• Climate Change
    Two Paths Forward on Oil and Gas
    In a post earlier this week, I argued that people who want serious action on climate change will need to build bipartisan coalitions, which will require accepting oil and gas development. Most of the responses were encouraging, but one type of reaction was not. It came from proponents of oil and gas development, and went something like this: “Great post. But the United States can’t do anything about climate change because [it’s too expensive][renewable energy sucks][China won’t act][etc]”. That reaction highlights something important: climate advocates aren’t the only ones who are going to need to build coalitions and accept compromise in order to get what they want. Enthusiasts for oil and gas development need to realize that they’re in a similar boat. Oil and gas developers and their allies are both fighting against opposition that is focused most prominently on fracking and on the Keystone XL pipeline but that extends to issues like access to offshore acreage and fossil fuel exports too. Just like proponents of aggressive action on climate change, they’ve tried to win the policy fight in substantial part through aggressive messaging in favor of their cause. And, just like the climate advocates, they aren’t quite getting what they want. That means that they too could benefit from making some mutually beneficial deals. Indeed the same sort of deal that I argued climate advocates should be looking for – serious action on climate change in exchange for expanded opportunities for production of oil and gas – is what advocates for oil and gas development should have on their minds. In arguing that climate advocates should favor such a deal I emphasized one central point: the tradeoff wouldn’t fundamentally undermine their core goals. That’s because U.S. oil production is unlikely to have a large impact on world oil consumption and because natural gas is currently displacing coal. Something similar ought to motivate enthusiasts for U.S. oil and gas production. Instead of asking, “Is serious U.S. action on climate change a good idea?”, they should ask this: “Is a package that expands opportunities for U.S. oil and gas production, while at the same time takes serious action on climate change, something that we prefer to the status quo?” Just as people who are concerned about climate change don’t need to become oil and gas boosters in order to see the wisdom of compromise, proponents of expanded oil and gas production don’t need to become “climate people” in order to see the merits of making sensible deals. All they need to do is accept that serious U.S. climate action, regardless of whether if it solves the climate problem, isn’t the end of the world – and that it can be done without undermining their own core goals. It turns out that oil and gas advocates have a similar pair of options to what climate advocates have. They can try to unilaterally push through their preferred options -- or they can try to build coalitions that might not seem obvious at first blush. The latter path may be trickier, but it also raises the odds of real success.
  • Climate Change
    Two Paths Forward on Climate Change
    The past week has been huge for people who want to see the United States go big on climate change. First Hurricane Sandy vaulted climate change back into the public debate. Now the reelection of Barack Obama means that there will be someone in the White House who cares strongly about the issue. The combination creates an opportunity to press for climate action. That makes it all the more critical for people who care about climate change to get things right. If they remember one thing, it should be this: they will need to build coalitions if they want to go big. The contours of the sort of policy that might have a shot at becoming the foundation for a coalition aren’t too tough to figure out. They probably look a lot like what President Obama advocates when he talks about pursuing an “all of the above strategy”. That would blend serious action to curb emissions from fossil fuel consumption with steps to help facilitate safe expansion of U.S. oil and gas production. (That, incidentally, looks a lot like what John McCain advocated in 2008, suggesting that it has the potential for bipartisan appeal.) Indeed now would be a great time to start telling people who are newly concerned with climate change that there are serious approaches to the problem that they can embrace that don’t require radical revisions to how they think about the world. Yet many of the loudest voices on climate change, particularly in the aftermath of Sandy, appear to have other ideas on their minds. To them the lesson of recent weeks seems to be that now is the time to redouble those strategies that appeal most to those who are already charged up about climate action. That means renewed efforts to block pipeline, shale, and other oil and gas developments – despite the fact that a substantial majority of Americans are opposed. The instinct is understandable, but it is ultimately likely to be counterproductive, for two big reasons. The first is a matter of substance: blocking U.S. oil and gas development would have barely any impact on either U.S. or world emissions, and might make things worse. Curbing U.S. oil would nudge emissions lower, but since U.S. production is likely to primarily displace production from others, the impact will probably be very small. More U.S. gas production, meanwhile, is currently reducing emissions by displacing coal, which is good climate news. All of this means that you need to do considerably more than block oil and gas development if you want to really bend the U.S. emissions curve. What you need is to go directly after emissions from U.S. fossil fuel consumption in a big way, whether that’s through an explicit price on carbon, a clean energy standard, or something else. And since that eventually requires action from Congress, you need to build coalitions. I’m not suggesting that advocates for climate action need to satisfy every member of the House and Senate. But really big steps will eventually require collaboration that extends far across party lines – and putting together coalitions in this vein will inevitably require some support for U.S. oil and gas. Now some advocates will have a ready response: taking a hard line on oil and gas now gives them something that they can trade when it comes time to deal later on. That’s not a crazy way for some people to take when they think about strategy. But it’s disastrous if it becomes the dominant (or most publicly prominent) approach. The country needs people who will actively articulate a way forward that can be widely embraced – one that, incidentally, probably looks a lot like the “all of the above” strategy that the President has advocated (though not always been able to fully pursue) and that so many have nonetheless mocked. Moreover, insofar as advocates are merely being tactically shrewd in taking a hard line on oil and gas, they will need to be prepared to compromise in the end in order to get a serious carbon price or clean energy standard through. Telling your grassroots base that U.S. oil and gas development spells certain doom for the planet is not a great way to set that endgame up. Those who want serious action on climate change should keep one more thing in mind. Four years ago, when the financial crisis hit, many smart analysts said that the opportunity to go big on climate change would return when the economy got back somewhere close to normal. Their mistake wasn’t in that analysis – it was in thinking that the return to normal was only a couple of years away. The economy is now slowly limping back to health, and while it’s far from being repaired, a considerably stronger economy is a real prospect when you look four years ahead. People who want serious action on climate should probably still be looking at the next year or two as an new opportunity to rebuild support for climate action and to begin to craft new coalitions, much as they did in the few years before President Obama was first elected. Doing that requires presenting a vision that people can embrace without completely overhauling their views of the world. Building that foundation will maximize the odds that it will be possible to make big and necessary things happen when the time is really right
  • International Organizations
    Charting the Future of Global Development
    For more than a decade, the global conversation about development has been dominated by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Established at the United Nations’ Millennium Summit of 2000, these eight objectives focused on what the international community could do to meet basic human needs in the developing world. Over the past dozen years the MDGs have been attacked on numerous grounds—for setting impossible goals (such as 100% primary school attendance), for neglecting critical requirements like good governance and strong institutions, and for placing unrealistic expectations on what foreign aid can actually accomplish. But whatever their shortcomings, the MDGs mobilized unprecedented global attention and financial resources for poverty alleviation, driving policy and budgetary decisions throughout the world’s aid agencies. Several of the MDGs have already been achieved (such as halving of absolute poverty) or are on track to be met by 2015. The global development community is now debating what should replace the MDGs when they expire in 2015. What is crystal clear is that the inherited MDG model is increasingly irrelevant to today’s development landscape: - First, the MDG approach focuses overwhelmingly on what Western donors can do to deliver development through foreign aid. This ignores growing evidence that aid often pales in comparison to foreign investment, trade liberalization, private sector promotion, and technology transfer in laying the foundations for sustained economic growth. It also overlooks the growing role being played by non-traditional aid donors, including China, India, Brazil, and the Gulf countries, and pays insufficient attention to aligning global goals and targets to the national development priorities of the poorest countries themselves. - Second, the world’s poor are not where they were when the UN establish targets for the MDGS. In 1990—the baseline date used for MDG targets—fully eighty percent of the world’s poor lived in stable, low income countries. Today, only 10 percent do, whereas nearly two-thirds (66 percent) live in middle-income countries and another quarter (24 percent) inhabit fragile or conflict-affected low-income countries. The implication? Making a dent in global poverty will require unprecedented collaboration with governments in middle-income nations, on the one hand, and new strategies to engage the world’s most conflict-ridden and dysfunctional countries, on the other. - Third, any successor to the MDGs must take a more comprehensive approach to development. As the UN team spearheading global consultations has concluded, follow-on goals must target not only inclusive economic and social development but also environmental sustainability (given short shrift in the MDGs) as well as peace and security (completely ignored by the MDGs, despite being a fundamental precondition for development). So what should replace the current MDGs? The best practical answer to date comes from the Korean Development Institute (KDI) and the Canada-based Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), which recently released a glossy report, titled Post-2015 Development Agenda: Goals, Targets and Indicators. Don’t let the soporific title fool you. This short document is an engaging, incisive and timely contribution to debates on the future development agenda. The authors’ eleven goals include: Inclusive growth for dignified livelihoods and adequate standards of living: The KDI-CIGI initiative wisely focuses on broadly shared economic growth as the sine qua non of development. Sufficient food and water for active living: This goal responds to growing concerns about water scarcity and food price volatility, as well as the need for adequate nutrition, not simply caloric intake. Appropriate education and skills for full participation in society: Whereas the MDGs focused on grade school enrollment and childhood literacy, this replacement goal encompasses secondary and tertiary education. Good health for the best possible physical, mental, and social well-being: The KDI-CIGI report wisely integrates all global health targets under one single goal. It also addresses not only infectious disease but the growing burden posed by non-communicable diseases. Finally, it emphasizes the importance of health system strengthening—as opposed to stove-piped, single disease interventions. Security for ensuring freedom from violence: Among the MDGs’ biggest lacunae was inattention to human insecurity (including war, crime, and domestic violence) as a limiting factor to development. Closing this gap is critical, particularly in engaging fragile states. Gender equality enabling men and women in society to participate and benefit equally in society: Reflecting the importance of women in the development process, the report calls for steps to advance the physical, economic, and decision making autonomy of women across societies. Resilient communities and nations through disaster risk reduction: Growing global vulnerability to natural disasters–ranging from drought to hurricanes—underlines the need for all societies to invest in preparedness and recovery systems. Quality infrastructure for universal access to energy, transportation and communication: In an age of globalization, development depends on connectivity. The authors thus include targets for increased access to energy, transportation networks, and communications technology. Empowering people to realize their civil and political rights: This proposed goal is both the most controversial and the most important. While authoritarian regimes may bluster, long-term development requires that people participate in the political process, possess civil rights, have access to rule of law, and can hold their governments accountable. Sustainable management of the biosphere, enabling people and the planet to thrive together: Building on the Rio+20 conference, the authors propose steps to break from “business as usual”, including putting a price on the ecological costs of economic activity. Global governance and equitable rules for realizing human potential: Finally, the report proposes sweeping reform of international institutions to advance development globally. This potential agenda is so massive and complex that the authors might wish to limit themselves to an even ten goals or focus on specific shortcomings in the global economy that represent enormous barriers to development. One of the report’s most distinctive—and perhaps controversial—recommendations is that progress toward these goals be measured in all countries, including advanced market democracies. While one can imagine outcries from some sovereignty-minded conservatives about being “judged” by the international community, there is no reason the United States should not voluntarily embrace, domestically, a set of universal, non-binding goals for human betterment broadly consistent with its own political and economic ideals—as well as the development agenda it has long pursued abroad. After all, as philosopher Amartya Sen has written, the most compelling definition for development is “freedom.”
  • Climate Change
    Assessing the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) and the Sustainability of South Korea’s Contribution
    When South Korean president Lee Myung Bak first offered to serve as a bridge between developing and industrialized countries on climate change issues in a speech August of 2008, it seemed implausible that South Korea, as a smaller country in the global climate change discussion, could have an influence on either group. In fact, the speech ultimately seemed more targeted at a domestic rather than an international audience, since it spawned the establishment of a Blue House-led Green Growth Committee tasked to reform national energy policy across all sectors (including the National Asssembly’s adoption of an emissions trading scheme) and to promote policies of adaptation through enhanced energy efficiency and promotion of Korean development of renewables. But there was also an international dimension, which took form through the establishment, funding, and international promotion of the GGGI by the South Korean government. Two weeks ago, GGGI was relaunched as an international organization. In a new report for CFR’s U.S.-Korea Program, my colleague Jill Kosch O’Donnnell has analyzed the significance and implications of the establishment of the GGGI as an international organization that acts to promote a bottom-up, economics-based vision for addressing climate change rather than getting mired in an international bureaucratic spider web of UN-led initiatives that effectively immobilize good intentions. The establishment of GGGI as an international organization is fraught with contradictions that make the organizational mission and its prospects for success both intriguing and daunting: GGGI must still prove that its green growth model of development will successfully achieve “green” growth and development while also attracting financial support and building its reputation as an effective international organization. GGGI’s operating model is distinctive, attempting to link developed and developing contries as well as to involve both governments and non-state actors. In some aspects, GGGI seems to position itself more as a specialized boutique consulting group than as an international organization, but what will it take for such a model to be sustainable and effective? As Lee Myung-Bak’s term as South Korea’s president comes to a close, the sustainability of South Korea’s commitment to green growth as a political priority is in question. In fact, one motivation for establishing GGGI as an international organization in the first place was the recognition that subsequent South Korean administrations may pull back from making green growth a priority since it is a signature initiative of Lee Myung-bak. This raises the question of which country will serve as an international “champion” for GGGI and for promoting green growth issues in general going forward. Among South Korea’s many efforts to influence the international agenda in recent years, Lee Myung-bak’s distinctive contribution has been to embrace and act on the premise that climate change will not allow for the conduct of “business as usual,” but instead that a sustainable development requires both “continued growth and efforts to combat climate change.” Two weeks ago, South Korea was named as host of the Green Climate Fund, which has been established in association with the UN Convention on Climage Change to finance the promotion of “low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways by providing support to developing countries to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.” These developments in combination suggest that it will be hard for a new South Korean president to walk away from green growth, even if it is still too early to know whether South Korean stewardship and contributions to this dimension of the international agenda will ultimately be successful.
  • Disasters
    Hurricane Sandy and Climate Change: Three Things to Know
    As the recovery from hurricane Sandy gets under way, CFR’s Michael A. Levi highlights three policy takeaways from the storm.
  • Climate Change
    The Global Green Growth Institute: On a Mission to Prove Green Growth
    Introduction On October 23, 2012, a new international organization dedicated to changing the way countries grow economically made its official debut on the world stage. The eighteen member countries of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) convened for the first time as an international body in Seoul during a ministerial meeting just a month in advance of the United Nations (UN) climate talks in Qatar.[1] Three years ago, the GGGI was only an idea championed by South Korean president Lee Myung-bak, who has made green growth a centerpiece of his administration's policy agenda. Since the institute's launch in June 2010, it has evolved from a small South Korean nonprofit into an organization that has built the necessary foundation for conversion to an international organization.[2] It currently has sixty-two staff members and three regional offices in Abu Dhabi, Copenhagen, and London, in addition to its Seoul headquarters.[3] The GGGI has an estimated 2012 budget of more than $35 million.[4] The GGGI reflects President Lee's "me first" approach to climate change, which he has described as the idea that countries should take initiative and execute policies appropriate to their respective circumstances without waiting for others to act first.[5] The GGGI is already at work on the ground in ten countries. The institute focuses on developing and emerging economies that want technical and policy advice on how to pursue more sustainable economic growth. It is intended to be an economic counterpart to the global bodies that focus on the scientific aspects of climate change.[6] Generally, green growth refers to the idea that economic growth and environmental protection are not at odds, but can be mutually reinforcing. Though green growth is now widely discussed, it remains an aspiration. The GGGI has staked its future on its ability to prove that green growth is possible. It is a grand experiment. While other international organizations have been formed in order to address collective challenges, the GGGI is organized around the pursuit of a solution that is not yet proven. Can developing countries achieve broad-based economic growth while avoiding environmental damage? And can avoiding environmental damage in itself present new opportunities for growth? The GGGI will test these ideas in countries that want to integrate green growth into their core economic development agendas and use those experiences to advance the body of knowledge. If it is successful, the GGGI's work could revolutionize international economic development efforts. However, the institute will face obstacles related to maintaining international political support, recruiting staff, and securing funding. Ultimately, the GGGI's success depends on its ability to effectively address developing countries' institutional and technical shortcomings over the long term. Maintaining continuity of political support for green growth plans inside South Korea will also need attention. In this way, it faces the same challenges that have dogged traditional development efforts for decades. Economics First The Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development held in June 2012 generated a slew of epithets. A news release from CARE International claimed the conference was "nothing more than a political charade."[7] Greenpeace International executive director Kumi Naidoo said it was "a failure of epic proportions."[8] Rio+20 secretary-general Sha Zukang's verdict: "An outcome that makes nobody happy."[9] Over the past several years, many observers have expressed frustration with the inability of environmental talks that include thousands of participants to produce concrete action or meaningful results. However, Rio+20 did produce numerous side agreements on a variety of sustainable development actions. These were negotiated on the margins of the conference between communities, countries, and corporations.[10] In a sense, this do-it-yourself spirit reflects the ethos of the GGGI, which seeks to combine coherence and technical capacity with local desires for action on green growth initiatives. There are two important premises to the GGGI's approach. The first is that environmental challenges, such as water stress, biodiversity loss, and climate change, are economic policy challenges.[11] Though the GGGI expects that its work will make positive contributions to climate change mitigation and poverty reduction, it operates by looking through a wider lens that assesses how countries can use resources more efficiently. The first step is to take an economic view of the situation. "We view ourselves as an economic institution, not an environmental institution," GGGI executive director Richard Samans said of the institute.[12] By acknowledging that economic growth and rising living standards are crucial for developing countries, and by accounting for the incentives that have led to stress on natural resources, this view is a welcome complement to the global climate bodies that tend not to emphasize these points as first principles. The second premise is that years of intense focus on global, top-down, legalistic solutions to climate change have come at the expense of a "how-to" focus on the ground.[13] The result is severe underinvestment in the economic framework necessary for countries to attract private and public capital to achieve economic development goals that can produce both economic and environmental payoffs, such as projects that can simultaneously produce new jobs and access to clean energy sources. The GGGI seeks to fill this economic gap by developing an "enabling economic architecture," or frameworks for integrating economic and environmental goals that include plans to attract investment to fulfill them.[14] In this way, the GGGI's country-by-country (or in some cases, province-by-province), bottom-up approach is the right supplement to top-down, global negotiations. In short, global discussions advance ideas about what to do. The GGGI focuses on how to do it. A core activity of the GGGI is advising countries on forming what it calls a Green Growth Plan (GGP). This begins with assessing the country's own goals for economic development. The GGGI then helps make a thorough evaluation of where economic performance targets can overlap with potential environmental benefits. It also helps identify policy options, taking into consideration the trade-offs inherent in policy choices. "Green growth is not a free lunch in most cases," Samans argues.[15] The GGGI also assists with the crucial step of investment analysis—building quantifiable investment cases that can help attract public and private sector resources—to help countries fulfill their plans. Reducing information and policy barriers to investment through rigorous analysis is seen as a critical part of the GGGI's work. In effect, the GGGI diagnoses an economy's green growth potential and then helps to craft investment cases to translate policy into reality. This is a distinguishing feature of the GGGI: a whole-of-government approach that seeks to integrate green growth into a country's economic development agenda, rather than produce disparate, one-off environmental projects. This is ambitious but necessary: uncoordinated, small-scale projects are unlikely to be enough to achieve the paradigm shift to a green economy that the GGGI seeks. Building a Green Growth Model The idea that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to economic development has become something of a mantra in the development community. Consideration of political, environmental, and economic conditions on the ground is an imperative often mentioned in discussions about development. This is as true when striving for green growth as it is for traditional growth. How then can the GGGI achieve its mission of building a green growth model that is widely applicable? The GGGI aims to do this by focusing intensively on a small number of countries that vary by region, income level, and type of economy in order to test green growth in diverse locations.[16] The goal is to produce successful examples that show green growth is possible in a variety of settings and that there are best practices that can be adapted to different situations. These on-the-ground experiences will also feed into the GGGI's own research, including through two multilateral initiatives for which it is acting as the secretariat: the Green Growth Knowledge Platform and the Green Growth Best Practice Initiative.[17] According to Samans, the GGGI plans to work with ten to twenty countries over the next several years "that are serious about driving green growth into their economic development plans."[18] How to judge whether a country is serious about green growth? The GGGI pursues projects only in countries from which it has received a high-level request, usually at the ministerial level, and also consults widely with interested parties and ministries.[19] This ensures buy-in at the highest levels, though this may last only as long as the current government is in place. What happens when administrations change, and along with them, the political dynamics that initially favored green growth? The GGGI hopes that successful cases of green growth will eventually inspire other countries to adapt green growth models to their own situations.[20] However, changes in political support or opposition from domestic interest groups will be potential risks to successful implementation of green growth plans. Even where political conditions are supportive of green growth, underlying problems can stymie the best of green growth intentions. A recent World Bank report cautions, "[Green growth] is not a panacea to a country's economic ills: if economic growth is insufficient because of institutional or policy problems, green growth will not boost it in the absence of other structural changes."[21] Buy-in without strong institutions and technical knowledge is not enough. The GGGI tries to address such deficiencies head-on from the beginning by integrating a strategy to strengthen institutional and technical capacity into its plans. Although such foresight is commendable, the task of fortifying institutions so that they can absorb and retain technical know-how for the long term remains a tall order for broader international development efforts. As a young organization, the GGGI is still building a pipeline of projects. Ethiopia is one of the first countries in which the GGGI began its work, and it offers one of the most complete cases so far to illustrate the GGGI's approach. In 2010, the government of Ethiopia announced an ambitious Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) that set a goal of achieving middle-income status and a climate-resilient economy through low-emissions growth.[22] The country's contribution to global carbon emissions is minimal and it already generates the bulk of its power from renewable sources, mostly hydropower.[23] Ethiopia's interests are avoiding future increases in emissions, using resources more efficiently, and reducing its vulnerability to changes in the climate.[24] Working within the context of the GTP, the GGGI assisted the Ethiopian government with developing a green growth plan called the Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) strategy. To build domestic support, the GGGI helped create a cross-ministerial committee to coordinate actions for shepherding the process along. The institute invested in local technical capacity from the start by forming technical committees to develop sectoral strategies and to serve as a repository for transferring technical knowledge to teams from relevant ministries.[25] The CRGE includes over sixty projects in multiple sectors for low-emissions growth. The GGGI is currently working with the Ethiopian government on an implementation and investment plan, called the "iPlan," to achieve these and other green growth objectives.[26] A country's decision to commit to sustainable development through green growth can offer an attractive benefit: access to financing. Economic development plans that can be sold as "green" can attract new sources of financing dedicated explicitly to green initiatives. Last month, the Ethiopian government launched the Climate Resilient Green Economy Facility, a tool for mobilizing public and private sources of funding to support projects in line with the CRGE. So far, the fund has received pledges of $60 million from the Norwegian government and $24.3 million from the government of the United Kingdom.[27] This is far short of the estimated $150 billion that the Ethiopian government is seeking to support the iPlan.[28] Current economic conditions may make it difficult for governments to follow through on funding pledges for new financing vehicles. The GGGI acknowledges that bringing Ethiopia's plan into action will require strong commitment from the government and others.[29] A look at some of its proposed projects for low-emissions growth is instructive.[30] For example, some could require significant investment, such as building a light rail transit system. Some may require serious expertise and introduce competing demands for a resource, such as bringing non-forest land into agricultural production through new irrigation projects. Still others may require political action and enforcement mechanisms, such as enacting fuel efficiency standards. Culture matters, too. For example, Ethiopia's CRGE cites "cultural reasons" as a barrier to the adoption of efficient cooking stove technologies, a strategy for reducing forest degradation.[31] The "enabling economic architecture" that the GGGI seeks to build requires complementary institutional strength and political support in order to translate these priorities into reality. This will be the real test for the GGGI. Building institutional capacity is a long-term project and political dynamics can be unpredictable and difficult to maneuver. The best green growth plan will not help a country achieve a true paradigm shift to green economic development if it stays on the shelf because the capacity to implement it is lacking or political support is weak. Recognizing this, the GGGI addresses these challenges from the time it begins working in a country. Whether it can manage them over the long term and leave in place something that will endure when its time in a country is over is an open question. Becoming an International Organization There are other organizations that pursue green economy projects around the globe, such as the UN Development Program and the Climate Knowledge and Development Network. Consulting powerhouses such as McKinsey & Company have generated numerous ideas related to advancing green growth strategies in recent years.[32] Until now, however, there has never been an international organization dedicated solely to developing green growth strategies for integration into a country's core economic development agenda. The GGGI will remain small for now, but it sees itself as a new kind of organization.[33] The GGGI aims to be a hybrid organization, linking developed and developing countries as well as governments and nonstate actors. Its advisory committee will consist entirely of nonstate actors, such as leading experts in fields related to green growth.[34] In addition, its executive body, called the council, which will oversee the GGGI's strategy and budget, will include a range of contributing member countries and participating member countries, along with experts or other nonstate actors, the host country, and the director general.[35] The GGGI's financing has come primarily from voluntary contributions from members, with additional project funding from member and nonmember countries and international financial institutions.[36] The GGGI has also received funds from Korean steel giant POSCO and Denmark-based manufacturer the Danfoss Group.[37] The institute will seek Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility status from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a means to enhance its attractiveness to some donor countries.[38] On October 20, South Korea won a bid to host the secretariat of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), a victory that could enhance the GGGI's prospects for securing future financing from a fund that aims to raise $100 billion per year by 2020.[39] The GCF was established during global climate talks last year to help developing countries access financing for climate change mitigation and adaptation projects. Locating the GCF secretariat in Songdo, near Seoul, could reinforce the GGGI's efforts and pave the way for relationship building between the two organizations. The decision to choose South Korea will become final upon endorsement by countries participating in the annual UN climate negotiations later this year in Qatar.[40] Prospects for Success There are at least two important criteria for the GGGI's success in the long run. First, can it amass enough evidence to prove that green growth is possible? Second, can it show that successful cases can be emulated in diverse settings? These are two separate challenges. Even if green growth is shown to be possible somewhere, is this a guarantee that it can succeed anywhere? It will take only one successful case of implementing a wide-ranging green growth plan in a country to show that green growth has potential. The second question is more difficult because answering it with an unequivocal "yes" means overcoming the same challenges that traditional development efforts have long faced: finding a way to address developing countries' institutional and technical limitations in a way that endures over the long term and successfully navigating in-country political dynamics. As a brand-new international organization, the GGGI has the benefit of decades of lessons learned in the broader development community, and the institute's embrace of these insights are evident in its approach, especially in the priority it places on gaining wide-ranging domestic support from the start and creating platforms for helping countries learn from each other's green growth experiences. Still, in order to achieve a paradigm shift, it will have to clear the same hurdles that continue to confront traditional development efforts. The GGGI will need many years of sustained support before it can show that green growth is truly possible in any setting. Maintaining international political support will be an ongoing task. The GGGI has begun to operate as an international organization without the ratification of its host country. The South Korean National Assembly has yet to ratify the agreement that established the GGGI; fourteen other member countries have also not ratified the agreement.[41] Distractions related to South Korea's upcoming presidential election may be one reason why the National Assembly has not acted. The National Assembly's lack of action raises the question of who will be the GGGI's national champion in the international sphere after President Lee's term is over. It is unclear whether South Korea will continue to be the driver of the GGGI that it has been under President Lee. Does South Korea see the GGGI specifically, and green growth more generally, as an agenda of the Lee administration, or will internationalizing the institute firmly establish it as an organization with its own identity? Denmark's early and strong support of the GGGI has endured, and the GGGI has amassed eighteen institutional partnerships so far, including with the Asian Development Bank and the World Economic Forum. These relationships may help it gain long-term traction. Winning over countries and other partners through the power of its ideas may also be a driver for its eventual success: the participants will be the ones who want to be there. This could add to unity of purpose, even if differences emerge among member countries on where to focus the institute's efforts. The GGGI will have to recruit more expert staff to carry out its goals of diagnosing the economies of up to twenty countries for their green growth potential and devising follow-up actions. This will be a big task in the months ahead; the GGGI plans to more than double its staff of sixty-two by 2014.[42] Its elevated status as an international organization is expected to confer a certain gravitas upon it that will be useful in attracting talent and boosting its credibility.[43] Operating as an international organization might also help it attract more funding, but where will the money come from? The Green Climate Fund is in its infancy; details about how it will operate and raise funds are not yet settled.[44] It will be important for the GGGI to show successful cases of green growth to attract more financial support in the future. To that end, one of the GGGI's strengths seems to be a willingness to show restraint—it will be a cheerleader for green growth only to the extent that its own theory and practices show evidence for its success. This approach can help build confidence in its work. "We will build a body of evidence and call it like we see it," said Samans. "We are not an advocacy organization."[45] The GGGI is unique for forging ahead and pursuing a bottom-up approach to green growth without waiting for a global, consensus-based organization to agree on what should be done. The self-starter gene that seems fundamental to this international organization's DNA is commendable. The GGGI will be successful in the short term because action trumps inaction. The only way to know for sure if green growth is possible is to try it. Green growth as a concept has already caught on in the global discourse about the environment, development, and climate change. The real question is whether the GGGI will be able to succeed fast enough to maintain interest in and funding for its work. Achieving a wholesale paradigm shift, if that is possible, is likely to take many years. The GGGI itself acknowledges that this is an ambitious vision.[46] However, one thing is certain: the GGGI is sure to advance the body of knowledge about green growth in a way that would likely not occur if this organization had never come into existence. By kick-starting green growth efforts on the ground and learning by doing, the GGGI is already contributing to green growth theory. In a few years' time, the world will know more about the possibilities of green growth than it does today because of the GGGI's work. Endnotes ^ Australia, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia, Guyana, Indonesia, Kiribati, Korea, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, the Philippines, Qatar, the UAE, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam are the seventeen member countries that signed an agreement in June to convert the GGGI into an international organization. Mexico became the eighteenth member country on October 15, 2012. ^ The Republic of Kiribati's approval of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Global Green Growth Institute on September 18 officially paved the way for the GGGI's conversion into an international organization in October. The governments of Denmark and Guyana had previously ratified the agreement. According to the GGGI, under international law, three countries were required to ratify the treaty in order to convert the GGGI into an international organization. ^ Global Green Growth Institute website, www.gggi.org. ^ Speech by Richard Samans, September 21, 2012, Seoul. ^ For example, see Lee Myung-bak, "Shifting Paradigms: The Road to Global Green Growth," Global Asia volume 4, no. 4, 2010, pp. 8–12. ^ As noted by President Lee Myung-bak, see "S. Korea Establishes 'Strategic Point' for Global Green Growth," Yonhap, June 17, 2010. ^ See CARE International media release, http://www.care-international.org/Media-Releases/rio20-nothing-more-than-a-political-charade.html. ^ Mark McDonald, "U.N. Report from Rio on Environment a 'Suicide Note,'" International Herald Tribune, June 24, 2012, http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/u-n-report-from-rio-on-environment-a-suicide-note/. ^ Ibid. ^ Simon Romero and John M. Broder, "Progress on the Sidelines as Rio Conference Ends," New York Times, June 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/world/americas/rio20-conference-ends-with-some-progress-on-the-sidelines.html?_r=1. ^ As noted by Richard Samans in an interview with the author, October 3, 2012. ^ Ibid. ^ Ibid. ^ Ibid. ^ Ibid. ^ As noted by GGGI staff in an email interview, August 25, 2012. The GGGI is currently working on national green growth plans in Brazil, Ethiopia, Mongolia, United Arab Emirates, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, and Thailand. The institute is working on provincial-level green growth plans in Indonesia, the Philippines, and China. See http://www.gggi.org/project/public. ^ Email interview with GGGI staff, August 25, 2012. ^ Interview with author, October 3, 2012. ^ Email interview with GGGI staff, August 25, 2012. ^ Ibid. ^ "Inclusive Green Growth: A Pathway to Sustainable Development," World Bank, 2012, p. 153. ^ "Growth and Transformation Plan," draft, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. ^ "Ethiopia's Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy," Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, http://www.undp-aap.org/sites/undp-aap.org/files/Ethiopia%20CRGE%20Strategy%20Final.pdf. ^ "Growth and Transformation Plan," draft, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. ^ "Green Growth Planning: GGGI Country Programs," Global Green Growth Institute, http://www.gggi.org/sites/www.gggi.org/files/attachment/20120514_GGGI_Country_Programs.pdf. ^ Email interview with GGGI staff, August 25, 2012. ^ "Ethiopia: Govt Launches Green Economic Funding Facility," Afrik-News, September 18, 2012, http://www.afrik-news.com/article19299.html. ^ Green Growth Planning: GGGI Country Programs," Global Green Growth Institute, http://www.gggi.org/sites/www.gggi.org/files/attachment/20120514_GGGI_Country_Programs.pdf. ^ Ibid. ^ "Ethiopia's Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy," Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, http://www.undp-aap.org/sites/undp-aap.org/files/Ethiopia%20CRGE%20Strategy%20Final.pdf. ^ Ibid, p. 112. ^ For example, see "India: Taking on the Green Growth Challenge," McKinsey on Sustainability & Resource Productivity, by Rajat Gupta, Sushant Mantry, and Ganesh Srinivasan, Number 1, Summer 2012. ^ See comments by GGGI chairman Lars Rasmussen in "Green institute seeks quality-driven expansion," by Shin Hyon-hee, Korea Herald, August 23, 2012. ^ See "GGGI's Conversion into an International Organization," GGGI News Release, July 2, 2012, http://www.gggi.org/news/release/2011/00/00/gggi-s-conversion-international-organization. ^ Ibid. ^ According to a speech by Richard Samans on September 21, 2012, in Seoul, core funding for 2012 comes from "Australia, Denmark, Japan, and UAE and project funding from Germany, Norway, UK, and international financial institutions." ^ Interview with Richard Samans, October 3, 2012. ^ Speech by Richard Samans, September 21, 2012, Seoul and email interview with GGGI staff, August 25, 2012. ^ "S. Korea selected as host of GCF secretariat," Yonhap, October 20, 2012. South Korea prevailed over five other countries vying to host the GCF: Germany, Mexico, Namibia, Poland, and Switzerland. ^ Green Climate Fund press advisory, "Republic of Korea selected to host the Green Climate Fund," October 20, 2012. ^ Lee Jae-min, "A bumpy road for the GGGI," Korea Herald, October 2, 2012. ^ Shin Hyon-hee, "Green institute seeks quality-driven expansion," Korea Herald, August 23, 2012. ^ Interview via email with GGGI staff, August 25, 2012. ^ For an assessment of the Green Climate Fund, see http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2012/08/09/guest-post-ready-for-primetime-the-100-billion-climate-fund/. ^ Interview with author, October 3, 2012. ^ As noted on the Global Green Growth Institute website, www.gggi.org.
  • Climate Change
    How Likely Was Hurricane Sandy?
    As the public debate over Hurricane Sandy turns in part from the immediate impacts of the storm to its possible links to climate change, a new theme is emerging: Sandy is not just part of a new normal – scientists actually predicted it well in advance. One of the most prominent exhibits being used to back this case is a paper (PDF) published in Nature Climate Change earlier this year by Ning Lin, Kerry Emanuel, Michael Oppoenheimer, and Erik Vanmarcke. One blogger described it with the following headline: “Peer Reviewed Research Predicted NYC Subway Flooding by #Sandy”. CNN went with the following: “[Scientists are] telling us we shouldn’t be surprised that this 900-mile-wide monster marched up the East Coast this week paralyzing cities and claiming scores of lives…. In a paper published by Nature in February, [Oppenheimer] and three colleagues concluded that the ‘storm of the century’ would become the storm of ‘every twenty years or less.’ New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo agrees. ‘After what happened, what has been happening in the last few years, I don’t think anyone can sit back anymore and say ‘Well, I’m shocked at that weather pattern,’’ Cuomo said Tuesday.” The Lin et al paper is meticulous and absolutely fascinating. (I particularly recommend reading the introduction for a primer on how climate change does and doesn’t influence storm surges.) Everything that Oppenheimer told CNN is sound. But the paper does not say what the journalists and pundits claim or suggest that it does. A more careful reading of it points to more subtle – and intriguing – conclusions. The Lin et al paper uses four different climate models to estimate the frequency of different storm surges at New York’s Battery both under present conditions and, assuming rising greenhouse gas emissions, in a hundred years. The results are summed up in this figure: What do their models say about the present probability of a 4.16 meter flood surge, which is what we saw during Sandy? One of the four models says that it’s probably a less-than-one-in-ten-thousand-year event given current climatic conditions. A second model puts the odds closer to one-in-eight-thousand-years or so. (Take these numbers with a big grain of salt – I’m reading them off the above figure with a ruler.) The final two models put the odds at between one-in-two-thousand and one-in-three thousand. The models themselves, of course, have internal uncertainty, which the paper takes into account. But even the most foreboding of the analyses suggest that there is at most a one-in-ten chance that surges like the one we saw this Monday have become more-than-one-in-a-thousand-years-or-so events. The takeaway here is simple: none of the models said that the storm was anywhere remotely close to likely given current climate conditions. The message from those models is pretty much that Sandy was a very unlucky fluke. The far more worrying part of the paper is what it projects for the future. I’m a focus-on-risk guy so I’m going to concentrate on what the paper says is unlikely but plausible. What the paper basically says is there’s a one in ten chance that storms like Sandy will become one-in-a-few-hundred year events. But the paper also says that flood surges north of about 1.5 meters – currently enough to create flooding in downtown New York – will go from one-in-nearly-a-hundred-year events to something that happens more than once every decade. What I would really love to see (and I know that this isn’t simple to do) is a backcast from Lin et al that estimates what the likelihood of a Sandy-scale flood surge would have been a hundred years ago. That would help us answer the question on everyones’ minds: how much did climate change contribute to Sandy?
  • Climate Change
    Hurricane Sandy: Is There Anything We Can Do About Climate Change Soon?
    The East Coast is slowly returning to normal life after Hurricane Sandy – and pundits, scientists, and journalists are quickly diving into a debate over what the storm says about climate change. I have nothing useful to add on that matter. But I do wanted to shed light on an important related question that has come up: is it even possible to change the course of climate change over the next fifty or so years? The uninformed conventional wisdom is something like “of course we can change things if we start shifting to clean energy”. As I explain below, that’s not really true. David Roberts does a nice job of laying out what I’d call the “informed conventional wisdom” in a series of tweets (!) that I’ve concatenated here: “Realtalk: The oceans will continue to rise for at least 50 years no matter what we do. We can only affect the latter half of century. There’s nothing Obama (or Bush, Clinton, Bush, or Reagan) could have done to prevent Sandy. Climate don’t work that way. Big time lags. The mega-hurricanes that we CAN prevent are the ones that will bedevil our children in the latter third of this century. The best we can do for ourselves and those alive in the next 50 years is enhance the resilience of our communities & infrastructure.” My instinct tends in the same direction: the climate system has an immense amount of inertia. But, after some thought, I’m inclined to conclude that reality is a bit more messy. We actually do have some meaningful potential influence – albeit limited – over what happens in the coming decades. To understand this it’s useful to focus on three distinctions. Carbon dioxide versus everything else Changes in carbon dioxide emissions take a long time to have any impact on the climate system. That’s because of inertia in the both oceans and the atmosphere. But changes in emissions of shorter lived gases can affect the climate system more rapidly. That’s because, even though their impact is still constrained by intertia in the oceans, they aren’t as constrained by inertia in the atmosphere. A recent paper in Science by Shindell et al helps shed light on this distinction. It examines a suite of measures aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions along with another suite aimed at cutting emissions of methane and black carbon (referred to as short lived forcers). A plot of projected temperatures taken from the paper is shown below. Two things immediately become clear. First, consistent with the “informed conventional wisdom”, measures that reduce carbon dioxide emissions have essentially no temperature impact for thirty years. (The actually make things a tiny bit worse, presumably because shutting down coal plants reduces emissions of planet-cooling sulfur dioxide.) Second, though, cutting emissions of methane and black carbon reduces transient temperatures starting right away. By 2050, they cut global average temperatures by about half a degree Celsius relative to trend. Eyeballing the chart in Shindell et al suggests that much of that benefit is realized by 2030. One can reasonably debate whether the modeled emissions cuts are realistic, but as far as the climate system goes, these outcomes are plausible. Temperature versus sea level Storm damage is potentially influenced by at least two factors related to climate change: temperature (which can provide storms with energy) and sea level (which can make low lying areas more vulnerable to start with). Everything I’ve just written refers to temperatures. Sea levels, unfortunately, are slower to respond. To put some numbers to this, I cooked up a highly unrealistic but still informative scenario. I started with a well known emissions scenario in which global carbon dioxide concentrations ultimately stabilize around 450 ppm (i.e. the sort of scenario that policymakers often talk about). Then I tweak that scenario so that methane emissions plummet in 2015 and stay low through 2100. The projected temperature outcomes (using MAGICC) look like the following: The temperature rise by 2100  in the case with near-term methane emissions cuts is about 0.3 degrees less than in the case without those cuts. Even more striking, though, is that 100 percent of that temperature reduction is realized by 2050, and that 55 percent of it is realized by 2030. The picture looks  quite different, though, for sea level rise: The sea level rise by 2100 in the case with near-term methane cuts is about 4 centimeters less than in the case without those cuts. Only half of that, though, is realized in 2050, and mere 20 percent of it shows up by 2030. The details of these projections, of course, are sensitive to the choice of model and the emissions path. But the basic point – you can do considerably more about temperatures than sea levels in the short run – is solid. Short term versus long term It is important to keep in mind that the near-term benefits that accrue from cutting short-lived forcers comes at a long-term cost. Shindell et al don’t show projections for the case where their methane and black carbon reducing measures are implemented with a delay. [ML: Important correction appended: They explore this possibility in the online supplementary material. See the comments section for Drew Shindell’s enlightening explanation, which largely tracks with how I see things. My mistake in the original.] If they did, they would find that delaying the cuts, but still implementing them eventually, would help keep down the rate of temperature increase precisely when temperatures are at or near their highest – and thus presumably when climate-sensitive systems are most stressed. Scientists often emphasize that rapid warming can be particularly damaging. The upshot is that near-term measures to cut emissions of things like methane and black carbon, while valuable in suppressing near-term warning, may have a long-term price in climate impacts. I personally think that many near-term steps have benefits – not only for climate but also for local air pollution and human health – that outweigh these downsides. But that doesn’t mean that the downsides don’t exist and shouldn’t be considered.
  • Elections and Voting
    The Candidates on Energy Policy
    Both presidential candidates have called for expanding U.S. energy production to create jobs, even as they disagree over the role of government subsidies and environmental regulation.
  • Heads of State and Government
    The Continuing Threat of Nuclear Terrorism
    Micah Zenko and I have an op-ed on nuclear terrorism today in USA Today. The opening paragraph captures the theme pretty well: “President George W. Bush called it his ’ultimate nightmare.’ Sen. John Kerry, running for president in 2004, said that it was ’the greatest threat that we face.’ They were both talking about the terrifying possibility that a terrorist group could acquire a nuclear weapon and attack the United States. Yet this year, over the course of three presidential debates, the issue barely surfaced. That is dangerous: Nuclear terrorism remains one of the very few vital risks to America, and the next president, whoever he is, will need to work vigilantly to prevent it.” We trace the history of shock and trance on the issue (not the only area where that occurs) back through the 1970s, warn against crying wolf but emphasize that the threat is still vital, and offer some thoughts on what to do. Since the piece is short, those ideas are presented only briefly, so I thought I might expand on them a bit more here. The first is to continue the removal of weapons-useable nuclear materials from as many states as possible in order to consolidate them in more secure locations. This is an old idea but one that hasn’t fully run its course yet. You can find some early thinking on it here. Another related idea – continuing to convert civilian reactors that use highly enriched uranium so that they operate using lower grade materials – didn’t make it into the piece, but remains important. Here’s a paper (PDF) about that scheme. The second strain of policy we emphasize is the need to deal with insider threats to facilities. We’ve done a decent job improving the “guns, guards, and gates” at nuclear facilities around the world; we still need to step up our game, though, when it comes to preventing thefts by facility employees. This is a particularly challenging problem for countries like Pakistan where extremist movements are strong. Our third emphasis is the need to extend the basic agreement underlying Nunn-Lugar cooperation with Russia. This challenge, which has emerged as a concern in recent weeks, deserves its own op-ed. For now, take a look at this, this, and this for more information. The starting point for any of this, though, is a serious recognition of the continuing threat. Take a look at the full op-ed here for more on that.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Democracy in Development: Food Insecurity and the Future of the Sahel
    Yesterday on my blog, I discussed the current outlook for food security in the Sahel. While a large humanitarian response and welcome rainfall have averted an immediate crisis, the region continues to face underlying problems ranging from unreliable weather to the conflict in Mali. As I conclude: Possible elements of a patchwork of solutions include more attention to the unique needs of small-scale farmers and pastoralists, plus interventions adapted to local contexts, like irrigation and better access to drought-resistant seeds and other agricultural inputs. Further experimentation with cash vouchers is also important. But ultimately, the Sahel’s food insecurity issues cannot be addressed without improvements in regional security and local governance. You can read the full post here.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Is the West Uninterested in Nigeria’s Floods?
    It baffles me that the Western media is paying so little attention to the flooding in Nigeria. There are dramatic aerial photographs of the flooding in the Delta, and affected areas spread as far afield as Kano and Kogi states in northern and central Nigeria. Over a million people have been displaced. In the Delta alone, tens of thousands have been moved into camps that are ill-equipped to receive them.  Crop fields and fisheries in their thousands of hectares are completely flooded and destroyed. Local food shortages seem inevitable; though President Goodluck Jonathan is confident existing grain stores will be sufficient. In over-crowded camps with poor sanitation, the spread of infectious disease also seems inevitable. Deaths–direct and indirect–from flooding in Nigeria this season, may exceed the total associated with Boko Haram. UN humanitarian agencies often sound the alarm about impending humanitarian crises, as they have done in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. For example, the World Health Organization’s Africa Regional Director, Dr. Luis Gomes Sambo, on October 25, called attention to the Sahel’s need for international help to combat Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs) that have spread because of flooding in that region. But these UN agencies are, by and large, not present in the Niger Delta. Other international NGOs, including Oxfam and the Red Cross and Red Crescent, are present however. Their relative quiet is hard to understand. The Nigerian federal government in Abuja does not seem to be asking for the international assistance it clearly needs. Meanwhile, the Western media is, almost universally, giving the flooding stories a pass. Is it a case of seeing the floods as yet another dreary story out of Africa, and Nigeria in particular, that allows news agencies to draw the  conclusion that their readership would have only a limited interest?
  • Climate Change
    Would Cap and Trade Have Increased U.S. Emissions?
    When the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill collapsed a few year back, advocates of aggressive action on climate change despaired. But a fascinating and provocative new analysis from Dallas Butraw and Matt Woerman at Resources for the Future suggests that people might want to revisit that judgment: by 2020, they write, domestic emissions will “probably [be] less than would have occurred if the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade proposal had become law”. Whether you believe that depends on some important details. The underlying logic is relatively simple. Butraw and Woerman identify three main sources of emissions reductions over the next decade: changes in the economy (notably cheap natural gas), state and regional policies, and regulation of carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act (CAA). They project that those will collectively lead to a 16.3 percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions below 2005 levels by 2020, with standards under the CAA contributing more than ten percentage points of that. That is close to the target the United States announced at Copenhagen. Then they make an important observation: Waxman-Markey would have preempted regulation of carbon dioxide under the CAA. The carbon price in the bill would have pushed emissions down, but the lack of new CAA regulations would have pushed it up, with the net impact, in principle, ambiguous. In addition, the impact of state level policies and changes in the economy would have been blunted under Waxman-Markey: by reducing emissions, they would have lowered the price of emissions permits, prompting some offsetting emissions increases elsewhere. Butraw and Woerman ultimately estimate that emissions would only have declined 13.6 percent by 2020 under Waxman-Markey – more than 2 percentage points less than without it. (This does not include controversial emissions cuts through offsets.) Worse, they observe, Waxman-Markey would have seen participants “bank” emissions permits equivalent to 5.7 percent of annual emissions, in turn allowing them to increase their emissions by that much in later years. If you factor out this sort of emissions-shifting, they observe, Waxman-Markey would only have resulted in a 7.9 percent cut, a full ten percentage points less than without it. This analysis is intriguing. It is particularly interesting because of what it says about the possibility that the United States could come very close to meeting the 2020 emissions target that it has pledged in international negotiations. But – in the spirit of the fact that the Butraw and Woerman analysis is a “Discussion Paper” – I want to explain why I’m somewhat skeptical of the bottom line. Start with the issue of banked permits. I think that Butraw and Woerman are incorrect to count these against emissions reductions. Yes, under Waxman-Markey, banked permits would have allowed higher emissions in later years. But those would have been higher emissions than the already reduced emissions mandated post-2020 by Waxman-Markey. Since Butraw and Woerman don’t give any credit to post-2020 emissions reductions in the first place, it’s wrong to penalize anything for undermining them. My next issue is with the fuel economy regulations implemented by the Obama administration. Butraw and Woerman assume that they would have been preempted by Waxman-Markey. But the cost-benefit analysis in the regulations makes clear that they could have been justified without any reliance on climate benefits. Indeed the Waxman-Markey bill itself called on the administration to strengthen fuel economy standards. Butraw and Woerman show that if you assume that Waxman-Markey wouldn’t have preempted CAFE regulations, then you get a 15.9 percent projected decline in emissions, not a 13.6 percent one, and barely distinguishable from what Butraw and Woerman project without Waxman-Markey. That leaves one big question: What will happen with CAA regulation of stationary sources? Butraw and Woerman are quite generous, assuming that emissions cuts in this area will add up to the equivalent of a bit more than 7 percent of 2005 emissions. These, they note, are all emissions cuts that would have been preempted under Waxman-Markey. Whether the U.S. government will actually put in place such measures, though, remains to be determined, since most of the CAA regulations that Butraw and Woerman have in their model don’t exist yet. Whether a second Obama administration will pursue those standards (which are admittedly relatively modest) remains to be seen. It’s fairly certain that a Romney administration wouldn’t. This says to me that whether you think emissions would have been higher or lower under Waxman-Markey depends fundamentally on what you think the prospects for regulation of stationary sources (particularly existing ones) under the CAA are. This is almost entirely a matter of political, rather than economic, projection. One last observation: Focusing on 2020 can be misleading. It is possible to make substantial short-term emissions cuts without really setting the stage for much deeper ones later. The U.S. emissions goals for 2020 were long believed to be rather weak – even the U.S. negotiating team in Copenhagen often emphasized the 2030 and 2050 goals when defending the U.S. approach.  (I made a similar case in Slate during the talks.) In the end, I believe Butraw and Woerman when they say that the United States might well end up doing better domestically by 2020 than it would have with cap-and-trade. But I worry that if we don’t put long-term signals to the market in place soon, that victory will be ephemeral, as our longer-term climate goals slip further from remaining realistic.
  • Health
    Holding Countries Accountable for Social and Economic Rights
    Last week I introduced the SERF Index, a new measurement tool my colleagues Susan Randolph, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, and I have built to evaluate social and economic rights fulfillment. The new index sheds important light on the issues facing the Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council, where Argentina, Gabon, Ghana, Peru, Guatemala, Benin, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Pakistan, Zambia, Japan, Ukraine, and Sri Lanka will be evaluated on their human rights practices under applicable international human rights conventions from October 22 to November 5. This year’s session will be the fourteenth meeting of the Universal Periodic Review since its first session in March 2006. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has underlined the importance of the upcoming session, noting that the Universal Periodic Review “has great potential to promote and protect human rights in the darkest corners of the world.” Yet the review process faces trying challenges, and wide scrutiny, in effecting real change in human rights situations on the ground. The SERF Index can help us analyze performance in the countries up for review. Some highlights: Overall, Argentina performs well, ranking thirteenth out of 98 countries on the SERF Index. Argentina consistently meets 80 percent or more of its obligations on the right to food, education, work, and health, which is surprising given the challenges the country faced during its economic crisis almost a decade ago. Nonetheless, Argentina could do better by focusing resources on its weakest area: the right to housing, for which the government meets only 78 percent of its potential. Data on Gabon reveals that even when limited state capacity is taken into account, the government is still underperforming in meeting its obligations to fulfill social and economic rights. Gabon achieves only 52 percent of its potential in providing citizens with the right to food—with 26 percent of its population stunted or not receiving adequate nutrition. Gabon’s fulfillment of the right to education is also quite low. Gabon’s performance in the right to housing is particularly bad, scoring a 20 percent fulfillment rate—ranking second to last on the SERF Index. Instead of dismissing Ghana as a middle-of-the-road development country, it should be commended for its efforts in some areas and supported in refocusing attention to others. Ghana is an example of a country that is, in general, meeting the rights of its citizens even with very little. Ghana reaches 80 percent or more of its obligations in the rights to work, food, and education, despite its median ranking on human development indicators. However, the SERF Index parses out the country’s weaknesses as well as its strengths. The Ghanaian government fulfills the right to health at only 60 percent and the right to housing at an unimpressive 52 percent, showing that although the government is successful in providing certain rights, it could perform much better in others. Benin struggles to meet its capacity for fulfilling the social and economic rights of its populace—ranking in the bottom fifteen of all the countries analyzed on the SERF Index—with a fulfillment of 52.5 percent. Benin’s categorization is also similar on the HDI, which ranks Benin as a “low human development” country. However, a closer examination of Benin’s fulfillment of specific rights shows that, in comparison to other indicators, the country is most successful in providing the right to education, at roughly 68 percent, versus the right to work (at 41 percent) or the right to food (at 46 percent). Peru seems like a a middle-of-the pack country at first glance, but SERF indicators offer a more nuanced perspective that can be useful for UN human rights evaluators to determine how the Peruvian government can close the gaps in human rights fulfillment. Peru performs especially well on the right to education at a high rate of 97 percent fulfillment, but struggles in the area of housing rights, meeting only 58 percent of its obligations. Guatemala, in most regards, scores at an above average rate when compared to other countries in the SERF Index. But while HDI characterizes Guatemala as a medium human development country, SERF reveals that the country is failing to address its food crisis. Although Guatemala fulfills the right to education (at 72 percent) and work (at 76 percent), the country scores above only two countries—Yemen and Afghanistan—on the right to food, meeting a mere 17 percent of its obligations. Switzerland is not currently ranked by the SERF Index. Overall Pakistan appears to be doing poorly. The government fails to meet even half of its obligations for fulfillment on the rights to education, food, and work. However, the SERF Index shows that Pakistan is not a hopeless case. Despite its limited resources, the country does relatively well in meeting its obligations for the right to housing (at 74 percent) and is about average in its fulfillment for healthcare, at 66 percent. Zambia barely meets 57 percent of its rights fulfillment capacity. But when we look in detail at the right to education, the country does remarkably well. It meets almost 92 percent of its capacity, given available resources. This presents a different picture that the one seen when only looking at HDI measurements, which neglect the great resource constraints Zambia faces and fail to take into account the country’s efforts on the right to education. However, the government could do better on other SERF indicators, particularly the right to food and work, where it meets only 44 and 39 percent of its capabilities, respectively. Japan is not currently ranked on the SERF Index. Ukraine ranks seventh overall on the SERF Index, with approximately a 91 percent fulfillment rate. The country also ranks highly among those assessed by the HDI, but an analysis of individual SERF indicators shows that while Ukraine performs well on the rights to work and education, efforts should be concentrated on improving the right to food, for which the country’s fulfillment currently stands at roughly 77 percent. Sri Lanka is another example of a country performing well in spite of limited resources. Ranking in the top thirty on the SERF Index, Sri Lanka meets 84 percent of its capacity overall. Specifically, the country reaches 85 percent of its capabilities or higher on the rights to housing, health, education, and food. However, the country falls short on the right to work, meeting only 63 percent of its capabilities—a nuance that is missed when looking at the country’s medium human development ranking on the HDI. While the SERF Index can help provide a fuller picture, it is by no means a complete one. No one index can perfectly capture the realities on the ground, and multiple sources of information should be used simultaneously to provide a complete picture. Nevertheless, the SERF Index can help global governance institutions and civil society organizations hold states accountable for meeting the social and economic rights of their people.
  • China
    Five Reasons to Talk Energy and Climate at the Foreign Policy Debate
    The moderator of tonight’s foreign policy debate has released a list of the topics he will focus on, and neither energy nor climate are there. This has, not surprisingly, not gone unnoticed. Indeed one need look no further than Hilary Clinton’s sweeping speech last Thursday on “Energy Diplomacy in the 21st Century” to confirm that energy and foreign policy are deeply intertwined. Here are five reasons that energy and climate should be part of tonight’s debate: Energy has been central to the biggest foreign policy issue of the campaign: Iran. A big part of the “crippling sanctions” that both candidates talk about have focused on Iranian oil exports. These have been made possible through a mix of concerted diplomacy and surprising gains in oil output in the United States and elsewhere. Are these sorts sanctions a model for the future? Can they be tightened further without risking the U.S. economy? Since Iran is certain to be a focus of debate, this may be the one energy subject that actually comes up tonight. Climate change is a really big global problem. You don’t need to be convinced of impending doom to believe this – you just need to accept that we’re running some pretty large risks. When the moderator of the last debate half-apologized to “the climate people” for not touching on the subject,  she revealed something important: too many people think about climate change as a special interest issue. It isn’t, and the candidates’ approaches deserve to be debated. This one is simple to tee off: just ask each candidate what he’d do. It’s easy to forget, but when the Arab Spring swept the Middle East a year and a half ago, alarm bells were ringing over the possibility that the spreading turmoil would wreak havoc on oil markets and send the economy back into recession. In the end, the U.S. and others released emergency oil, but the disruptions remained limited. How would the two candidates respond to a major Middle East disruption – perhaps originating in Saudi Arabia – down the road? What would they do today to prevent such an eventuality, and to prepare to weather one that nonetheless occured? Those who aren’t seized with the importance of dealing with climate change on its merits should still be concerned: U.S. allies around the world care about what the United States does. Europe remains fixated on the issue, and might reconsider carbon tariffs on the United States down the road. Scores of countries in Asia and Africa care deeply about what climate change will do to their safety and prosperity – and the United States is battling with China for their allegiance. Do the candidates think that these concerns matter? How would they deal with them?  Both candidates talk regularly about energy independence. The first two debates gave them ample opportunity to contrast their approaches to domestic energy and to reducing oil imports. But “energy independence” is inherently a foreign policy issue – that’s what “independence” is all about. What dividends do the two candidates believe their domestic energy policies would deliver internationally? Do they think that the United States could reduce its presence in the Middle East? Stop defending sea lanes around the world? Scale back its diplomacy with oil and gas producing powers? Would the candidates’ policies give the United States a strategic advantage over China? Or is “energy independence” just a simple way of describing higher U.S. oil and gas production? Inquiring minds want to know.