Elections and Voting

This year, a cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure and networks was included as a top tier priority in the Center for Preventive Action’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey.

This week’s alarming developments in Zimbabwe have prompted a curious response from President Emmerson Mnangagwa. A massive popular protest against fuel price increases, fed by broader frustration with an economy crippled by a currency crisis and decades of mismanagement, tipped into violence as security forces responded with a heavy hand, arresting over 600 people, leaving eight dead, and dozens injured. Mnangagwa, who departed for Russia just as the price increase came into effect, delivered his remote response to the turmoil in his country in the form of a tweet sent Wednesday morning—a particularly strange choice given that his government cut internet access countrywide in response to the protests, threatening draconian legal action against service providers who do not comply. From Russia, where he aims to drum up investment—particularly in the diamond mining sector, which is dominated by the Zimbabwean security services—Mnangagwa has plans for additional travel to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan before heading to Davos. The contrast between his jet-setting investment pitch and media photographs of brutalized Zimbabweans and burning roadblocks is jarring—one wonders what sort of investors are eager to jump into this particular market. However, the substance of his message home is even stranger. He expresses his sadness, sends thoughts and prayers to those affected by violence, and assures readers that he understands their concerns. But if he feels a sense of urgency about the meltdown in his country, or a responsibility to rein in the security services brutalizing civilians, he keeps these feelings well-concealed. Instead, he writes as if violence has been perpetrated only by troublemakers abusing the freedoms he allows—ignoring the fact that the security forces under his control have responded to unarmed protesters with live ammunition, have systematically terrorized people in their homes, and have rounded up activists who have had nothing to do with violence. The head of state assumes the role of passive spectator to the state-sponsored repression and resulting chaos that has his citizens living in fear. In his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in December, Todd Moss of the Center for Global Development noted the Mnangagwa government’s enthusiasm for passive constructions—for example, acknowledging that “citizens died” when in fact innocent citizens were murdered, on camera in some cases, by Zimbabwean soldiers during post-election violence. Moss was onto something. It’s all part of the same leadership style characterized by artful omissions, willful myopia, a failure to take responsibility for the acts committed in the name of the state, and the shedding of crocodile tears.  

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s complicated and long-delayed elections ended with a surprise twist. Most of those riveted by the middle-of-the-night announcement of results had two likely outcomes in mind. Perhaps the less-than-independent electoral commission would announce that incumbent President Joseph Kabila’s handpicked successor had won—an outcome that would be fraudulent given his lack of popularity—but not surprising in a repressive and corrupt system. Or perhaps a new day would dawn for Congo, and the real winner—reported by many to be opposition coalition leader Martin Fayulu, who had a clear lead in pre-election polls—would be allowed to assume power.  Instead, another longtime opposition leader, Felix Tshisekedi, was declared victorious. Rumors abounded about a deal cut between Kabila and Tshisekedi before the announcement—one that would ensure protection for Kabila and his inner circle and access to power for Tshisekedi.  However, the fallout remains unclear. Fayulu is contesting the results, but the courts in Congo are as biased as the electoral commission. Regional powers are calling for a recount—a sound idea given the dubious parliamentary results that were announced alongside the presidential surprise—but simultaneously confusing is to propose a government of national unity.  One cautiously optimistic school of thought about the current state of affairs rightly acknowledges that this is an important change from the norm. The Congolese people, by voting in such numbers for opposition options, made it impossible to pretend that Kabila’s preferred candidate had won, disrupting plans for business as usual. They forced the regime to accommodate their desires—at least to a degree.  Another, more perplexing approach is embodied by the Southern African Development Community to call for a government of national unity. Ostensibly the notion that problematic and contested elections should end in unity governments is rooted in fears of instability. However, for Congo to overcome the violence and deprivation that have plagued it for decades, it needs a whole new model of governance. A unity government in which every major political player gets a slice of power does not move the country forward; it keeps it spinning its wheels in place. It sweeps the fact that the election’s most credible observers claim there was a clear winner under a rug of dubious cooperation and even more questionable utility. Something important is missing from these analyses—accountability. At the end of the day, elections are about more than expressing the preferences of the electorate. They are about establishing the lines of accountability that give legitimacy to leaders. Right now, it certainly appears that Tshisekedi owes his victory to Kabila and the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy. That loss of connective tissue to the citizens of the country distorts accountability in ways unlikely to deliver the relief from predatory governance that the Congolese people crave. Likewise, a government of national unity solution has nothing to do with accountability to voters and everything to do with elites accommodating one another. Without accountability, there is little reason to anticipate better days for the long-suffering people of Congo.

The past few months have not been comforting for advocates of dynastic succession in Africa. In Togo and Gabon, favorite sons have become focal points for popular frustration. Togo’s Gnassingbé Eyadema led the country from 1967 until his death in 2005. His son, Faure Gnassingbé, was promptly installed as president, and was since been victorious in three deeply flawed elections. Togolese citizens have been vociferously demanding democratic reforms and insisting on term limits that would apply retroactively, effectively ending Faure’s tenure in 2020. They have been met with sometimes violent repression that has alarmed the region.  Togo’s December parliamentary elections did little to improve the country’s prospects. The opposition largely boycotted the exercise, insisting on key reforms to the electoral commission and process before participating. The resulting predictable victory for the ruling party is unlikely to be understood as a definitive decision about the country’s future, and unlikely to quell popular demands for change. Gabon’s future is equally uncertain, though for different reasons. Omar Bongo led Gabon for over 40 years. When he died in 2009, his son Ali was declared the winner in disputed presidential elections, and re-elected in another flawed election in 2016.  Last October Ali Bongo suffered a suspected stroke while in Saudi Arabia, and while his government insists that he is recovering in Morocco, he has not yet returned to the country he purportedly leads. Widespread confusion about who is really making decisions, uncertainty about when the newly elected National Assembly and a new cabinet will begin work, and political maneuvers that appear designed to evade the constitutional requirement that an incapacitated President be replaced through a special election do not inspire confidence domestically or abroad. A tight inner circle of Bongo loyalists (unsurprisingly featuring some family members) appear to hold the real levers of power for now, but as the failed coup attempt on January 7 illustrates, it will be difficult to maintain stability with provisional and ad hoc measures indefinitely.   As measures these long-ruling families have taken to cling to power become increasingly extreme, they invite resentment and resistance from citizens whose everyday concerns predispose them to reject the air of entitlement that surrounds their leaders. On a continent where calls for generational change have real political potency, installing junior in office is rarely a satisfying response. 

A look back at election security in 2018. 

A long-awaited election in the Democratic Republic of Congo offers hope for the country’s first democratic transition, but a contested result could incite turmoil.

The New York Times, along with the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal, is probably the most influential newspaper in the United States among those who follow foreign affairs. On December 18, the Times ran a full-page story with three photographs on the Nigerian army’s killing of peaceful Shiite protesters in the outskirts of Abuja, the national capital, at the end of October. The Times reported the Nigerian army’s efforts to portray the Shiite protesters as violent and posing a threat to Nigerian soldiers. At the time, army spokesmen defended their deadly response as being what President Donald Trump had told American soldiers to do in similar circumstances (in reference to the migrant caravan then approaching the southern U.S. border), and they grossly underreported the number of those killed by army fire. The Times' conclusion is based largely on a close analysis of a video made at the time and interviews of witnesses. It shows soldiers indiscriminately shooting into crowds trying to flee. An army spokesman, who said he had not seen the video, said that it had probably been “stage managed” to discredit the soldiers.  On December 14, the army suspended the operations of the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) in areas where the Islamist jihadist Boko Haram is most active (and where the situation is most dire). The army accused UNICEF of “spying” for Boko Haram; the charge apparently was based on UNICEF training material on spotting human rights abuses by the military; the army rescinded the ban shortly thereafter. On December 17, the army called on Amnesty International to shut down its operations in Nigeria. Amnesty had just issued a report that, since 2016, 3,641 people had been killed in violence characterized by conflict between farmers and herders in Nigeria’s Middle Belt. The army has claimed that Amnesty is attempting to destabilize the country with its “fictitious claims.” Since the colonial period, it has been the army, not the police, that successive military and civilian governments have used to maintain order. With little or no training in police work, the army’s response too often has been rough, if not brutal. Army personnel have only rarely been held accountable, and seem immune from international pressure, whether applied by human rights organizations or foreign governments. Nigeria faces presidential elections in February 2019. The two leading candidates are Muhammadu Buhari, the incumbent president, and Atiku Abubakar, a former vice president. Buhari, himself a former general and military head of state, has largely followed a hands-off policy with respect to reports of military abuses, and his opponent has largely been silent. When Buhari was elected president in 2015, his platform included, among other things, defeating Boko Haram and restoring security throughout the country. Despite some significant initial progress against Boko Haram, the group is now intensifying its operations. Furthermore, the conflict between farmers and herders is escalating, and a wave of kidnappings is sweeping throughout the country, prompting many Nigerians to feel more insecure. Security is a major electoral liability for Buhari's reelection. Army propaganda relating to Shiite protesters and attacks on highly respected human rights organizations might therefore be politically motivated. However, election season or not, Shiites are widely distrusted by the Sunni Muslim majority, while the political class, especially in areas far away from conflict, are still willing to defend the army and generally deeply resent criticism of Nigerian human rights by international organizations and foreign governments. So, it is by no means certain that this latest round of press coverage on army human rights abuses and army attacks on NGOs will translate into votes for opposition candidates. 

Numerous countries will hold elections in 2019. Here are ten to watch. 

His personalistic presidency threatens years of hard-won institutional gains.

On November 28, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari visited soldiers and a military hospital in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state and the epicenter of the Boko Haram insurgency. His visit was in conjunction with the 2018 chief of army staff’s annual conference. Speaking to the conference, Buhari commended the army’s efforts so far against Boko Haram, acknowledged their recent setbacks, such as at Metele earlier this month where many soldiers and their commander were killed, and encouraged them to do more as he promised that the army would get the resources it required. The conference was originally scheduled to take place in Benin, the capital of Edo state in the south, but it was moved north in light of the series of military defeats at the hands of Boko Haram.  Following the conference on November 29, Buhari is scheduled to meet with the leaders of Chad and Niger in N’Djamena to discuss Boko Haram’s apparent resurgence and proposals to strengthen the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), made up of military assets from Cameroon, Chad, Benin, Niger, and Nigeria. Initially founded in 1994 to combat lawlessness near Nigeria’s porous and unregulated northeastern borders, it is now principally focused on defeating Boko Haram.  The move of the chief of army staff’s annual conference to Maiduguri was almost certainly at President Buhari’s initiative. The move, Buhari’s presence, and his associated visit to wounded troops in a hospital indicates that Buhari is taking seriously the increased tempo of Boko Haram activity. The president’s failure to destroy Boko Haram, as he promised to do in the 2015 presidential election campaign, is a major liability for his chances at reelection in 2019.

Udo Jude Ilo is the Nigeria country representative for the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). Yemi Adamolekun is the executive director for Enough is Enough Nigeria (EiE). Nigerians will go to the polls for elections in February and March 2019. In line with its mandate, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has reminded candidates that they are prohibited by law from campaigning before November 18, which marks ninety days before election day for federal offices, which is scheduled for February 16. Elections for state-level positions will take place on March 1 and campaigns will begin on December 2. The campaign period is a very delicate time and is often characterized by violence, abuse of power, hate speech, and corruption.  For the 2019 general elections at the federal level, Nigerians will elect a president and vice president, 109 Senators, and 360 members of the House of Representatives. In state level elections two weeks later, they will elect 29 state governors and 991 members of states’ Houses of Assembly. For the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), 62 Councilors and 6 Area Council Chairpersons will be elected.  The elections come with huge logistical and operational challenges, but the greatest challenge facing election officials in Nigeria is the enforcement of rules, and by extension, securing the cooperation of the political class. The Electoral Reform Committee of 2008, or the Uwais Committee, was set up following the 2007 general elections. Local and international observers determined them to be the worst elections since the return to democracy in 1999. The Uwais Report [PDF], which is still the most comprehensive review of Nigeria’s electoral process, identified the weakness of the enforcement regime and the attitude of the political class as the two primary problems facing credible elections in Nigeria. Unfortunately, the political class has continued to find ways to undermine elections and enforcement remains weak. Under Section 150 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) [PDF], INEC is granted the authority to prosecute electoral offences. However, INEC lacks the actual capacity and resources to fulfill this mandate. Despite its best efforts, INEC has only been able to prosecute successfully a handful of cases since 2015. The police are responsible for investigating crime, including that related to elections. But, INEC has no operational control over the police to ensure the investigation of allegations of electoral fraud. The ministries of justice at the state and federal level, which exercise a complimentary role in crime prosecution, have typically shown little interest in electoral accountability. Prior to the 2015 elections in Nigeria, the National Human Rights Commission documented a list of individuals indicted for electoral malpractices in the course of election tribunal proceedings. They submitted that list to the Attorney General of the Federation, but no further action was taken. The structures of accountability and law enforcement in Nigeria are often under the control of politicians who exercise undue influence on the actions of those agencies. This makes any form of accountability difficult. Politicians understand that they are unlikely to face consequences for tampering with the electoral process, thereby undermining the elections’ legitimacy and fairness. Furthermore, electoral impunity is a major trigger for violence and instability in the region. Election-related violence led to the deaths of over eight hundred people in 2011, according to Human Rights Watch, and in the 2015 elections more than fifty Nigerians were killed in the run up to the election, according to the National Human Rights Commission.  Given the weakness of Nigeria’s electoral and judicial institutions, the political class has little incentive to play by the rules. Therefore, the success of Nigeria’s elections will hinge partly on tough love from international election observers and foreign governments. The United States in particular can help avert a crisis by supporting a framework for electoral accountability that encourages respect for the rule of law. This framework must include punitive measures. Within this context, the United States should consider targeted sanctions and travel bans against individuals who abuse their office or who undermine the electoral process through their supporters. In instances were such actions trigger mass violence, the observer missions and foreign governments should demand accountability. Observers and international NGOs will also need to support local civil society as they document infractions in the electoral process, support community mandate protection initiatives, and provide technical and political support to INEC to allow it to hold the political class accountable.

This post was coauthored by Alexandra Bro, research associate in the women and foreign policy program. Last week, US voters reshaped the face of Congress, pushing women's representation there close to 25% percent for the first time in history. These victories follow an extraordinary rise in female candidates this year, in which 22 women won their party's nomination for the Senate and more than 475 women announced a run for the House. More than twice as many women were elected this year than in the so-called "Year of the Woman" in 1992, which doubled the number of women in Congress on the heels of the contentious confirmation of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, then accused of sexual misconduct. A quarter century later, following the confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh – another Supreme Court nominee accused of sexual misbehavior – history has repeated itself at the ballot box. Read the full article in CNN.com >>

The South African Independent Electoral Commission has announced that national elections will occur on a Wednesday between May 7 and the end of the month in 2019. The three leading parties will be the governing African National Congress (ANC) led by current state President Cyril Ramaphosa; the official opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) led by Mmusi Maimane; and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) led by Julius Malema. The ANC, the party of Nelson Mandela, has been the governing party since the 1994 transition from apartheid to “non-racial” democracy. Ideologically, it is a broad church. It has been the party of the black majority, which comprises about 80 percent of the population. However, it is tarnished by corruption and poor governance associated with the former party leader and state president, Jacob Zuma. The DA is center-right, and in South Africa’s racial calculus, has been the party of whites, coloreds, and, increasingly, Asians. It is aggressively seeking black electoral support, and its leader Maimane is black. The EFF has radical economic and social policies; among other things, it calls for the expropriation of white-owned property without compensation. At the last parliamentary elections in 2014, of the 400 seats in parliament, the ANC won 249; the DA won 89; the EFF won 25. Six other parties also altogether hold the remaining seats, a reflection of South Africa’s system of proportional representation.  As he looks to the national elections in 2019, Ramaphosa is still seeking to consolidate his authority within the ANC in the aftermath of a bitter fight for its leadership. That effort will be helped if the ANC exceeds expectations in the 2019 elections, even if the number of seats it wins is fewer than in 2014. However, if the ANC performs below the expectations of the moment, Ramaphosa will be weakened and perhaps even exposed to possible removal. To become a credible party of government, the DA will need to expand its electoral appeal beyond racial minorities that altogether are only about 20 percent of the population. Its leaders are looking to make inroads among hitherto black middle-class support for the ANC. Despite its frequent media coverage, which is largely due to its fiery rhetoric, the EFF remains on the fringe.  This far in advance of the 2019 elections, predicting the outcome is a mug’s game. Many scenarios are possible, including a merger or alliance of the EFF with the ANC. (Julius Malema was once in charge of the ANC’s youth league until he had a falling out with Zuma.) Moreover, if the DA, EFF, and the minor parties increase their share of the vote, and if the ANC’s drops below 50 percent, then coalition scenarios become possible. Nevertheless, as in most democracies, incumbency is an advantage, and the ANC also benefits from being the party of the black majority. In South Africa, race is likely to continue to be the greatest predictor of electoral behavior, if perhaps less so than in the past.  

For many South Africa watchers, it can be difficult to conceive of the state as a separate entity from the ruling African National Congress (ANC). The ANC is so closely associated with the long struggle against apartheid, the birth of a democratic state, and the founding leadership of modern South Africa that it can seem fundamental to the country’s identity. Notwithstanding some opposition parties’ important gains in local elections in recent years, many analysts and journalists cover the ANC’s internal debates and power struggles as if they were synonymous with national political contests—and for good reason, because to date they largely have been. For obvious reasons, the blurring of lines between the party and the state raises concerns about the extent of corruption in South Africa, as well as questions about the strength and resilience of South Africa’s democracy. But, South African voters may have a much easier time envisioning a South Africa that is not governed by the ANC than is typically assumed. Recently released polling from Afrobarometer suggests a meaningful decline among South African voters with a strong sense of party loyalty, particularly among young, educated urban voters. For the first time in eighteen years of polling, over half of respondents considered themselves nonpartisan. For these voters, their own sense of identity does not overlap with party affiliation. They are unlikely to be moved by nostalgic campaign appeals based on liberation credentials. They are dissatisfied with their government, wish to enjoy more personal and economic security, and are likely to cast their votes for any party they believe can deliver on these core issues. In fact, the Afrobarometer survey found a solid majority would forfeit fundamental democratic rights if they could be assured of strong government performance on service delivery, which suggests that the country’s fundamental national values may be far different from the way they are conventionally described and understood.  The numbers suggest that external and internal narratives about South Africa may be diverging, and that those genuinely trying to understand the South African state may need to consider a broader range of political possibilities going forward. They also underscore the challenge before new President Cyril Ramaphosa as he approaches next year’s elections. Ramaphosa will need to attract voters unmoved by the historic triumphs of the ANC and convince them that the same ANC that has so dissatisfied them can achieve the results they crave on employment, security, and housing—all while managing the fraught internal politics of the party itself.