the offending tweets. This Week in History This week marks the thirtieth anniversary of a short-lived U.S.-mediated Lebanese-Israeli peace agreement. On May 17, 1983, Lebanon and Israel signed a peace accord ending the state of war between the two countries since the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The 1983 agreement, coming on the heels of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon the previous year, called for a phased Israeli withdrawal from the country and was a product of negotiations held over thirty-five sessions between December 1982 and May 1983. Israel’s withdrawal was contingent on a Syrian withdrawal; however, Syria refused to recognize the agreement and nearly forty thousand Syrian troops remained in northern Lebanon. In March 1984, under pressure from Syria, the Lebanese government cancelled the peace agreement with Israel.

“I swear to God we will eat your hearts and your livers, you soldiers of Bashar the dog.” –Abu Sakkar, leader of the Syrian rebel Farouq Brigade from Homs, as he bit into the heart of a regime soldier “What do I care if they destroy Tel Aviv and lose Beirut?” –Amin Hoteit, retired Lebanese colonel close to Hezbollah, on the possibility of escalating tensions between Hezbollah and Israel “Israel never bent down before anyone, but they did for him — at least, that is the perception among the Turkish public.” –Cengiz Candar, one of Turkey’s leading political commentators about Israel’s apology to Turkey for the Mavi Marmara incident “The security forces don’t ask me to make up stories, but I know informants who do because they want more money.” –Ghalib, a Baquba resident and informant for the Iraqi security forces “We could now envision selling gas to Egypt…The pipeline is there. You can simply change the direction the gas flows.” –Pinhas Avivi, Israeli Foreign Ministry official “I think the army has an important role to play in this phase — to get us out of this tragedy that the Muslim Brotherhood has put us in.” –Shadi al-Ghazali Harb, a prominent Egyptian liberal activist

The Turkish government’s tepid response to the car bombings in Reyhanli last Friday should help bring to a merciful end the prevailing meme in Washington that Ankara is poised to lead the Middle East.  Rather than providing leadership and a source of stability in the region, Turkey is now a party to regional conflicts, especially the civil war in Syria.  It is true that Turkey did not necessarily seek the position that it now finds itself in, but the mismatch between its grand ambitions and Ankara’s capacity to provide order to the Middle East contributed mightily to its problems. Despite all the talk of models and rising to the level of U.S. traditional allies in Europe—code for the United Kingdom and France—over the last few years, Turkey, like a variety of other countries in the region, needs rescuing. In what seems like Cold War redux, Washington and Moscow are stepping in to do what they can to prevent the Syrian conflict from engulfing the region.  Although Washington and Ankara have shared interests in Syria and other regional hotspots, the United States and Russia are likely to pursue a political solution to the Syrian civil war—Turkey’s most pressing foreign (and suddenly domestic) policy problem that is consistent with its interests.  Since the summer of 2011 after trying in vain to persuade Bashar al Assad to reform and negotiate—two things the Syrian leader was never going to do—the Turkish leadership has consistently called for Assad’s ouster and the end of the regime he leads.  It is a principled position, but not one that is likely to serve Ankara well if the United States and Russia preside over a political solution in Syria that includes regime figures, if not members of Assad’s inner circle.  Although Erdogan remains a popular figure among the Syrian opposition, leaving former regime players in place will likely complicate Ankara’s efforts to be a player in post-Assad Syria.  Some observers  have suggested that the Turks (as well as the Saudis and Qataris) would be able to “kiss and make-up” with the regime holdovers or even Assad should he prevail, but this is a profound misreading of Erdogan who does not forgive and forget easily.  Just ask Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or Iraq’s leader, Nouri Kamal al Maliki. It would be extremely difficult for Erdogan to be magnanimous toward Assad or his supporters after 80,000 Syrians have died and a staggering ten percent of Syria’s population has been displaced, including anywhere from 322,845 refugees(at the time of writing) who have found safe haven in Turkey.  In addition, before Friday’s bombing Assad has killed approximately nineteen Turks, dropped ordinance on Turkish territory, allegedly shot down a Turkish surveillance jet operating in international waters, and is believed to be behind the Reyhanli bombings with forty-six dead and at least one-hundred injured.  And yet, with the exception of the artillery barrages in October 2012, the Turks have let Assad get away with these provocations.  Turkey is in the worst of all possible positions: Unable to corral the opposition; at odds with its ostensible partners, Riyadh and Doha; it has become a party to Syria’s civil war, but is unable to respond to Bashar al Assad’s periodic taunts because Erdogan’s Syria policy is generally unpopular in Turkey.  With all of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s eloquence about history endowing Turkey with special responsibilities in the region, the caution associated with Ataturk’s “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” still makes sense to many Turks. One could argue that much of what has befallen Turkey in Syria is not of Ankara’s own doing, which is partly true, but it still was not supposed to be this way. Turkey, with the 16th largest economy in the world, has historical and cultural legacies in the region that were assets, a political and economic system that is attractive to Arabs, and its use of soft-power galore was going to be a regional problem solver and economic engine, making it another Turkish century in the Middle East and in the process relieving the United States of some of the burdens it has carried in the last six decades.  Yet here we are, heading to Geneva or some other anodyne place for a peace conference under the auspices of Washington and Moscow.  At best, Prime Minister Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party leadership will emerge from this episode with egg on their faces but with enough of their position intact to help implement whatever solution (if one materializes) the big powers coerce out of the players in Syria’s tragedy.  At worst, it will reveal once again the hollowness of their aspirations and dependence on great power patrons.  The saving grace for Erdogan is that he has no credible domestic political opposition capable of capitalizing on his foreign policy problems—the main opposition Republican People’s Party supports Bashar al Assad.  Consequently, Syria may have put only a small dent in Erdogan’s domestic political aura, but it should smash Washington’s incongruent belief in “Turkey’s rise as a regional power.”  

Significant Developments Syria. Hassan Nasrallah announced yesterday that Syria would transfer strategic “game-changing” weapons to the Lebanese group Hezbollah. The televised speech was a response to Israel’s alleged airstrikes near Damascus last Friday and Sunday that reportedly targeted Fateh-110 missiles transiting to Hezbollah from Iran. Israel has neither confirmed nor denied responsibility for the attacks, but a senior Israeli defense official said that the airstrikes were intended to prevent weapon transfers to Hezbollah and stressed that Israel was not taking sides in Syria’s civil war. Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday that Israel warned the United States about an imminent Russian deal to sell advanced ground-to-air missile systems to Syria. Bashar al-Assad’s government has long been trying to buy S-300 missile batteries, which are capable of intercepting both manned aircraft and guided missiles. Western nations have repeatedly asked Russia not to make the sale, which would complicate any potential international intervention in Syria. Egypt. President Mohammed Morsi swore in nine new cabinet ministers on Tuesday following a major reshuffle that overhauled the government. Morsi replaced the ministers of finance, planning, investment and petroleum in the second reshuffle since he took office last June. Samir Radwan, a former finance minister, warned that the changes could adversely affect Egypt’s negotiation with the IMF over a $4.8 billion loan, saying “IMF officials have told me that each time they get used to a minister, he disappears…We know have our fifth finance minister since the revolution; this is a sign of instability.” U.S. Foreign Policy Syria. U.S. secretary of state John Kerry told reporters in Rome yesterday that Syrian president Bashar al-Assad would not be a component of a transitional government. His comments came two days after Kerry and Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov announced in Moscow that they would seek to hold an international conference within the coming month focusing on finding a political solution to the civil war in Syria. Kerry and Lavrov told reporters that they would push to have both Bashar al-Assad’s government and the Syrian opposition attend. Lavrov told reporters that Russia is not interested “in the fate of certain persons…We are interested in the fate of the Syria people.” Israel-Palestine. Secretary Kerry told reporters in Rome that he would travel to the Middle East in two weeks. Kerry made the announcement following his meeting with Israeli peace negotiator Tzipi Livni, saying he intended to meet with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas. "We are working through threshold questions and we are doing it with a seriousness of purpose that I think Minister Livni would agree with me has not been present in a while," Kerry said at the U.S. ambassador to Italy’s residence before meeting with Livni in private. His trip to the region will be his fourth since becoming Secretary of State. While We Were Looking Elsewhere Turkey. Kurdish militants began to withdraw their forces from Turkey to their stronghold in Iraq on Wednesday, the latest step in a peace process meant to end a three-decade long conflict. The withdrawal process is expected to be mostly complete by the end of June. Turkey’s deputy prime minister Bulent Arinc cautiously asserted that “we feel that we are nearing the conclusion,” but would not confirm the beginning of the withdrawal. Iran. Former parliament speaker Gholam Ali Haddad Adel, a close adviser to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, joined the presidential race today. Haddad Adel is part of the Coalition of Three that includes two other Khamenei loyalists who have declared their candidacies: former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati and Tehran mayor Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf. Iranian media has speculated that two of the three will step aside in favor of whomever appears to be in the strongest position as the race heats up. Meanwhile, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, former president of Iran from 1989 until 1997, told his students at Tehran University on Sunday that he would run if convinced that his presence would be beneficial to the country. Registration for candidates began on Tuesday morning and will continue until tomorrow. The election is slated for June 14. Libya. Two police stations in Benghazi were hit by bombs early this morning. It is the fourth time in the past month that police stations in the city have been attacked with explosives. Meanwhile, Libya’s General National Congress passed the Political Isolation Law on Sunday excluding former officials from the Qaddafi era from public office. The law’s passage comes after heavily armed militiamen blockaded the foreign and interior ministries from April 28 to May 5 demanding legislators back the bill. Proponents of the law have made clear their intention to specifically exclude from public office former prime minister Mahmoud Jibril. Israel. Israeli security forces detained Mohammed Ahmad Hussein, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, on Wednesday and held him for questioning on suspicion of involvement in the latest disturbance at al-Aqsa Mosque. Following six hours of questioning, the grand mufti was released without charges. His detention sparked small demonstrations against Israel in Jordan and Egypt. This Week in History This week marks the fifty-second anniversary of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi dissolution of Iran’s parliament, paving the way for his modernization agenda and the “White Revolution.” On May 5, 1961, Iranian prime minister Jafar Sharif Imami and his cabinet resigned a day after fifty thousand demonstrators clashed with security forces during a teacher’s strike. The following day, the shah appointed Ali Amini as prime minister. On May 9 he dissolved both houses of parliament, receiving a mandate to rule for six months by cabinet decree. Under Amini, the cabinet adopted a land reform law, which redistributed land from the minority to small-scale cultivators. The land reform law was a prelude to the shah’s “White Revolution,” a more ambitious package of social, political, and economic reforms that were approved by popular referendum in 1963.

Steven A. Cook probes the arguments against a No-Fly Zone over Syria. Gary Schmitt says it is doubtful that the Pentagon really believes that Syria’s air defenses are a significant hurdle to intervening in that country’s war. Michael Koplow argues that a No-Fly Zone over Syria would present obstacles for the United States. Dan Trombly claims that a No-Fly Zone over Syria would have a huge cost, and would likely result in minimal returns.

Tuesday’s agreement between Moscow and Washington to convene an international conference on Syria raises some obvious questions. After a brutal conflict that has killed more than seventy thousand, is a negotiated peace between government and rebels forces plausible? And even if a settlement can be negotiated, is it likely to hold? Certainly, the apparent rapprochement between the United States and Russia is important. For the past two years frictions between the governments have paralyzed diplomacy at the UN Security Council, with Moscow (supported quietly by China) blocking Western efforts to place intense pressure on the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Moscow’s agreement to an international conference, secured during a meeting between Secretary of State John Kerry and President Vladimir Putin, would seem to signal greater diplomatic flexibility—an impression reinforced by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s statement that Russia is not concerned about the fate of “certain” individuals (a clear reference to Assad’s future). The timing of the conference remains up in the air. Kerry, warning that Syria is heading “over the abyss and into chaos,” wants it “by the end of the month.” Whether the antagonists themselves will actually agree to substantive talks remains in doubt, however. Assad continues to dismiss the rebels as “terrorists,” while the Syrian National Coalition—the Western-backed umbrella group of rebel forces—has long made his departure a precondition for any talks on Syria’s future. Still, international pressure for the two sides to meet will be intense, and likely irresistible. Getting the combatants to the bargaining table is critical to ending a war that has generated tremendous human suffering and now risks a wider regional conflagration, possibly involving weapons of mass destruction. But it is only a first step. Presuming the two sides actually meet and are able to achieve a cease-fire—or even a more extensive peace agreement—what is the likelihood that that accord will endure?  It is not too early for policymakers in Washington—and Moscow—to begin asking these questions. With the caveat that each conflict has its own dynamic, the scholarly literature on how civil wars end may provide some clues, if no definitive answers, about Syria’s future. One of the biggest lessons is that negotiated settlements are notoriously difficult to maintain, for several reasons. To begin with, peace agreements rarely remove the underlying societal conflicts, such as political and economic inequities between different tribal or sectarian groups, that led to war in the first place. Second, negotiated settlements, compared to winner-take-all scenarios, are by definition second best, compromise solutions, and formerly warring parties are accordingly often reluctant to invest heavily in them. Third, peace agreements typically force parties to cede unitary control over their respective areas and ultimately disarm in settings of persistent insecurity. Finally, individuals and factions—known as “spoilers”—may have a vested interest in undercutting the peace process, particularly if it interferes with their access to illicit revenue streams that have sprung up during the conflict (say, from smuggling arms or other commodities). Beyond these generalities, what else can we say? Based on their study of sixteen civil wars (ranging from Bosnia to Sierra Leone) the political scientists Stephen John Stedman and George Downs distinguish between “permissive” and “demanding” environments for implementing peace agreements.  What separates these environments are two sets of critical contextual factors. The first set of factors are international: All things being equal, peace agreements are most likely to hold if major powers agree to serve as custodians of the peace process, if outsider actors invest major financial and other resources to help support the accord, and if the international community is willing to risk the lives (whether as part of an intervening coalition or UN peacekeeping force) to defend the terms of the agreement. How would these international factors apply in Syria’s case? First, the United States, Russia and other parties will need to form an enduring “contact group” that shepherds the peace process for years. Second, the international donor community, including major powers, the World Bank, and other entities, must be prepared for a multiyear financial commitment to reconstruct a devastated country. Third, preserving the peace will require international “boots” on the ground. These need not be American, but they will need robust terms of engagement. The second set of factors determining success and failure of peace agreements are internal and, alas, more numerous and daunting. The most important include: the number of warring parties and the extent of agreement among these groups prior to external intervention, the presence of potential “spoilers,”  the degree of state collapse, the overall number of combatants, the presence of exploitable natural resources, the involvement of neighboring states in the conflict, and whether secession is a motive for the conflict. Taking all of these factors together, chances for an enduring peace in Syria would appear to be dim. Let’s begin with the warring parties. Despite press coverage dividing combatants into government and rebel forces, the latter are extraordinarily heterogeneous. For example, there is little agreement on Syria’s future between those secular opponents of the Assad regime favored by the West and the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front, which is already establishing Islamist rule in cities under its control. Syria is also replete with potential spoilers to any eventual peace treaty. These include first and foremost the Alawite coterie around Assad himself, likely to fight tooth and nail against a diminution of its historic influence in Syrian politics. Shia militants, backed by Hezbollah, could also play a spoiler role, as could Syria’s Christian and Kurdish minorities, depending on the composition of any transitional government. The Syrian state, meanwhile, is close to collapse. The government has ceased to function in approximately 85 percent of the country and struggles to deliver services even in areas that it controls. Syria’s physical as well as administrative infrastructure has been decimated, contributing to a humanitarian catastrophe that now includes over 1.2 million registered refugees and 4.25 million internally displaced persons. Meanwhile, the country has become a battleground for regional rivalries between Shiite Iran and Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey, with each funding their local proxies. Finally, at least some Alawites, fearing eventual collapse of the Assad regime, appear prepared to carve out a secessionist enclave of their own in western Syria, while Syria’s Kurds have their own secessionist ambitions. Only in the area of exploitable natural resources, it appears, does oil-poor Syria escape vulnerability. If history is any guide, these internal vulnerabilities may well trump even robust external support for any future peace settlement. Still, the fact that the belligerents in Syria appear locked in a “mutually hurting stalemate” make this a ripe time for the U.S.-Russian initiative.

Since I first broached the subject of intervention in Syria sixteen months ago, I have had episodic debates with various former military officers and defense intellectuals concerning the wisdom of a more robust approach to the insurrection that began against Bashar al Assad in March 2011.  The most recent installment came last Friday in response to the following tweet: Serious question:how come Syria’s air defenses present a problem for US aviators but not Israeli pilots? — Steven A. Cook (@stevenacook) April 26, 2013 The tweet itself was prompted by a National Public Radio story on Syria in which the correspondent gravely intoned, “Syria’s formidable air defense system.”  I have heard this over and over again in one form or another and it has always struck me as odd.  Why does it seem that Israel’s air force can penetrate Syria’s alleged superior air defense network at will and with impunity, but whenever the idea of using American and allied air forces to help the rebellion comes up, the Syrians are 10 feet tall? My question on Twitter was serious, but I was also attempting to draw my sometimes interlocutors Peter J. Munson (@peterjmunson) and Andrew Exum (@abumuqawama) into another discussion.  Perhaps having had enough of me they didn’t bite or didn’t see my tweet, but I did have an extended repartee with Dan Trombly (@stcolumbia) and Brian Haggerty (@brianhaggerty) over the issue.  Let me just start out by stipulating that both Exum and Munson have a perspective and gravitas on issues related to foreign interventions that is unique given their military service in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Trombly and Haggerty are civilians, but with strategic studies specialties.  I am neither a battlefield veteran nor a guns and trucks kid.  Still, just because I did not serve and someone had to tell me the difference between a Maverick missile and a Maverick does not disqualify me nor other civilian Middle East analysts from offering credible analyses of what can/should be done in Syria. To date, the answers to my questions about Israel’s capability to penetrate Syrian airspace and American disinclination to do the same and more generally concerning intervention in Syria amount to the following: 1)  Israel’s brief incursions are different from the sustained campaign the United States—and presumably allies—would have to undertake to establish a no-fly zone (NFZ) in Syria. 2) Israel’s missions have been on the “periphery” of Syria and have never had to contend with the dense network of air defenses  in and around major population centers. 3) The Assad regime has placed air defenses within population centers, putting both Syrian civilians and American aviators at risk during any air campaign. 4) Intervention in Syria would be costly and detract from the U.S. military’s ability to conduct operations in other areas. 5) Syria is complicated and military intervention may not help the situation; in fact, it might make the situation for Syrians a good deal worse. With the exception of the last, none of these claims is convincing either in part or whole.  It is true that enforcing a no-fly zone is an entirely different undertaking than Israel’s bombing of a Syria-based Islamic Jihad training camp in 2003, the destruction of Syria’s suspected nuclear facility in 2007, or high-speed overflights of Latakia intended—literally—to rattle Bashar al Assad in his summer palace in 2003 and 2006, but that does not mean the United States should not or cannot prevent Assad’s forces from flying.  When analysts and others first broached the idea of establishing a NFZ in Syria, they were told that, among other reasons, this was not a good idea because there was nothing to enforce.  Assad was not using aircraft to attack his own people.  That has not been true since at least the summer of 2012. The second claim—that the Israelis have only penetrated along Syria’s “periphery”—does not ring true.  Is Latakia, where the Syrian president has a summer residence, the periphery?  It is also only 55 miles from Latakia to Tartus, where Russia maintains a naval base.  I don’t know, but I would bet that Syrians have put up air defenses in this area.  Once more, the periphery claim suggests Israeli pilots are somehow getting off easy.  Ask the Turks.  They lost the two crew members of an F4 Phantom II operating off the coast of Syria in June 2012.  Now, the Syrians may have gotten lucky or they may be pretty good at defending their airspace, but the record suggests the former. It would be tough going for American pilots, hoping to avoid civilian casualties, if they were asked to establish and enforce a no-fly zone.  This type of operation entails destroying the Syrian air defenses.  Without being glib, complications and all it seems that Syrians are at far greater risk from the Assad regime and its supporters than from U.S. aircraft.  That said, it is a given that civilians will perish in the process of setting up a NFZ—one of the grave and unfortunate complications that Syria presents. Then there is the claim that the United States cannot get involved in Syria because of other pressing international problems and the prospect of war in another theater.  I can understand why observers might advance this claim; it has been a long and costly decade in the Middle East. That said, the last time I checked, the U.S. armed forces were designed to fight on multiple fronts. Before moving on, let’s get a few things clear: Syria’s GDP is $65 billion; The United States’  is $15 trillion. Syria spends $2.5 billion on defense; The United States spends $500 billion. Syria officially has 600 combat aircraft, though it is not known how many can actually be deployed; The United States has a lot more. Syria possesses five squadrons of attack helicopters; The United States has many more. I recognize that raw numbers cannot always tell very much about capabilities.  The Israelis were outgunned in terms of the amount of planes and tanks they could bring to the battlefield in June 1967, but they nevertheless prevailed.  Still, given all the caveats one could possibly think of concerning the particularities of the Syrian “battle space,” the regime’s use of irregular soldiers, and terror, Assad is a military pipsqueak in comparison to the United States.  That is not suggesting that intervention in Syria will be a “cakewalk,” but that the United States’ capability to establish and enforce a no-fly zone in Syria should be beyond dispute. If that is, indeed, the case (if it isn’t I want my taxpayer money back) then the real issue in Syria is both reason #5—military intervention might not attenuate the civil war or might make things worse and, I would add, the American people do not want to become involved in another Middle Eastern imbroglio.  Both are important arguments, though I would suggest that the second is the more compelling. It is important to remember that there are no risk free policies.  If the United States is determined to stay out of Syria in any meaningful way, there are also grave moral and strategic consequences.  Many more Syrians are likely to die and leaders in the region will draw the conclusion that they can pursue malign policies with little cost.  I too am reluctant to see the United States militarily engaged in yet another Middle Eastern country, but I also do not want to live in a world where dictators can kill their own people with abandon, develop nuclear technology without fear of punishment, threaten to destabilize a region, and drive millions of their own people into the wretched conditions of refugees and displaced people.