Diplomacy and International Institutions

Genaro Garcia Luna, the Secretary of Public Security (SSP) and head of this new force has just released a new book, Para Entender: El Nuevo Modelo de Seguridad to explain Mexico’s “New Security Model.” It is worth a read in order to understand what the government is officially trying to do – then one can judge how far it has progressed down that path.

When you share a printer with others in your office, you also tend to share interesting news items and reports. Such was the case with my CFR colleague, Michael Levi, and I with the State Department’s just-released Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973. On his CFR blog, Michael posted his favorite finding from the 1,278 page historical record. During an October 1973 briefing from the Deputy Defense and Treasury Secretaries on oil policy, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger asked aloud: “Does anyone here understand what these two are talking about?” The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, which began 150 years ago and now comprises over 400 individual volumes, is the “official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions,” according to the State Department’s Office of the Historian. Published thirty or forty years after the events covered, they contain analytical memos, transcripts of conversations, and policy instructions, very little of which is deleted for classification reasons. Moreover, the FRUS series explains how much of a document has been excised, with editor’s notes, such as “less than one line not declassified.” To learn more about the "official" versions of the history of American foreign policy visit here and browse. After reading the latest FRUS release for several hours, I share my five favorite findings: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 13, 1973, 11:30 a.m. President Richard Nixon: We are Israel’s only friend. Israel has only contempt for the UN….The Middle East will never be totally settled. We would like to get started on something, though, and the private channel is best. Because if the public channel were to fail, it would be catastrophic. We’ll go public in the channel only when we know it will succeed. (p. 50) Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Washington, October 6, 1973, 7:22–8:27 p.m. Mr. [James] Schlesinger [Secretary of Defense]: What if Qadhafi goes on a rampage? Mr. Kissinger: Then we’ll get the Marines moving. (p. 335)   Minutes of Bipartisan Leadership Meeting, Washington, November 27, 1973, 8:30 a.m. [Senator Michael] Mansfield: Do Egypt and Israel have the capability to make nuclear weapons? Kissinger: Israel has the capability to make small numbers. Not Egypt. And we don’t think the Soviets have put them in. Should Israel brandish nuclear weapons, the Soviets would counter it and it would be very dangerous for Israel. (p. 993) Paper Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, undated [probably October 1973]. Israeli Nuclear Threat. Assuming that Israel has or is soon to acquire nuclear weapons, their threatened use against such targets as Arab forces, cities, ports, holy places, and the Aswan High Dam could serve to deter future armed attacks. Such an avowed Israeli policy would occasion world-wide opposition. The US would, therefore, find it extremely difficult to associate itself with such an Israeli policy. Meanwhile, the Arabs might be willing to attack, despite the deterrent threat. They might assume that (1) Israel will not carry out the threat, (2) they could succeed even if the Israelis used nuclear weapons, perhaps with the aid of other unconventional means of their own such as chemical or biological weapons, or (3) they would reap important benefits from the resultant international reaction should Israel carry out its threat. Any deterrent effect of such an Israeli threat would, of course, be diminished should the Arab states themselves acquire nuclear weapons. (p. 732) Page 1001, footnote 2: Schlesinger discussed the use of military force to secure Middle East oil during bilateral meetings on energy issues with members of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, November 5–8. (Telegram 4914 from The Hague, November 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) According to a U.K. account of a November 15 meeting between Schlesinger and Ambassador Cromer, Schlesinger again stated that the U.S. Government seriously contemplated using military force to secure oil fields in the Middle East, including launching airborne troops to seize fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi, but only as a “last resort.”

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrives in Indonesia on July 21, 2011. (Ho New/courtesy Reuters) The World Next Week podcast is up. Bob McMahon is taking a well-deserved vacation this week. So I sat down with my colleague Stewart Patrick to discuss the continuing debt ceiling debate; Secretary Hillary Clinton’s trip to Asia; the inauguration of Peruvian President-elect Ollanta Humala; and the UN Security Council’s debates on Sudan and Libya. [audio: http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/media/podcast/2011/20110721_TWNW.mp3] The highlights: So far foreign financial officials have been upbeat that Washington will resolve the debt ceiling debate without a default. But many people overseas, like many Americans here at home, have to be dismayed by the bickering in Washington. Secretary Clinton wraps up her eleven-day overseas trip with stops in Indonesia, Hong Kong, and China. Her diplomatic skills are likely to be tested. She can expect lectures from Chinese officials about U.S. debt, Washington’s efforts to help broker a deal over conflicting claims to the South China sea, and the Dalai Lama’s recent visit to the White House. Incoming Peruvian president Ollanta Humala seems to have quieted initial fears that he would nationalize the country’s industries and rapidly redistribute wealth to the poor. His recent visit to the White House looks to have paid dividends for smooth U.S.-Peruvian relations. The Security Council has been seeking to stave off fighting over Abyei in Sudan while the military operation it sanctioned in Libya drags on. CFR released an independent task force report this week urging that Brazil be made a permanent member of the Security Council, but the odds of the Security Council expanding anytime soon remain small. Stewart’s Figure of the Week is Nelson Mandela. Mine is 847. As always, check out the podcast to find out why. Reuters has updates on the latest developments in debt ceiling negotiations, the Christian Science Monitor describes the ‘Gang of Six’ proposal, and Time’s “Swampland” explains why it may be too late to pass it. The State Department gives Secretary Clinton’s travel schedule, Reuters covers the South China Sea dispute, and the Economist outlines Chinese-American relations with regard to Tibet. BBC News provides a short profile of Peruvian President-elect Ollanta Humala, Reuters reports on Humala’s poll numbers, and the Wall Street Journal covers Humala’s decision to keep Peru’s current central bank chief in office. Reuters covers the most recent events in Libya, the Center for Strategic and International Studies publishes a report on Sudan’s risks to stability, and the UN News Centre reports on the UN General Assembly President’s views on reforming the Security Council.

While last week Damien Cave’s great New York Times piece highlights the positive economic factors keeping Mexicans at home, this week the Wall Street Journal adds border crossing dangers to the reasons for a downward trend in undocumented migration. This holds doubly true for Central Americans. A recent RAND study shows that while fewer Mexicans are coming to the United States, fewer are leaving as well, even with the economic downturn. Its authors suggest that this is due to the “target earner hypothesis,” which holds that migrants will not return to their home country until they have earned a prefixed level of savings. I’d add that the increasing costs and dangers of returning must also affect migrants’ calculation.

Syria's President Bashar al-Assad speaks in Damascus, June 20, 2011, in this handout photograph released by Syria's national news agency SANA. Assad pledged on Monday political reforms within months to address a wave of protests against his rule, but blamed saboteurs for the unrest and warned that no deal could be reached with gunmen (Sana Sana/Courtesy Reuters). On July 11, when asked about Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton answered: “From our perspective, he has lost legitimacy, he has failed to deliver on the promises he’s made,” adding that “we would like to see even more countries speaking out as forcefully as we have.” Proponents of a low-cost regime change in Damascus seized upon Clinton’s use of the phrase “lost legitimacy” to press the case for the Obama administration to see through Assad’s removal. The Washington Post editorial board, in a piece titled “The U.S. has Gotten Tough with Syria; Now it Needs to Get Tougher,” noted that it was “good that the Obama administration has finally spoken that truth” but that “now it must act on its words.” Soon after Secretary Clinton’s judgment about who should be the rightful political leader of Syria, the administration has wisely de-escalated its demonization of Assad.  During her trip to Turkey over the weekend, Clinton expressed hope that the Syrian opposition “can provide a pathway, hopefully in peaceful cooperation with the government, to a better future.” In a piece in this morning’s Los Angeles Times, “U.S. Softens its Criticism of Syria,” an unnamed State Department official acknowledged that the administration was still undecided about whether to ramp up its rhetorical attacks on the Syrian leader: "Whether we take it farther will depend on events on the ground. We need to think through carefully what we say." That final sentence should be printed on large banners that hang prominently in briefing rooms at the White House, State Department, Pentagon, and every other U.S. government agency. While the ability of the United States to compel changes in the behavior of other states is diminishing, what the United States says still matters to dictators hanging onto power, civilians protesting against those dictators, neutral third-parties, regional actors, and close allies. Proponents of regime change demand clarity and specificity from U.S. government officials about whether a dictator has lost legitimacy and, therefore, should voluntarily step down from power. More important than what the United States says, however, is what it is willing to do to achieve the objectives it expresses. It is one thing to make aspirational statements that shape administration thinking, test allied support, and gauge public opinion. This is what President Obama did on March 3, when he stated  flatly, “Muammar Qaddafi has lost the legitimacy to lead and he must leave.” However, neither President Obama nor any members of the western-led intervention into Libya ever presented what military strategists call a “theory of victory” for how this could be achieved. This glaring disconnect between maximalist objectives (regime change) and minimalist tactics (selectively-enforced no-fly zones and arms embargoes, and close air support) should have been a clear indicator that the intervention would not proceed as quickly or easily as was believed. Those now demanding that the U.S. government clearly articulate its support for regime change in Damascus should also seek a plausible explanation for how this happens. Then, we can decide if that plan is believable, what the likely costs and consequences are, and whether regime change in Syria is in the US’s national interest.

A Chadian refugee sits with his possessions in North Africa (Finbarr O'Reilly/Courtesy Reuters) Today, the Internationalist would like to draw your attention to a disturbing phenomenon ignored by the foreign policy community but all too common in global conflict zones: The pervasive sexual abuse of men in war. Women, of course, bear the main brunt of wartime sexual violence—as they always have. Last December, my CFR colleague Mark Lagon hosted a sobering meeting with the eminent legal scholar and activist Catharine MacKinnon. Now the special gender adviser to the prosecutor at the International Criminal Court, Mackinnon in 2000 argued the path-breaking legal case Kadic vs. Karadzic—about  mass Serbian rape of Bosnian women—which for the first time established mass rape as an act of genocide. Over the past two decades, international attention to rape as a weapon of war has been growing. Documentary filmmakers have often been in the forefront. In 2006 Lisa F. Jackson traveled to DRC to interview thousands of rape victims, and their perpetrators. Her resulting film, The Greatest Silence: Rape in the Congo, won the Special Jury Prize at Sundance in 2008 and subsequently inspired a UN resolution condemning rape as a weapon of war. Several of my CFR colleagues—including Laurie Garrett, Isobel Coleman, and Matthew Waxman—have spoken and written eloquently on the scope of such atrocities and the need to hold perpetrators accountable. At the same time, as the Guardian reported on Sunday, the United Nations (UN) and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) “barely acknowledge” the pervasive sexual violence against men that occurs in modern war. The article documents the terrible suffering of a Congolese refugee who was captured by rebels and raped multiple times per day, and watched countless other men be similarly brutalized. 22% of men in Eastern Congo reported being victims of sexual violence, compared to 30% of women. One victim reported the crime to police, and was laughed at. A doctor in whom he confided merely gave him Panadol (a local equivalent of Tylenol). He described: “Everybody has heard the women’s stories. But nobody has heard the men’s.” The violence, and the disregard, is global. 80% of Bosnian males imprisoned in concentration camps and 76% of El Salvadoran male political prisoners report sexual abuse. Yet, of roughly 4,000 NGOs addressing wartime sexual violence, only 3% mentioned male victims (and usually only in passing). International institutions are also falling short. They should be lauded for attempting to address mass violence against women during wartime, but the protection and outreach must be extended to all victims. The Guardian quoted one refugee who sought help from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and was told “‘we have a programme for vulnerable women, but not men.’” Margot Wallström, the UN special representative of the secretary-general for sexual violence in conflict counters that UNHCR does assist both men and women, but that women are “overwhelmingly” the victims. Emerging studies, however, suggest sexual violence against men is more widespread than commonly acknowledged. Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that some countries do not criminalize sexual abuse of men, as this report (PDF) by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs documents. International humanitarian law criminalized rape in the twentieth century, but “prosecution was nonexistent” during the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and its Rwandan counterpart (ICTR) included rape in the category of crimes against humanity, war crime, and genocide, but abuse against women earned harsher punishment than abuse against men. However, Lara Stemple of the University of California’s Health and Human Rights Law project also notes that: “There are dozens of references to “violence against women” — defined to include sexual violence — in United Nations human rights resolutions, treaties and agreements, but most don’t mention sexual violence against men.” She adds: "The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 treats wartime sexual violence as something that only impacts on women and girls… Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently announced $44m to implement this resolution. Because of its entirely exclusive focus on female victims, it seems unlikely that any of these new funds will reach the thousands of men and boys who suffer from this kind of abuse. Ignoring male rape not only neglects men, it also harms women by reinforcing a viewpoint that equates ’female’ with ’victim’, thus hampering our ability to see women as strong and empowered. In the same way, silence about male victims reinforces unhealthy expectations about men and their supposed invulnerability." The Internationalist recognizes that this is not an easy subject for men, in particular, to acknowledge. But we all need to shine the spotlight on such suffering to underscore that sexual abuse, no matter the gender of the victim, is abhorrent—and that perpetrators must be held to account. And the world needs to provide legal resources and psychological support to men who demonstrate the courage to come forward in reporting such crimes, despite the social stigma so often attached to their plight.

President Barack Obama meets with His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama in the Map Room of the White House on July 16, 2011. (Pete Souza/Courtesy The White House) Is it ritualized noise or does China really mean it? Here is what the Chinese Foreign Ministry had to say about President Obama’s July 16 meeting with the Dalai Lama: “We demand that the U.S. side seriously consider China’s stance, immediately adopt measures to wipe out the baneful impact, stop interfering in China’s internal affairs and cease to connive and support anti-China separatist forces…such an act has grossly interfered in China’s internal affairs, hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and damaged Sino-American relations.” Did President Obama’s meeting with the Tibetan spiritual leader really “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people”? The reports of the meeting suggest two primary outcomes: President Obama telling the Dalai Lama that the United States does not support Tibetan independence, and President Obama reiterating his support for the maintenance of Tibetan culture. Both of these are supported by Beijing. And here is what the People’s Daily had to say about the meeting between Admiral Mullen and General Chen earlier that same week, “The United States should understand that the obstacles to exchanges between the Chinese and U.S. militaries over recent years are not the lack of transparency in China’s military or the aggressive posture adopted by China. The root cause is the mentality of containment to which the United States has long clung, which lies behind its public statements. This has sometimes caused the nation to make moves threatening China’s core interests. Only a country that respects other countries can win their respect.” The U.S. has no mentality of containment—although it probably would be fair to raise U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and reconnaissance missions off the Chinese coast as contributors to tensions in the Sino-U.S. military to military relationship. But does the Chinese government really believe that its lack of transparency and assertiveness in the South China Sea are not relevant to the challenges in military to military relations between China and the United States? Beijing’s propensity for hyperbole and its frequent repetition of ideas and phrases that may not be relevant or even true reflect an effort both to define the terms of debate and to reinforce traditional policy thinking for domestic consumption. China’s leaders should realize, however, that they run the risk of being like the boy who cries wolf: when you keep repeating something that isn’t true, people eventually stop listening. The danger then becomes that when the wolf really does show up—when everyone really ought to listen to what Beijing says—no one will be paying attention anymore.

A Libyan rebel gestures at the frontline, 60 km (37 miles) west of Ajdabiyah (Esam Al-Fetori/Courtesy Reuters) My friend, Karim Mezran, the director of the Centro Studi Americani in Rome weighs in on U.S. recognition of the Libyan Transitional National Council. Last Thursday (July 14), the Washington Post ran  an editorial advocating what many have long pressed the Obama administration to do: recognize Libya’s Transitional National Council (TNC) (as the rebels’ government is called) as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people . This legal and diplomatic recognition allows the TNC to claim access to the billions of dollars of Libyan assets frozen in many Western countries.  Although many legal obstacles remain, all agree that recognition constitutes a major step  in this direction. Is this really a good idea? Most of the objections  to recognition have focused on the risk of recognizing a rebel government before it has conquered the capital of the state,  creating a dangerous precedent or emphasized the ambiguous background of some of the TNC’s members or questioned their democratic credentials.  These concerns also include potential radical Islamist influences within the Council or its relative vulnerability to the many militias that are springing up all over the eastern part of the country.  For those who have advocated for recognition, these are all valid issues, but are either easily overcome or ignored. The Post declares that the Benghazi based administration “has shown itself to be moderate and responsible” and that “it has committed itself repeatedly to an agenda of democracy and personal freedoms” despite many reports to the contrary.  Human Rights Watch, for example, has raised questions about the rebels’ commitment to basic human rights and there is credible evidence that prisoners in TNC-controlled jails have been tortured. There are, however, other reasons why the United States should not have offered official recognition to the TNC, notably the increased risks of splitting the country. The situation on the ground is stalled. The rebels in the western mountains are strong enough to control some villages, but definitely not enough to mount an attack on Tripoli. The forces in the East have made little real progress in weeks.  The recent liberation of Brega though very important does not alter significantly the situation on the ground. Defectors from the Libyan army have expressed skepticism that the rebel army can ultimately prevail. All of this, coupled with the wavering European engagement, leads to affirm that the only way to get out of this impasse is to negotiate directly with Qaddafi. Anyone who knows the Libyan leader knows that he respects only one power, the United States of America.  To be effective, the Americans should be able to exercise strong influence on both sides to force them to accept a negotiated solution, though recognition of the TNC has weakened Washington’s position. Recognizing the rebel’s government has outraged Qaddafi and his supporters, while at the same time depriving the United States of a powerful tool to pressure the TNC into accepting a possibly unpopular negotiated solution. Moreover one has to be wary that, the TNC may feel a duty to reward the people of the eastern provinces who have suffered much in the last month. In other words, while the situation on the ground remains stalled, the TNC may prefer to spend and invest resources in the reconstruction and strengthening of the liberated zones thus decreasing the war efforts to liberate Tripolitania. The unintended consequence of this policy would hasten the breakup of Libya. This would be the worst possible outcome of recognizing the TNC.

Activists of NGO's demonstrate the Doha Round before the closing ceremony of the 7th WTO ministerial meeting in Geneva (Denis Balibouse/ Courtesy Reuters). World Bank President Robert Zoellick got the White House’s attention this weekend, chiding (Washington Post) the Obama administration for “dumbing down” the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks. Rather than exercising its historical leadership and thinking boldly, the United States has allowed the “whole discussion” to “become very defeatist.” To be sure, Zoellick has a dog in this fight. Having launched the now-moribund Doha “development round” nearly ten years ago, he’d clearly like to see it revived. But after so many obituaries, it may be wiser to bury Doha in order to ensure the survival of the World Trade Organization (WTO) itself. One of the few silver linings in the global financial crisis has been the restraint showed by major trading nations when it comes to protectionism. Thanks to solidarity among Group of Twenty (G20) nations and close monitoring by independent watchdogs like Global Trade Alert, the world avoided what many anxious commentators (including this one) had feared: a descent into 1930s-style, beggar-thy-neighbor trade discrimination. In fact, the global trading system—and the WTO that embodies it—has remained remarkably resilient. The same cannot be said of the Doha Round. A deadlock between developed countries—including the United States and Europe­—and major emerging market economies (EMEs)—particularly China, India, and Brazil­—has kept the trade talks in a nearly comatose state for the past several years. The fundamental problem, as former U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. Schwab explains (Foreign Affairs), is that the developed versus developing country dichotomy at the heart of the Doha Round obscures the surging global importance of the biggest EMEs. In the past, it might have been enough for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, given their global dominance, to lead global liberalization through asymmetrical concessions to poor countries. But the rise of the BRICs and other major economies has created a more complicated world. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) now exceeds that of Japan’s—just as India will soon overtake Germany; Brazil, France and the UK; Mexico, Canada; and Indonesia, Australia. And yet the “deal” on the table at Doha in 2008 would have relied overwhelmingly on major concessions from the developed world, while allowing China, India, and other big EMEs ample protection for their agricultural and manufacturing sectors. In other words, as Schwab notes, Doha has failed to “address the central question facing international economic governance today: What are the relative roles and responsibilities of advanced (or developed), emerging, and developing countries?” Free-trade advocates, wedded to the bicycle theory of trade negotiations (that you either move forward or fall over) are loathe to admit defeat. Some also fear that the demise of Doha will erode global support for the WTO and its dispute settlement mechanism. If the WTO can’t deliver as a negotiation forum in this case, won’t countries ignore its role as standard setter and policeman? The WTO is certainly vulnerable. Over the past decade—despite the continuation of the Doha Round—the world has witnessed a proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements. Such arrangements, which exceed two hundred in number, discriminate against non-parties and skew global commerce. Jagdish Bhagwati of CFR and Columbia University worries that if Doha collapses, the world will be “overtaken by regional trade agreements and other bilateral arrangements, which will be discriminatory.” Certainly, a multilateral round of liberalization would be vastly preferable. But the Doha Round is not up to the task.  As a team of experts from the Petersen Institute has concluded, salvaging Doha—or at least the agreement that collapsed in 2008—would bring fairly modest gains. Better to rescue a few feasible deals as spin-offs, and then regroup for a greater multilateral push. A package to decrease the price of moving goods internationally could contribute as much as one hundred billion to the global economy, while a nearly finished agricultural-export pillar, and cuts in subsidies to fleets that engage in overfishing, would bring real, short-term gains and be less controversial. The Obama administration should then spearhead a new effort at a more realistic round of international trade liberalization that reflects the growth of emerging economies. As Leo Hindery Jr. of the New America Foundation documents, the benefits of three pending trade deals with Panama, Colombia, and South Korea would be “negligible in terms of America’s overall trade balance and have little potential to be a driver of exports and job creation.” President Obama will of course need to face the dragons of a protectionist constituency, but such is the price of U.S. leadership, which is necessary to ensure the health of the global economy and to cultivate more burden-sharing by EMEs.

Reformers say never to waste a crisis -- or a scandal. They certainly have found one with the ATF’s Fast and Furious program, in which bureau officials allowed hundreds of firearms to “walk” across the border, straight into the hands of Mexican drug traffickers.

American policy toward Syria is increasingly inconsistent and unintelligible. On Saturday, the Assad regime murdered another thirty-two peaceful protesters. What was the secretary of state’s reaction? She was in Istanbul, where some Syrian opposition leaders are located, but she did not meet with them—nor it seemed did she dispatch any of her aides to do so. Instead, she advised them to negotiate with the Assad government. The Washington Post tells the story: “Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was meeting with Turkish officials a few miles away, a day after she offered formal U.S. recognition to the Libyan rebel Transitional National Council, also while in Istanbul. “But she made no effort to meet with the Syrian opposition there, despite hopes expressed before the conference by some opposition figures that she would. Instead, she offered only lukewarm support for the Syrian gathering and made it clear that the United States hopes the protest movement will engage in dialogue with the Syrian government, something most opposition groups reject. "‘We’re encouraged by what we see the Syrian people are doing for themselves. This is not anything the United States or any other country is doing,’ she said after talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. ‘It’s what the Syrian people are doing, trying to form an opposition that can provide a pathway, hopefully in peaceful cooperation with the government, to a better future.’” This statement came just days after she said the regime had “lost legitimacy,” a bizarre phrase to use regarding a government that never had any. But that phrase was regarded as a toughening of the U.S. position, so what explains her advice to people being shot dead in the street that they “cooperate” with the man shooting them? That twenty-three of the thirthy-two people killed by the regime on Saturday were in Damascus shows that the demonstrations have reached the capital and continue to grow. The great scholar Fouad Ajami recently said that aspects of  the Arab Spring are well described as a “prison break” by an entire population, and certainly that term fits for Syria. I understand the Administration’s desire not to urge people into the streets, lest there be a slaughter that we cannot halt or avert. But no one is suggesting that the president call for a mass uprising. U.S. policy needs only to show consistency and moral clarity. I shudder to think how a Syrian protester must view the United States when he is risking his life and the secretary of state is still dreaming of “peaceful cooperation” from the government shooting him and his fellow demonstrators dead in the streets day after day. Mrs. Clinton’s remark about Assad’s loss of legitimacy was, we are told, unscripted. “The administration’s policy toward the Syrian autocrat has lately been shaped more by diplomatic improvisation than methodical planning within the White House,” the Washington Post reported. This may explain why the secretary oscillates between tougher and weaker rhetoric and positions, but it is a terrible indictment of the Obama Administration foreign policy team that it cannot get its act together after thirty months in power. This Administration’s Syria policy has now moved from “improvisation” to incoherence.

Canadian F-18 war planes (L) wait to refuel from a British VC-10 tanker aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea off Libya July 10, 2011. Seven countries, including Britain, have provided air tankers to sustain the NATO air mission over Libya, which is now in its fourth month. Picture taken through an aircraft window on July 10, 2011 (David Brunnstrom/Courtesy Reuters). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed command and control over the western-led intervention in the Libyan civil war four months ago with three stated military missions: enforce an arms embargo, enforce a no-fly-zone, and protect civilians and civilian populated areas. As I have noted often on this blog, NATO has selectively enforced the arms embargo by looking the other way when the rebels were caught red handed violating it. Furthermore, after NATO ally France was exposed by Le Figaro for violating the arms embargo by air-dropping rocket launchers, machine guns, and anti-tank grendaes to Libyan rebels, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen responded: “I don’t consider the so-called arms drop a problem.” Alliance spokesperson Oana Lungescu added, despite all public evidence to the contrary, that “the arms embargo is effective.” Now, there is growing evidence that NATO is also selectively enforcing the no-fly-zone over Libya. The international mandate for NATO’s intervention is UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973, the latter of which establishes “a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians.” Last Wednesday, an unnamed Financial Times reporter wrote: “Supplies to the Nafusa region have to be brought in on long road journeys from neighbouring Tunisia, although there is also an aircraft that comes from Benghazi.” Indeed, Ali Tarhouni, the Oil and Finance Minister of the rebels’ National Transitional Council, was on-hand to celebrate what was the third no-fly-zone violation from this airport (For a photograph of an Air Libya plane taking off from the Rhebat Airfield in Benghazi, see here). On Thursday, without pointing out that the alliance was actually not enforcing a no-fly-zone, William Booth of the Washington Post added: “Although NATO enforces a no-fly-zone over Libya, it appears to allow rebel flights that shuttle personnel, food, medicine — and allegedly some weapons and communications equipment.” UN Security Council Resolution 1973 contains an important caveat: it does not apply to humanitarian flights, “such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance.” However, Libyan rebels acknowledge that these flights are being used for military purposes, in clear violation of the resolution. “The importance of this airport is bringing humanitarian aid and military supplies for our rebel brothers… in the Nafusa Mountains,” said Mohammed al-Bujdidi, a rebel commander near the airport. This is consistent with countless reports of a rebel tactic for smuggling weapons into Libya—namely within supposed humanitarian aid shipments.  Furthermore, the Libyan rebels have a small number of MIG-21 fighter aircraft that have flown within the supposed no-fly-zones. Three armed MIG-21s were photographed in late June flying in formation over the Benina Airport, and a video of a rebel’s armed fighter jet being serviced before takeoff is available here.  The truth of NATO’s intended strategic objective in Libya was articulated with rare candor last week by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta: “The objective is to do what we can to bring down the regime of [Libyan leader Muammar] Qaddafi.” Increasingly, and more overtly, the three military missions that NATO claims to be conducting in Libya are being utilized in a coordinated effort to remove Qaddafi from power.  As a local rebel commander in Libya’s western mountains told CBS Evening News on Friday: “When we get permission from NATO we will advance forward.”

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gestures as she speaks at the international conference "Women Enhancing Democracy: Best Practices" in Vilnius June 30, 2011. REUTERS/Ints Kalnins At a recent conference on U.S. foreign policy, I was struck by how few women were in the room. The discrepancy came sharply into focus when all of us in attendance posed for a group photograph—of thirty-nine participants, only six were women. Struck by the inequality, I looked into whether the data substantiated my anecdotal impression of women’s underrepresentation in U.S. foreign policy and national security-related fields. The results of what emerged are presented in an essay I wrote for ForeignPolicy.com, “City of Men.” The evidence shows that women are proportionally underrepresented within the academy, military officer corps, civilian foreign policy positions, and at foreign policy-related think tanks. Although the 2010 Census found that women make up 51% of the U.S. population, they hold less than a third of senior positions at most foreign policy-related institutions. While there are assuredly other groups and voices underrepresented in the DC-centric foreign policy and national security world, the lack of women at many stops in my career has always been particularly notable. Beyond what is in the ForeignPolicy.com piece, two additional thoughts. First, several women working at think tanks or related institutions have been in touch to tell me of the inadequate maternity leave that they are offered. The Family and Medical Leave Act provides most federal employees “with up to 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave per year,” including “for the birth and care of the newborn child.” Several think tanks provide much less. Second, from my own personal experiences and hearing from colleagues abroad, the underrepresentation of women at non-U.S. think tanks is as bad or worse. I have been fortunate to give talks at think tanks and universities from Madrid, to Moscow, to Beijing, and it is most often to a table full of men, though women overwhelmingly do the administrative work that makes the event actually happen. Without doing large surveys of women, and examining the policies and practices of relevant institutions, it is impossible to know exactly why so many women are missing from key foreign policy positions. I do not think that people are born to be State Department officials or foreign policy wonks. They are made through educational opportunities, socialization, interest, ambition, and for other reasons. I would appreciate hearing your thoughts on why women are underrepresented in the foreign policy world, and if and why it matters.

People stand near their belongings at a bus station in Mogadishu (Shabele Media/ Courtesy Reuters). My friend Joseph Siegle of the National Defense University recently published an interesting article about “Stabilizing Fragile States” in order to protect against their “grim dangers to the international community.” In this, he echoes U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s claim that we must prevent Libya from becoming a giant Somalia. U.S. foreign policy has been infused with these arguments since 9/11, when weak and failing states were catapulted from their place as humanitarian concerns on the foreign policy agenda to top national security concerns. Under the first Bush administration, yours truly worked on the policy planning staff at the U.S. State Department, considering strategies to combat this threat of failing states. But the Internationalist just published a book that empirically analyzes the transnational threats emanating from weak and failing states—and concluded that our conventional wisdom is based on isolated anecdotes that don’t accurately reflect the danger of all failing states. I was interviewed by Eric Felten on Voice of America’s On the Line about this recent book, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZeiD9GDyQws Some highlights from the discussion: The notion of a failed state as a safe haven is a contradiction. It turns out that ethnic conflicts, lack of basic communications, crumbling roads and transportation systems, and the absence of banks or their inability to transfer money frustrate terrorists just as much as they frustrate citizens or aid workers. (Watch to hear about some stunning cables from al-Qaeda complaining about this.) International drug traffickers will accept a slightly higher degree of risk to be in functioning societies that are geographically and logistically more convenient-- and where they can make higher profits. It’s easier to corrupt a weak regime than be entirely responsible for their security. (Watch to hear about one nation where cocaine shipments exceed GDP.) Policymakers must look beyond institutional capacity of the country, and also consider the will of the ruling regime. Consider that Osama bin Laden was discovered to be hiding miles from a military academy where the state was relatively strong. Countries like South Africa or Mexico that possess stronger institutions, but governance gaps, represent greater threats to the international community in the issue areas of: epidemic disease, terrorism, global crime, weapons of mass destruction and energy insecurity. Pandemics don’t fester in failing states and later engulf entire regions. The most fragile states bear a disproportionate disease burden, but they’re endemic diseases: measles, malaria, cholera. Acute, fast-moving pandemics that endanger international health, like SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) or influenza,  bypass failed states because they’re not linked with the global economy. Simply because weak and failing states are not of security concern to the United States does not mean they should not be of humanitarian and development concern. However, when the United States misperceives a humanitarian challenge as a security threat,  it unwittingly empowers regimes that obscure oppression as combating terrorism.