Defense and Security

  • Nigeria
    U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram
    Overview The militant Islamist group Boko Haram's increasingly bold attacks in Nigeria—most notably its April kidnapping of nearly three hundred female students—threaten to fuel further Muslim-Christian violence and destabilize West Africa, making the group a leading concern for U.S. policymakers, writes former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell, CFR senior fellow for Africa policy studies, in a new Council Special Report from the Center for Preventive Action (CPA). Boko Haram's proclamation that it has established an Islamic caliphate has stoked global fears over the insurgents' rapid ascent in Africa's most populous country ahead of the February 2015 national elections. Campbell, however, warns U.S. policymakers to resist characterizing Boko Haram as simply another foe in the global war on terrorism, since the group's grievances are primarily local. "The Boko Haram insurgency," Campbell explains, "is a direct result of chronic poor governance by Nigeria's federal and state governments, the political marginalization of northeastern Nigeria, and the region's accelerating impoverishment." Rather than fighting the militant group solely through military force, he argues, the U.S. and Nigerian governments must work together to redress the alienation of Nigeria's Muslims. "Washington should follow a short-term strategy that presses Abuja to end its gross human rights abuses, conduct credible national elections in 2015, and meet the immediate needs of refugees and persons internally displaced by fighting in the northeast," Campbell continues. He also recommends that the Obama administration revive plans to open a consulate in the northern city of Kano in order to improve U.S. outreach to that region's predominantly Muslim population. Though the United States has "little leverage" over President Goodluck Jonathan's government, Washington should "pursue a longer-term strategy to address the roots of northern disillusionment, preserve national unity, and restore Nigeria's trajectory toward democracy and the rule of law." Campbell's long-term recommendations comprise: supporting Nigerians working for human rights and democracy; revoking U.S. visas held by Nigerians who promote ethnic and religious violence and commit financial crimes; and encouraging Abuja to revamp the culture of its military and police. Read U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram, a report from CFR's Center for Preventive Action (CPA). CPA seeks to help prevent, defuse, or resolve deadly conflicts around the world. Additional CFR resources on Nigeria and Boko Haram: Nigeria Security Tracker, an interactive map monitoring violence in Nigeria Global Conflict Tracker, an interactive guide to U.S. conflict prevention priorities Backgrounder on Boko Haram Africa in Transition, Campbell's blog on political and security developments across sub-Saharan Africa Council Special Reports are concise policy briefs that provide timely responses to developing crises or contribute to debates on current policy dilemmas. The reports are written by individual authors in consultation with an advisory committee. The content of the reports is the sole responsibility of the authors. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Professors: To request an exam copy, contact [email protected]. Please include your university and course name. Bookstores: To order bulk copies, please contact Ingram. Visit https://ipage.ingrambook.com, call 800.234.6737, or email [email protected]. ISBN: 978-0-87609-610-9
    Council Special Report by John Campbell November 19, 2014 Center for Preventive Action
  • Iraq
    Next Steps for U.S. Foreign Policy on Syria and Iraq
    Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, CFR Senior Fellow Elliott Abrams details the United States' goals in Iraq and Syria: to alleviate the humanitarian and refugee crisis; to prevent an Iranian victory in Syria; and to strike devastating blows at the Islamic State.
    Testimony by Elliott Abrams November 19, 2014
  • Cybersecurity
    Disclosing Policies on Zero-Days as a Confidence-Building Measure
    Alex Grigsby is the assistant director for the Digital and Cyberspace Policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations.  Yesterday, Kim Zetter of Wired published an interview with Michael Daniel, special assistant to the president and cybersecurity coordinator, in which Daniel provides more information about the U.S. government’s policy on disclosing zero-day vulnerabilities. Zero-days are security flaws in computer software that are unknown to the software’s developer and the public. Zero-days are particularly dangerous, as threat actors can exploit these vulnerabilities without anyone else knowing they exist, giving the developer "zero days" to patch the flaw. This has led to fears that certain countries are stockpiling zero-days to use on their adversaries, not only leaving their adversaries vulnerable but everyone else as well. While Daniel’s comments were probably directed at a domestic audience, they could also be used to reduce tensions among certain cyber powers, such as the United States, Russia, and China. Policymakers have begun promoting confidence-building measures (CBMs) for cyberspace as a way to reduce misperceptions and ultimately avoid an armed conflict triggered by a cyber event. The United States used CBMs extensively with the Soviet Union during the Cold War to avoid a nuclear crisis, and the same principle is being applied to cyberspace. In 2013 for example, the United States and Russia agreed to three cyber-related CBMs, a United Nations group of government experts endorsed CBMs for cyberspace, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe adopted to a set of multilateral cyber CBMs. The Atlantic Council and the Swedish National Defence College also recently published a primer on CBMs for cyberspace. Having countries publicize their policies on zero-day disclosure could act as a CBM. As countries exchange their respective policies, they can clarify their approach and potentially dispel notions of ill intent, such as stockpiling. With right amount of outreach and repackaging, the United States could promote its policy on zero-day disclosure as a CBM and prod other countries to do the same.
    Blog Post by Alex Grigsby November 18, 2014 Net Politics
  • Iran
    Iranian Nuclear Talks: Negotiating a Bad Deal?
    In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade, Ray Takeyh argues that Iran participates in the nuclear talks because they serve so many of its interests—one of which may yet be an accord that eases its path toward nuclear empowerment.  
    Testimony by Ray Takeyh November 19, 2014
  • Conflict Prevention
    You Might Have Missed: Drones, Obama on Proxies, and U.S.-China Military Relations
    Remarks by President Obama at G20 Press Conference, White House, November 16, 2014. Obama: But we’re also very firm on the need to uphold core international principles. And one of those principles is that you don’t invade other countries or finance proxies and support them in ways that break up a country that has mechanisms for democratic elections. (3PA: The United States led coercive regime change invasions in three countries in the past thirteen years. Moreover, the international community has been funding and training proxies in the Syrian civil war for almost two years, and on September 19 Obama signed legislation to include the Pentagon in training the proxies. Presumably, these core international principles apply exclusively to other countries.) Steve Coll, “The Unblinking Stare: The drone war in Pakistan,” New Yorker, November 24, 2014. There are many reasons to be skeptical of the C.I.A.’s unpublished, lower estimate. According to former Obama Administration officials, the C.I.A.’s Counterterrorism Center, which oversees the agency’s drone operations, generates an after-action report, which includes an assessment of whether there was collateral damage. The center has a specialized, independent group that conducts post-strike investigations. The investigators grade the performances of their colleagues and bosses—not exactly a recipe for objectivity. But it seems clear that, over time, the Administration’s record improved significantly in avoiding civilian casualties… “The drones create a lot of misery in our area,” one student said. “So do the Arabs.” He meant Al Qaeda. “Why are the Arabs coming to our country? Why are they not fighting in their own countries? But we also say to America: If you say the Taliban are terrorists, yes, we agree. They are. But who created them?”… North Waziristan residents and other Pakistanis I spoke with emphasized how difficult it would be for a drone operator to distinguish between circumstances where a Taliban or Al Qaeda commander had been welcomed into a hujra and where the commander had bullied or forced his way in. If the Taliban “comes to my hujra and asks for shelter, you have no choice,” Saleem Safi, a journalist who has travelled extensively in Waziristan, told me. “Now a potential drone target is living in a guest room or a guesthouse on your compound, one wall away from your own house and family.” “You can’t protect your family from a strike on a hujra,” another resident of North Waziristan said. “Your children will play nearby. They will even go inside to play.” The researcher in Islamabad said, “There is always peer pressure, tribal pressure, to be hospitable.” He went on, “If you say no, you look like a coward and you lose face. Anyway, you can’t say no to them. If a drone strike does take place, you are a criminal in the courts of the Taliban,” because you are suspected of espionage and betrayal. “You are also a criminal to the government, because you let the commander sleep in your hujra.” In such a landscape, the binary categories recognized by international law—combatant or noncombatant—can seem inadequate to describe the culpability of those who died. Women, children, and the elderly feel pressure from all sides. A young man of military age holding a gun outside a hujra might be a motivated Taliban volunteer, a reluctant conscript, or a victim of violent coercion... Cheryl Pellerin, “Fiscal Crisis, Threats Test DoD Strategy, Readiness,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 16, 2014. One such area, particularly because of the ISIL fight in Iraq and Syria, [Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael G. Vickers] said, is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR. “There is just not enough of that capacity to go around right now,” he said, adding that primary reconnaissance aircraft in demand include the Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles. “We’re making due,” he added, “but we’re taking more risk in some areas. The demand now in Iraq and Syria is very high and we have challenges in Yemen and Libya and elsewhere, so we’re working hard to fix this but it’s not something you can get out of right away.” Without going into specific shortfalls, the intelligence official said, “we’re concluding that we will need more [drones] going forward than we might have thought a year ago if we hadn’t had Iraq-Syria and this situation.” Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America Department of Defense and the People’s Republic of China Ministry of National Defense on Notification of Major Military Activities Confidence-Building Measures Mechanism, U.S. Department of Defense, November 12, 2014. The United States Department of Defense and the People’s Republic of China Ministry of National Defense (hereinafter referred to as the “sides”): Reaffirm the commitment to the development of a new model of U.S.-China military-to-military relations, which is an integral part of the bilateral relationship: …The United States Department of Defense and the People’s Republic of China Ministry of National Defense (hereinafter referred to as the “sides”): Affirm that notifications should aim to reduce misunderstanding, prevent miscalculation, and manage risk and crisis effectively; and Establish a mechanism to inform when both sides would exchange notifications of major military activities on the basis of the principles of constructive cooperation, mutual interest, mutual trust, mutual benefit, and reciprocity, consistent with accepted international norms of behavior… Gen. Wesley K. Clark (ret.), Don’t Wait for the Next War: A Strategy for American Growth and Global Leadership (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2014) p. 39. “Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary [Paul Wolfowitz],” I opened. I paused. It felt a little awkward as he looked up at me. I thought I better put it in context. “Sir, when you visited us out at the NTC in January, you said I should stop by to say hello when I got back to the Pentagon.” I paused. No reaction. I tried again. “Well, I just wanted to stop by and say congratulations for all that was done overseas. You must be very proud of the operations and the troops.” I wasn’t one of those troops, and, sure, that was a little disappointing. I’d been held in position at the National Training Center during the war to continue the training activities for our mobilizing National Guard forces. But I was proud of what our team and the Army had accomplished. Now Wolfowitz was engaged. He looked up at me intently. “Yes,” he said, “of course….But, we didn’t get Saddam Hussein. President Bush says his own people will take him out….Maybe, but I doubt it.” I knew there was a rebellion underway as the Shiites in southern Iraq took advantage of Saddam’s defeat to rise up against his control, and I had read there was some argument as to whether or not President Bush had flinched and called a halt too soon, or should have ordered General Normal Schwarzkopf Jr. to Baghdad. But I wasn’t prepared with an opinion one way or the other on Saddam’s future. “Still, we did learn one thing,” Wolfowitz continued. “We learned that we can intervene militarily in the region with impunity, and the Soviets won’t do a thing to stop us.” (p. 39)
    Blog Post by Micah Zenko November 17, 2014 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Nigeria Security Tracker: Weekly Update November 8-November 14
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 8 to November 14, 2014. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. Learn About Tableau November 8: Gunmen assassinated the aide to the Governor of Nasarawa. November 8: Herdsmen killed thirty-two in Nasarawa. November 10: A suicide bombing at a school in Yobe resulted in the deaths of fifty-eight, including the bomber. Boko Haram is suspected. November 11: Hunters killed eighty members of Boko Haram, pushing them out of Maiha, Adamawa. November 12: A female suicide bomber targeted a school library in Niger, detonating early. She killed herself and nine others. Boko Haram is suspected. November 13: Soldiers and hunters took back the town of Mubi in Adamawa from Boko Hararm, killing "many" in the process (estimated at twenty). November 13: Boko Haram invaded Hong and Gombi in Adamawa and Chibok in Borno. There are no casualty figures. November 14: A suicide bomber killed six at a filling station in Kano. Boko Haram is suspected.
    Blog Post by John Campbell November 17, 2014 Africa in Transition
  • Islamic State
    Defeating ISIS
    President Barack Obama's strategy in Syria and Iraq is not working. The president is hoping that limited air strikes, combined with U.S. support for local proxies—the peshmerga, the Iraqi security forces, the Sunni tribes, and the Free Syrian Army—will "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). U.S. actions have not stopped ISIS from expanding its control into Iraq's Anbar Province and northern Syria. If the president is serious about dealing with ISIS, he will need to increase America's commitment in a measured way—to do more than what Washington is currently doing but substantially less than what it did in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past decade. And although President Obama will probably not need to send U.S. ground–combat forces to Iraq and Syria, he should not publicly rule out that option; taking the possibility of U.S. ground troops off the table reduces U.S. leverage and raises questions about its commitment. A Big Threat A reasonable goal for the United States would be neither to "degrade" ISIS (vague and insufficient) nor to "destroy" it (too ambitious for the present), but rather to "defeat" or "neutralize" it, ending its ability to control significant territory and reducing it to, at worst, a small terrorist group with limited reach. This is what happened with ISIS' predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, during 2007 and 2008, before its rebirth amid the chaos of the Syrian civil war. It is possible to inflict a similar fate on ISIS, which, for all of its newfound strength, is less formidable and less organized than groups like Hezbollah and the Taliban, which operate with considerable state support from Iran and Pakistan, respectively. Although not as potent a fighting force as Hezbollah or the Taliban, ISIS is an even bigger threat to the United States and its allies because it has attracted thousands of foreign fighters who could return to commit acts of terrorism in their homelands. What It Will Take to Defeat ISIS To defeat ISIS, the president needs to dispatch more aircraft, military advisors, and special operations forces, while loosening the restrictions under which they operate. The president also needs to do a better job of mobilizing support from Sunnis in Iraq and Syria, as well as from Turkey, by showing that he is intent on deposing not only ISIS but also the equally murderous Alawite regime in Damascus. Specific steps include:   Intensify air strikes. So far, the U.S. bombing campaign against ISIS has been remarkably restrained, as revealed by a comparison with the strikes against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan after 9/11. When the Taliban lost control of Afghanistan between October 7, 2001, and December 23, 2001—a period of seventy-five days—U.S. aircraft flew 6,500 strike sorties and dropped 17,500 munitions. By contrast, between August 8, 2014, and October 23, 2014—seventy-six days—the United States conducted only 632 airstrikes and dropped only 1,700 munitions in Iraq and Syria. Such episodic and desultory bombing will not stop any determined military force, much less one as fanatical as ISIS.   Lift the prohibition on U.S. "boots on the ground." President Obama has not allowed U.S. Special Forces and forward air controllers to embed themselves in the Free Syrian Army, Iraqi security forces, Kurdish peshmerga, or in Sunni tribes when they go into combat as he did with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. This lack of eyes on the ground makes it harder to call in air strikes and to improve the combat capacity of U.S. proxies. Experience shows that "combat advisors" fighting alongside indigenous troops are far more effective than trainers confined to large bases.   Increase the size of the U.S. force. Military requirements, not a priori numbers dreamed up in Washington, should shape the force eventually dispatched. The current force, even with the recent addition of 1,500 more troops for a total of 2,900, is inadequate. Estimates of necessary troop size range from 10,000 personnel (according to General Anthony Zinni, former head of Central Command) to 25,000 (according to military analysts Kim and Fred Kagan). The total number should include Special Forces teams and forward air controllers to partner with local forces as well as logistical, intelligence, security, and air contingents in support.   Work with all of Iraq's and Syria's moderate factions. The United States should work with the peshmerga, Sunni tribes, the Free Syrian Army, and elements of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) that have not been overtaken by Iran's Quds Force, rather than simply supplying weapons to the ISF. Given Shiite militia infiltration, working exclusively through the ISF would risk empowering the Shiite sectarians whose attacks on Sunnis are ISIS' best recruiter. The United States should directly assist Sunni tribes by establishing a small forward operating base in Anbar Province, and also increase support for and coordination with the Free Syrian Army. Current plans to train only five thousand Syrian fighters next year need to be beefed up.   Send in the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Between 2003 and 2010, JSOC—composed of units such as SEAL Team Six and Delta Force—became skilled at targeting the networks of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Its success was largely due to its ability to gather intelligence by interrogating prisoners and scooping up computers and documents—something that bombing alone cannot accomplish. JSOC squadrons should once again be moved to the region (they could be stationed in Iraq proper, the Kurdistan Regional Government, Turkey, and/or Jordan) to target high-level ISIS organizers.   Draw Turkey into the war. President Obama should do what he can to increase Turkey's involvement in the anti-ISIS campaign. If the Turkish army were to roll across the frontier, it could push back ISIS and establish "safe zones" for more moderate Syrian opposition members. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said that he will not join the fray without Washington's commitment to overthrowing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whom he rightly sees as the source of instability in Syria. Assuming Erdogan has honestly outlined his conditions for Turkish involvement in Syria, a greater U.S. commitment, demonstrated by a no-fly zone and airstrikes on Assad's forces, should be sufficient to entice Ankara to play a greater role.   Impose a no-fly zone over part or all of Syria. Even though U.S. aircraft are overflying Syria, they are not bombing Assad's forces. This has led to a widespread suspicion among Sunnis that the United States is now willing to keep Assad in power. More broadly, Sunnis fear that Obama is accommodating Assad's backers in Tehran to allow Iran to dominate Mesopotamia and the Levant. A no-fly zone over part or all of Syria would address these concerns and pave the way for greater Turkish involvement. The United States should act to ensure that Assad does not take advantage of the anti-ISIS campaign to bomb opposition centers. Obama could announce that no Syrian aircraft will be allowed over designated "safe zones." Such a move would garner widespread support among Arab states, undercutting attempts to portray U.S. action as a war against the Muslim world. There are legitimate concerns that overthrowing Assad now, before the Syrian opposition is ready to fill the vacuum, would be counterproductive and potentially pave the way for a jihadist takeover of all of Syria. But instituting a partial or even a complete no-fly zone would not lead to Assad's immediate ouster. It would, however, facilitate the moderate opposition's ability to organize an administration capable, with international help, of governing Syria once Assad finally goes.   Mobilize Sunni tribes. As long as the Sunni tribes of Iraq and Syria continue to tacitly support ISIS, or at least not to resist it, defeating ISIS will be almost impossible. But if the tribes turn against ISIS, as they did against al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2007, a rapid reversal of fortunes is likely. Galvanizing Sunni tribes into action will not be easy; Iraqi Sunnis feel that the United States betrayed them after the surge by leaving them under Shiite domination in Baghdad. The fact that Haidar al-Abadi replaced former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in September is a good first step. But Abadi is also a Shiite from the same Dawa Party as Maliki, making it unlikely that Sunnis will fight ISIS if they once again find themselves subordinated to Shiite rule. This concern could be allayed if the United States were to engineer a political deal to grant Sunnis autonomy within the Iraqi federal structure, similar to what the Kurdistan Regional Government already enjoys. To assuage Sunnis' fear of betrayal, the United States should pledge to indefinitely maintain advise-and-assist forces in Iraq—even without Baghdad's agreement, U.S. forces could at least remain in the Kurdish area.   Prepare now for nation-building. The United States should lay the groundwork for a postconflict settlement in both Iraq and Syria that does not necessarily require keeping both political entities intact. In the Iraqi context, this means offering greater autonomy to the Sunnis and guaranteeing the Kurds that their hard-won gains will not be jeopardized; the United States should propose to permanently station troops in the Kurdistan Regional Government. This is not necessarily synonymous with Kurdish independence, but the United States should give serious consideration to dropping its longtime opposition to the creation of a Kurdish state or possibly even two—one in Syria and one in Iraq.   Social fragmentation in Syria will make postwar reconstruction difficult; after three years of civil war, it may not be possible to reconstitute the country as it previously existed. The U.S. goal should simply be to ensure that Syrian territory is not controlled by either Shiite or Sunni extremists. The postwar settlement in the former Yugoslavia, which involved the dispatch of international peacekeepers and administrators under United Nations, European Union, and NATO mandates, could be a possible model. The United States should push UN Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura to work in cooperation with the Arab League, the EU, NATO, the United States, and even Russia to create a post-Assad administration that can win the assent of Syria's sectarian communities. As Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution has suggested, "[T]he U.S. should provide most of the muscle, the Gulf states most of the money, and the international community most of the know-how." This is admittedly an ambitious goal. Neither Assad nor ISIS is in imminent danger of falling, and it will be challenging to impose any kind of order in Syria. But the United States should not repeat the mistake it made in Iraq and Libya of pushing for regime change absent a plan to fill the resulting vacuum. Admittedly even the best-laid plans can fail, but failure is guaranteed if no such plans are in place.   Down the "Slippery Slope"?   Critics will call this strategy too costly, alleging that it will push the United States down a "slippery slope" into another ground war in the Middle East. This approach will undoubtedly incur greater financial cost (dispatching ten thousand troops for a year would cost $10 billion) and higher risk of casualties among U.S. forces. But the present minimalist strategy has scant chance of success, and it risks backfiring—ISIS' prestige will be enhanced if it withstands half-hearted U.S. air strikes. Left unchecked, ISIS could expand into Lebanon, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia. Greater American involvement could galvanize U.S. allies—the most important being Turkey and the Sunni tribes of Iraq and Syria—to commit more resources to the fight. If this plan is not implemented, a major ground war involving U.S. troops becomes more probable, because the security situation will likely continue deteriorating. By contrast, this strategy, while incurring greater short-term risks, enhances the odds that ISIS will be defeated before Obama leaves office.  
    Policy Innovation Memorandum by Max Boot November 17, 2014 National Security and Defense Program
  • Russia
    Ukraine Needs U.S. Arms to Play Defense
    Outmatched by the Russian military, Ukrainian forces require more support from the Pentagon, including defensive weapons, says expert Steven Pifer.
    Interview with Steven Pifer and Bernard Gwertzman November 14, 2014
  • United States
    ISIS, Cyberattacks, and Other Threats to Homeland Security
    Play
    Michael McCaul, chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security in the U.S. House of Representatives, joins Jane Holl Lute, president and chief executive officer at the Council on CyberSecurity, to discuss the growth of ISIS, foreign fighters, and threats to U.S. homeland security.
    Event with Michael McCaul and Jane Holl Lute November 13, 2014
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    How Can U.S. Intel Training Help Fight Boko Haram?
    Jesse Sloman is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations and a reserve officer in the Marine Corps. He served on active duty from 2009 to 2013. The views expressed here are his own. The New Telegraph reported last week that approximately forty U.S. military personnel landed in Abuja to assist the Nigerian Army with operations against Boko Haram. Although additional information about their mission has yet to trickle out, a primary focus of any American advisory effort is likely to be intelligence collection and analysis. The techniques and procedures U.S. intelligence specialists could provide would undoubtedly prove valuable for Nigerian troops tasked with fighting a distributed and mobile foe operating in an area the size of Rhode Island. U.S. military doctrine describes the intelligence process as a cycle with several distinct stages. It begins with a commanding officer’s questions, which intelligence specialists turn into formal information requirements. These requirements drive the collection of raw data by a variety of means, including satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, espionage networks, and even the aggregation of civilian news reporting. The information is categorized, analyzed, and turned into a finished product that is disseminated to consumers. Feedback is solicited, new questions are posed, and the cycle begins again. Intelligence training for the Nigerian Army would likely consist of classroom instruction covering these steps in detail, with particular attention paid to how the intelligence cycle can be fused with a commanding officer’s overall planning process. Given the poor technical state of the Nigerian military, U.S. advisors would likely emphasize human intelligence (HUMINT) over more sophisticated--and expensive--methodologies. The instruction could include establishing and running networks of informants, debriefing friendly personnel on their observations, and interrogating captured enemy forces. The Nigerian Army’s documented history of human rights violations means that a particular emphasis would be placed on legal, ethical, and humane methods for dealing with prisoners. Intelligence advisors could also provide support by allowing the Nigerian Army to leverage U.S. aerial reconnaissance assets for missions against Boko Haram. In May 2014, the United States deployed Predator and Global Hawk unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) as well as MC-12 Liberty manned surveillance aircraft to West Africa to assist in the search for the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapped last April. Additionally, in March 2013, the United States was reported to have begun flying Predators on surveillance missions out of a base in Niger. While the current status of these platforms is unclear, assets like these could assist the Nigerian Army with tracking the movement of Boko Haram fighters and locating and identifying important insurgent leaders. Despite the potential benefits of a U.S. advisory mission, there are still more questions than answers regarding the effort’s ultimate efficacy. First, without systematic reform of the corruption and human rights abuses endemic to the Nigerian Army, it is unclear if a limited advisory mission will have much of a positive impact. Indeed, small numbers of U.S. troops have already been on the ground since May assisting in operations to recover Nigeria’s missing schoolgirls without success. Second, Russia’s decision to provide counterterrorism training to 1,200 Nigerian troops may cause U.S. advisors to restrict information sharing, limiting their ability to cover sensitive topics or leverage external assets. Finally, the Nigerian government’s increasingly outspoken criticism of U.S. assistance efforts for refusing “to grant Nigeria’s request to purchase lethal equipment” does not foreshadow a positive working relationship between advisors and the Nigerian Army. Without addressing these potential areas of concern, even the very best intelligence training would, at best, only have a marginal impact.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for John Campbell November 13, 2014 Africa in Transition
  • United States
    ISIS, Cyberattacks, and Other Threats to Homeland Security
    Play
    Michael McCaul, chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security in the U.S. House of Representatives, joins Jane Holl Lute, president and chief executive officer at the Council on CyberSecurity, to discuss the growth of ISIS, foreign fighters, and threats to U.S. homeland security.
    Event November 13, 2014
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Nigeria’s Kidnapped Chibok School Girls and Boko Haram’s Forced Recruitment
    Jacob Zenn has written a thoughtful and important article, “Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region.” It appears in the Sentinel, a publication of the Combating Terrorism Center based at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. Zenn’s article requires careful reading. His principal conclusions are that Boko Haram is forcibly recruiting boys and girls who are “re-educated” at camps in Cameroon. He also posits growing and close relations between Boko Haram and Cameroonian arms traffickers and financiers. Zenn sees Boko Haram as needing these additional human and financial resources because of its move to extend control over territory. He notes that where Boko Haram operates outside of Nigeria, it is in the area of the former "Kanem-Borno caliphate" (commonly known as the Kanem-Bornu empire). He suggests that any future negotiations between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram will require the former to cede territory to the latter. He also suggests that the Chibok girls will never be recovered, having been married-off and scattered. Zenn also posits growing links between Boko Haram and ISIL. Finally, he includes a fascinating discussion that Boko Haram may have between fifteen and fifty thousand members–the higher number he finds plausible if it includes forced recruits and individuals who cooperate with Boko Haram, whether freely or because of coercion. He notes that even the lower number would mean that Boko Haram has manpower similar to that of the pro-Russian militias in eastern Ukraine. Zenn’s article is thoroughly documented. His sources are primarily the media. That, of course, is what is available. Otherwise, there remains a paucity of hard facts about Boko Haram. Zenn’s conclusions, therefore, should be seen as thoughtful and credible hypotheses rather than definitive. I find particularly convincing his discussion about Boko Haram’s efforts to recreate the Kanem-Bornu empire as a final reversal of British colonialism that has been sustained by the governments in Abuja and Yaounde. I also agree that the liberation of the Chibok school girls is unlikely.
    Blog Post by John Campbell November 12, 2014 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Nigeria Security Tracker: Weekly Update November 1-November 7
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 1 to November 7, 2014. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. Learn About Tableau November 1: Boko Haram killed eighteen in Uba, Borno. November 1: Fulani herdsmen killed twenty in Nasarawa. November 2: Sectarian violence resulted in the deaths of forty-two in Zamfara. November 2: Gunmen freed 144 inmates and killed 1 in Kogi prison. November 3: A suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber killed eighty-two Shiites during a procession in Potiskum, Yobe. November 3: Boko Haram has brought Mubi under Sharia law, amputating ten people and beheading two imams. November 3: Soldiers killed over fifty sectarian insurgents in Nasarawa during a raid on their camp. November 4: Boko Haram killed thirteen in Gombe and raided a French factory, stealing a large quantity of dynamite. November 5: Boko Haram killed twenty-one in a raid on Malam Fatori, Borno, but also lost "dozens" of their own insurgents (estimated at twenty-four). November 5: Eighteen were found shot dead after they were arrested by the Nigerian army in Potiskum, Yobe. Community leaders believe they were targeted because they belonged to the Kanuri ethnic group (most Boko Haram recruits are Kanuri). November 7: A suicide bomber and a second bomber killed at least sixteen during an attack on a Bauchi bank. Boko Haram is suspected.
    Blog Post by John Campbell November 10, 2014 Africa in Transition
  • Defense and Security
    Happy Birthday to the United States Marine Corps!
    The Marine Corps turns 239 years-old today. On November 10, 1775, the Continental Congress adopted a resolution to create a Marine force composed of two battalions. Since then, the Marines have been “from the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli” and many other places as well. You probably know that the Marine Corps’ motto is Semper Fidelis, or Semper Fi for short. It means “always faithful” in Latin, and it signifies a Marine’s loyalty both to the Corps and to the United States. What you may not know is that Semper Fi wasn’t the Corps’ motto until 1883. During its first century of existence, the Corps had a few unofficial mottos. These included “to the shores of Tripoli,” which commemorates the Marines’ service in the First Barbary War, Fortitudine (meaning “with courage”), and Per Mare, Per Terram (“by sea and by land”), which the Marines borrowed from the British Royal Marines. No Marine has ever become president, but several have made it in politics. Secretaries of State James A. Baker and George P. Shultz and Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan all served in the Marine Corps. Senator John Glenn (who first gained fame as an astronaut) was also a Marine. Several baseball hall-of-famers are veterans of the Corps, including Rod Carew, Roberto Clemente, Eddie Collins, Bill Veeck, and Ted Williams. Marines who made it in Hollywood include Harvey Keitel, Lee Marvin, Steve McQueen, and George C. Scott. Comedians Drew Carey and Rob Riggle were Marines, as was the late, great Jonathan Winters. Several famous musicians served in the Corps, including country legend George Jones, hip-hop artist Shaggy, and “The March King,” John Philip Sousa. The Marine Corps is the smallest of the four U.S. armed services in the Department of Defense, with roughly 190,000 active-duty personnel, deployed in the Pacific, South America, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. To put that in perspective, the U.S. Army is about two and a half times larger with roughly 490,000 troops. But compared to most of the world’s militaries the Marine Corps is a giant. Countries that have armies smaller than the U.S. Marine Corps include France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan. Want to learn more about the Marine Corps? I asked Col. Stephen Liszewski, one of five active duty U.S. military officers spending the year as part of CFR’s Studies Program, to recommend a few books worth reading. Here are five books he recommends, with his brief summaries: Krulak, Victor H. First to Fight: An Inside View of the U. S. Marine Corps (1984). Lt. Gen. Krulak writes that “This book, therefore, is an effort to set down what I perceive to be the qualities that have caused the Marine Corps to survive and flourish.” Pressfield, Stephen. The Warrior Ethos (2011). Pressfield served as a Marine after graduating from Duke University in 1965. This book captures the essence of the ethos we strive to teach to our Marines. Russ, Martin. Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950 (1999). Russ tells the story of the First Marine Division and the Chosin Reservoir campaign in 1950 during the Korean War. The 12,000 Marines and sailors of the First Marine Division found themselves surrounded by 60,000 Chinese in the frozen mountains of Korea. The First Marine Division fought its way out of this death trap, taking out their dead, wounded, and equipment while facing relentless Chinese attacks. An incredible story of courage and warfighting skill. Sledge, E.B. With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa (1981). The Pacific theater of World War II was the crucible that made the Marine Corps the famed fighting force that is known around the world. The author, E. B. Sledge, was a private first class with Company K, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, who fought in and survived the battles of Peleliu and Okinawa. This book tells the story of Sledge and his fellow Marines in a deeply personal way that highlights the human dimension of the war in the Pacific. Webb, James. Fields of Fire (1978). A novel about young men from different worlds plunged into jungle warfare as U.S. Marines in the An Hoa Basin of Vietnam in 1969. This book is a classic story of men under fire and combat leadership. Col. Liszewski also recommends the HBO mini-series The Pacific (2010), which tells the stories of three marines, John Basilone, E.B. Sledge, and Robert Leckie, on the Pacific front during World War II. The show is based true stories, drawing on Sledge’s With the Old Breed, as well as Leckie’s Helmet for My Pillow: From Parris Island to the Pacific(1957). If you want to know what all Marines are required to read, the Marine Corps has posted its reading list online. Marines.com also has a great timeline of the history of the Marines. The official video birthday message of the Commandant of the Marine Corps (the Marine Corps just got a new commandant, General Joseph Dunford, last month) provides a moving reminder of the heroism and sacrifices Marines have made over the years: Thanks to all those who have served.
    Blog Post by James M. Lindsay November 10, 2014 The Water's Edge
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Nigeria’s Boko Haram Moving Toward Governance?
    The Nigerian media is reporting that Boko Haram is firmly in control of Mubi, a strategically important town in Adamawa state. Apparently based on telephone contact with city residents and a few interviews with those who have fled, the media is presenting a Boko Haram effort to return the city to normal, albeit run according to Islamic law. Boko Haram “leaders” in the city, not further identified, are urging residents who have fled to return. They have also ordered shops to reopen. A gasoline station has reopened in the neighboring town of Uba, and Boko Haram provided security for the weekly market in Mubi last week. There are reports that Boko Haram is paying for anything they take from the shops. The same “leaders” are also saying that residents are free to come and go and may use motorcycles, the use of which is banned in some parts of Adamawa still controlled by the government. Boko Haram is promising to provide residents with “security.” On the other hand, the media is also reporting that residents continue to flee. Boko Haram has renamed Mubi Madinatul Islam, “the city of Islam and peace.” Residents report that there are checkpoints everywhere. One resident is reported in the media as saying that the insurgents have warned against any attempts to hold an election in the state, and that Boko Haram would “capture the whole state in no distant time.” Meanwhile, military sources say that their efforts to retake Mubi continue. Media documentation of what Boko Haram is doing in Mubi is thin. But, if it is an accurate reflection, it may be a reflection of the direction in which Boko Haram is moving. Boko Haram’s focus appears now to be on the acquisition of territory, including the entire state of Adamawa. It also appears to be moving in the direction of providing services, especially security for the residents in the territories it controls. It remains to be seen whether residents who have fled Mubi and Uba will start to return. Boko Haram’s leadership remains as shadowy as ever.  
    Blog Post by John Campbell November 7, 2014 Africa in Transition