Sanctions

Nolan Quinn is a research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations’ Africa Program. On January 19, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo—on his last full day in the position—announced visa restrictions on “Tanzanian officials responsible for or complicit in undermining” the general elections held in late October last year. As of yet, none of the individuals sanctioned have been identified publicly. In announcing the measures, Secretary Pompeo asserted that “there are consequences for interfering in the democratic process,” while the U.S. embassy in Tanzania said it had “kept its promise” to hold accountable those officials who had interfered in the elections. Prior to Tanzania’s elections, Secretary Pompeo released a nonspecific statement urging African governments to hold “free, fair, inclusive elections.” The Tanzanian government, led by President John Magufuli and the increasingly authoritarian ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), undoubtedly failed to heed Secretary Pompeo’s call. However, the same could be said of incumbents in the Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Uganda, none of which faced a response from the Trump administration beyond rhetoric. While the reasoning behind the decision to single out Tanzania—one that belies the Trump administration’s weak record of defending democracy in Africa—is not clear, what is apparent is that U.S.-Tanzania relations have sharply soured in the past decade. Until recently, the U.S.-Tanzania partnership was strong. In 2013, President Barack Obama became the third successive U.S. president to travel to Tanzania. In a joint press conference with Tanzania’s President Jakaya Kikwete, who was also the first African head of state to visit the Obama White House, President Obama commended Tanzanians—and their government—for “doing their part to advance the good governance and transparency upon which democracy and prosperity depend.” Obama, in touching on the “spirit of friendship” the two countries enjoyed, was not merely offering a one-sided, feel-good bromide: from 2006 to 2012, approval of U.S. leadership in Tanzania stood at an average of over 72 percent; in 2015, 78 percent of Tanzanians expressed confidence that President Obama would “do the right thing regarding world affairs.” Tanzania has also consistently been among the top two or three recipients of bilateral aid administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the 2015 annulment of an election in Zanzibar—one initially praised as the smoothest in the semiautonomous archipelago’s history—precipitated what has been a rapid deterioration in bilateral relations. Citing the Zanzibar election and limitations on freedom of expression, in March 2016 the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a U.S. foreign assistance agency, suspended its partnership with Tanzania. Magufuli further irritated relations when, in June 2016, his government unilaterally cancelled a contract with Symbion Power, a U.S. company that had received more than $110 million in MCC procurement awards. Pressure to act against the Tanzanian government rose further amid a crackdown on human rights, which included the president’s pledge to set up a “surveillance squad” targeting the gay community. On January 31, 2020, the Trump administration announced sanctions against Paul Makonda, the regional commissioner of Dar es Salaam, for his role in targeting “marginalized people,” and on the same day, the White House added Tanzania to a list of countries—considered by some commentators the final iteration of President Trump’s much-maligned “Muslim ban”—for its apparent failures to share public-safety and terrorism-related information. Pompeo’s final imposition of sanctions for electoral malfeasance is likely to command support across the aisle. In the U.S. House of Representatives, a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced a resolution noting discontent with the Tanzanian government’s conduct in business disputes and its role in suppressing dissent in the lead-up to the elections. Following the vote, Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ) called violence by security forces “the culmination of five years of sustained attacks by the Magufuli administration against the country’s democratic institutions,” while U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania Donald J. Wright, a political appointee, noted that “detaining opposition leaders is not the act of a government confident in its victory.” Tanzanian opposition figures have welcomed Pompeo’s move. Zitto Kabwe, a Tanzanian opposition leader, had already expressed a desire for other countries to sanction Tanzania. Fatma Karume, a former president of the Tanganyika Law Society who was disbarred seemingly for her political activism, thanked the United States for “saying NO to IMPUNITY” and giving those “who believe in DEMOCRACY and HUMAN RIGHTS renewed vigour.” Magufuli’s main contender for the presidency in October’s elections, Tundu Lissu, called the move a “clear and unmistakable warning to dictators who stole elections.” The question for the Biden administration is not whether it will repeal sanctions against Tanzanian officials. Without wholesale changes in Tanzania’s political climate, it will not, though the broader travel ban is almost sure to be axed. More pressing is for President Biden and his coterie of advisers to decide whether to send similarly strong messages to other authoritarians in Africa, particularly in Uganda, where reported abuses have been on par or worse than those in Tanzania. While the United States’ democratic credentials have certainly been damaged following the assault on the U.S. Capitol, failing to punish blatant abuses of human rights would do nothing more than leave autocrats comfortable in their ill-gotten victories.

On November 2—the day before the U.S. presidential election—more than seventy-one states party to the treaty that established the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a statement in a UN General Assembly plenary session that affirmed their commitment "to preserve the tribunal's independence undeterred by any measures or threats against the Court, its officials, and those cooperating with it." Though the statement did not mention the United States, it was a response to the Trump administration's sanctions against the court's chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, and other ICC personnel. The statement was supported by NATO member states—except the United States—as well as by most other U.S. allies and friends. It was also supported by Nigeria, South Africa, and other African states. The 1998 Rome Statute established the ICC as a mechanism for holding governments accountable for crimes against humanity and genocide. A total of 123 states are party to it. In effect, it imposes limits on the national sovereignty of those states that accept its jurisdiction. Under President Bill Clinton, the United States signed [PDF] the Rome Statute. However, the George W. Bush administration declined to submit it to the Senate for ratification, and no U.S. administration has accepted ICC jurisdiction over the country or its citizens, though Barack Obama’s administration actively cooperated with it. The ICC is based in the Hague. Four of its eighteen judges are African, as is the chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, from The Gambia. However, all eight of its active investigations and eighteen active prosecutions involve African states and Africans. Authoritarian African rulers tend to loathe the ICC, accusing it of "racism" and "colonialism." Among others, Uganda (under President Yoweri Museveni) and South Africa (under former President Jacob Zuma) have threatened to withdraw from the court's jurisdiction, though none has actually done so. Fatou Bensouda, however, has pointed out that that six of the eight active investigations have been undertaken at the request of African governments.  At present, the chief prosecutor is looking into whether there are grounds for an ICC investigation in Afghanistan that would primarily focus on the Taliban and Afghani forces but also U.S. military units. She is also looking at complaints about Israel. (The Palestinian State accepts ICC jurisdiction, Israel does not.) Consistent with U.S. policy, the Trump administration forcefully rejects any ICC investigatory role regarding U.S. military forces in Afghanistan. Accordingly, it has imposed economic sanctions on Fatou Bensouda and other ICC personnel that presumably involve personal hardship, including revocation of visas and freezing of U.S. bank accounts. Administration use of economic sanctions has long been common—the Obama administration imposed some two thousand. But their focus was primarily criminals or rogue states, not human rights lawyers such as Bensouda. Further, the Trump administration's rhetoric against the ICC has been strong—a senior administration figure has raised the prospect of abolishing it. The Trump administration's rhetoric and imposition of sanctions on individuals are consistent with its "America First" ideology and adherence to maintenance of absolute American sovereignty, including over American forces stationed abroad. However, its style and rhetoric, more than the substance of its position, distance itself from its traditional allies and partners and human rights organizations. But the rhetoric is likely to be welcomed by authoritarian leaders in Africa—as well as elsewhere.

The Trump administration’s case for invoking “snapback” sanctions against Iran for violating the nuclear deal rests on shallow arguments that have left Washington alone in efforts to pressure Tehran.

New U.S. sanctions under the Caesar Act could compound the economic turmoil threatening to undo the Assad regime.

Germany's federal prosecutor has issued an international arrest warrant for suspected GRU hacker Dmitriy Sergeyevich Badin. This hints at the use of the European Union's Cyber Sanctions Regime to punish Russia for its cyber operations against EU member states.

Coronavirus will likely be far more effective than sanctions in inducing internal changes in North Korea.

Kitaneh Fitzpatrick is an intern for Middle Eastern history and geopolitics at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. She is pursuing a master of arts in Near Eastern studies at New York University.  In November 2019, hundreds of Iranian intelligence reports were leaked that shed light on Tehran’s success in bolstering Iranian influence throughout the region. Syria and Iraq featured heavily in the reports and are usually the focus of international attention on Iran’s foreign influence. But the Islamic Republic’s reach extends far beyond the Middle East. Recently, Iran has turned its attention to Africa. Faced with crippling sanctions and diplomatic isolation, Iran has developed a close partnership with South Africa. South Africa has long been a cornerstone of Iran’s South-South strategy, which aims to strengthen ties with African and South American states. Strongly promoted by President Ahmadinejad, the South-South strategy intends to boost Iranian international credibility and promote trade. The Islamic Republic was one of the first countries to resume trade with South Africa following the end of apartheid, and the two countries have enjoyed strong relations ever since. Trade has been an integral element of this relationship, with Iranian officials estimating the value of Iranian Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa in 2018 at roughly $135 billion.  South Africa has proven to be an unlikely ally, calling the U.S. withdrawal from of the Iran Nuclear deal “regrettable” and publicly reaffirming its commitment to building an Iranian-South African relationship. South Africa has also advocated for Iranian interests at the UN, siding with Iran on critical issues at the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency. South Africa’s commitment to maintaining diplomatic ties with Iran in the sanctions era has allowed the two countries to engage in joint business-tech forums, scientific cooperation, and tourism. Operating within the framework of the South Africa-Iran Joint Commission of Cooperation established in 1995, Iranian and South African foreign ministers meet frequently to discuss enhancing cooperation.  South Africa has become an important defense partner. Tehran has sought to leverage its longstanding relationship with South Africa to support Iranian naval expansion outside of the Middle East, and has conducted limited out-of-area naval operations in South Africa, according to a recent U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report. Iran and South Africa have also signed basic military cooperation agreements, and Iran’s deputy minister of defense met with South Africa’s chief of defense force staff in Tehran this May to discuss “the development of defense cooperation [that would achieve] long term and strategic engagement.” While deepening defense ties with South Africa is important to projecting Iranian military might, Iran’s navy frequently faces maintenance issues and its deployed forces are largely symbolic. However, naval expansion to South Africa is still a powerful demonstration of Iranian political influence in spite of economic hardship and domestic unrest.  South Africa is part of Tehran’s effort to offset the cost of U.S. sanctions and increasing diplomatic isolation from the West. The relationship still has room to grow, but it and others will provide an essential lifeline to Iran and will undermine U.S. pressure.

Jennifer Davis, an American anti-apartheid activist, passed away on October 15. Among her many legacies, she mobilized public pressure on the U.S. Congress to overturn President Ronald Reagan’s veto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Born in Johannesburg and a graduate of the prestigious University of the Witswatersrand (Wits), she and her husband eventually moved to New York. Soon after, she became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Like other white, highly-educated anti-apartheid activists, she was strongly influenced by the racism of Nazi Germany and the subsequent holocaust.  From 1981 to 2000 she was the director of the American Committee on Africa that coordinated NGO opposition to apartheid and made it a mass movement. She went beyond the Sullivan Principles, which called on American companies doing business in South Africa to treat their South African employees the same as they treated their employees in the United States. She pushed for Americans to boycott South African goods, and for Americans to divest from companies that profited from apartheid.  Within the governing African National Congress, there is frequent criticism that the United States came late and only half-heartedly to the anti-apartheid struggle. Jennifer Davis is a reminder of the important role played by civil society in heightening public awareness in the United States of apartheid—which eventually led to real legislative action—and that the international anti-apartheid movement acquired significant American support.

As Iran slowly untethers itself from the Iran nuclear deal’s central constraints on enriched uranium, signaling the deal’s potential collapse, President Trump is proving that U.S. unilateral power remains paramount on the global stage.  Trump’s policy to kill the 2015 deal has been prevailing against the objections of the remaining signatories, perhaps the most powerful global counter-coalition possible — China, Russia, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the European Union. It has been prevailing despite that Iran had until very recently been abiding by the deal following the U.S. withdrawal last May. But without an endgame strategy on Iran that includes an exit ramp off the escalatory ladder of tensions and a solution to the nuclear problem, Trump’s victory will be a Pyrrhic one. Throughout the Cold War and after, it was dogma that the United States needed partners in order to make sanctions work. With Iran, Trump has shown that the U.S. alone remains a preeminent power that can implement an unprecedented “maximum pressure” campaign of primary and secondary sanctions.  U.S. unilateral sanctions, and the threats to retaliate against companies doing business with Iran, have effectively crippled the Iranian economy, isolating it from international financial markets, drying up foreign investment, cutting its oil exports to 1.1million barrels per day (bpd) and below, stifling its economy (which is projected to shrink by 6 percent in 2019) and causing its currency to lose 60 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar.  But Trump’s assertion of U.S. unilateral power, through the use of sanctions, is a disruptive power and not an end in itself. To date, U.S. efforts to strengthen the Iran nuclear deal have been counterproductive to enhancing U.S. security. By withdrawing from the deal, Trump has provoked an Iranian reaction that could lead to the deal’s collapse while providing no alternative constraints on the Iranian nuclear program. The Iran Deal had resulted in a rollback of the Iranian nuclear program that included the removal of 98 percent of its enriched uranium, decreasing its enrichment capabilities to very low levels of 3.67 percent — far below weapons grade — and subjecting its program to robust international inspections. As the deal unravels, the Iranian program will be able to continue unfettered, adding once again to the destabilizing challenges in the region, not reducing them.  Furthermore, as the president recently increased the sanction pressure — including tightening sanctions on Iran's oil exports, sanctioning Iran’s supreme leader and placing its elite military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on the terrorist list—Iran has adopted a more aggressive response and tensions have escalated across the region. The U.S. and Iran came very close to open conflict as the confrontation spilled into the Persian Gulf. And the chances for conflict are only accelerating as tit-for-tat reactions continue to disrupt the shipping lanes in the gulf. U.S. sanctions also have enabled the IRGC and Iran’s conservatives to tighten their control over Iran's economy and politics. And U.S. rejection of the Iran deal has turned the Iranian public against negotiations with the West, particularly on its nuclear program, further constraining Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani’s; 72 percent do not think Iran should negotiate with the West because it is untrustworthy.  The challenge before Trump is whether he is willing and able to convert U.S. power into an endgame strategy that results not in war by design or miscalculation, not in Iran building nuclear weapons, but in his stated goals of a nuclear weapons-free Iran with a better nuclear deal and an Iran that, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put it, behaves like “a normal nation.” Meeting that challenge won’t be easy, especially for an administration that is short-staffed on the national security cabinet level on down, and a president who is dismissive of coordinated approaches to strategy and policy. Trump, nonetheless, did lay the groundwork for progress earlier recently when he offered to talk to the Iranians without pre-conditions. If this offer is more than just a hat tip to a U.S. domestic constituency, there needs to be a comprehensive strategy with clear goals, objectives and options. Time is of the essence as Iran moves away from the constraints on its nuclear program. To be successful, a strategy would need to include as incentives something very similar to what the president appears to be offering North Korea: broad-based sanctions relief and security guarantees reinforcing the president’s claim that he is not pursuing regime change in Iran.  Although the Iranian leadership has rejected the president’s offer, the Iranians should reconsider their response. The Iranian strategy is inappropriately focused on pressuring the other signatories to fulfill the trade and investment requirements of the Iran nuclear deal with threats of incremental violations every 60 days. This strategy does not fully recognize how the U.S. has checkmated the other signatories on this issue.   If the U.S. is going to go it alone on Iran, it must implement a strategy that leverages U.S. economic power into opportunities for a diplomatic solution that makes the U.S. more secure.

Neither Iran nor the United States likely wants war, but the possibility of a miscommunication is considerable, risking a dangerous escalation.

With significant risks now looming over global energy markets, the United States should be careful in evaluating any future oil sanctions, Amy Myers Jaffe writes in the following Q & A which first appeared on CFR.org.  Oil prices ticked up a few percentage points after the announcement. Do you expect prices to remain higher, or is there enough supply in the market to cover a drop in Iranian exports? U.S. sanctions had already curbed Iran’s oil production substantially earlier this year. The Trump administration’s tough stand on waivers could remove an additional five hundred thousand barrels per day or more from the market in the coming weeks. This would come on top of production cuts planned by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and ongoing production and export problems in Libya and Venezuela. Oil prices will continue to be sensitive to any supply disruptions, despite expectations of rising U.S. oil production and possible production increases from Saudi Arabia. Should prices begin to rise precipitously, the Trump administration could make sales from the United States’ strategic petroleum reserve. How has the United States’ growing role as a major crude oil exporter changed its attitudes when it comes to sanctions?  There is no question that rising U.S. oil production has emboldened U.S. policy regarding oil sanctions. U.S. crude oil exports reached record levels, above 2.5 million barrels per day, in recent weeks and are expected to rise further this year. However, the administration should take care not to impose too many complex sanctions in the oil market at once because surprise events such as hurricanes, accidents at major oil fields, or geopolitical strife can create sudden disruptions in oil supplies and leave markets more vulnerable to price spikes. U.S. crude oil production is still less than 12 percent of the total global crude oil supply. It can only go so far in hedging against the multiple risks now looming in the market. Iran has threatened to stop the flow of oil from other big suppliers via the Strait of Hormuz. Could it do that? How exposed is the U.S. economy to oil disruptions in the Middle East? The Strait of Hormuz is more than twenty miles wide. It would be extremely difficult for Iran to close it completely for an extended period of time. There is the question of whether Iran could use asymmetric warfare tactics, such as swarming speedboats and missile attacks, but the possibility of a decisive international military response led by the United States makes such an endeavor extremely risky for Iran and its military. Iran would likely use more clandestine approaches, such as cyberattacks on neighboring state oil facilities. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have alternative pipeline routes that can bypass the Strait of Hormuz. In the case of Saudi Arabia, upward of 6.5 million barrels per day in exports could bypass the Persian Gulf. The U.S. economy is less exposed now to oil price shocks than in past decades due to the lower oil intensity of the U.S. economy. Still, high gasoline prices can derail consumer spending, especially on durable goods such as cars. At the same time, an oil price shock in the developing world could cut into countries’ appetites for U.S. goods and services. China is the largest purchaser of Iranian crude. How do you expect it to respond to the Trump administration’s decision? China said that Iran’s discounted oil was too cheap to pass up, and it has been increasing its purchases of Iranian crude in 2019, reaching over seven hundred thousand barrels per day this month. In the past, China attempted to circumvent these sanctions by purchasing Iranian crude on a barter basis or by promising to pay Tehran once sanctions are lifted. In the end, the United States and China have many bilateral issues of greater salience, so both sides will be reluctant to fight over Iran policy. What will this additional pressure on Iran achieve? Iran has little incentive at this point to negotiate with the Trump administration so close to the U.S. presidential election cycle. Iran has a policy it calls strategic patience, which is simply waiting to see if a new administration might reinstate the Iran nuclear agreement or take a less aggressive posture. The International Atomic Energy Agency maintains that Iran has continued to comply with nuclear inspections set up by the deal, which is still being honored by European signatories.