• China
    Global Economics Monthly: October 2015
    Bottom Line: Experts disagree about whether China faces a hard landing, but emerging markets pose a growing risk to the global recovery. Two months ago, a seemingly innocuous change in the way China sets the value of its currency—opening the market each day at a rate related to the closing rate the day before—rattled global markets. Since that time, the renminbi (RMB) has weakened further against the U.S. dollar, then strengthened after strong government support, and now stands just 2.5 percent lower than it was on August 11. Global stock markets, in contrast, have experienced bigger changes: the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Shanghai Composite Index are down by 6.5 percent and 22 percent respectively, compared to the day of RMB devaluation.  The crisis reflects long-standing concerns about the Chinese economy, including overinvestment and excess capacity in manufacturing, real estate and stock market bubbles fueled by easy money and leverage, and an incomplete reform process that failed to place hard budget constraints on state enterprises. In addition, the initial policy response by the government was chaotic and opaque. Together, those predicting a hard landing have good reason to suspect that the crisis has more room to run. China's Growth Story  In a somewhat surprising announcement this week, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reaffirmed its China growth forecast at 6.8 percent this year and 6.3 percent in 2016, below the official government forecast of 7 percent but well above many market projections. Such optimism relies on three basic tenets. First, the nearly double-digit growth of services and retail sales will continue, providing evidence that the much-discussed rebalancing of the Chinese economy is indeed underway. Second, policy will be better coordinated and communicated going forward and monetary and fiscal stimulus will provide meaningful support to activity later this year. Third, the sharp slowdown in manufacturing will not cascade to the broader economy. Stabilization in China is a central pillar of an IMF global outlook that, while marked down from earlier forecasts, is still the highest it has been since 2011. Most likely, the truth in China lies somewhere between hard-landing and muddle-through scenarios. Chinese growth tends to be smoothed, underreporting activity in a boom and overreporting it in a downturn. Other indicators of growth, including sales, energy consumption, and cross-border shipments, also tell a mixed story. Many forecasters have marked down their China forecast by half to three-quarters of a percentage point. But ultimately, how Chinese policymakers respond will likely be determinative to the path Beijing takes. Emerging Risks Of course, strong growth in Chinese services and a jobs-supporting Chinese government stimulus package are small comfort to a commodity-exporting emerging country and its companies. The direct effect of a China manufacturing bust on the major commodity exporters—notably Australia, Brazil, and Argentina—is already being felt strongly and is likely to put increasing pressure on these governments. In countries where policies have been weak, markets have been brutal in their response. In Brazil, which is also experiencing a political crisis, the real is down 30 percent against the U.S. dollar since July, and the Sao Paolo Bovespa index is down by 10 percent. Other countries, such as South Africa and Indonesia, also face significant currency pressures.  However, perhaps the greater risks come from financial contagion. A number of recent reports (for example, the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report and an Institute of International Finance report) have highlighted the rapid buildup in corporate debt, with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) warning of a looming banking crisis as a result of rapid credit growth in some emerging markets. According to the Institute of International Finance, emerging market nonbank corporate debt has increased 500 percent over the past decade, to $23.7 trillion or around 90 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) of these countries. Corporate debt defaults weigh directly on economic growth and can damage the balance sheets of banks that have lent to those companies and the countries that stand behind the banks. Much of this debt is linked to trade with China and falling profits, as well as losses that could result from added currency volatility, which is likely to dramatically add to the burden of servicing this debt. This could create financial distress throughout the emerging world and add to deflationary pressures, which in turn would depress returns on investment. Indeed, some are concerned that the loss of trust between tightly connected financial institutions could contribute to a deleveraging and pullback in activity akin to what happened in 2008.  On top of these cyclical concerns, the most striking change in the IMF’s outlook is a sharp downward revision to the long-term growth prospects for emerging markets. The end of the commodity cycle, and a reversal of capital inflows, signals a period of lower investment and weaker fiscal positions, and as a result policymakers in many cases have reduced capacity to support growth. In many cases, the optimism that existed following the Great Recession that emerging market countries would rapidly see their incomes converge to levels in industrial countries has been lost.  For the United States in particular, fragility in emerging markets is the critical risk. By itself, softer Chinese growth and the 2.5 percent decline in the RMB since August 11 would only reduce U.S. growth by 0.1 or 0.2 percent. There is an additional argument that the RMB’s exchange-rate movement has a smaller effect on the U.S. economy than in the past, reflecting the globalization of supply chains and the continuing small role that trade plays in the U.S. economy compared with China’s other major trading partners. Still, exchange-rate pass-through can take time to play out—as much as two years—and the U.S. economy continues to absorb the effects of last year’s appreciation against the euro and yen. If other countries depreciate their own currencies against the dollar in response to these pressures, the effect of the broader appreciation of the dollar against a trade-weighted average of our trading partners could be significant. (A rough rule of thumb is that a 10 percent move in the trade-weighted dollar reduces U.S. GDP by around half a percentage point after a year.) FIGURE 1. CURRENCY DEPRECIATION IN EMERGING MARKETS Source: BIS effective exchange rate (real, broad indices) These risks appear to have been an important factor in the September decision by the Federal Reserve to delay raising interest rates from zero. As Fed Chair Janet Yellen noted in her press conference, concerns about an abrupt slowdown in China (and emerging markets more generally), along with commodity price declines and an appreciation of the dollar, provided a deflationary shock that was cause for concern. Although deflationary pressures were expected to be temporary, these moves contributed to a tightening of financial conditions that may have tipped the scales toward delaying a raise. The challenge for the Fed is that these pressures are unlikely to resolve and the path forward will not be any clearer the next time the Fed meets. In sum, the China-driven emerging markets risks are likely to dominate decision-making for months if not years to come. Looking Ahead: Kahn's take on the news on the horizon United States  The Treasury exhausts its borrowing authority on November 5, and some analysts place odds of a government shutdown in December as high as 50 percent. Europe Greek debt relief negotiations should start soon; if protracted, the situation could renew concerns about “Grexit.” Central banks  The European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan may both consider new easing measures, but new dollar strength could push the market back.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Secretary of State John Kerry on African Elections
    The Obama administration and Secretary Kerry have been deeply invested in supporting free, fair, and credible elections in Africa. President Obama and UK Prime Minister David Cameron were directly involved in Nigeria’s national elections in March, as was Secretary Kerry, who also attended the inauguration of President Muhammadu Buhari in May. This month, national elections will take place in Guinea, Tanzania, Cote d’Ivoire, and the Central African Republic. Elections are also expected soon in Burkina Faso. Marking these upcoming events, Secretary Kerry published an op-ed in AllAfrica.com on October 6, titled Decisive Moment for Democracy. The op-ed praises Africa’s progress toward democracy and recalls the elections in Nigeria, where for the first time in that country’s history the opposition came to power through the ballot box. It affirms the genuine hunger for democracy in Africa and elsewhere. The op-ed also reiterates U.S. policy. But, in this pre-electoral period, it is useful to reiterate them. First, Secretary Kerry calls for the respect for term limits, as President Barack Obama did earlier this year during his Africa trip. Term limits are currently challenged by incumbent presidents in, among others, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. Second, while free, fair, and credible elections do not guarantee a successful democracy, they are important milestones of progress. And, third, elections, important though they are, “cannot be the only moment for citizens to shape their future.” The op-ed asserts that citizens must be part of an ongoing process of engagement between the people and their government. The Secretary’s last point is salutary. Too often observers of Africa see election events as the very definition of democracy rather than as part of an on-going process of governance.
  • Economics
    What Big Data Can Tell Us About the Oil Price Crash
    The oil price collapse was supposed to boost the U.S. economy by prompting consumers to spend their savings on other goods and services. During the first half of this year, though, data seemed to suggest that they were saving the windfall instead, damaging economic growth. But new big data research from the newish JP Morgan Chase Institute appears to provide strong evidence that consumers did, indeed, spend most of their savings. It’s an intriguing energy result that also offers a glimpse into how changes in data availability and computational capacity are changing the sort of energy research that’s possible. The conventional wisdom until recently was that consumers had failed to spend a large part of their windfall from the oil price collapse. This first showed up in savings figures: as the oil prices fell, the personal savings rate rose, seeming to reveal that consumers were putting their oil money in the bank. It then appeared to be confirmed by consumer survey data. People took guesses as to what explained the phenomenon: Had a cold winter deterred consumption? Were consumers still skittish after the financial crisis? The big question wasn’t whether or not consumers were reaction timidly – it was whether they would eventually change course. Now the JPMC research concludes that consumers spent roughly eighty cents of every dollar they saved. They did this by using a database of transaction records from twenty five million credit cards that give them an extraordinary window into individual consumption patterns. They then applied some clever analysis to distinguish spending increases that were spurred by lower gas prices from ones that weren’t. This wouldn’t have been possible without the massive number of detailed records they had or the computational capacity to crunch through them. On its face, the result is good news: lower gasoline prices are stimulating the economy. But things aren’t quite so simple. Had consumers been hoarding their savings, we might have hoped that they’d eventually start spending them, boosting the economy as a result. The JPMC results suggest that that’s not a significant possibility. The research also implicitly raises questions about the reliability of consumer survey data. Researchers should also be left puzzling over why the savings rate jumped earlier this year. The new research is also a striking example of what big data analytics is making possible when it comes to energy research. We’ve seen a glimpse of that through companies that are studying behavioral responses to energy efficiency interventions. Now we have an application to an important macroeconomic question. One could imagine leveraging the kind of data that JPMC and other similar institutions have to understand more about how energy price volatility affects all sorts of consumer and business decisions; to gain insight into why American driving and gasoline consumption is rising again; to see how changes in drilling activity affect local economies; and, I’m sure, much more. The same is true for a whole host of economic questions that go well beyond energy. It’s worth staying tuned.
  • Europe and Eurasia
    The U.S. Government Largely Has Itself to Blame for the EU Court’s Safe Harbor Decision
    Alan Charles Raul is a partner in the Privacy, Data Security and Information Law practice of Sidley Austin LLP.  You can follow his group at datamatters.sidley.com. In a decision Tuesday that was as shocking as it was predictable, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) invalidated the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor for westward bound international transfers of personal data. The companies whose information flows to the United States will be impeded by the EU decision need to look to the U.S. government and not just the EU for letting this mess happen. The case stems from a complaint Max Schrems filed with the Irish Data Protection Authority about the privacy risks of using Facebook. He was concerned that electronic communications transferred to the United States would end up in the hands of the NSA’s PRISM program. PRISM involves the NSA’s use of a provision in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, section 702, that allows it to target non-U.S. persons located outside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. This section only applies to collections from electronic communication service providers located in the United States. The CJEU, followed a recommendation of its Advocate General that assumed without any facts or analysis that NSA surveillance under section 702 is massive and "indiscriminate." Without the opportunity to receive any evidence or argument from the U.S. government, any U.S. company, or any amicus filing a brief on behalf of the United States, the CJEU decided that the EU’s executive branch, the Commission, had improperly determined that the U.S. Safe Harbor assured EU citizens an "adequate" level of privacy and data protection. This finding was necessary because the EU prohibits sending personal data to a non-EU country that does not provide "adequate" protection, which the CJEU understood as requiring the third country in fact to ensure, “by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights essentially equivalent to that guaranteed in the EU legal order.” Accordingly, a company needing to send its HR data or customer records to the United States requires an EU-approved mechanism to legitimate transfers of the personal data across the Atlantic. Until yesterday, companies could certify to comply with the fundamental privacy principles worked out in the Safe Harbor framework in 2000 between the US Department of Commerce and the EU Commission. Participating companies must also agree to submit to the enforcement jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission in the event of non-compliance with those principles, making their commitments legally binding. Other than Safe Harbor, U.S. companies can transfer data pursuant to certain EU-approved data transfer contracts, which can be implemented even between offices of the same multinational in different countries, or by adopting so-called Binding Corporate Rules where a company agrees to self-impose EU privacy standards for transfers of EU data throughout the company’s global operations. International data transfers are also allowed if EU citizens are informed and freely consent to the transfer of their data. The rationale for the CJEU’s invalidating the Safe Harbor is not really clear. The CJEU was apparently not required to, and did not, conduct any analysis of U.S. law, let alone review the statute authorizing NSA collection of foreign intelligence material under section 702. Accordingly, the CJEU merely assumed, and did not actually rule (or even consider) whether the PRISM program of concern to Mr. Schrems was indeed indiscriminate or unjustified. If the CJEU had examined that statute, it would have found checks and balances, including judicial oversight, more rigorous than controls on government surveillance in most if not nearly all other countries, including EU member states. Even beyond the requirement for judicial approval, the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence must both certify that the NSA surveillance involves obtaining foreign intelligence information, is subject to rigorous minimization procedures to avoid excess collection, and is a collection that requires the assistance of an electronic communication service provider. After such detailed authorization, the Department of Justice Inspector General and the relevant intelligence community Inspector General must investigate and report on the surveillance practices, and the relevant intelligence agency must provide an annual report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, and also to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), now a fully independent, free-standing institution of the federal government, is another oversight body authorized to investigate and assess these national security surveillance practices. In fact, the PCLOB concluded that the Prism program “consists entirely of targeting specific persons about whom an individualized determination has been made”—hardly indiscriminate surveillance. Significantly, the PCLOB has specifically asserted its role and authority to assess the impact of such surveillance on non-U.S. Persons. In its 2014 report to Congress, the PCLOB addressed the issue head on, noting that many of the “applicable protections that already exist under U.S. surveillance laws apply to U.S. and non-U.S. persons alike” and that it will contribute to President Obama’s effort to add additional privacy protections to non-U.S. persons. So how could the CJEU be unaware of the extensive certifications, checks, balances, judicial approval and independent oversight applicable to the national security surveillance in question? The answer is because the U.S. government simply does not defend or even explain how the privacy system works—neither with respect to national security privacy issues, nor with respect to commercial privacy regulation. The President has designated no one to be in overall charge of coordinating these issues government-wide and to serve as a senior public spokesperson with responsibility to communicate effectively on privacy to foreign and domestic constituencies. Accordingly, it is no wonder that the CJEU made no real effort (indeed no effort at all) to understand the significant protections built into the U.S. system, even for foreigners. Another recent example of the negative consequences of having no White House privacy coordinator is that the Department of Justice was left free to serve a search warrant in 2014 on Microsoft to compel disclosure in the US of one of its customer’s communications that were stored in Ireland. With no senior policy person to tell DOJ how much damage this would cause to the United States’ international privacy reputation, the fallout has been highly damaging to global respect for the U.S. privacy and data protection regime. The data the DOJ seeks could have been readily obtained from Ireland using the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty process. In sum, the sky may not fall with the (perhaps temporary) collapse of the Safe Harbor.  EU officials have indicated they are determined to protect transatlantic data flows, and are likely to find away to enhance the Safe Harbor in the future and acquiesce in short-term workarounds. In the meantime, companies can also sign data transfer contracts between their subsidiaries, or look to individual consent and other mechanisms for legitimating the transfer of personal data to the US. And while the CJEU’s decision in the Schrems case was neither logical nor informed, the US government needs to do a lot better job to explain (and defend) U.S. privacy and data protection laws so this sort of mess doesn’t happen again.  
  • Global
    The Drug Tradeoffs in TPP Deal
    One of the most contentious issues in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations is related to intellectual property and medicines. CFR’s Laurie Garrett reviews the intensifying debate among industry and global health advocates.
  • Europe and Eurasia
    The Implications of the European Safe Harbor Decision
    The European Court of Justice (ECJ) invalidated the Safe Harbor framework between the United States and the European Union that, for the past fifteen years, has enabled the movement of Europeans’ data across the Atlantic. As the business community seeks clarification about what rules will apply going forward, both the White House and the European Commission promised that they will continue work on a new agreement. The case began in 2013 when Austrian law student Max Schrems complained to the Irish data protection commissioner that his Facebook data was inadequately protected when it moved to U.S. servers, citing Edward Snowden’s leaks about widespread NSA surveillance. The Irish commissioner rejected Schrems’s complaint on the grounds that the European Commission had determined in 2000 that the Safe Harbor framework adequately protected EU citizens’ data. On appeal, the Irish High Court referred to the ECJ the question of whether a national data protection authority is bound by the Commission’s finding. Yesterday, the ECJ ruled the Safe Harbor agreement invalid because it places “national security, public interest or law enforcement requirements” over privacy principles. The court found that the European Commission had approved the pact without making a determination that U.S. law provides adequate privacy protection for European citizens. It also ruled that each data protection authority in the European Union may examine whether a transfer complies with EU privacy rules and, if it deems that it does not, raise the issue with its national court that can then refer it to the ECJ for a ruling. However, the ECJ made clear that only it can issue a final determination that a country does not offer “adequate” protection for personal data. What are the implications of the decision? First, U.S. and EU negotiators will attempt to put Humpty Dumpty back together again by updating the Safe Harbor framework. Both sides have been renegotiating the agreement since the Snowden revelations. Negotiators were reportedly close to an agreement when they got wind of the breadth of the upcoming ECJ decision. The Commission may now attempt to use the decision to gain more leverage in these negotiations. However, Congress is already considering bipartisan legislation that would provide U.S. Privacy Act protections to European citizens. Second, the spotlight is now on European national data protection regulators. In addition to their new ability to examine data transfers, they have a role approving other mechanisms companies may deploy to replace Safe Harbor, including binding corporate rules for intra-company transfers of personal data. In a number of EU countries, national regulators also have the power to confirm whether model clauses are being used to transfer personal data to the United States and other third countries. Today, many of these national authorities have backlogs of several months. It is unclear if they will order suspension of transfers of personal data to the United States under model clauses arrangements until they work through what would surely become a much bigger backlog. Third, this decision is a direct fallout of Edward Snowden’s revelations of NSA surveillance. Experts within and outside the U.S. government have argued that the ECJ based its ruling on erroneous factual assumptions regarding the nature and oversight of U.S. surveillance. Moreover, they note that the United States provides adequate privacy protections, especially in comparison to European countries many of which have no independent data protection oversight of law enforcement and intelligence surveillance. The ECJ also based its decision on a 2013 European Commission report on U.S. surveillance, parts of which are outdated given U.S. surveillance reforms spurred by President Obama’s 2014 executive order. Robert Litt, general counsel for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, wrote an opinion piece for the Financial Times before the ruling to argue that the surveillance program at issue in the ECJ’s decision “does not give the U.S. ‘unrestricted access’ to data.” Meanwhile, privacy advocates are citing the decision to prod Congress to engage in much broader reform U.S. surveillance programs. Jens Henrik-Jeppesen, director of European affairs for the Center for Democracy and Technology, for example, said “There is a clear need for the U.S. and Europe to set clear, lawful and proportionate standards and safeguards for conducting surveillance for national security purposes.” In the end, the ECJ’s willingness to invalidate the Safe Harbor framework underscores the unpredictable outcomes of the proposed reforms to European data protection regulation, new intra-European tax rules on digital goods, or the competition cases involving U.S. tech giants. Europe appears willing to act to protect its interests even if it means upsetting established business conventions.
  • Technology and Innovation
    Karen Kornbluh Joins Net Politics
    I am pleased to announce that Karen Kornbluh, senior fellow for digital policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, is contributing to Net Politics. Karen served as U.S. ambassador in Paris to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, where she spearheaded development of the first global Internet Policymaking Principles. She worked with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to launch the OECD’s Gender Initiative and the Middle East-North Africa Women’s Business Forum. In addition, Karen led efforts to expand the OECD’s reach to emerging economies, refocused the organization on developing countries, and expanded anti-corruption and governance efforts. At CFR, she has been hosting a roundtable series on digital policy.
  • Energy and Environment
    Gender Equality and the Global Goals
    Just over a week ago at the United Nations (UN), one hundred ninety-three countries adopted a new sustainable development agenda to tackle some of the world’s most pressing challenges, including inequality, climate change, poor health, and poverty. The agreement comes a few months after the Third International Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and following a year-long negotiation over the new development framework. The seventeen sustainable development goals (SDGs) adopted at the UN include 169 targets, to be achieved by the year 2030. The Global Goals are a landmark achievement in the international movement to advance women’s rights through development. The new framework makes it clear that addressing gender inequality is critical to global progress. Gender equality is integrated throughout the seventeen SDGs, and one of the goals is specifically focused on this issue (Goal Five). Notably, the goal on gender equality was the first to which governments and civil society agreed during the initial stages of drafting the now-finalized agenda. At the United Nations, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon highlighted the importance of Goal Five, emphasizing that “[w]e cannot achieve our 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development without full and equal rights for half of the world’s population, in law and in practice.” The SDG framework is important because it elevates the global ambition to advance the status of women and girls through development. Unlike the Millennium Development Goal framework that preceded it, the new sustainable development agenda addresses several critical issues—such as child marriage and violence against women—that previously were overlooked. The SDGs also include a commitment to women’s economic participation, calling for equality in property ownership, inheritance, financial services, and natural resources, which the World Bank and others have linked to poverty reduction and economic growth. Other targets under Goal Five include ending discrimination against women and girls; eliminating female genital mutilation; recognizing unpaid care and domestic work; promoting equal participation in leadership and decision-making; supporting access to sexual and reproductive health services; and improving women’s access to technology. Though the new sustainable development agenda has been heralded across sectors, significant challenges remain that are likely to impede its realization. The United Nations has estimated that the SDGs will cost approximately $172.5 trillion over the next fifteen years, or between $3.3 trillion and $4.5 trillion a year. The dearth of financial commitments at the Addis conference and the subsequent SDG summit leaves a serious funding vacuum that could hamper the achievement of the Global Goals. Nowhere is this threat more real than with respect to targets related to gender equality, which historically have been gravely underfunded. Another challenge for the new sustainable development agenda will be ensuring accountability. With 304 proposed indicators to evaluate success against each goal, measuring progress could be a significant hurdle, particularly for national governments and regional statistical bodies. The launch of the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, which aims to fill data gaps and improve measurement of the SDGs, is one promising approach to this problem. Led by governments such as the United States, Colombia, Kenya, and the Philippines, international organizations like the World Bank and UN Global Pulse, private sector companies including Facebook, and several foundations, the Partnership seeks to improve effective use of data in development, which should help to ensure nations are held accountable for their commitments. The Global Goals offer a critical opportunity to advance gender equality by providing a more ambitious development roadmap than ever before. This opportunity will only be realized, however, if governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society come together to enhance financing and ensure accountability for the agenda the world has now taken on.
  • India
    Where’s India on the Trans-Pacific Partnership?
    The United States and eleven other countries have concluded negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade pact that will cover 40 percent of global trade spanning Asia and the Pacific Rim, including some Latin American countries. It represents a subset of the countries in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and one can anticipate that other APEC members may elect to join the TPP in the future. While China, the largest economy in Asia, has not been part of the negotiations, it has “welcomed” the agreement. The Japanese prime minister has indicated that Chinese membership in TPP would aid “Asia-Pacific regional stability.” Back in June, President Barack Obama said that Chinese officials had been “putting out feelers” about joining. So where is India? India has not yet indicated whether it has interest in pursuing TPP membership down the line. This is because no clear consensus has formed in India on whether expanded market access will help the Indian economy grow, and whether the gains will be worth the potential costs to some still-protected Indian industries. To think about possible TPP membership, India would have to prepare itself for more significant market opening as well as enhanced standards than it has committed to in the past. Indian officials will need to decide whether they wish to position their country for the increased trade flows that participation in a major regional agreement would provide. Of course, a negotiation separate from the TPP has been underway in Asia: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP. India and China participate in this negotiation centered around the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Seven countries—Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam—are participating both in the TPP negotiations as well as in the RCEP. Trade experts generally assess the RCEP process as less demanding than the TPP. In addition, within Asia, major economies like China, Japan, and India as well as emerging economies have been pursuing bilateral and regional trade negotiations among themselves. China and India have negotiated free trade agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN to advance their own, and ASEAN’s, interests. Both have separate bilateral agreements with Singapore. Looking across the Pacific, China has FTAs with Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru. India has been negotiating an FTA with the European Union for nearly nine years, completed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan in 2011, and is in the process of negotiating Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements with Australia and with Canada. In a study released in September, C. Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute for International Economics argued that India could gain as much as $500 billion in exports by joining an expanded TPP. For a government interested in boosting the country’s exports and creating jobs at home, that certainly sounds like compelling logic. India has become more vocal internationally about its unambiguous interest in joining APEC, a necessary stepping stone for TPP membership, but here it appears New Delhi has some further work to do to convince its partners, including the United States, that it is ready. While the U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region released in January 2015 welcomed India’s “interest in joining” APEC, no follow-up statement from the United States emerged from the September meeting between Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, nor did any of the numerous documents released following the first U.S.-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue include it. In his joint press conference with Obama following their September 28, 2015 meeting in New York, Modi said he looked “forward to work with the U.S. for India’s membership of Asian Pacific Economic Community.” Modi’s statement had no echo from Obama. I’ve argued elsewhere that it is in U.S. interests to develop a more ambitious vision for U.S. economic ties with India, and to work closely with Indian officials on a roadmap toward that goal—with APEC a good start as a nonbinding trade promotion forum, and then discussion of a free trade agreement in the longer-term or Indian membership in TPP. But for that to become possible, India will need to decide whether it wants the benefits that will come from expanded trade in a more open arrangement than those it has previously joined—and whether it is willing to make the hard choices at home to do so. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa 
  • China
    Tu Youyou: An Outlier of China’s Scientific and Technological System
    On October 5, a native Chinese scientist, Tu Youyou, won the Nobel Prize in medicine for her role in developing an antimalarial drug that saves millions of lives in Africa and Asia. The award is considered a milestone in China’s history of science and technology as Tu is not only the first Chinese citizen but also the first Chinese-trained scientist ever to be awarded the most prestigious award in science. In fact, unlike other Chinese Nobel laureates in science, all of whom had overseas training, Tu had neither study nor research experience abroad. The most important research that led to the discovery of the medicine for which she was awarded the prize, artemisinin, was conducted in China. Surprised but exalted, many Chinese have attributed this prize to China’s scientific and technological (S&T) regime. Already, social media in China is flooded with discussions on who will be the next Chinese scientist to win the prize. But does this honor truly testify to the effectiveness of China’s S&T system? Since the early 1980s China has aggressively promoted research and development (R&D) as an integral part of its modernization agenda. By 2011, China had already become the second largest investor in R&D in the world. Between 2011 and 2015 the government invested more than $4.7 billion in medical science research alone. Currently, and for almost five years running, the volume of Chinese patent filing is the largest of any country of the world. With support from the government, Chinese scientists have independently developed about forty chemical drugs since 1986. Still, constrained by institutional, policy, and capacity factors, the country is struggling to become a true innovator—indeed, most of the so-called “independently developed” (zizhu chuangxin) drugs are copycat drugs from a clinical point of view. Furthermore, the pharmaceutical industry in China remains positioned at the lower end of the global supply chain as an exporter of active pharmaceutical ingredients rather than a formulator of innovative pharmaceutical products. This is in part caused by a research culture that remains bedeviled by inefficiency, corruption, and mismanagement problems. Among other things, the system has failed to develop an effective incentive structure that rejects mediocracy and recognizes truly innovative scientists. As a result, a Gresham’s Law-like system has developed where mediocracy is overvalued and innovation is hindered. For example, even though Tu was found to have played a critical role in artemisinin-based drug development, she was never an individual recipient of top science awards in China. She was several times nominated but rejected membership in the prestigious Chinese Academy of Sciences. Many Chinese scientists who participated in the project hold the belief that Tu was only one contributor and they too deserved a piece of the Nobel Prize. This might explain why Tu had earlier refused to share the original research data with a scientist who had wanted to promote her research. Much to the chagrin of the champions of the existing S&T system, the artemisinin-related research was primarily conducted not in the post-Mao era but in the early 1970s, during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Does that mean that the Maoist S&T regime was superior to the current one (as some Maoists would contend)? An argument for “yes” would be as logically fallacious as saying that the Soviet system was better than its successor because the former produced more Nobel laureates than the post-Soviet one. Indeed, only two drugs—artemisinin and dimercaptosuccinic acid —developed in the Mao era were internationally recognized as innovative drugs. True, the development of artemisinin-based drugs was the result of a top secret mission ordered by Mao (“Project 523”), which itself demonstrated the advantages of a nationwide system that encouraged esprit de corps while effectively mobilizing available resources for R&D. Political turmoil, coupled with Mao’s anti-intellectualism and egalitarianism, nevertheless left little room for inspiration and innovation in other research fields. The emphasis on group contribution, for example, led to the elimination of individual authors’ names from all academic publications. Against this backdrop, serendipity rather than the system was more relevant to Tu’s discovery. Furthermore, Mao’s China cut itself off from the outside world, which forestalled international exchange and prevented groundbreaking discoveries from being introduced and marketed internationally. Indeed, foreign scientists did not learn about the discovery of artemisinin until December 1979; unable to independently break into international markets, China sold the international rights to market artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) to a Swiss company. This in part explains why even today ACTs made in China only account for 1 percent of the international market share. Having a native Chinese win the Nobel Prize in science has long been a Chinese dream. Just two years ago, China kicked off an ambitious program aiming to select 100 top scientists for extra support in order to compete for future Nobel Prizes. Winning the award by Tu appears to boost the confidence in a system where Tu is by no means a representative sample. National pride aside, the fact that Tu is an outlier only underscores the need for China to fundamentally revamp its S&T system.
  • Asia
    Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal
    Podcast
    Following the agreement reached on the Trans-Pacific Partnership by the United States and eleven other countries, Council on Foreign Relations experts assessed the trade deal’s consequences for the global trade regime, geopolitics, and the international economy.
  • Trade
    The TPP Agreement: Big Things Are Still Possible
    A dozen countries from the Asia-Pacific region showed today that it is still possible for nations to do big things. Following a week of difficult meetings in Atlanta, trade and economy ministers from the United States, Japan, Mexico, Vietnam and others have reached a final deal on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the largest and most consequential trade agreement since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) more than two decades ago. While there is still a long road ahead to final ratification by the U.S. Congress and other national legislatures, the TPP deal has the potential to reshape an important part of the U.S. economy, strengthen American diplomacy, and launch a new generation of international economic cooperation. There are three broad implications for the United States. The first is economic. The United States is a far more trade dependent economy than it was even two decades ago when the WTO was formed, and the TPP will have big implications for the future of America’s traded industries, especially in manufacturing. The decade of the 2000s was a lost one for U.S. manufacturing, in no small part because of growing competition following China’s 2001 entry into the WTO. But the TPP should help write a different story for the next decade. The most important impact of trade agreements is in shaping corporate investment decisions--all else being equal, big companies are likely to invest more now in the TPP member countries because they can move their products freely within the TPP’s tariff-free zone. In sophisticated industries like autos and electronics, corporations rely on global supply chains, and the ability to move intermediate and finished goods at low cost within the TPP region will provide a significant advantage for the countries that are part of the deal. This should be good for the United States as an investment location. A recent report from the Boston Consulting Group found that manufacturing costs in the United States have fallen against every one of the other ten largest exporting nations over the past decade. Among the TPP countries, only Mexico still has an edge on the United States. Such investments will not flow automatically, to be sure. U.S. states and cities will have to compete aggressively to attract and retain companies. The U.S. government will need to keep a careful eye on the dollar to ensure that--as has happened too often in the past--a rising currency doesn’t price the United States out of global markets. The absence of any provisions on currency is a weakness of the TPP agreement, but one the U.S. government can address by actually using the many tools it already has to discourage currency manipulation. Investments in infrastructure and worker training to make the United States a more attractive business location would help a lot, as would corporate tax reform. And the government will need to stop doing stupid things, like Congress’s decision to let authorization lapse for the U.S.-Export Import Bank, which provides financing for U.S. companies selling to buyers in developing countries. But if Washington takes a few sensible steps, the TPP should help the United States become more competitive as a business location, boosting exports and creating higher-paying jobs for Americans. The second implication is diplomatic. Again assuming Congress does not torpedo the deal, which seems unlikely, the TPP shows that U.S. global leadership is alive and well. The United States more or less by itself choreographed the conclusion of the agreement--it was no coincidence that the critical final two ministerial meetings were both held in this country, in Hawaii and Atlanta. And it did so by working closely with multiple partners--Japan and Mexico on the rules for auto trade, Vietnam and Malaysia on labor rights, Australia on data protection for biologic drugs, New Zealand and Canada on dairy trade. There will be dissenters on the compromises reached in each of these sensitive areas, but pulling them together was an impressive feat of negotiation. Such a success will serve the United States well in future international negotiations, by demonstrating that Washington can still set ambitious targets and reach them. Finally, the conclusion of the TPP should create the conditions for a new push to enhance international economic cooperation--and on terms that favor the United States. The conclusion of TPP will light a fire under the Europeans to speed up the slow-moving negotiations on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). With the conclusion of those two deals, nearly two-thirds of all U.S. trade would be covered by free trade arrangements. Perhaps more importantly, it will force some difficult decisions on the big emerging economies that have benefited so much from growing global trade but have been reluctant to open their own markets and enforce fair rules for trade and investment. China in particular, which has been turning more inward under President Xi Jingping, will face a tough choice on whether to stick to its own lackluster collection of trade agreements or try to make the reforms needed to join the TPP. India too faces a similar decision if it wants to accelerate its drive to become a manufacturing center. The open architecture of the TPP, which invites membership by any country in the region that agrees to accept its terms, will be a bargaining chip held by the United States and its allies for many years. The TPP deal took nearly a decade to come to fruition, and it is not quite done yet. But big things are hard to do. And with the TPP, the United States has shown that it still has the capacity to do them.
  • India
    Zero Rating: Are We In Danger of Killing the Goose Before Knowing If Its Eggs Are Golden?
    Helani Galpaya is CEO of LIRNEasia, a pro-poor, pro-market think tank working on ICT and infrastructure regulatory and policy issues in the Asia Pacific. You can follow her @helanigalpaya. Bringing Internet access to the developing world is a big challenge. While significant strides have been made over the past few years, four billion people still lack Internet access. The concept of zero rating (ZR) has emerged as a potential, if controversial, solution to the challenge. Here’s how ZR works and what the fuss is about. Like users in North America and Europe, most people in Asia and Africa consume mobile Internet on a capped and metered basis. There’s a set volume of data they subscribe to and anything above the data cap is paid for separately, often at a premium. Carriers have begun to allow mobile Internet subscribers to consume content that doesn’t count towards their data cap. That’s ZR. Telecom operators offer different flavors. Users subscribing to a basic data package are offered unlimited consumption of certain ZR content, or they are offered ZR content for a price much lower than other content. In all cases, users pay standard data rates when they access anything other than the ZR content, making ZR content more affordable. Facebook, Whatsapp, and music apps are commonly found in ZR bundles. In the case of Facebook, a text-only version may be zero-rated, but viewing videos or clicking on links outside of Facebook incurs charges. For the user it’s an opportunity to consume their favorite content for free or for a much lower price. For telcos and content providers, it’s an opportunity to entice users to experience the Internet, specific content, or app in the short term, with the hope of converting them to “full paying” subscribers in the long term. Many offering ZR content claim altruistic motives. Facebook’s Internet.org platform (recently renamed Free Basics), for example, gives a package of content (usually video-free Facebook, and depending on the country and operator, a bundle of apps that may include one or more maternal health, weather, and ecommerce apps). Like most of Asia, less than 20 percent of Indians are online. Many might say that an initiative seeking to make the Internet affordable to all can only be a good thing. Yet Internet.org faced enormous criticism earlier this year in India where many argued that the service violates the Indian government’s proposed net neutrality rules. Flipkart.com, the Indian equivalent of Amazon, news providers NDTV and Times of India, online travel agent Cleartrip and others pulled out of the platform to avoid controversy. Well-meaning net neutrality advocates fear that people who start using the Internet through a Facebook-provided service will stay inside Facebook without experiencing the rest of the Internet. This is indeed a concern, but it is not tied to ZR. People have been observed limiting their online usage to Facebook in Asia and Africa as far back as 2011. There is no evidence yet that this increased after ZR is offered. Net neutrality advocates also fear that throttling content outside the walled garden will create a two-tiered Internet, a faster tier for the zero-rated content and a slower tier for all other content. Users in Asia already get lower-than-advertised broadband speeds, so this would indeed be a problem. Regulators can get around this by monitoring speeds and making data public, allowing subscribers to vote with their feet. They can also require Internet providers be transparent about how they manage their traffic. Asian markets are highly competitive, with most retail markets having six or more mobile broadband operators in addition to one or two fixed broadband solutions. Regulators will also need to monitor the market to ensure competition, particularly to avoid exclusive contracts between a telco and one content provider that prevents another provider with similar content from being zero-rated.  Instead of banning ZR, regulators in Asia can use regulatory nudges to adjust the market. There is little systematic evidence so far that ZR harms competition in highly competitive retail markets. That doesn’t mean there won’t be. On the other hand, a nationally representative sample survey in Myanmar shows that when telcos offer content for free and users are aware of the fact, adoption is high. 49 percent of users whose telecom operator offered Facebook via a ZR plan started using it, (compared to a national average of 20 percent for any social media app including Facebook), 8 percent used a ZR version of Wikipedia (compared to a 5 percent national average), and 20 percent downloaded music and ring tones. Survey respondents came from households that were rich as well as poor. ZR appears to drive people to consume online content. In the end, the best defense against the possible downsides of ZR is high levels of competition at all parts of the broadband value chain—content, application, devices, international connectivity—not just in retail mobile connectivity. Given the low capacity of many regulatory institutions in Asia, it probably makes sense for regulators to focus on creating a competitive environment and let the ZR battle play out, while being ready to act if actual harm occurs. If regulators insist on acting to enforce net neutrality policies, they could take other actions, such as making ZR offerings time-limited or mandating the first click outside of the walled garden also be zero-rated. Banning ZR products outright could leave millions of the poorest disconnected with no actual benefit. What’s the point of net neutrality if nobody is online?
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Where have all the young men gone?
    This is a guest post by Mohamed Jallow, an Africa watcher, following politics and economic currents across the continent. He works at RTI International in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. I received a frantic phone call recently from a family member living in New York City. She was inquiring whether I knew anyone who could help, or any way for, a young seventeen-year-old migrant (her younger brother), stranded in Ecuador to come to the United States. I was lost for words. Do African migrants go to Ecuador? How in the world did he end up there? This is the reality facing parents in many West African countries. Throngs of young men are heading North, for a chance to make it to Europe, or anywhere else with better economic prospects. Many are fleeing conflicts and political repression, while many more are fleeing poverty and unemployment. The journey to the North, however, is fraught with danger. Thousands have died just this year in the Mediterranean, and the death toll is set to beat the record from last year. All this is if they make it through the Sahara desert alive----teeming with bandits, and now Islamic militants. As for the young man who is stranded in Ecuador (I will call him Bangalie), his odyssey started a few months ago when he left the Gambia for the Bahamas, purportedly enroute to the United States without the proper documentation. His family was lured into shelling out about $5,000 of life savings to what I will consider a swindler who promised to help him and five others get into the United States. The journey began in Dakar, Senegal, to Spain and then on to Bahamas where the person leading them disappeared because they could not come up with more money. From the Bahamas, they headed to Quito, Ecuador with hopes of travelling from there to the US through Central America. News of young people moving to the US and seeking asylum had reached them, and they were prepared to try their chances, but the uproar over migrant children in the U.S. has thwarted their plans. As of this posting, he is still in Ecuador, still waiting for a chance to make it to the United States. This is what is known in the Gambia as “the back way.” That is going to Babylon (Europe, America, or anywhere else out of the continent) through illegal and often dangerous means, risking everything, not least their lives. The Gambia, a tiny sliver of a country in West Africa is one of the most affected by outward migration. Whole towns are being emptied of their young men on their way to Europe or America. In some communities, there are very few young men left to work in the farms. Babylon seems to be the major pre-occupation. Conversely, for a good number of the population, migrant remittances from those who manage to make it are a mainstay of economic survival. For others, it is a rite of passage for young men to go out into the world to seek their fortunes. My father and his cohorts were among the first wave of migrants in the 1960s and 1970s that left the Gambia for in Sierra Leone during the diamond boom in that country. The difference this time is that the migrants are younger, and are headed north, much farther north-----to Europe. If the Atlantic was narrower, they most certainly will cross it to the United States. As it turns out, even the vast Atlantic, as in the case of Bangalie, cannot stop those who are willing to give up everything for a better future. For the parents, there is anguish, and then there are mixed feeling. While many will certainly benefit from the remittances of those who make it, they have no clue of what awaits these young men, or the horrors of a journey fraught with uncertainty. As a result, they become willing participants, often draining their life savings, and entrusting their children to people smugglers, and criminals. Even the US embassy in the Gambia has recently gotten involved in the effort to deter young men from leaving through the backway. The embassy sponsored a concert last year with performances in local languages “to sensitize the public” about the dangers facing their children. As far back as I can remember, the constant ebbs and flows of migrants, flowing with the economic currents to a place a little better than their countries, have shaped this part of the world. In the past, these young men would have gone to the larger urban centers or neighboring countries for work. However, the global economic downturn, and the lack of opportunities in these neighboring countries has shifted the tide northwards. So what is being done to stop the flow of migrants like the young man in Ecuador? Nothing much, at least, nothing with significant impact to change minds. West African governments have raised alarms, but they cannot offer anything meaningful for these young men to start a life in their own countries. Regionally, there is no mechanism in place to address this issue as a collective, just as European governments are struggling to come up with a cohesive plan. Meanwhile, these young people continue to leave, and are willing to do anything, to pay any price for a chance to make it to their Babylon. Many will make it, and many more will perish in the Mediterranean, or languish for years in detention centers in Italy and France, or prisons in Libya, and Algeria. In this case, faraway Ecuador.
  • Development
    This Week in Markets and Democracy: Sustainable Development Goals Adopted
    The biggest achievement of the past week’s United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York was the adoption of a new fifteen-year plan for global development. Replacing the soon-to-expire Millennium Development Goals, seventeen new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will guide UN and domestic development policies through 2030 with an ambitious, and some say overly idealistic agenda. Based on UN member and civil society input over a three-year process, the final set of SDGs aims to eliminate hunger, reduce inequality, promote shared economic growth, and “end poverty in all its forms everywhere.” President Obama, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, and Pope Francis all endorsed the new “global goals” during the three-day UN Sustainable Development Summit held in the run-up to UNGA. Here are two major takeaways from the summit: The Global Goal of Good Governance One of the more controversial global goals is SDG 16, which promotes inclusive, accountable institutions and includes twelve specific targets on anti-corruption, representative decision-making, access to information, and the rule of law. With a UN-led global survey of over eight million people ranking governance as a top priority (the second most popular answer in low-income countries), leaders incorporated it into the SDGs despite “adamant resistance.” While many, including U.S. policymakers, support the citizen-led goal, others point to the ambiguity over what “good governance” means, owing to differing perceptions between developed countries and poorer ones. Further, defining and measuring corruption remains difficult, with no standardized cross-country metrics. While polling data propelled governance onto the SDG agenda, citizen participation may also determine whether goal 16’s accountability objectives are achieved. Financing the Global Goals The SDGs now set, the development community must find ways to pay for them as costs are estimated to run $3 trillion a year or more. With private capital as a growing funding source—foreign direct investment (FDI) outpaced government-led assistance by about five times last year—the UN and domestic donor agencies embraced multinationals during the summit. A “UN Private Sector Forum” convened business leaders including Unilever’s Paul Polman, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, and MasterCard’s Tim Murphy with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Oxfam International’s Winne Byanyima to discuss SDG priorities. Many pitched a win-win “business for good” model that stimulates domestic economic growth and cuts poverty while expanding the customer base. Yet others highlighted the limits of private investment—UNGA President Mogens Lykketoft pointed to the failure of big corporations and wealthy individuals to pay taxes. Next week rich countries may advance this conversation with new international rules to govern multinationals.